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ABSTRACT

AN ETHICAL JUSTIFICATION FOR POST-TRIAL ACCESS TO ANTIRETROVIRAL DRUGS FOR PARTICIPANTS AND HOST POPULATIONS IN
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES: A GLOBAL JUSTICE PERSPECTIVE

By
Evaristus Chiedu Obi, MA, MSW, MPA
December 2014

Dissertation supervised by Gerard Magill, PhD
The pandemic nature of HIV/AIDS in developing countries engenders global
health emergency which establishes the urgent need to address the issue of affordable
access to anti-retroviral drugs in developing countries. The dissertation discusses an
ethical justification for post-trial access to anti-retroviral drugs for participants and host
populations in developing countries within the context of global justice, stressing the
combination of national and global responsibilities in realizing this objective. Drawing on
the strengths of Rawls’s statist and Pogge’s cosmopolitan theories and on the
International Human Rights Law, the dissertation proposes a paradigm of Global Health
Justice involving a sliding scale of national and global responsibilities for the realization
of the right to health in general and access to drugs in particular.
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Every nation has the primary responsibility for realizing the right to health,
including affordable access to drugs for its citizens. However, poor nations that have
demonstrated their best efforts by spending at least 3% of their average Gross Domestic
Product (GDP) on national health should be assisted in realizing this objective by the
global community.
International human rights law was argued as providing a theoretical framework
for national and global responsibilities for realizing the core obligations that stem from
socio-economic rights and for addressing global health inequalities. The obligation to
provide international assistance in realizing the minimum essential level of the right to
health which includes access to drugs was argued as imperative.
The dissertation proposes an international agency such as Global Health Fund for
the distribution of health-related goods that would rectify the injustice stemming from the
current global system. Expanding the mandate of the current Global Fund to fight AIDS,
Tuberculosis and Malaria in order to include interventions for other diseases as well as
addressing the weakness of the public health systems in developing countries was
proposed as a good start for establishing the Global Health Fund. An effective Global
Health Fund rooted in the concept of financial sustainability would significantly enhance
the realization of the right to health and affordable access to drugs, including antiretroviral drugs for participants and host populations in developing countries.
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CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION: ETHICAL ISSUES IN GLOBAL HEALTH INEQUALITIES AND
GLOBAL HEALTH RESEARCH
A. Introductory Comments: The Context of the Debate
The pandemic nature of HIV/AIDS in developing countries results in global
health emergency which creates the urgent need to address the issue of affordable access
to anti-retroviral drugs in developing countries. The dissertation focuses on the ethical
justification of post-trial access to anti-retroviral drugs for participants and host
populations in developing countries by combining national and international
responsibilities in realizing this objective. The dissertation argues for a paradigm
involving a sliding scale of national and global responsibilities for the right to health in
general and access to drugs in particular.
The implication is that every nation has the primary responsibility for providing
affordable access to drugs for its citizens. However, when developing countries exhaust
their domestic resources and still are not able to provide affordable access to drugs for its
citizens, developed countries should intervene to exercise their global responsibilities in
realizing this objective. Providing affordable access to drugs in developing countries is
defended in this dissertation within the context of realizing the minimum essential level
of the right to health which includes access to drugs.
Global inequality in health and wealth between developed and developing
countries continue to be a challenge for the global community. No place is this inequality
felt more than in the catastrophic impact of HIV/AIDS in developing countries, where
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those living with HIV/AIDS lacked access to anti-retroviral drugs. Global health crisis
created by HIV/AIDS results in many clinical trials in developing countries in search of
anti-retroviral drugs for combating the disease. Some of the clinical trials conducted in
developing countries were marred by allegations of violation of rights of research
participants and host populations.
A related issue discussed by some scholars was the availability of successful
products, e.g. anti-retroviral drugs at the end of clinical trials.1 In spite of the fact that the
industrialized world shoulders very few research burdens, it enjoys most research benefits
because, unlike the developing world it can buy a proven intervention. On the other hand,
poor inhabitants of developing countries who serve as research subjects assume the vast
burdens of research but rarely share economic reach of both research subjects and their
governments.2 The problem of affordable access to anti-retroviral drugs in developing
countries has been exacerbated by Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights
Agreement (TRIPS) and TRIPS-plus measures. TRIPS agreement and TRIPS-plus
measures ensure strong patent protection which drive up the price of drugs through
monopoly pricing system and block generic alternatives.3 Forman notes, “The price
impact of excluding access to generic medicines is particularly acute, since generic
competition is a critical factor in reducing drug prices.”4 Trade agreements currently
being negotiated by United States and other western governments may severely limit
production of generic drugs which is considered the primary source of affordable
medications in developing countries.5
A related issue regarding the problem of affordable access to anti-retroviral drugs
in developing countries was discussed by some authors as the demand factors that
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influence access to HIV/AIDS drugs in Africa.6 Schuklenk and Ashcroft observe that on
the demand side that the health care infrastructure needed to make use of these drugs
effectively is lacking in developing countries.7 Three factors were identified as impeding
affordable access to anti-retroviral drugs in developing countries, highly strong legal
protection of patents, lack of or slow third world government focus on the crisis and
economic programs that have largely reduced funding for public health.8
However, some scholars advocate for the social responsibility of pharmaceutical
companies as a way of dealing with the affordable access issue.9 Private donation of
drugs, differential pricing, price reductions, prior agreements, public-private partnerships
and manufacture of generic copies of patented drugs and compulsory licensing were
highlighted as strategies for dealing with affordable access to anti-retroviral drugs in
developing countries.10 Private donations, differential pricing and price reductions are
improvised solutions that merely rely on the generosity of pharmaceutical companies and
they do not go far enough in dealing with affordable access to anti-retroviral drugs in
developing countries. These strategies are considered substandard in both preventing
avoidable death and in relation to the sustainability of the policy and the recognition of
the social responsibilities of companies and states.11 Compulsory licensing is considered
more effective because it helps the countries to fulfill the duty of meeting the health
needs of their populations in national health emergencies.
The debate for the affordable access to anti-retroviral drugs in developing
countries has been dominated by two approaches, John Rawls’s statist approach and
Thomas Pogge’s cosmopolitan approach. Rawls’s statist approach relies on humanitarian
assistance from the perspective of global justice to provide affordable access to drugs in
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developing countries. In contrast, Pogge’s cosmopolitan approach adopts a much more
international perspective to global justice to justify access to anti-retroviral drugs in
developing countries. The dissertation introduces a paradigm which combines Rawls’s
national responsibilities and Pogge’s emphasis on international responsibilities for global
justice to address the ethical problem of affordable access to anti-retroviral drugs in
developing countries. The discussion on ethical justification for post-trial access to antiretroviral drugs for participants and host populations in developing countries begins with
the issue of global health inequalities.

B. Global Health Inequalities
1. Global Health Inequalities between Developed and Developing Countries
The global inequality in health is morally alarming. The gap between developed
and developing countries is increasingly widening. A child’s birth either in a developed
country or a developing country determines the life’s chances and opportunities of the
child.12 Ruger acknowledges wide and growing global health inequalities in relation to
life expectancies and child mortality rates between developed and developing countries.
For example, a child born today in Afghanistan is 75 times as likely to die by age 5 years
as a child born in Singapore. Furthermore, in Africa the number of children at risk of
dying is 35% higher today than it was 10 years ago.13 The global health inequalities exist
between developed and developing countries in several areas, health outcomes, supply of
health care services and funding of such services by public and private agents.14 We will
examine some aspects of global health inequalities, inequalities of life and death between
countries and causes of death and disability.
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1a. Inequalities of life and death between countries
The global burden of disease is disproportionately borne by developing countries,
which has resulted in significant different health outcomes between developed and
developing countries.15 An abundance of data exists that shows vast disparities in life
expectancy, child mortality, adult mortality and maternal mortality among rich and poor
countries. Average life expectancy in Africa is nearly 30 years less than in the Americas
or Europe.16 World Health Organization reports vast disparity in average life expectancy
between inhabitants of Africa, America and Europe. The disparity is also significant
between the rich and the poor relative to the number of years of healthy life.17 Life
expectancy in Zimbabwe or Swaziland is less than half that in Japan.18 WHO reports that
“A person born in Zimbabwe can hope to live only to age thirty-four for men or thirtythree for women, whereas a person born in Japan is expected to live to age seventy-nine
for men or eighty-six for women.”19 A child born in Angola is 65 times more likely to die
in the first few years of life than a child born in Norway.20 A woman giving birth in subSaharan Africa is 100 times more likely to die in labor than a woman in a rich country.21
Although life expectancy has increased in developed countries in the past five decades, it
has been decreasing in developing countries.22 Infectious disease epidemics, especially
HIV/AIDS which kills over 5,800 African, but only 49 North Americans, each day,23 and
increased chronic disease have been instrumental in the decline of life expectancy in
developing countries.24
Other key health status indicators that are used to measure the global health
inequalities are child mortality rate or under five mortality rate and infant mortality rate.
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Child mortality rate or under five mortality is “the probability that a newborn baby will
die before reaching age five, expressed as a number per 1000 live births.”25 This rate
varies to a great extent with the wealth of a country. In developed countries the rate is
about 20 per 1000 live births, while, in developing countries the rate can be as high as
170 per 1000 live births, as in the African region of the World Health Organization
(WHO).26 In many developing countries, child mortality rates can be twenty-five to thirty
times higher than the rate in developed countries.27 Statistics available indicate that of the
10.8 million children under five who die each year, 10 million are from low-income
countries more- than twice the number of children born annually in the United States and
Canada combined.28 Infant mortality rate which is another health status indicator is the
“the number of deaths of infants under age 1 per 1000 live births in a given year.”29 The
infant mortality rate varies largely with the income status of a country.30 Some of the
poor countries, such as Niger, have infant mortality rates as high as 150 infants deaths for
every 1000 live births, whereas Sweden has only about 3 infants for every 1000 live
births.31 Data provided by the World Bank on the global health gap between the rich and
the poor indicates that in one year alone, 14 million of the poorest people in the world
died, while only 4 million would have died if this population had the same death rate as
the global rich.32
The health gap between developed and developing countries is consistently
increasing. In richer nations, the population is increasingly healthy and living longer,
while in the least developed countries, the population is getting sicker and dying
younger.33 In countries with the highest child and adult mortality rates, people suffer
multiple deprivations when compared with their low-mortality counterparts. They are
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four times more likely to live on less than one dollar per day, have twice the female
illiteracy rate, and a twenty-fold for adults or sixty-five fold for children difference in per
capita health spending.34

1b. Causes of Death and Disability
The causes of death and disability differ significantly between developing and
developed countries. Leading causes of death and disability in developed countries are
chronic, non-communicable diseases because they have technologies to prevent and treat
most communicable diseases.35 Gwatkin and Guillot write, “Among the global rich, all of
the top five causes of death and of disability-adjusted life year (DALY) losses are noncommunicable diseases, with ischaemic heart disease and malignant neoplasms at or near
the top.”36 The DALY is defined as a measure of premature deaths and losses due to
illness and disabilities in a population. A DALY measures the number of healthy years of
life lost between the population being measured and the healthiest possible population.37
On the other hand, communicable diseases are the leading causes of death and
disability in developing countries.38 Infections defy geographical boundaries especially in
an age of advanced innovation in transportation which makes for easy transmission of
infectious agents.39 In developing countries, chronic diseases are also becoming more
widespread, thus, producing a double burden of disease.40 In poor developing countries,
communicable diseases account for majority of deaths (58.6 percent) and DALY loss
(63.6 percent).41 Similarly, non-communicable diseases are responsible for more than
half the disease burden in low and middle income countries.42 However, in rich
developed countries, communicable diseases are responsible for 7.7 percent of all deaths
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and 10.9 percent of DALY loss.43 We will examine the preventable and treatable diseases
prevalent in developing countries usually classified as diseases of poverty.

1c. Diseases of Poverty
Infectious diseases of poverty are defined as “an umbrella term used to describe a
number of diseases which are known to be more prevalent among poorer populations,
rather than a definitive group of diseases.”44 It is a concept that acknowledges the need to
focus on the poor and vulnerable, which have less power to intervene. A good number of
such diseases are regarded as “neglected tropical diseases”, as defined by WHO.45
Griffiths and Zhou acknowledge that many other infectious diseases have not been high
on the global agenda except tuberculosis, malaria and HIV/AIDS.46 Diseases such as
diarrhea, elephantiasis, guinea worm, malaria, measles, river blindness, schistosomiasis,
and trachoma are largely unheard of in rich countries, but in contrast are leading causes
of sickness and death in poor countries.47
Data shows that diseases of poverty are responsible for 54% of deaths in highmortality poor countries, compared with 6.2% of deaths in high-income countries.48
Diseases of poverty are as well leading causes of child mortality in poor countries.49
Eighty-five percent of the 2.1 million deaths each year from diarrheal disease are in lowincome countries, primarily among infants.50
A large proportion of diseases in low-income countries are preventable and
treatable with current medicines or interventions.51 A clear majority of the disease burden
in low- income countries is rooted in the consequences of poverty, such as poor nutrition,
indoor air pollution and lack of access to proper sanitation and health education.52
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Malaria can be prevented through various interventions, spraying dwellings with DDT,
using insecticide treated mosquito nets and taking prophylactic medicines such as
mefloquine, doxycycline and malorone.53 Tuberculosis can be prevented with improved
nutrition and treatment with DOTS therapy. About 95% of infectious patients in poor
countries can be detected and cured.54 Education is necessary for the prevention of
HIV/AIDS and this requires involvement of civil society. Combining anti-retroviral drugs
and good nutrition can help in controlling the viral load and suppressing the symptoms of
HIV/AIDS.55 Macklin highlights the staggering figures of HIV infection in Africa and
India, but, with very limited access to anti-retroviral drugs for a very few population in
those countries and most other developing countries with exception of Brazil. On the
other hand, most HIV infected individuals in United States and other industrialized
countries are treated.56 Vast inequalities between poor and rich countries relative to
access to health care and essential drugs are clear indications of increasing global health
inequalities.
Apart from affecting morbidity and premature mortality of populations in poor
regions of the world, the diseases of poverty also result in physical anguish.57 People who
suffer from these diseases are often stigmatized and ostracized from the society.58
Diseases of poverty impose a heavy health and economic burdens on poor populations in
Africa, Asia and Latin America.59 For example, malaria which is one of the leading
causes of mortality in children under five years of age in Africa accounts for 40% of
public health expenditure in areas with high malaria transmission.60 These diseases
perpetuate the cycle of poverty by decreasing earning ability and economic
productivity.61 Griffiths and Zhou articulate, “Lost labor time due to illness often means a
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reduction in household capacity to earn income, particularly at a time when the household
needs additional money to pay for treatment.”62 The social and economic conditions of
poor populations support poverty which can affect health status and health outcomes
either directly or indirectly.

2. Social Determinants of Health Inequalities
The commission on social determinants of health recognizes that the global
burden of disease and the major causes of health inequalities, which are found in all
countries, stem from the conditions in which people are born, grow, live, work and age.63
Daniels also articulates, “Health is produced not just by having access to medical
prevention and treatment but also, to a measurably great extent by the cumulative
experience of social conditions across the life course.”64 These conditions are generally
referred to as social determinants of health including early year’s experiences, education,
economic status, employment and decent work, housing and environment, and effective
systems of preventing and treating ill health.65
Social disadvantages are linked with inequalities in socio-economic status,
gender, ethnicity and geographical area.66 On the other hand, social advantages result
from socio-economic development, and are associated with cultural, political and
historical factors. They are natural and “built in” environments as well as public
policies.67 In a nutshell, the structural determinants and conditions of daily life form the
social determinants of health as well as account for a substantial part of health
inequalities between and within countries.68
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2a. Health and Socio-economic Status
Many studies have documented a strong correlation between health outcomes and
socio-economic status. Daniels describes each increment up the socioeconomic hierarchy
as associated with improved health outcomes.69 Gostin also articulates, “If residence in a
poor country significantly increases a person’s risk of illness and premature death, it is
only more disadvantageous to be a member of a low-income, low-status population in
that country.”70 Poverty and ill-health are regarded as interwoven. Poor countries are
usually predicted to have worse health outcomes than better-off countries. There is also a
prediction that within countries, poor people have worse health outcomes than better-off
people.71 However, the wealth of a country does not solely determine the health outcomes
of the particular country. There are other mediating factors certainly involved. For
example, Costa Rica’s life expectancy is nearly the same as that of the United States,
despite about $21,000 large difference between the Gross Domestic Product per capita
(GDPpc) for Costa Rica and the United States.72 Daniels et al. contend that factors such
as culture, social organization, and government policies contribute significantly to the
determination of population health, and that variations in these factors go a great length
to explain the differences in health outcomes between nations.73
Strong epidemiological evidence shows that individuals of low socioeconomic status live
much shorter and less healthy lives than individuals of high socio-economic status.74
There is a consensus among numerous authors that the level of economic inequality in a
society adversely affects population health.75 The implication is that societies with wide
inequalities between rich and poor tend to have worse health status than societies with
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smaller inequalities after controlling for per capita income.76 Scholars who give credence
to this line of thought argue that social justice is good for our health.77
Disparities in socioeconomic status show differently in both developed and
developing countries. For example, in United States, “Persons of poverty, non-white race,
and or menial position are more likely to experience significant health problems decades
before their more privileged fellow citizens.”78 In developing countries, health and
longevity of individuals are severely affected if they are poorer, less valued and less
powerful.79
Furthermore, vulnerable populations consisting of women, children and
indigenous persons in developing countries are less healthy than their counterparts.
Women have very limited control over their social, political and economic lives, which
are best indicators of poor health.80 Such living conditions result in worse health
outcomes for women. For example, in Angola, the maternal mortality ratio is 1,700
deaths per 100,000 live births, compared with 7 deaths in Switzerland.81 HIV infection
rates in sub-Saharan Africa are 5-16 times higher among young girls than boys.82
Women’s physical health and mental health are also affected by gender-based violence
such as rapes, forced pregnancies and sexual assaults.83 In developing countries, children
experience worse health outcomes than in developed countries. For example, in
developing countries, 33 out of 1,000 infants die during the neonatal period, compared
with 4 out of 1,000 in developed countries.84 Studies have also shown that “indigenous
groups historically have faced worse health outcomes due to low socioeconomic status
(SES) and marginalization within states and communities.”85
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Discrimination against various racial, ethnic or religious groups in both
developing and developed countries usually has severe social and health consequences.
For example, in Bulgaria, the life expectancy of the Roma people at any age is five to six
years below the rest of the population, while their infant mortality rate is six times the
national average.86 Among the non-Tagalog speaking population of the Philippines, child
mortality rates were 33 percent above those of Tagalog speakers. Child mortality rates for
non-Christians were 47 percent above those of Christians.87 In Latin America, the
prevalence of child diarrhea and maternal mortality is much higher among indigenous
people than among non-indigenous.88 In United States, “the life expectancy of AfricanAmericans in the District of Columbia is 63 years, compared with 80 years for whites in
neighboring Montgomery county Maryland.89 We will further examine the components
of Socio-Economic Status (SES) including income, education and social class, and how
they affect health outcomes differently in both developing and developed countries.

I.

Relative Income and Health
Studies have shown that there is a correlation between the income distribution
in a society and the level of health achievement of its members.90 Succinctly put, “It
is not just the size of the economic pie but how the pie is shared that matters for
population health.91 Variations in life expectancy between countries were associated
with income distributions. Countries with more equal income distributions have
higher life expectancies than countries with lesser income distributions. For example,
Japan and Sweden have higher life expectancies than U.S. that has higher GDP per
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capita.92 Countries with lower GDP per capita, such as Costa Rica also enjoy high life
expectancy due to a more equitable income distribution.93
Individual mortality rates are also associated with income distributions.94
Wilkinson describes far reaching impact of income on mortality.95 For example, a
study “estimated that a move from household income of $20,000-$30,000 to a
household income greater than $70,000 was associated with a halving of the odds of
adult mortality.”96
Parental income has strong effects on children’s health. Family income is
clearly associated with various measures of child health.97 The association continues
to be large after controlling for household composition, race, parental education, and
parental labor force status.98 Health, on the other hand has an effect on income and
wealth. “Health improves one’s ability to participate in the labor market and earn a
decent wage.”99 Illness increases spending on health and consequently reduces
wealth. The negative effect of poor health on income and on wealth accounts for the
correlation between financial resources and health especially among adults.100

II.

Education and Health
Education plays a central role in any discussion and analyses of the SES-health

gradient. Educational attainment has been used as the primary indicator of SES.101
Education is a significant determinant of health for several reasons. “First, it brings with
it knowledge of good health practices. Second, it provides opportunities for gaining
skills, getting better employment, raising one’s income, and enhancing one’s social
status, all of which are also related to health.”102
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Studies show that the best predictor of the birth weight of a baby is the mother’s
level of educational attainment.103 There is a strong and positive correlation between the
level of education and all key health indicators.104 For example, in United States more
educated individuals report better health and suffer lower mortality risk.105 Birn points
out that people who are better educated have lower levels of infectious diseases and noncommunicable diseases such as hypertension, emphysema, diabetes, anxiety and
depression. They also show improved physical and mental functioning; health behaviors
such as lower rates of smoking, heavy drinking and drug use. They as well have higher
rates of exercise and better management of stress and chronic health conditions.106
The implication is that more educated individuals engage in more healthy behaviors
because they are more informed. They are more inclined to comply with prescribed
therapies and to utilize modern medical technologies to deal with their health
problems.107 Furthermore, studies have shown that education affects cognition, which
invariably affects the ability to process information relative to healthy behaviors.108
Studies also support that health affects education.109 For example, in Britain, adolescents
who were born with low birth weight or suffered health insults in childhood have worse
schooling outcomes.110 In developing countries, children with poor health have worse
schooling outcomes.
Access to education and quality of education are significantly compromised in
developing countries. Millions of children are excluded from formal education due to
costly fees involved. Investing on education for girls is endangered when families prefer
to have them focus more on household work rather than pay their school fees. The
perception that boys benefit more from education also constitutes an impediment in

15

educating girls. In many countries, deregulation and decrease in social sector spending
result in a marked decline in the quality of education. Furthermore, factors such as high
rates of migration to developed countries, civil conflict and HIV/AIDS have destroyed in
recent decades the ranks of educators in some settings.111 There are indications that those
developing countries that invest heavily in human capital, for example in education, have
better health outcomes. In developing countries, adult literacy is one of the best
predictors of life expectancy.112

III.

Social Class and Health
Individuals attain social class through their educational attainment and their levels

of income and wealth. Cutler et al., articulate, “Education, income, and wealth
characterize individuals who are separated from the society in which they live.”113 There
is a positive correlation between an individual’s position in a social hierarchy and better
health outcomes. Individuals of greater wealth and education enjoy better health for a
greater extent, because of the individual’s position in a social hierarchy not because of
some process affecting the individuals in isolation.114
The Whitehall studies of British civil servants report that civil servants with lower
prestige jobs experience higher rates of mortality from cardiovascular causes.115 The
studies report variations in behavior patterns based on the rank of the civil servants. For
example, higher ranking officials show a lower obesity rate, a lower tendency to smoke
and higher propensities to exercise and eat fruits and vegetables.116 The rank or position
in employment is positively associated with a sense of control over one’s health and
one’s work, job satisfaction, social support, and the absence of stressful life events.117
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Apart from sources of international health inequalities that focus on disparities in global
disease burden between developing and developed countries and marked variations in
status, we will further explore other factors such as international practices that undermine
the population health of developing nations.

2b. International Practices Affecting the Health of Developing Nations.
Benatar identifies increasing poverty in most parts of the world as a primary
factor preventing sustainable control of population growth, which invariably threatens
physical and mental health as the necessary conditions for a decent human life and global
survival.118 He further traces the current global inequalities in health status and access to
health care to poverty in developing countries resulting from the world expenditures on
military goods and services.119 As at 1990, “the world spends almost $1 trillion a year on
military goods and services.”120 Developed countries spend an average of 5.4% of their
Gross National Product (GNP) on the military and a meager 0.3% on aid to developing
countries.121 Similarly, United States spend 0.15% of its GNP on defense support for
Egypt, Israel, Turkey, Parkistan and the Philippines.122 Militarization and the associated
militarism have been identified as compromising the health of individuals and nations in
a variety of ways including killing, maiming, torture, refugeeism, destruction of
livelihoods, diversion of resources, crime, terrorism, black markets, poverty, starvation,
environmental damage, and destabilization within developing countries.123
Modern international economic policies and market driven health care also
contributed to the poverty in developing countries, which undermines the population
health. Some scholars describe the impact of such economic policies as removal of great
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quantities of material and human resources from poor developing countries to rich
industrialized nations.124 The debt burden of developing countries threatens the health of
those nations. In 1990, total developing country world debt was $1.3 trillion, that is,
double the level in 1980, and it had grown further to $1.9 trillion by 1995.125 International
lenders such as World Bank (WB) and International Monetary Fund (IMF) imposed
structural adjustment programs on developing countries as a condition for lending money
to them. The implication is that these poor countries were forced to embark on severe cut
back on their publicly funded health systems and to take other necessary steps to cut
spending deficit.126 For example, in the 1990’s Cameroon adopted Structural Adjustment
Programs (SAP) measures which include suspension of health worker recruitment,
mandatory retirement at age fifty or fifty five, suspension of promotions, and reduction of
benefits.127
The brain drain of health care workers from developing to developed countries
also harms the population health. Daniel argues, “Rich countries have harmed health in
poorer ones by solving their own labor shortages of trained health care personnel by
actively and passively attracting immigrants from poorer countries.”128 Data shows that
23-34 percent of physicians in developed countries such as New Zealand, The United
Kingdom, the United States, Australia and Canada are foreign trained.129 WHO reports
that, “Over 60 percent of the doctors trained in Ghana in the 1980s emigrated
overseas.”130 International efforts to reduce poverty, lower mortality rates and treat
HIV/AIDS patients as articulated in the Millenium Development Goals (MDG) are
jeopardized by the loss of health personnel in sub-Saharan Africa.131
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The global enforcement of intellectual property rights which resulted in
impediment to access to essential drugs threatened the health of poor developing
countries. The globalized patent regime raised the prices of essential drugs that poor
patients in developing countries could not afford them. Furthermore, bilateral free trade
agreements negotiated currently by United States made the problem of access to essential
drugs worse, with the extension of 20 year patent and the suppression of generic
production of drugs. In the wake of HIV/AIDS crisis in developing countries, millions of
people have died due to the suppression of manufacture and trading of generic drugs.132

C.

Impact of HIV/AIDS on Developing Countries

1.

Data on the Scope of HIV/AIDS Epidemics
Statistics on the spread of HIV/AIDS across the countries shows an upward trend.

The Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS (UNAIDS) and WHO reported that,
an estimate of 39.4 million (35.9 million- 44.3 million) people were living with HIV at
the end of 2004. About.4.9 million (4.3 million-5.4 million) people were infected in
2004. An estimate of 3.1 million (2.8 million-3.5 million) people died of HIV/AIDS in
the past year.133 The data on the magnitude of HIV/AIDS shows that Africa has been
hardest hit by the epidemics. Sub-Saharan Africa is the worst devastated region, with
25.4 million at the end of 2004, which is an increase of one million since 2002. Sixty four
percent of all people living with HIV, that is, about two thirds are in sub-Saharan
Africa.134 Most severely affected regions are Southern and Eastern Africa. Seven
countries have an estimate of adult (15-49) HIV prevalence of 20 percent or greater:
Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia, South Africa, Swaziland, Zambia and Zimbabwe.135 Other
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countries such as Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Kenya, Malawi
and Mozambique, have adult HIV prevalence levels higher than 10 percent. 136
The onslaught of the HIV/AIDS epidemics was underestimated initially, mostly in
South Africa due to the debate on the reliability of the data. The scope and the scale of
the epidemics were undermined. Malan, a South African journalist argues that in as much
as AIDS is a serious issue for Africa, the size of the problem and its long-term effects on
society and economy have been blown out of proportion.137 The denial is made worse
when the former president of South Africa Mbeki used Malan’s perspective to argue that,
“AIDS is not a serious problem as we think.”138
The data and data collection on the full extent of HIV/AIDS are plagued by many
problems, high refusal rates, inadequate testing and reporting facilities, poor access to
individuals who were selected and lax use of numbers by the press and AIDS activists.
There were high refusal rates of people who would not be interviewed, provide
specimens or who were not contactable in both Kenya and South Africa. The data of the
prevalence of HIV in Swaziland for 2002, which stood at 38.6 percent, was loosely
presented as if 38 percent of the adult were living with HIV.139 There are indications of
limitations relative to data and data collections but the overwhelming impact of the
HIV/AIDS should not be undermined. Whiteside acknowledges the debate about the
exact number of people currently living with HIV/AIDS in South Africa, but highlights
increasing number of people being infected, continuing high prevalence and no sign of
downturn. There is also a prediction of an astronomical rise of the number of people
falling ill and dying, the number of orphans growing and a greater impact of the disease
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yet to be fully felt.140 The devastating impact of HIV/AIDS has been felt in two areas,
demographic and economic.
2.

The Demographic Impact of HIV/AIDS
The population dynamics is generally altered by unusual levels of death.

Demography focuses on populations and their dynamics. It deals with the numbers,
growth rates and structure of populations. It evaluates and predicts size and growth rates,
structure by gender and age, and important indicators like birth, death and fertility rates,
life expectancy and infant and child mortality. The demographic data is derived from two
sources, the census and vital registration statistics.141 Censuses are generally conducted in
most countries every ten years. A census is defined as the total process of collecting,
compiling, evaluating and publishing or otherwise disseminating demographic, economic
and social data pertaining at a specific time to all persons in a country or a well
delimitated part of a country.142 On the other hand, vital registration deals with
information about births, deaths and marriages. In developed countries, registration of
these events is compulsory, while, in poor developing countries these statistics may not
be recorded or collected.143
Exploring the demographic impact of HIV/AIDS presents some problems. There
is a concern that what is finally recorded regarding the impact of HIV/AIDS is an event
such as the death and its effects on household composition and dependency ratios rather
than a process. The impacts of the events culminating to the death and stemming from it
are not recorded.144 The demographic impact of HIV/AIDS does not account for the
process. Whiteside et al. write, “The impact of AIDS is felt as a process: a person begins
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to feel unwell and so, perhaps, does not grow as much food, the family has less to sell
and can’t afford to send children to school. When the person dies, the household
composition changes.”145 Another problem is that demographic indicators may focus on
nations, provinces or areas, while the impact of the epidemics may be felt more in
households and among specific groups.146 Another concern deals with demographic
changes which are measured only after several years, as in the case of census which is
usually done every ten years. The implication is that the impact of a new disease may not
be tracked in most of the national and international statistics for a very long time.147
The demographic consequences of HIV/AIDS are experienced through increased
mortality and decreased fertility in developing countries severely affected by the
epidemics.148 Furthermore, mortality increases among infected adults and those infants
infected through mother to child transmission and adults.149 The significant increase in
the death toll from HIV/AIDS in developing countries has resulted in changes to the
population structure. In South Africa, mortality of young adult women between 25 to 29
year range increased sharply by 3.5 times higher in 1999/2000 than in 1985. Mortality of
young men between 30 to 39 year range increased nearly twice in 1999/2000 when
compared to the 1985 rate.150 The rapid increase in adult mortality and child mortality in
developing countries has been attributed to HIV/AIDS epidemics. The South African data
prove convincingly that there is increased mortality in the country. AIDS is blamed in the
absence of any other reasonable explanation. In 2000, about 40 percent of adult deaths
aged 15 to 49, were attributed to HIV/AIDS. An estimate of about 25 percent of all
deaths was due to AIDS, making it single biggest cause of death.151
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The decreased fertility among childbearing age women due to HIV/AIDS
contributes to population changes. Women who are infected with HIV may have
difficulty getting pregnant and carrying a child to term, resulting in premature mortality.
There will be fewer childbearing age women, which significantly affect fertility.152 For
example, in Uganda the number of births was decreased by about 700, 000, which is
about 5.9 percent of all births that would have occurred during the last two decades.153
The astronomical increase in the number of orphans constitutes a demographic
impact as well as social and economic consequences.154 In 2003, The United Nations
Children’s Fund (UNICEF) projected that by 2010 an estimated 20 million children in
Africa will have lost one or both parents to HIV/AIDS. HIV/AIDS accounts for over 80
percent of orphans in the worst affected countries. These children suffer severe stress and
they are more likely to drop out from school and to be exploited. They may likely
experience premature mortality and as well have a more pessimistic view of life.155

3.

The Economic Impact of HIV/AIDS
A research presented at a meeting of economists at the XIII International

Conference on AIDS indicates that, “HIV/AIDS is already starting to have immense
impact on the economies of hard-hit countries, hurting not only individuals, families and
firms, but also significantly slowing economic growth and worsening poverty.”156 An
Increasing evidence shows that national wealth of the hardest hit countries of South
Africa will be reduced by 15-20 percent over the next ten years as a result of
HIV/AIDS.157 UNAIDS and World Bank press release note, “Lower economic growth
and increased poverty threaten to form a vicious cycle, in which HIV/AIDS drives many
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families into deepening poverty, and at the same time poverty accelerates the spread of
HIV.”158
There is an enormous economic impact of HIV/AIDS on households in countries
severely affected by the epidemics. The impact on the household begins to be felt
whenever a member of the household begins to suffer from HIV-related illness. The first
major impact is the loss of income of the patient who is likely the main breadwinner. This
may be followed by substantial increase of household expenditures for medical expenses.
Another ripple effect indicated is that daughters and wives of the patient may miss school
or work less in order to care for the sick person. Finally, death results in a permanent loss
of income, from less labor on the farm or from lower remittances, funeral and mourning
costs and the removal of children from school so as to save on educational expenses and
increase household labor, resulting in a severe loss of future earning potential.159 Studies
in African countries decimated by the epidemic highlight the significant burden of loss of
income, large health care expenditures and draining of savings to pay for funeral and
mourning costs.160 For example, in Ethiopia, a study of 25 AIDS-afflicted rural families
discover that the average cost of treatment, funeral and mourning expenses equaled to
several times the average household income.161 Steinberg et al., present the findings of a
survey of household in South Africa on the impoverishing nature of the HIV/AIDS
epidemic: “two thirds reported loss of income as a consequence of HIV/AIDS; half
reported not having enough food and that their children were going hungry; and almost a
quarter of all children under age 15 had already lost at least one parent.”162
HIV/AIDS has a significant impact on firms. AIDS-related illnesses and deaths to
employees affect a firm in two different ways, increasing expenditures and reducing

24

revenues. Factors that lead to increased expenditure include, health care costs, burial fees
and training and recruitment. On the other hand, factors that lead to decreased revenue
consist of absenteeism due to illness, time-off to attend funerals, time spent on training
and labor turnover. Labor turnover may result in a less experienced labor force that is less
productive.163 A study that examines several firms in Botswana and Kenya reveals that
major factors in increased labor costs were absenteeism due to HIV/AIDS and increased
burial costs.164 The increased mortality and morbidity as a result of HIV/AIDS epidemics
reduces labor supply in key sectors of the labor market. For example, in South Africa
about 60% of the mining workforce with age range of 30 and 40 years is predicted to fall
to 10% in 15 years.165 Labor productivity also reduces as a result of a long period of
illness associated with HIV/AIDS. The annual costs associated with sickness and reduced
productivity as a result of HIV/AIDS per employee ranged from $17 to $300.166 These
costs adversely affect competitiveness and profits.
The situation results in a decline to government income. Dixon et al. articulate,
“Government incomes also decline, as tax revenues fall, and governments are pressured
to increase their spending to deal with the rising prevalence of AIDS, thereby creating the
potential for fiscal crises.”167 The economic effects of HIV/AIDS which lead to lower
domestic productivity reduce exports and increase imports of expensive health care
goods. The significant decrease in export earnings and the increase in export expenditure
may result in budget crises for the government. This could result in the government
defaulting on debt repayments as well as requiring economic assistance from the
international community.168
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The macroeconomic impact of HIV/AIDS has been documented by several
studies. Studies in Tanzania, Cameroon, Zambia, Swaziland, Kenya and other subSaharan African countries discover that the rate of economic growth could be decreased
by about 25 percent over a 20 year period.169 The macroeconomic impact of HIV/AIDS
varies across countries. The impact of HIV/AIDS on the macro-economy is felt in several
areas, loss of experienced workers, reduced productivity, higher domestic production
costs, and loss of international competitiveness, lower government revenues, reduced
private savings and slower employment creation. Initially, the overall impact of AIDS on
the macro-economy is minimal, but increases significantly over time.170 Several studies
show significant effects of HIV/AIDS in some African countries. A study focusing on the
macro-economic impacts of AIDS in Zambia discover that as a result of HIV/AIDS
epidemics, the GDP would be five to ten percent lower by 2000.171 The macroeconomic
impact of AIDS in Tanzania assessed in 1991 shows that total GDP will decline by 15 to
25 percent in 2010 due to the impact of AIDS.172 A study conducted on the impact of
AIDS on the Kenyan economy projects that GDP will decrease by 14 percent in 2005
than it would have been without AIDS.173 The impact of AIDS creates a global health
emergency, since anti-retroviral drugs are not accessible to the majority of infected
individuals in developing countries.

D.

Distributive Justice in Global Research
Addressing the catastrophic impact of the HIV/AIDs in developing countries has

given rise to many clinical trials, resulting in the discovery of anti-retroviral drugs. There
are on-going debates regarding what justice requires when developed countries sponsor
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or conduct research in developing countries. Some scholars argue that global health
inequalities and the devastating impact of HIV/AIDS can be redressed through
biomedical research by providing access to anti-retroviral drugs resulting from clinical
trials.174 Concerns about justice in international clinical trials have shifted from focusing
on the exploitation of research subjects or entire population in developing countries in the
process of recruiting subjects and conducting the study to providing beneficial products at
the end of the trials.175 The Belmont report emphasizing the need for justice in research
writes, “Research should not unduly involve persons from groups unlikely to be among
the beneficiaries of subsequent applications of the research.”176

1.

The Concept of Distributive Justice in Global Research
Research in developing countries needs to fulfill the requirement of distributive

justice which mandates a fair distribution of the benefits and burdens of research.177 The
two ethical concerns in any research are identified as an imposition of undue burdens and
the absence of expected benefits. Despite the lasting concern about risks to research
subjects, a major shortcoming in research sponsored by industrialized countries and
conducted in resource-poor countries that has been recognized is the failure to share in
the benefits of research when successful products or contributions to knowledge result.178
There have been debates regarding the use of the term distributive justice for the
interactions between countries. A perspective on the issue argues that the scope of
distributive justice lies within a single country.179 The implication of this perspective is
that the fair distribution of social benefits and burdens applies only among individuals
living together in a society. A related perspective argues that distributive justice applies
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to group of collaborators in international research, regardless of any geographical
distance that separates the countries involved.180 A report published by the Institute of
Medicine of the National Academy of Sciences writes, “Beneficiaries of the research
outcomes must include people in the developing countries where the research is
conducted, as well as in the developed country that sponsors the research.”181
Researchers in developed country usually establish a relationship with their
collaborators in developing country and with the research subjects in the country where
the research is conducted. The multinational clinical research is not regarded as
interaction between countries. The research may be sponsored by several stakeholders,
governmental agencies such as the U.S. National Institute of Health (NIH), U.K. Medical
Research Council, private industry, private foundation, and international organizations
such as WHO.182
The concept of distributive justice is broad, and it covers not only social benefits
and burdens but also other benefits such as health benefits, financial benefits etc. all of
which may be regarded as social benefits.183 Macklin argues, “There is nothing inherent
in the concept of distributive justice that requires those benefits and burdens to result and
arise from a group of people living together in a society.”184 The criteria for a fair
distribution in the concept of distributive justice vary according to the context.185 For
example, equity is the core concept of fair distribution in the context of research
involving human subjects.186 “Equity requires that no one group-gender, racial, ethnic,
geographic, or socio-economic receive disproportionate benefits or bear disproportionate
burdens.”187 A glaring example of global inequity is seen in the disparity between the
distribution of the global disease burden and the allocation of research funding. Less than
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10% of global expenditures for health research by private and public sectors is devoted to
addressing 90% of the world’s burden of disease shouldered by developing countries.
This is usually called “the 10/90 gap.”188 Resnik argues that 10/90 gap exists because of
two reasons: (1) multinational pharmaceutical and biotechnology companies do not view
research and development (R&D) investments on the health problems of developing
nations to be economically advantageous; and (2) government biomedical research
agencies encounter limited pressure to allocate funds for the problems of developing
nations.189 He argues further that developed nations have a moral obligation to address
the disparities in connection to biomedical research funding. He proposes that developed
countries should establish a trust fund in the form of Global AIDS Fund to sponsor
research on the health problems of developing nations.190
Documented evidence shows that people in developing countries
disproportionately shoulder the burden of research risks without enjoying corresponding
benefits that may arise from it. Macklin articulating a similar view writes, “Residents of
developing countries lack access to the products of research carried out in their countries
if the medications are too expensive for individuals or the ministries of health to
afford.”191 Some scholars stipulate two conditions for fulfilling the requirements of
distributive justice in international research: (1) applying the same standards used in a
research conducted in the sponsoring country in the evaluation of the design and
determination of acceptable risk-benefit ratios; (2) beneficiaries of research results must
consist of people in the developing countries where the research is carried out, as well as
in the United States.192 These conditions imply that determining equity in international
clinical trials requires that not only that the research participants bear the burdens and
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benefits from the research, but also the larger community needs to have opportunity to
enjoy the successful products. Many of the HIV/AIDS clinical trials in developing
countries have encountered a similar problem, because the participants were allowed to
disproportionately bear the burden of the research without sharing equally in the benefits.
In order to resolve this issue, with emphasis on satisfying the requirement of distributive
justice, a solution has been proposed for developed countries to make a commitment to
provide an affordable access to anti-retroviral drugs to host developing countries at the
end of international clinical trials.193 The discussion of the distributive justice principle
which focuses on the fair distribution of burdens and benefits of research for participants
and the larger community draws from two different interpretations of the distributive
justice principle.

2.

Theoretical Approaches to Distributive Justice
Cooley refutes critics who attacked HIV clinical trials in developing countries

on the ground that they were not based on a distributive justice principle found in the
commentary of the Council of International Organization of Medical Sciences (CIOMS)
guidelines for international research on human subjects.194 The Guideline stipulates that
the sponsoring agency should guarantee that at the end of the trial, any successful product
will be made reasonably available to inhabitants of the underdeveloped community in
which the research was conducted. All parties involved in any research should justify and
agree to exceptions to this general requirement before engaging in the research. 195 Critics
of HIV clinical trials in developing countries argue that some researchers have violated
the distributive justice principle and consequently exploited the poor in developing
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countries, because they did not ensure that successful products developed in the trials
were made reasonably available to the community where the trials were conducted.196
Scholars offer two different interpretations of distributive justice principle with
their foundations on the opposing theories of Capitalism and Marxism.197 Cooley
explains that distributive justice requires that each social member receives a just
distribution of the benefits and burdens of society, i.e., what he or she deserves from
being a member of the society. The implication is that members of the community who
did not participate in the trial and consequently did not shoulder any burden will also
receive a huge benefit at no real cost to themselves. This interpretation cannot be based
on capitalism, for capitalist justice requires that only those who have contributed to
realizing their group’s goals may receive benefits.198 Cooley argues that an idea of
distributive justice that would require that successful products be made reasonably
available to the community or developing country that hosted the trial is “more closely
aligned with Marxism, which requires that people work according to their abilities, while
they receive according to their needs, than it does with capitalism.”199 He argues further
that critics of HIV clinical trials in developing countries employed a notion of distributive
justice that requires that goods be distributed according to need, but leaves out the part
that emphasizes that abilities should determine contributions.200 He contends that the
principle is more extreme than Marxism, because it requires no contribution from those
receiving benefits, regardless of whether or not they are able to contribute.201 He argues
that, “It is not clear that people in the country who do not receive any benefits are
exploited when they did not share the burdens to obtain the benefits, especially since both
capitalistic and Marxist justice require that they contribute in some way.”202 He argues
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further that human subjects were exploited for the benefit of non-participants who did not
contribute anything to deserve the benefits. He points out that those who do not
contribute to a research have no reasonable expectation of a benefit. They will require a
justification for such a desert in order to have a reasonable expectation of a benefit.
Simply indicating that you are a member of the community in which the research is
conducted is not adequate to enable one to get benefits.203 Cooley argues that need alone
does not justify a desert but claims that justifying a desert requires individuals to make
some contributions to the effort.204
An opposing view in the UNAIDS Guidance Document for preventive
HIV/AIDS vaccine research argues that dire human need can justify the requirement of
distributive justice. UNAIDS Guidance Document indicates that the severity of the
epidemic makes it crucial that adequate incentives exist, both through financial rewards
in the marketplace and through public subsidies to promote development of effective
vaccines while also guaranteeing that vaccines are produced and distributed in a way that
really makes them available to the population at greatest risk.205 Cooley does not defend
clinical trials conducted in developing countries on grounds of distributive justice
principle which he considers too vague and ambiguous. Rather, he defends them based on
utilitarian considerations, Kantian principle to treat people as ends in themselves and
autonomy of the subjects to choose to participate in the trials.206 Cooley argues that, “If a
medical experiment in the Third World intended to help the citizens of those areas fails
either to serve utility or not treat anyone as a mere means, it is unethical.”207
Benatar disagrees with Cooley’s utilitarian approach to clinical research in
developing countries that disregards the principle of distributive justice in CIOMS
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guidelines and describes it as superficial for several reasons.208 First, it is not proper to
overlook the extent of injustice in health and health care research. Second, the belief that
the principle of justice can be applied in a simple deductive manner, indicates lack of
acknowledgment for the nature of principles and the need for interpreting how these
should be applied in specific contexts. Third, there is a failure that the limited form of
utility proposed has been linked with exploitative practices with far reaching effects on
health and disease, and that such exploitation is perpetuated by some trials in developing
countries. Fourth, a hidden form of paternalism underlies the author’s proposals. Finally
the important notion of informed consent is applied naively to clinical trials in developing
countries.209 Benatar argues further that, “These shortcomings serve only to entrench
further a neo-liberal economic mind-set deeply inimical to the progress required to rectify
some of the widening disparities in wealth and health that characterize an increasingly
unstable world.”210
A further discussion on distributive justice for clinical trials in developing
countries explores other candidates for principle of justice or equity. A perspective
termed equity as maximization describes a notion of justice or equity that focuses on
maximizing health benefits for a population. In this context, some people regard it as selfevident that health policy should aim to produce as much health as possible for a given
population.211 Some scholars argue for maximizing principles as candidates for principles
of justice or equity. Marchand et al. point out that the basic moral assumption for
maximizing principles focuses on expressing equal respect for each person by according
the same importance to every person’s interests. The principle of equality emphasizes
that each person’s interests, in this case their health is considered a priority just as much
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and no more than anyone else’s.212 The implication is that “an improvement in health for
the well-off is just as valuable and carries the same moral weight as an improvement in
health for the worse off.”213 Health benefits matter equally both for the well off and the
worst off. Contrary to Cooley’s interpretation of distributive justice, the concept of equity
as maximization does not demand contributions from individuals in order to be entitled to
their improved health status. The idea of justice supported by this perspective requires
that both the entire population in need and the research subjects who have contributed to
development of a successful product are entitled to the benefits of research.214
Another perspective for a principle of justice or equity which applies some
criteria of urgency to levels of health is known as equity as priority to the sickest.215 This
perspective focuses on the urgency of people’s needs, “those who are threatened with the
worst harms – who have the shortest life expectancy and most serious diseases and
injuries – should count as the worst off.”216 Based on this account, we should give
priority to those with the greatest urgent need, the sickest people. In clinical trials, this
creates a problem because the research subjects who have received the benefits during the
research of a successful product are no longer the sickest. Those who are the sickest are
people who were not recruited in the research and as a result did not have access to any
treatments because none of the treatments were available outside research.
The implication of this principle of priority to the sickest is that the rest of the
populations who did not participate in the research and did not receive any beneficial
product deserve priority for receiving the product. The principle did not fully account for
the research subjects who may still need the product when the research is concluded. It
points to the fact that no single principle of justice accounts for all situations. There is a
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consensus that research subjects should not be left worse off after a clinical trial is
concluded than they were, while they were participating in the trial. In this context,
another principle of justice is needed which accounts for a situation where the research
subjects will continue to require a successful product that they received during their
participation in the clinical trials.
The National Bioethics Advisory Commission (NBAC) report situates posttrial obligations to research subjects in the principle of justice as reciprocity which reechoes Cooley’s line of thought earlier discussed. The NBAC report articulates that
justice as reciprocity in the context of clinical trials could imply that something is owed
to research participants at the conclusion of the trial, because their shouldering of
research risks and burdens made it possible for the researchers to generate findings
necessary to advance knowledge and develop new medical interventions.217 The NBAC
report indicates that the principle of reciprocity relate to research subjects who
participated in a clinical trial that yielded successful products or not. In both instances,
the subjects bore burdens and risks of the research.
Another notion of justice that may also apply to clinical trials in developing
countries is compensatory justice. The concept of compensatory justice can be applied to
the research context in two situations. The first situation refers to compensating research
subjects for the injuries they sustained in course of the research. The second situation
relates to research subjects who have lost time due to their participation in the research or
have spent some money out of pocket for research related expenses like travel to the
research site and childcare. Macklin contends that “in both situations, compensation is
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owed or provided to research subjects for something they did or that happened to
them.”218
Compensatory justice has also been applied to a broader context to encompass
situations that have happened in the past. The idea of compensatory justice has been
broadened to go beyond fairness in distribution and to include an attempt to remedy or
redress past wrongs. An example usually cited is the monetary payments made to
survivors of the Tuskegee syphilis study or to their relatives, to compensate them for the
harm or wrong done by the study.219 Paying the survivors of the Tuskegee syphilis study
for the harm they incurred is in line with the concept of compensatory justice that
compensates the subjects for something that happened to them, although in this case the
events occurred in the past. On the other hand, there has been a debate whether
compensating the relatives of Tuskegee syphilis study participants was a stretch in the
idea of compensatory justice. Macklin argues that, “a case could be made for benefiting
developing countries or the communities where research is conducted today as
compensation for past research from which no benefits flowed to those communities or
countries.”220 In this context, compensatory justice calls for providing benefits from
current research because of injustices of the past. The inability of the host population to
access successful products, e.g. anti-retroviral drugs at the conclusion of trials, has been
acknowledged as a problem with the clinical trials in developing countries.

E.

Responsiveness of Research to the Needs and Priorities of the Host Population

1. Ethical Issues Related to Responsiveness Requirement in Clinical Trials in
Developing Countries
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Responsiveness of research to the needs and priorities of the host population
has been hotly debated especially with regard to clinical trials in developing countries.
Grady expresses concerns about exploitation and double standard in international clinical
research. She contends that “research participants and populations in developing
countries may be particularly vulnerable to exploitation due to poverty; illiteracy; limited
resources, education, and access to health care; and lack of familiarity or experience with
research.”221 In the past, communities in developing countries who have participated in
research have too often not enjoyed the benefits of the research. Instead, the benefits of
research hosted in developing countries have been primarily enjoyed by developed
countries.222 London argues that international collaborative research “must be conducted
in such a manner as to leave the host community better off than it was, or at least not
worse off.”223
The requirement for responsiveness of research to the health needs and
priorities of the host population is supported by several groups who have grappled with
how to minimize exploitation in international clinical research. For example, the National
Bioethics Advisory Commission recommends clinical trials conducted in developing
countries that are only responsive to the health needs of the host country.224 The World
Medical Association’s 2000 version of the Declaration of Helsinki also stipulates that the
justification for a medical research will be based on the reasonable likelihood that the
populations involved in research will benefit from the results of the research.225 The
United Kingdom’s Nuffield Council on Bioethics advises national priority-setting for
health care research so that it will be, “easier for host countries to ensure that research
proposed by external sponsors is appropriate and relevant to its national health care
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needs.”226 The Council of International Organizations of Medical Sciences (CIOMS) in
their international guidelines recommends two essential requirements before engaging in
a research in a population or community with limited resources. First, the sponsor and
researcher must make every effort to guarantee that the research is responsive to the
health needs and the priorities of the population or community in which it is conducted.
Second, any intervention or product developed or knowledge generated will be made
reasonably available for the benefit of that population or community.227 There is a general
consensus among scholars regarding the support for the requirement of responsiveness in
international clinical research, but the interpretation of what it entails in actual practice
varies.

2. Different Interpretations of the Responsiveness Requirement in International Clinical
Trials.
Different perspectives have emerged in the debate about the responsiveness
requirement in international clinical research. One perspective stresses that research is
responsive to the health needs of the population whenever it addresses health problems of
the population.228 Grady articulates, “The requirement to be responsive suggests that
research should address a question that is relevant and important to a host country and
that the answer should be of potential benefit to that country.”229 For example, a study of
a less toxic malaria treatment or a strategy for preventing malaria is responsive to an
important health need, in a country where malaria is prevalent and a major cause of
mortality in children.230 London describes health needs as, “concerns that are particularly
important or urgent because of their close relationship to the ability of persons to be free
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from medical conditions that shorten their lives or prevent them from functioning in ways
that are basic or fundamental to their pursuit of a reasonable life plan.”231 Developing
countries have been ravaged by diseases such as malaria, tuberculosis and HIV, and
finding new strategies for treating these diseases would constitute health needs that are
also health priorities of such countries. Disease burden or prevalence is not the only
criterion for defining the requirement of responsiveness in international clinical research.
Another perspective defines the criterion for responsive research as ensuring
that successful products, e.g. anti-retroviral drugs are available at the conclusion of the
research.232 This perspective is in line with CIOMS guidelines that requires that the
research project should not leave low-resource countries or communities worse off. It
should be responsive to their health needs and priorities in such a way that any product
developed is made reasonably available to them, and as much as possible leave the
population in a better position to obtain effective health care and protect its own health.233
This statement attests to the fact that medical research can play a significant role in
assisting communities protect their own health by finding new therapies. London argues
that, “the requirement to ensure reasonable availability seems most appropriate when
combined with the requirement that such research actually focus on health needs that are
also health priorities of that community.”234 The results of research should be made
reasonably available in such a way that maximizes their value and usefulness.235
Collaboration with host country researchers, institutions, health policy makers,
community groups, and others all through the phases of research will guarantee
dissemination of results and assimilation of important new knowledge.236
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In some situations, research may not yield successful products but may ensure
that other benefits are provided for host communities. Some scholars argue that
something is owed to the community or country at the end of the research, but it may not
be necessarily successful products of the research.237
In line with this notion, another perspective links other benefits of the research
with responsiveness. CIOMS guidelines indicates that the ethical requirement of
responsiveness can only be realized if successful interventions or other kinds of health
benefits are made available to the population.238 Grady argues that if the goal is to
minimize potential exploitation of research participants, benefits are certainly critical but
the emphasis is on the level, not the type, of benefits that participants receive.239 She
further suggests several types of possible benefits associated with clinical research,
therapeutic benefits to research participants, useful and generalizable knowledge for the
community, infrastructure and capacity building, the inclusion of required public
measures, training of research and clinical staff, ancillary medical benefits to participants
or others, the post-trial benefits of new drugs and other products, economic benefits and
increased business employment.240 Similarly, Emmanuel et al. argue, that guaranteeing a
type of benefit, the proven intervention instead of a fair level of benefits does not
necessarily prevent exploitation.241 They proposed what is usually referred to as “the fair
benefits framework.”242
Proponents of the fair benefits framework contend that it “Supplements the
usual conditions for the ethical conduct of research trials, such as independent review by
an institutional review board or research ethics committee and individual informed
consent.”243 The fair benefits framework builds upon three background principles that are
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generally considered as requirements for ethical research. First, the research should have
social value by focusing on a health problem of the developing country population.
Second, fair subject selection guarantees that the scientific objectives of the research
itself, not poverty or vulnerability, support a strong justification for carrying out the
research in a specific population. Third, the research must have a favorable risk-benefit
ratio, which entails that benefits to participants outweigh the risks, or the net risks are
appropriately low.244 The fair benefits framework emphasizes additional three principles
such as fair benefits, collaborative partnership and transparency that are specified by
multiple benchmarks.245

Principle 1: Fair Benefits
This requires a complete outline of tangible benefits that may accrue to the
research participants and the population from the conduct and results of the research.
These benefits comprise of three types: “(1) benefits to research participants during the
research, (2) benefits to the population during the research, or (3) benefits to the
population after completion of the research.”246 Since, exploitation is a major concern in
international clinical research; the emphasis is on providing a fair level of benefits rather
than types of benefits. Emmanuel et al. write, “… it would seem fair that as the burdens
and risks of the research increase, the benefits should also increase. Similarly, as the
benefits to the sponsors, researchers, and others outside the population increase, the
benefits to the host population should increase.”247 The fair benefits framework tackles
the issue of exploitation by allowing the host population that bears the burden of the
research to receive benefits as well as determine their fairness. Nevertheless, every
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benefit of research may not directly flow to research participants but may also benefit the
entire community. For example, capacity development realized through improving health
care infrastructure, training of health and research personnel and training of personnel in
research ethics could be provided to the community.248

Principle 2: Collaborative Partnership
It is important to note that only the host population can determine the adequacy
and fairness of the level of benefits for itself. Emmanuel et al. articulate, “outsiders are
likely to be poorly informed about the health, social and economic context in which the
research is being conducted, and are unlikely to fully appreciate the importance of the
proposed benefits to the population.”249 The choice of the host population to participate in
research must be free and uncoerced, and refusing to participate must be a realistic
alternative.250

Principle 3: Transparency
Transparency similar to the full information requirement for ideal market
transactions allows the host population to compare benefits agreements in similar
transactions. An independent body, for example, WHO should establish and operate a
publicly accessible repository of all formal and informal benefits agreements. A central
repository allows independent assessment of the fairness of benefits agreements by
populations, researchers, governments and others, such as non-governmental bodies.251 A
series of community consultations are required in order to inform populations in
developing countries about previous benefits agreements in other research projects. 252
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Emmanuel et al., argue that the three background conditions and the three principles of
the fair benefits framework guarantee the realization of essential requirements of
research. The essential requirements of research include (1) the selection of the
population based on good scientific reasons; (2) the research presenting limited net risks
to the research participants; (3) presence of adequate and long lasting benefits to the
population; (4) ensuring that the population is not subject to a coercive choice; (5)
guaranteeing that the population freely determines whether to participate and whether the
level of benefits is fair given the risks of the research; and (6) ensuring that the repository
offers the opportunity for comparative assessments of the fairness of the benefit
agreements.253 They further argue that in comparison with reasonable availability
requirement, the three principles – fair benefits, collaborative partnership, and
transparency – are more inclined to guarantee that populations in developing countries
are not exploited, benefit from clinical research, and retain decision-making
responsibility.254

F. Summary of Dissertation Chapters
The dissertation presents an ethical argument for post-trial access to antiretroviral
drugs for participants and host populations in developing countries based on the
obligation of justice. Humanitarian assistance is not sufficient in itself because it has a
limited term and lacks the capacity to regulate the relevant inequalities between societies.
The analysis contrasts two dominant perspectives that address the issue of post-trial
access to antiretroviral drugs: the statist approach of Rawls and the cosmopolitan
approach of Pogge. In contrast to the approaches of Rawls and Pogge, the dissertation
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argues for a paradigm involving a sliding scale of national and global responsibilities for
the right to health. A summary of the dissertation’s chapters presents the argument in
more detail, as follows.
Chapter one presents a general introduction to the analysis focusing on ethical
issues in global health inequalities and global health research. Chapters two and three
present the context of the ethical problem under discussion: the process of international
clinical research that tends to inadequately respect the health rights of local populations
(chapter two); and the right of local populations that undergo clinical research to have
affordable access to resulting drugs, such as anti-retroviral drugs (chapter three).
Chapters four and five present two contrasting but inadequate approaches to global
justice that address access to anti-retroviral drugs for host populations in developing
nations. Chapter six presents a paradigm that combines national and international
responsibilities for global justice to address the ethical problem of affordable access.
Chapter seven concludes the dissertation with a discussion on the significant role of a
landmark intergovernmental document, the Universal Declaration on Bioethics and
Human Rights adopted by United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural
Organization (UNESCO) on biomedical research. The UNESCO Declaration aims at
setting global minimum standards in biomedical research and clinical practice. As the
first international legal, non-binding instrument, it grapples with linking human rights
and bioethics. It resorts to international human rights law as a means of protecting
responsible biomedical activities. The UNESCO Declaration emphasizes the principles of
human dignity, human rights and fundamental freedom in its efforts to promote
responsible biomedical research and clinical practice. It further stresses the priority of the
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individual over science or society. A more detailed explanation of the argument in the
main chapters follows.
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CHAPTER TWO
REGULATORY INFRASTRACTURE AND ETHICAL OVERSIGHT OF CLINICAL
INTERNATIONAL RESEARCH

A. Introduction
The first highly publicized violation of the rights of research subjects was the
atrocities committed by Nazi research physicians with non-consenting subjects under the
pretense of medical experimentation. The startling revelations of such abuses of human
rights at the Nuremberg war crime trials led to global outrage and the urgent need to craft
a code of conduct for human research known as the Nuremberg code.1 The Nuremberg
code established in 1947 was the first international code of ethics for research involving
human subjects. The code was prepared in response to inhuman attacks on the rights and
welfare of human subjects by Nazi research physicians. The code established the
standards of carrying out research on human subjects with strong emphasis on the
voluntary consent of the participants and minimization of risks. The Belmont report
refers to this code as the “prototype of many later codes intended to assure that research
involving human subjects would be carried out in an ethical manner.”2
The World Medical Association adopted the Declaration of Helsinki in 1964,
which further addressed the issue regarding rights of research subjects. The Declaration
of Helsinki emphasized basic principles for the conduct of human biomedical research.3
The major purpose of the declaration initially was to protect the interests of the research
subjects over the interests and benefits of science and society. Baum articulates that, “the
Declaration stated that to be ethically justifiable, clinical research must protect both the
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rights and welfare of the participants. It also stated that scientific research must serve the
purpose of healing.”4 The Declaration of Helsinki has undergone many controversial
revisions and some authors argue that these revisions have eroded and undermined the
document’s commitment to protect the rights of the research subjects.5 For example, the
1964 version of Helsinki Declaration assures every subject in a medical research
including those in the control arm a guaranteed access to the best proven therapy
available anywhere, while in the revised version, he or she only receives therapy that is
available to him or her in a particular country.6 The implication is that the standard of
care in the revised version of the declaration is local standard, that is, treatment available
in the host country, instead of the universal standard, that is, the best treatment available
anywhere in the world.
Furthermore, the revised version of the Helsinki declaration broadens the role of
placebos in research. It allows the use of placebo to test the efficacy and safety of an
intervention, whenever it is justified by a compelling and scientifically sound research
protocol and when the patients who receive placebo are not subjected to any risk of
serious or irreversible harm.7 The opponents of the revised version of the declaration
emphasized a change in the tone of the declaration from principalism to utilitarianism.
They argued for incoherence between the revised articles of the declaration and the need
to protect the principles of human rights.8 The principles established in the Helsinki
Declaration were in large part physician oriented and did not precisely deal with the issue
of research in developing countries.9
The United Nations General Assembly adopted the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights in 1966 which emphasized free consent to medical or scientific
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experimentation.10 The issue of research in developing countries was finally addressed by
the council for International Organization of Medical Sciences (CIOMS), in collaboration
with the World Health Organization (WHO). In 1982, CIOMS and WHO proposed
international guidelines for biomedical research involving human subjects. The
guidelines were additionally revised in 1993. The guidelines were aimed at establishing
ethical principles that should guide the conduct of biomedical research involving human
subjects in the international arena. The document also explored ethical issues relating to
clinical trials of vaccines and drugs as well as human experimentation among vulnerable
populations.11
Despite the extensive publication of these guidelines and the recognition by the
agencies engaged in biomedical research, the implementation and adoption of these
guidelines were for the most part voluntary. The indication regarding the laxity of
researchers in implementing the guidelines was evident in the case, where medical
researchers deliberately withheld treatment from African American patients with syphilis
in Tuskegee, Alabama, in the United States of America.12 The wide publication of these
abuses in human research triggered establishment of a national commission in the United
States of America to develop principles and guidelines for the protection of human
subjects of biomedical and behavioral research. The Belmont Report which was the
outcome of the national commission identified three basic ethical principles that should
guide the conduct of research involving human subjects, respect for persons, beneficence
and justice.13 Similar complimentary efforts in developed countries aimed at protecting
the human subjects of biomedical research were made by the consultations of the
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Nuffield Council for Bioethics in the United Kingdom,14 and the National Bioethics
Advisory Commission in the United States of America.15
The rights of research subjects are protected by the requirement of two
safeguards, voluntary informed consent and review of research. Both safeguards are
required by U.S. regulations and International declarations and guidelines for research.16
The requirement of voluntary informed consent and review of research are extensively
discussed in the reports of the US National Bioethics Advisory Commission and UK
Nuffield Council. Regarding protection of the rights of research subjects, current U.S.
regulations require that Institutional Review Boards (IRBs) approve a research when,
“risks to subjects are reasonable in relation to anticipated benefits, if any, to subjects, and
the importance of the knowledge that may reasonably be expected to result.”17
Current U.S. regulations also emphasized the requirement of informed consent, in
such a way, that an investigator can only involve a human subject in research after
obtaining the legally effective informed consent of the subject or the subject’s legally
authorized representative.18 The code of federal regulations on protection of human
subjects further indicated that an informed consent whether oral or written may not
contain any excusable language that allows the subject or the representative to waive any
of the subject’s legal rights or to release the investigator, the institution or its agents from
liability for negligence.19
Similarly, international ethical guidelines for biomedical research involving
human subjects prepared by the Council for International Organizations of Medical
Sciences in collaboration with the World Health Organization emphasize review of all
proposals to conduct research involving human subjects for scientific merit and ethical
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acceptability.20 CIOMS guidelines stipulated that if the ethics review committee finds the
research proposal to be scientifically sound, it will further explore whether the balance of
risks to anticipated benefits is reasonable. The ethics review committee is also charged
with the responsibilities to determine whether research methods will minimize harm and
maximize benefits, as well as, to determine whether the procedures proposed for
obtaining informed consent are satisfactory.21 CIOMS highlights that, “the ethical review
committee is responsible for safeguarding the rights, safety, and well-being of the
research subjects.”22 Despite the general consensus regarding the need for these two
safeguards of voluntary informed consent and review of research, enough evidence
abounds that they are sometimes faulty, insufficient or even non-existent in the conduct
of clinical trials in developing countries.23
NBAC offers justification for the need for obtaining informed voluntary consent,
when it argues, “the use of human beings as a means to the ends of others without their
knowledge and freely granted permission constitutes exploitation and is therefore
unethical.”24 There is a general agreement for the need to provide the subjects of research
with adequate information in order for them to make an informed decision whether or not
to participate in clinical trials. Many people also agree that it is relevant to convey the
information in such a way that the potential subjects can easily comprehend especially in
developing countries where many of the research subjects are educationally
disadvantaged. Another area of universal agreement in voluntary informed consent is that
consent should be obtained without putting pressure on the potential subjects and without
exerting undue influence or coercion.25
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Obtaining informed voluntary consent needs to be sensitive to cultural differences
especially in developing countries without infringing on the standards of informed
consent. Current guidelines for research ethics should be adapted to embrace the
operational flexibility of applying the informed consent process in developing
countries.26 Mystakidou et al. observes that, “the application of standards for consent can
be daunting for researchers when they face the pragmatic constraints of the field and the
reality of cultural beliefs about consent in the developing nations.”27 The implementation
of consent in developing countries which is one of the core responsibilities of ethics
review committee must take into account their cultural values and cultural diversities.
In developing countries, inadequate resources may create barriers to effective
independent review of research protocols. The research ethics committee is charged with
the responsibilities of assessing the risks and benefits of proposed research as well as the
review and approval of the consent forms for the study.28 Many of the clinical trials
conducted in developing countries struggle with issues of inadequate protection of
participants. Allegations of violations of informed consent and review of research have
been reported regarding some of the trials conducted in developing countries.29
There have been concerns as well about the capacity of ethics review committees
in developing countries to adequately review clinical trials. The ethics review committees
in developing countries have major limitations with regard to capacity to review clinical
trials.30 Collaboration among research partners from developed and developing countries
is a desideratum for the successful completion of international clinical research. A more
detailed discussion of these two safeguards follows.
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B. Informed Consent
B.1. Meaning of Informed Consent
Informed consent is an important aspect in discussing the ethical conduct of the
clinical trials. The requirement to obtain voluntary informed consent from individuals
before enrolling them in clinical trial is a fundamental principle of research ethics.31 The
requirement for informed consent in clinical trials reflects the ethical principles of respect
for persons, human dignity, and autonomy.32
Two different senses of informed consent are presented by authors in literature
and practices.33 In the first sense, the informed consent is explained within the context of
autonomous choice. An autonomous action refers to “normal choosers who act (1)
intentionally, (2) with understanding, and (3) without controlling influences that
determines their actions.”34 The first of these three conditions dealing with acting
intentionally does not accommodate any degree, because acts are either intentional or
unintentional. On the other hand, the two other conditions of understanding and absence
of controlling influences can be met by acts to a greater or lesser degree.35 Beauchamp
and Childress articulate, “for an action to be autonomous in this account, it needs only a
substantial degree of understanding and freedom from constraint, not a full understanding
or a complete absence of influence.”36
Informed consent is an autonomous authorization by an individual for
participation in research or to receive medical care. In this sense, informed consent
entails that a patient or a subject must authorize a professional to do something through
an act of informed or voluntary consent.37 The implication is that health professionals or
researchers will explain the purpose, risks, benefits and alternatives of medical

65

intervention or research to patients or subjects and ensure they understand before
voluntarily consenting.
The doctrine of informed consent prescribes that research subjects should
participate in research voluntarily and with adequate information about the research.
Noteworthy, is that only a competent individual gives an informed consent, after
receiving necessary information, adequately understanding the information and
considering the information in order to arrive at a decision without being subjected to
coercion, undue influence, inducement or intimidation.38 Informed consent recognizes
that, “individuals have the right and the ability to make decisions in their own interest and
to act upon them.”39
The second sense of informed consent is explained within the context of the social
rules of consent in institutions that require obtaining effective consent legally or
institutionally from patients or subjects before initiating medical or research procedures.40
In this sense, informed consent as an effective consent is a policy oriented approach
whose conditions are not deducible from analyses of autonomy and authorization, or
from extensive ideas of respect for autonomy.41 Informed consent in this context deals
with institutional requirement and practices of informed consent in health care or in
research which mandates group of patients and subjects to be treated in accordance with
rules, policies, and standard practices.42
Professionals are required according to the social and legal practice to obtain
informed consent in institutional settings. Conforming to such policies and procedures
satisfies the conditions of informed consent in the second sense. From this perspective,
informed consents are not usually autonomous acts or meaningful authorizations. The
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second sense of informed consent focuses on regulating the behavior of the professional
seeking the consent and on establishing procedures and rules for the context of consent.
The requirements of such professional behavior and procedure are easily tracked and
implemented by institutions.43
Informed consent in the second sense deals with effective authorization of either a
patient or a subject as governed by institutional rules such as federal and state regulations
and hospital policies. In this sense, “a patient or subject can autonomously authorize an
intervention, and so give an informed consent in sense one, and yet not effectively
authorize that intervention in sense two.”44 The code of regulations for medical and
research interventions as well as case law develop models of consent that are outlined in
a sense two informed consent. A typical example is disclosure criteria for informed
consent which are integral to the history of informed consent. The disclosure requirement
constitutes a necessary condition of effective informed consent. The legal doctrine of
informed consent is clearly articulated in a law of disclosure, since the fulfillment of
disclosure rules devour informed consent in law. The rules of informed consent in sense
two concentrate on disclosure, comprehension, the minimization of potentially
controlling influences and competence.45
Faden and Beauchamp also discuss the relationship between informed consents in
both sense one and sense two.46 Informed consent in sense one may not meet the criteria
to be an informed consent in sense two due to a lack of compliance with relevant rules
and requirements. Likewise, an informed consent in sense two may not be an informed
consent in sense one. The rules and requirements that regulate informed consents in sense
two may not necessarily result in autonomous authorizations in any way, in order, to be
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considered as informed consents.47 There is a general consensus among some scholars
that the model of autonomous choice which reflects informed consent in sense one need
to serve as the standard for the moral adequacy of institutional rules.48 The rules and
requirements of informed consent in sense two should be devised to comply with the
standards of informed consent in sense one. This reinforces the fact that the objective of
informed consent or the purpose for obtaining informed consent in both medical care and
in research is to allow potential patients and subjects to make autonomous decisions
relating to whether to participate or not in medical or research interventions.49 Three
conditions are essential to informed consent: disclosure of information, comprehension of
information and voluntary participation.50

B.2. Key Components of Informed Consent
B.2.a. Disclosure of Information
NBAC indicates that requirements for disclosing information in research settings
generally surpass those for disclosing information in clinical contexts.51 Most codes and
regulations of research outline critical elements of disclosure in order to guarantee that
potential subjects are given adequate information. NBAC highlights four principal types
of disclosures that are crucial to the process of informed consent in the research setting:
“(1) disclosure of diagnosis and risk; (2) disclosure of the use of placebos and
randomization; (3) disclosure of alternative treatments and (4) disclosures about possible
post-trial benefits.”52 Related to the issue about specific and detailed items for disclosure,
the Belmont report gave a different list of important types of disclosures: the research
procedure, purposes, risks and anticipated benefits, alternative procedures, and a
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statement that gives the research participant the opportunity to ask questions and to
withdraw from the research at any time.53
The disclosure requirement also grapples with the standard of how much
information and what type of information should be provided to potential subjects. Two
competing standards of disclosure have emerged, the professional practice standard and
the reasonable person standard.54 The professional practice standard maintains that
adequate disclosure is determined by a professional community’s customary practices.
The implication is that professional custom determines the amount and kinds of
information to be disclosed.55 In research, the professional practice standard that is, the
information usually provided by professionals in the field is insufficient because research
occurs when a common understanding does not exist.56 The reasonable person standard
requires the professional to divulge adequate information that reasonable persons would
wish to be aware of in order to make informed decision regarding their medical care. The
reasonable person standard is also considered inadequate in the research setting. This is
supported by the reason that the research subject is typically a volunteer, who may wish
to know a lot more about risks undertaken voluntarily than patients who are seeking
needed care from a clinician. A third standard was also proposed as the reasonable
volunteer. The reasonable volunteer standard requires that the nature and extent of
information should entail that such persons aware that the procedure is neither necessary
for their care nor fully comprehended, can decide whether they wish to participate in
advancing of knowledge. More so, the subjects should understand clearly the range of
risks and the voluntary nature of participation in research settings, when some direct
benefit to them is anticipated.57
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A related issue pertinent to the disclosure of information is that some types of
research involve incomplete disclosure. A typical example of such type of research is the
therapeutic use of placebos. The therapeutic use of placebos usually entails intentional
deception or incomplete disclosure. A placebo is a substance or intervention considered
by the health care professional as biomedically or pharmacologically inactive for the
condition being treated.58
Data also shows that an improvement in the patient after use of a placebo usually
referred to as the placebo effect can occur in some situations without nondisclosure,
incomplete disclosure, or deception. However, in many cases a placebo is less probably
to be effective, if utilized with the knowledge of the patient.59 In such cases informing
subjects of some relevant aspects of the research is more likely to weaken the validity of
the research. It is enough in such cases to notify subjects that they are being invited to
participate in research of which some aspects will not be disclosed until the research is
finished.60 In all cases of research, incomplete disclosure should only be justified under
the following conditions: (1) it is important to obtain vital information; (2) no significant
risk is involved; (3) subjects are informed that deception or incomplete disclosure is part
of the research, and (4) subjects consent to participate under these conditions.61
Information regarding research risks should never be withheld for the purpose of
obtaining the cooperation of subjects. Attention should be paid to differentiate cases in
which disclosure would damage the research from cases in which disclosure would
simply inconvenience the researcher.62 A related issue in the discussion of disclosure
requirements focuses on the impact of cultural differences in determining the scope of
information to be disclosed to potential subjects of research in developing countries.
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B.2.a.i. Cultural Barriers Related to Disclosure Requirement
Cultural barriers relating to disclosure requirement can constitute a challenge in
obtaining informed consent in developing countries. Macklin acknowledges challenges
encountered by researchers who conduct clinical trials in developing countries, in dealing
with cultural practices that depart from the requirements of informed consent expressed
in international and national research guidelines and regulations.63 Ethical relativists
argue for the need to withhold key information from potential research subjects. They
contend that departures from substantive ethical standards of voluntary informed consent
are justified by the cultural context in the country or community hosting the research.
They further argue that cultural relativity justifies ethical relativism.64 On the contrary,
the type of relativism supported by many other scholars is the increasing need to adapt
the form and content of procedures for obtaining informed consent to the educational
level and understanding of the potential research subjects. The justification of this
perspective stems from the fact that the method and type of informed consent must be
relative to the literacy level of the subjects, their ease with signing documents and other
cultural conditions.65
Deviating from the accepted standard of disclosure of information in the
voluntary informed consent process has sometimes been justified by cultural
considerations especially in developing countries. It is still accepted in some developing
countries for physicians to withhold certain information such as diagnoses and prognoses
of cancer and other serious medical conditions from patients. Professionals prefer to
provide such information to family members.66 Sugarman et al. articulate, “in one
country, complete information about medical diagnoses and prognoses are withheld
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routinely from patients with certain diseases, such as cancer. Consequently, valid
informed consent for either treatment or research participation can be difficult or
impossible.”67 Such cultural practices of withholding information from patients in clinical
care are pertinent to research subjects who are involved in similar circumstances.
NBAC report recommends that “research should not deviate from the substantive
ethical standard of voluntary informed consent.”68 The commission refutes the assertion
that cultural standards about the inappropriateness of providing diagnoses and prognoses
to patients or research subjects justify deviation from the substantive ethical standard of
informed consent in research. The commission further argued that lack of information
regarding diagnoses and prognoses by potential subjects impedes understanding of the
purpose of research, any potential benefits, the risks of not participating or the
alternatives to participation. The potential subjects cannot make an informed decision to
enroll in the research without an understanding that they may not receive a proven
therapy. It is a departure from the substantive ethical standard of disclosure required for
adequate informed consent to enroll individuals in research without giving them the
opportunity to understand essential features of the information regarding the research.
The practice of disclosing information in different ways in the clinical context does not
change the requirements for such disclosure in the research context.69

B.2.a.ii. Cultural Barriers Related to Disclosure of Risks and Research Study Design
Another issue presented by cultural differences is the disclosure of potential risks
and harms associated with treatment or research. International guidelines for informed
consent require that all potential risks including the possibility of death must be disclosed
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to potential subjects in the informed consent process. Marshall acknowledges that
disclosing all potential risks associated with research in a direct way may be alarming and
frightening for many individuals. She further describes frustrations of Nigerian
researchers regarding the lengthy and complex disclosure requirements of informed
consent which included information that were considered irrelevant and culturally
inappropriate for potential subjects. One of the researchers indicated that in Nigerian
cultural norms, disclosing all possible risks would unnecessarily scare potential research
subjects associated with the research.70
Furthermore, the language utilized to communicate risks in informed consent
documents may be difficult to understand because of different views that researchers and
the general public have regarding the idea of risks. Researchers, unlike the general public
usually understand risks in terms of statistical probabilities. More so, it may be hard to
communicate potential risks that cannot be easily measured or that may be difficult for
individuals to comprehend or realistically anticipate. For instance, the risks of sideeffects from taking medications utilized in a protocol may raise some concerns among
some people, but there is a clear connection between the procedure, that is, taking the
medicine and the possibility of risk, that is, getting sick from the drug.71 On the other
hand, it may be difficult to communicate the potential for group risks that might occur in
the future in genetic epidemiological research as genetic research findings are reported. 72
A related issue in the discussion of the communication of risks is cultural and
social factors that impact beliefs about what really constitutes a risk or potential harm.
For example, in developed countries drawing a sample of blood is depicted usually in
consent documents as only posing a minimal risk for individuals. But, in developing
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countries blood and other bodily fluids or tissues are considered to have great symbolic
power. There are sometimes concerns that they may be used in sorcery practices or in
other means to harm people. This belief heightens the perception of risks among potential
subjects that it affects their understanding and signing of informed consent in HIV/AIDS
clinical studies.73 Researchers from Nigeria that conducted community based studies on
diabetes and hypertension reported the concerns of patients regarding the amount of
blood drawn and the possibility that blood samples could be utilized in sorcery
practices.74 Concerns among Kenyan parents regarding the amount of blood drawn from
their children for research were reported. Furthermore, there were indications that some
parents were perplexed about the blood samples, due to their belief that blood drawn
from their children might be combined and given to other patients.75
Cultural barriers are also experienced in clinical trials in developing countries
regarding the requirement of disclosure of information about the use of placebo, the
randomization of subjects and uncertainty about the efficacy of an experimental
intervention. Sugarman et al. describe ideas of local population regarding cultural barriers
to randomization and use of placebos. For example, investigators deliberately omitted the
use of randomization in their research in one of the cases because they felt it would have
posed a major obstacle in obtaining valid informed consent for a randomized trial.
Investigators in another case utilized placebos, despite their conception that research
subjects did not understand the implication of doing so.76 NBAC articulates, “despite
these barriers, cultural differences do not provide adequate justification for foregoing the
requirement to disclose key elements of the nature of the clinical trial, such as the use of a
placebo or the randomization of participants into different trial arms.”77 The commission
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further indicated that the challenges of cultural differences in clinical trials in developing
countries for obtaining informed consent do not adequately justify foregoing the
requirement for disclosure of alternative therapies available to potential subjects.78
Cultural differences make it more imperative for investigators to explore innovative
strategies for presenting information to participants in order to enhance understanding of
disclosed information to research participants.

B.2.b. Comprehension of Information
Comprehension is a key element of informed consent process. The notion of
informed consent in clinical trials stems from the fact that research subjects giving the
consent understand the purpose and nature of the study, what is expected of them and the
potential benefits and risks resulting from the study.79 There are concerns regarding
research subjects consenting to participate in clinical trials without adequate
understanding about the nature and purpose of the research. The comprehension issue is
further exacerbated in international clinical trials where subjects have different language
and culture from researchers. The situation is even worse in developing countries where
high poverty and low literacy levels and poor access to quality health care services make
them vulnerable to exploitation in biomedical research.80

B.2.b.i.

Language Barriers and Lower Level of Literacy
Communication between researchers and potential subjects may be difficult to

attain when they are from different cultures. Misunderstandings and miscommunication
about biomedical research are more likely to happen when researchers and potential
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subjects speak different languages.81 Language barriers create significant concerns
regarding adequate understanding of the nature and purpose of the research by potential
subjects. In most developing countries, people speak and live for the most part of their
lives in a different language from the language of the researchers and practitioners, and
with an educational level far below desired standard.82 Interpretation of study purposes
involves not only the translation of language, but also cultural.83 Dawson and Kass
observe that potential subjects may lack education or exposure to western scientific
concepts in biomedical research and their language might lack terminology for these
concepts.84
In international clinical trials, informed consent documents are generally
translated into the host country’s national language and in some instances to the local
community language or dialect. Translating sophisticated scientific or medical concepts
presents a serious challenge in the comprehension of informed consent. There are some
concerns that some local dialects do not have written form. For example, the Bambara in
West Africa do not have written form. Furthermore, some scientific or medical concepts
do not have direct translation in local languages or dialects. Some examples are
randomization, placebo and clinical trial. Attempts by researchers in some cases to
explain what one word in a foreign language means in a local language may need a
lengthy paragraph, causing the consent document to be too long and not user friendly.
The prevalence of low literacy levels among potential subjects in developing countries
may make them not to be able to read and understand what they are consenting to.85
Language barriers may be significantly reduced by the use of native language
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interpreters. Elementary language should be utilized in communicating with research
subjects, rather than the technical or high level language used in informed consent forms
of developed countries. Dialects that adequately accommodate scientific or medical
concepts can as well be used.86 The training of translators in research methods may assist
in eradicating or decreasing the introduction of personal interpretations and attitudes.87
However, potential problems continue to exist in the use of an interpreter.
Marshall identifies a dual problem for health researchers created by a clinical trial
requiring a translator. First, the researcher relies on the translator for communicating the
research objectives correctly and effectively. Second, the researcher as well relies on the
translator to follow through with the consent, which entails presenting the information
and consenting to participate in the research. Consent can only be assumed if the
respondent agrees to participate, especially in cases where a translator is used.88
Generally, there is an assumption that translators are straightforward interpreters
of information exchanged between health researchers and subjects. The implication is
that this perspective underestimates the complexities of the process of interpretation,
which requires the translator to negotiate not only language, but also cultural and
contextual factors.89 Putsch observes that there may be inclination for family members or
friends to conceal, overstate, or minimize information, if they are used as translators.90
Research shows that interpreters have a significant influence on medical interactions and
their outcomes. It shows further that native interpreters, apart from mediating the
explanatory models of illness held by clinicians and patients, they also usually introduce
their own beliefs and personal agendas into the interaction.91
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It is evident that interpreters wield some degree of influence over the
communication between researchers and potential research subjects. Their influence on
communication between researchers and potential subjects is clearly shown through the
function of gatekeeping, where interpreters make critical decisions regarding the
selection of information to communicate the terminology to express concerns, and the
clarification of information to fit particular interactions.92 There are also indications that
interpreters impact the communication process by acting as cultural brokers, patient
advocates and counselors.93

B.2.b.ii. Cultural Beliefs about Health, Disease and Biomedical Procedures
Another major barrier to comprehension of information for potential research
subjects is their belief system about health, disease and biomedical procedures. In some
cultures, the belief system of potential research subjects does not explain health, and
disease utilizing the concepts and terms of modern science and technology.94 Kass and
Hyder acknowledge the overwhelming challenge of obtaining voluntary informed
consent when people do not comprehend or accept scientific and western explanations of
health and disease.95 Marshall also indicates that in some circumstances cultural beliefs
regarding the cause and treatment of disease may differ completely from western views
about underlying disease etiology which are consistent with medical and scientific
explanations.96 She further cites a physician’s perspective on the potential subjects’
understanding of the nature of the research thus, “... Indeed, what I worry about is
whether we are really informing them. We are talking to a society that does not believe in
the germ theory of disease so it’s difficult to explain.”97 There is a pervasive belief in
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most cultures of developing countries that a person’s death is usually as result of sorcery,
rather than an underlying disease. Potential subjects also believe that illness and disease
can be inflicted on individuals by the use of sorcery.98 Marshall quotes a physician
reflecting on patient’s belief about the cause of hypertension as follows: “some people
ask us what causes hypertension… whether it’s inherited or whether it’s caused by
someone thinking something as in sorcery.”99
Researchers from developed countries should respect the culture and the belief
system of the local population involved in research in developing countries. They need to
refrain from attacking their belief system, and focus on explaining the safety and efficacy
of the interventions being tested. Sommer articulates a similar view thus, “we do not want
to fight a belief system. We simply say we have this pill. We believe it is safe. We think
it may reduce the recurrence of the following thing. We would like you to take it.”100
A related issue in the discussion of barrier to comprehension is the cultural belief
about the biomedical procedures, especially with regard to blood drawn for laboratory
tests. There are grave concerns that some potential subjects believe that blood drawn for
tests could be used for sorcery practices against them. Marshall cites a research
assistant’s view regarding this issue, “there are concerns about drawing too much blood.
People are worried about the effect on their health, and also what you are going to do
with it, some might think it could be used for sorcery.”101 Beliefs about the potential
harm linked with the misuse of blood specimens play a major role in informed consent
process. It affects potential subjects’ comprehension of research goals and their decision
to participate. Potential subjects should be educated and reassured about the purpose of
drawing blood and how it might be used.102 Their fears should be allayed about the
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potential harm that may result from their involvement in the research. The
comprehension of research goals and procedures can also be impacted by problems,
linked with the misunderstanding of potential subjects that participating in clinical trials
is the same as receiving routine medical care or treatment.

B.2.b.iii. Therapeutic Misconception
A key feature of informed consent to participate in biomedical research is the
understanding of the difference between clinical research and ordinary treatment. In some
cases, research subjects fail to appreciate the difference between research and treatment,
and this condition is dubbed therapeutic misconception.103 Confusion regarding the
purpose of research is critical in any definition of therapeutic misconception. Therapeutic
misconception is prevalent when a subject is primarily motivated by a desire for personal
benefit to enroll in a research, even in studies with minimum chance of benefit.104
Applelbaum et al., define therapeutic misconception as “when a research subject fails to
appreciate the distinction between the imperatives of clinical research and ordinary
treatment, and therefore inaccurately attributes therapeutic intent to research
procedures.”105 In the same vein, the NBAC defines therapeutic misconception as “the
belief that the purpose of a clinical trial is to benefit the individual patient rather than to
gather data for the purpose of contributing to scientific knowledge.”106
Applebaum and Lidz documented a study in which the patients interviewed were
enrolled in clinical trials that involved randomization, placebo, non-treatment control
groups and double blind procedures. The study showed that 69% of the research subjects
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did not know that their allocation to control and experimental groups would be
randomized. Furthermore, 40% of the research subjects thought that treatment
assignment’s decision would be made based on their therapeutic needs. Finally, 44% of
the research subjects did not appreciate that the use of placebos and non-treatment control
groups implied that some subjects who wanted experimental intervention would not
receive it.107 Literature highlights some essential features which indicate the prevalence
of therapeutic misconception in clinical research; people often overestimate the benefit of
enrolling in a study, 108 underestimate the risks,109 are muddled regarding how treatments
will be allocated either to control or experimental group,110 and usually inclined to
confuse research with ordinary treatment.111
However, some authors do not agree that overestimation of direct benefit or
underestimation of risk or both together constitutes an essential feature of therapeutic
misconception. Horng and Grady contend that there is a clear distinction between
therapeutic misconception and therapeutic misestimation. They argue that therapeutic
misconception focuses on the nature or intent of clinical research, while therapeutic
misestimation deals with misunderstanding the probability of direct benefit or risk that
may result from participating in research. They further contend that the heterogeneity of
clinical trial design makes inferences about realistic expectation of direct benefits very
challenging.112 Some authors have identified five draft dimensions of research that trial
participants should understand before enrolling in clinical research including scientific
purpose, study procedures, uncertainty, adherence to protocol and clinician as
investigator. They indicate that specific questions to assess therapeutic misconception
should be developed within the scope of five draft dimensions of research already

81

outlined.113 Potential subjects who lack adequate understanding of the purpose and
methods of research are not equipped to evaluate risks and benefits of research
participation. They also may not be able to appreciate how personal care may be
compromised by research procedures such as randomization and use of placebos.114
The prevalence of therapeutic misconception in clinical trials conducted in
developing countries is exacerbated by the severity of the disease. Study conducted by
Schaeffer et. al, shows that disease severity affects comprehension of information, and
that the most severely sick research subjects are likely to attribute therapeutic intent to
research that has remote chance of benefit as in phase 1 trials. They postulate that a
subject with an immediate life-threatening disease and no therapeutic alternative might
retain less information from a consent document, than a subject with less severe disease
and more therapeutic options. In the same vein, research subjects with life-threatening
conditions are less autonomous than healthy volunteers in their decision making. Their
motivation for enrolling in the trials is care of their health condition and may consent
without considering the potential risks involved. The study shows that healthy volunteers
retained the most information about risks and side effects, while severely ill subjects
retained the least. Furthermore, more sick subjects than healthy volunteers reported that
the informed consent document had no effect on their decision to participate in the trial.
Subjects with severe health conditions like cancer and HIV/AIDS may enroll in clinical
trials with goals that are different from the goals of the research. Research subjects with
advanced disease conditions rate the consent document as less relevant in their decision
to participate in a trial which was primarily motivated by expectations and hopes of

82

recovery. They have poor retention of disclosed risk information probably due to denial
of unpleasant realities, or avoidance of disturbing thoughts related to risk information.115
The onslaught of HIV/AIDS and lack of adequate access to anti-retroviral
treatments in developing countries for most of the population result in desperation for
potential subjects. In most developing countries, potential subjects are usually not able to
access adequate and quality treatment outside the research context. The implication is
that potential subjects in resource limited countries count solely on being enrolled in
clinical trials in order to access better health care. NBAC affirms, “it is not a
misconception to believe that participants probably will receive good clinical care during
research. But, it is a misconception to believe that the purpose of clinical trials is to
administer treatment, rather than to conduct research.”116 Despite potential barriers to
adequate comprehension of information for research subjects in clinical trials conducted
in developing countries, there is an indication that those barriers can be surmounted by
innovative ways of presenting information to potential subjects.

B.2.b.iv. Innovative Strategies to Enhance Comprehension of Information
Comprehension of information by research subjects can be enhanced when
researchers engage the community in which research is conducted in active discussions of
project goals and procedures through meetings with community leaders or public forums,
and when information is provided to potential subjects prior to obtaining informed
consent.117 Woodsong and Karim indicate that community involvement is a prerequisite
to achieving high quality informed consent especially in circumstances in which the
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cultural norms of the researchers and participants differ significantly. They proposed a
model designed to enhance informed consent process that occurs during three phases of
the research period, pre-enrollment, enrollment and post-enrollment, and at two levels,
individual and community. Individual participants are familiarized with a study before
enrollment, and the larger community in which participants are drawn are also involved
in order to be cognizant of and support the research effort.118 Respecting the community
and its values is essential. More so, the research protocol should start and end with the
community.119 In another study of HIV-1 transmission in Haiti, Fitzgerald et. al report
that the understanding of the content of the consent forms by research participants
increased considerably after meetings with a counselor in which information was
provided concerning the study. In this study, 80% of the 30 individual participants passed
an oral examination before enrollment in the research project.120
Comprehension of information by research subjects can also be enhanced
through consultation with cultural experts and local representatives concerning the most
effective ways of communicating with potential research participants regarding the
purpose of the study and the importance of obtaining consent.121 Researchers can conduct
focus groups with representatives of potential subjects for comprehending issues and
concerns related to preparing the consent form and developing approaches to obtaining
consent.122
Comprehension may be increased using a continuous consent process. Vallely
et al. write, “providing information to trial participants in a focused, locally appropriate
manner, using methods developed in consultation with the community, and within a
continuous informed consent framework resulted in high levels of comprehension and
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message retention in this setting.”123 They describe a study aimed at investigating the
effectiveness of a continuous informed consent process adopted during microbicide trial
in Mwanza, Tanzania. In this study, participatory community research methods were used
to develop a locally-appropriate pictorial flipchart in order to communicate key messages
regarding the trial to potential participants. Pre-recorded audio tapes were also used to
promote understanding and compliance with instructions pertinent to the trial. A
comprehension checklist was also administered to all participants at different stages of
the trial. In depth interviews were used to measure how well participants internalize and
retain key messages provided in a continuous informed consent process.124
Researchers also facilitate comprehension by using concepts and terms
understandable to the community hosting the research, to explain complex issues in
biomedical research. For example, the principle of randomization and the possibility that
one of the vaccines might fail were explained with a familiar agricultural example, the
analogy of testing fertilizers or new seeds on randomized plots, a procedure familiar to
farmers in the area.125 The concepts of immunology and immune cells were explained
with familiar analogy, people who guard houses, but it’s a particular kind of watchman in
your body.126 Pertinent to note also is that adequate comprehension of information by
research participants facilitates either voluntary informed consent or refusal.

B.2.c. Voluntary Participation in Clinical Research
The requirement of voluntary participation in clinical research is a critical
component of informed consent. Clinical research in developing countries is confronted
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with several challenges especially with regard to voluntary consent. Marshall highlights
four major challenges to voluntary consent, (1) the ability of a person to understand study
objectives and the risks involved; (2) the vulnerability of potential subjects to incentives
including money, drugs or medical treatment; (3) the power and authority of researchers
to impact a potential subject’s decision to participate due to their professional background
and social status; (4) the influence of community pressure to participate in a study
especially when community elders give permission.127 In developing countries,
diminished autonomy for research participants is prevalent. There are concerns that due
to high levels of poverty in developing countries that payment provided to research
participants may unduly induce them to enroll in HIV/AIDS clinical trial.128 Payment is
possibly viewed as coercion when those recruited are very poor or if the benefits are
considerable.129
Furthermore, voluntary participation in research is more challenging for
potential participants when no other treatment options are available. In developing
countries, people may feel unduly induced to enroll in HIV clinical research because of
limited affordable access to anti-retroviral drugs. They consider enrolling in clinical
research as the only option to receive anti-retroviral treatment which makes voluntary
informed consent or refusal more difficult. However, we need to resist the line of
argument that one’s consent is not voluntary just in case one has no acceptable
alternative.130 Voluntary participation in research requires conditions free of coercion
and undue inducement or influence. A detailed analysis of the impact of coercion and
undue inducement in voluntary choice to participate in clinical research follows.
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B.2.c.i. Coercion and Undue Inducement
Coercion occurs when one person intentionally uses a credible and severe
threat of harm or force to control another or to compel him or her to do something.131
Coercion is also defined as the presence of a threat of harm or force that could make the
coerced person worse off in some way.132 On the other hand, undue influence deals with
an offer that is considered excessive, unwarranted or inappropriate or improper reward or
other overture for obtaining compliance.133 Beauchamp and Childress identify three
forms of influence, coercion, persuasion and manipulation that can void autonomous
decision to participate in clinical research.134
Most decisions that individuals make, including the decision whether to
participate in a research study, are affected by multiple influences. Generally, people
choose and act in consonance with their wants and needs, which are usually influenced
by their physical, psychological, social, economic, and cultural experiences and
circumstances.135 In a similar vein, Faden and Beauchamp acknowledge that influences
on peoples’ decisions can come in many forms, and from many sources. They can differ
significantly in degree of influence actually exercised.136 Some influences may be
adequately strong to constitute inducements, motivations, or stimuli for action. It is also
pertinent to note that inducements do not necessarily invalidate or preclude voluntary
choice. We encounter and respond to inducements all of the time in various areas of life,
including selecting employment, making purchases, participating in research, and other
choices. There is usually no single reason for doing something, since human motivation
is complex and most times entails multiple considerations.137
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Coercion in the sense of researchers threatening to make anyone worse off for
refusing to participate in a research study is not a common problem. Coercion may be an
issue in relation to research conducted with prisoners or other captive populations, in
which refusal to participate in research could result in punishment or retaliation.
However, most institutional review boards (IRBs) ban threats of harm for refusal,
whenever a power differential exists between researcher and participant. Even in
circumstances when there is no threat, people may sometimes fear they will be treated
worse. Both perceived and real coercion do not have any link to payment because
payment should never be a threat itself. There may be possibility of a third party coercion
in some cases, if the spouse of someone refusing to participate in a paid research study
threatens the refusing spouse. But, in such cases researchers should not be held
responsible for coercion. Payment may decrease perceived coercion in doctor-patient
relation by completely changing the exchange into one that is less personal and unrelated
to medical care.138
There is an ongoing debate as to what makes certain offers undue. Generally,
offers are considered unduly influential if they are so enticing that they lead individuals
to participate in clinical research they would otherwise preferred not to participate.139
Certain conditions may raise concerns for the possibility of undue inducements to
participate in clinical research, even if they pose significant risk of harm. Such conditions
may include offers of medical care not otherwise available or offers of money. CIOMS
guidelines document recognizes that, “it may be difficult to distinguish between suitable
recompense and undue influence to participate in research… someone without access to
medical care may or may not be unduly influenced to participate in research simply to
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receive such care.”140 This situation is prevalent in developing countries, in which most
people living with HIV/AIDS have limited or no access to anti-retroviral treatments. In
general terms, the provision of medical care or treatment that would not otherwise be
available to research participants should not be interpreted as an undue influence to
participate.141 Researchers from developing countries surveyed by Kass and Hyder
supported this conclusion. In the survey, 64 percent of the researchers indicated that
participants joined research projects in order to obtain compensation, medical care or
other benefits.142 Most researchers interviewed in focus groups for this same study were
of the opinion that it was satisfactory, given the general risk/benefit ratio of the research.
Some focus group respondents mentioned that providing significant benefits basically
gave potential participants no reasonable choice except to participate, but they did not
construe this as undue inducement.143 NBAC indicates that even though the potential
benefits of participation in research for those in developing countries who lack access to
medical care may be an inducement to participate in research, this does not adequately
diminish the voluntariness of their decision in a way that would make their consent
ethically invalid.144
On the other hand, being attracted to the money offered for participation in a
research does not necessarily exclude the possibility of other influential motivations and
considerations. Research subjects may participate in research for numerous reasons other
than money.145 Grady argues, “if inducements can be compatible with voluntary choice,
then money, as an inducement, does not inherently obviate or compromise
voluntariness.”146 Apparently, most subjects who are attracted to participate in research
partly because of money, still have the freedom to refuse. Potential subjects are usually
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advised of their right to exercise this freedom in the process of obtaining voluntary
informed consent. They are reminded about their voluntary choice to participate and that
they have the right to refuse or withdraw at any time without punishment.147
Furthermore, many people who are attracted to research because of money
usually have other options for acquiring money, generally from other full or part-time
unskilled jobs. Potential subjects may choose research participation because of other
considerations such as flexible hours, limited time, or that it seems more interesting and
easier. More so, subjects who volunteered to participate in research can exercise their
freedom to refuse when they decide that participating in the particular research study is
not in their advantage.148 Concerns about potential for money serving as an undue
inducement in the sense of making research an irresistible offer have been acknowledged
for persons who are poor and have no other means of obtaining comparable amounts of
money. Eliminating the option of obtaining money through research participation which
has been propounded by some people does not resolve the issue. In the process of
obtaining informed consent, the emphasis is better focused on more appropriate and
effective strategies such as, a subject’s reason for participating, his or her understanding
and expectations of research, and his or her impression of freedom to choose whether to
participate or not.149
The ethical concern about money being an inappropriate motivating factor for
research participation has been identified. Money is known for getting people to do things
they would prefer not to do, and in some instances for getting people to do something
they know is wrong. Money is as well considered capable of inappropriately distorting
people’s judgments and motivations.150 The U.S. Office of Protection from Research
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Risks (OPRR), currently known as the Office of Human Research Protections (OHRP)
points out the problematic nature of money as a possible undue inducement for research
participation. In this context, money can diminish or weaken an individual’s judgment
about what is at stake in the research or blind him or her to the potential risks of research
participation. OPRR also indicates that offers of money could influence potential
participants to distort something about themselves in order to acquire or maintain
enrollment in a research study and receive the money. Distortion may not only endanger
the informed consent of participants, but perhaps also their well-being as well as the
integrity of the study.151 The vulnerability of potential subjects to distorted judgment
because of money is relative not only to their particular circumstances but more
importantly to their values. The implication is that even in very desperate situations,
some people cannot be bought. Nevertheless, the bigger the sum of money involved, the
greater the tendency for altering judgment or prompting potential participants to lie or
ignore risks.152 CIOMS notes, “the payments should not be so large … or the medical
services so extensive as to induce prospective subjects to consent to participate in the
research against their better judgment.”153 There is a consensus among some scholars that
limiting the amount of money paid for research participation decreases the possibility that
money will alter judgment and induce people to engage in deception.154 Payment to
research participants as acknowledgement for their contribution which may be calculated
according to locally acceptable standard is probably more modest. The implication is that
modest payment is less likely to alter judgment than amounts designed exclusively to
attract subjects and exceed the competition in relation to recruitment.155 Random or huge
amounts of money intended clearly to attract, to overpay other studies, or to compensate
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for risk should not be allowed. Modest payment considered as compensation for the
participant’s contribution decreases the likelihood of undue inducement, because the
offer of money is neither excessive nor inappropriate.156 Voluntary participation in
clinical research can also be enhanced or impaired by influences related to decisional
authority for consent to research in developing countries.

B.2.c.ii. Decisional Authority for Consent to Clinical Research in Developing Countries
Freedom of choice and personal decision-making are usually emphasized in the
discussion of voluntary informed consent. Marshall articulates that, “beliefs about
individual autonomy and decisional capacity are embedded within the social and cultural
patterns of community obligations and family ties.”157 Personal autonomy is highlighted
in western industrialized countries. The implication is that individuals are anticipated to
make decisions about research participation for themselves or through chosen surrogates.
On the other hand, in numerous non-western countries, family members, or community
leaders may play a major part in decisions regarding medical care and medical
research.158 There are two points to be considered, first, influences from community
leaders; and second, influences from family members in the decision to participate in
clinical research.
In most cultures in developing countries researchers must seek permission from a
community leader or village council before any interactions with potential research
subjects. A clear distinction should be made between obtaining permission to enter a
community for conducting research and for acquiring individual voluntary informed
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consent.159 CIOMS highlights, the importance of meeting with community leaders,
councils of appointed or elected elders or other designated authorities to seek formal or
informal approval of a study in some contexts, but also emphasizes that it does not
replace obtaining individual voluntary consent.160 In meeting with community and village
leaders, researchers explain and discuss the details of the proposed study with them. The
leaders are given opportunity to discuss and ask questions regarding the proposed study,
before reaching a consensus whether to approve or reject permission for the research to
be conducted in their community. When the permission has been granted by community
and village leaders, the researcher could easily approach individuals for their
participation. Individuals have the choice to decline participation in the research despite
their village or community leader’s approval of the study.161
While researchers are encouraged to obtain permission from community leaders
or designated authorities before engaging in research, an ethical problem is encountered
when the community leader wields undue influence on the community in a way that
impedes the voluntariness of individual consent.162 In some situations, the head of the
village or a group of elders makes a joint decision for the village. The implication is that
almost everyone will participate if they make decision to approve participating in the
research. The people in the community are very unwilling to withdraw from the research
because of the shared nature of community activities.163 Marshall acknowledges that in
some settings, authorization by the community leader is consistent with individuals’ right
to decline and authorization in a context in which the chief has the final say.164 One
researcher articulated two levels of consent or permission: “One is community and the
other is individual…. When you leave the chief, the chief is expected to open households,
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so there is really another level of consent in between…the chief and council, the
household head, then the individual.”165 The impact of the approval of the study by a
chief on the community response was explored. One researcher indicated that community
members for the most part consent to participate when researchers obtain prior approval
from the chief or household heads. There were also some doubts regarding the degree to
which individual consent to participate is voluntary.166
There were also discussions on differences between the rural and urban settings
concerning the significance of obtaining permission from local community leaders. The
strict requirement of community consent is stronger in rural setting than urban setting. 167
One physician commenting on the difference between the process of obtaining consent in
urban and rural settings indicated: “In the rural area, community consent is stronger than
the urban area. In Ibadan, some neighborhoods have traditional leadership, some modern,
some have a traditional chief and the community structure still holds.”168 In some
cultures, the processes for recruiting participants include community leaders who use
their authority to prevent individuals from refusing to participate in research for which
permission has been granted. Furthermore, authoritarian governments in some countries
may restrict autonomous decision-making by their citizens, which may influence their
participation in research.169 A related issue with regard to decisional capacity for the
consent to participate in research in developing countries is the influences from family
members in personal decision-making.
In developing countries, family-centered decision-making is customary than
individual decision-making.170 Family members of potential research participants are
usually involved in the informed consent process. Potential research participants
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generally seek permission from a family member in order to be enrolled in clinical
trials.171 In most cases, the need to include the family is not intended as a replacement for
individual consent, but rather as an additional step in the process. For example,
researchers in one country pointed out that research participants frequently become
doubtful of researchers who attempt to enroll participants in a biomedical study without
involving the family in the decision-making process.172 Sugarman et al. also described a
research project in another country that involves a multistep consent process which starts
with community consent and followed by individual parental consent for research
involving children. Lastly, village elders were involved in sessions with children, due to
community worries that children might be kidnapped and used as servants or be subjected
to harvesting of their organs.173
Loue, Okello and Kawuna acknowledge the importance of involving family
members in the informed consent process in Uganda. Even though Ugandan civil law
requires an 18 year old male residing at home to make his decisions, it is normal for the
son to seek his father’s consent before engaging in any obligation or contract, including
research participation. Furthermore, some Ugandan women seek the approval of their
husband prior to making a decision concerning their participation in research. In
numerous traditional societies in developing countries, obtaining approval from one’s
husband may be routine.174 In another study of anti-malarial drugs conducted in Kenya,
the research assistants indicated that the women were hesitant to discuss with the
researchers before obtaining approval from their husbands.175
Researchers in developing countries emphasize the need to involve the family
members in the informed consent process, without compromising the requirement of
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individual voluntary informed consent. For example, Marshall indicated that obtaining
the approval of a woman’s husband before enrolling her in a research might be a
requirement in Nigeria, where traditional cultural norms are strong. A Nigerian physician
engaged in a breast cancer study described that cancer patients frequently require the
permission of their husbands to participate in clinical research. Nevertheless, the
physician also stressed that in such cases, the individual consent of the woman is still
crucial. It is also pertinent to note that most researchers have devised strategies that
accommodate and encourage discussion about study participation with family members.
In the hypertension study, for instance, the study is explained to patients and they are
handed over the information to take home. The patient is given an appointment for a later
date in order to obtain his or her consent.176
Marshall also explained the difficulties involved in the negotiation of permission.
For example, in one case, a woman described different strategies she can use in order to
convince her hesitant husband to grant her an approval to participate in a clinical
research. She listed strategies such as cooking him a good meal before asking him again,
giving him time to think about it, and bringing it up again and seeking the assistance of
individuals he respects.177 In this context, persuasion can be an effective instrument. It
implies also that obtaining approval does not essentially indicate a loss of personal
autonomy. In some cases, outcomes of interviews conducted with women in Nigeria
indicate that they differentiate between their experience of self-determination and their
need, to persuade their husband of the relevance and significance of the research to them
personally.178 It is also pertinent to acknowledge the changeability that occurs not just
across cultures, but within specific social settings. A study focusing on informed consent
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in genetic research conducted in Nigeria, reported that all the women interviewed were
not required to obtain approval from their husbands to participate in the study.179
Various international guidelines and recommendations such as CIOMS, 2002;
Nuffield Council on Bioethics, 2002, 2005; National Bioethics Advisory Commission,
2001, emphasized the significance of individual consent to research.180 For example,
CIOMS guidelines indicated that the woman’s informed consent is the only thing
required for her participation in research. The permission of either a spouse or a partner
will not on any occasion substitute for the requirement of individual informed consent.
Women were highly encouraged on their own to consult with their husbands or partners
before making a decision to enroll in research. It was also made categorically clear that a
strict requirement of authorization of spouse or partner, infringes on the substantive
principle of respect for persons.181 The implication is that CIOMS guidelines give a
stronger defense of women’s autonomy than NBAC recommendations, which allow a
research ethics committee to make determination on the need for spousal authorization
with appropriate documentation.182 Macklin expresses her uncertainty regarding allowing
exceptions that would involve approaching a woman’s husband or father before speaking
to her. She strongly supports not permitting any exceptions, so as not to perpetuate or
reinforce the practice prevalent in developing countries where women are considered
subservient or inferior, which violates the principles of respect for autonomy and equal
respect for women. Macklin also acknowledged that spousal authorization could be
justified from the utilitarian perspective, if the consequences of not conducting the
research would be serious.183 The discussion of informed consent process also calls
attention to legal requirements of documentation and enforcement of voluntary informed

97

consent, which will hold researchers and sponsors responsible for their unethical
practices especially in developing countries.

B.3. Legal Requirements of Documentation and Enforcement of Voluntary Informed
Consent in Clinical Research in Developing Countries
B.3.a. Documentation of Informed Consent in Clinical Research
Requirements for documentation of informed consent by U.S. funding agencies
present serious challenges in clinical trials conducted in developing countries. Major
concerns regarding documentation of informed consent stem from the length and
complication of informed consent documents and the necessity of written and signed
consent. These problems may constitute impediments not only to obtaining consent from
potential subjects, but also to subject’s comprehension of the study.184 Requirements for
signed consent forms stress the legal aspect of the consent as a signed contract rather than
a social process. From this perspective, critics argue that the purpose of informed consent
is more to protect the interests of institutions and researchers rather than those of the
subjects.185
In some developing countries, obtaining written and signed consent from research
subjects may be considered very challenging and inappropriate. One clear situation is that
of illiterate subjects, who may be comfortable with oral consent, but unsettled with
written consent, because they didn’t understand the content of the consent documents.
Furthermore, people are suspicious of any signing process in some cultures, especially in
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countries where they have lived under oppressive regimes and dread that signing a
document could put them in danger.186 Sugarman et. al gave two examples of the
challenges of obtaining written and signed informed consent documents in some settings.
In one project that includes many illiterate subjects, local researchers did not use
thumbprints, even though it was regarded as an appropriate means of documenting
individual consent, because it was very closely associated with past police tactics and was
believed to alarm potential research subjects. In another setting, where guerilla warfare
was continuing, using written informed consent presented a risk to research subjects
because these documents connected them to specific institutions.187 A site visitor
abridged this point clearly, “signing a form in this country means asking for trouble,
whereas signing a form in the United States means self-protection.”188
In Marshall’s research conducted in Nigeria, researchers in that setting indicated that
individuals may have some concern in connection to writing their signature or putting
their thumbprint on a formal document because of suspicions regarding how the
document may be used against them.189 A Nigerian researcher pointed out that, “even if
they use a thumbprint, they can get suspicious. They can’t read so they wonder why you
need their thumbprint. It’s a big fear…the issue has to do with government documents.
It’s threatening because they don’t know what they are signing or what they might be
giving away.”190 Similarly, Upvall and Haswani also compared informed consent in
Pakistan and Swaziland and indicated that some subjects might find it menacing to sign a
document when they are uneducated or do not comprehend its contents, especially if
signing or utilizing a thumbprint might only be utilized for marriage documents or for
other important life events.191 Kass and Hyder established that researchers working in
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developing countries were worried about the need for signatures. A respondent in the
focus group noted that in Latin America, those with inadequate reading capacity are very
undecided about signing things. The researchers’ emphasis on informed consent is
understood as culturally insensitive but was accepted out of understanding of their needs
to fulfill requirements of their funding agency and government regulations.192
International guidelines acknowledge the validity of verbal consent when written
consent is either unsuitable or improper but only when it is appropriately documented.193
For example, the Nuffield Council on Bioethics endorses that if asking for a person’s
signature is inappropriate, at that point other ways should be designed for documenting
consent, such as an audio-taped recording, or an independent witness for verbal
consent.194 NBAC also recommends that U.S. research guidelines should be revised to
allow ethics review committees to waive requirements for written and signed consent
forms to be adaptable enough to local cultural norms.195 Another critical issue that
requires attention is the legal enforcement of informed consent through the court, which
allows research subjects whose rights have been violated in clinical trials to seek
compensation.

B.3.b. Legal Enforcement of Informed Consent through the Court
The story reported by Washington Post regarding clinical trial conducted by
Pfizer researchers in Kano, Nigeria during a major meningitis epidemic set the stage for
the enforcement of violations of rights of research participants through U.S. court, under
Alien Tort Statute (ATS).196 The story sparked an outrage, with the description of the
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gradual death of a 10 year-old girl identified as Subject 6587-0069. The Pfizer
researchers observed her dying for days without adjusting her treatment, in a protocol
designed to test an oral form of the antibiotic trovafloxacin, with a trade-name Trovan in
children.197 The Washington Post also reported that its inquiry into drug experiments
sponsored by corporations, “in Africa, Asia, Eastern Europe and Latin America reveals a
booming, poorly regulated testing system that is dominated by private interests and that
far too often betrays its promises to patients and consumers.”198
In the protocol designed by Pfizer researchers, two hundred sick children were
enrolled and assigned into two groups. One group was treated with Trovan, the
experimental drug, and the other group was treated with low dose ceftriaxone, an FDA
approved drug which is the best standard of care for treatment of bacterial meningitis.199
The children’s blood was supposed to be monitored during the course of the trial, but it
was not followed through as result of insufficient number of medical staff. As a result of
such laxity on the part of Pfizer, they didn’t identify the children who were not doing
well with the experimental drug, Trovan in order to switch them to standard intervention.
This violation in standard procedure apparently resulted in severe brain damage or death
for several children. Pfizer also left Kano after two weeks without any plans for
implementation of follow up interventions.200 Specifically, eleven children died, five who
had received Trovan and six who had been administered a low dose of Ceftriaxone. Many
others suffered blindness, deafness, brain damage and paralysis.201
Due to alleged violations of the rights of the subjects who were enrolled in Pfizer
trial conducted in Kano, their families filed lawsuits against Pfizer in Nigeria and United
States. Pfizer was primarily charged with conducting medical experiments without
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obtaining voluntary informed consent from the subjects in the Nigerian law suit. In 2006,
the report from Ministry of Health in Nigeria established that the trial breached Nigerian
law, the Declaration of Helsinki and the United Nations’ Convention on the Rights of the
child. At this juncture, the Nigerian government brought both a criminal and a civil
lawsuit against Pfizer in Nigeria. A resolution to the case was reached, but the details of
the agreement were not made public.202
The first lawsuit in United States against Pfizer, filed by the families of the dead
and injured subjects, under the ATS in the Southern District Court of New York occurred
in 2001. The ATS was approved in 1789 as a Judiciary act, and provides U.S. district and
federal courts with jurisdiction to handle claims by foreigners for civil offenses
committed “in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States.”203 Many
allegations were leveled against Pfizer. The plaintiffs claimed that Pfizer failed to obtain
informed consent from the subjects or their parents/guardians and precisely failed to
divulge and describe the experimental nature of the trial and the potential risks and side
effects of Trovan and Ceftriaxone. The subjects were not offered or read informed
consent documents either in English or Hausa, the subjects’ native language. Pfizer also
failed to offer the subjects the option of an alternative treatment, by not furnishing them
with the information that Medecins Sans Frontieres (Doctors Without Borders) a nongovernmental organization was offering more conventional and effective treatments for
bacterial meningitis, at the same location, for free. There was no prior review of the
study, because the ethics review committee was non-existent at the research site. The
backdated authorization letter for the study from the nonexistent hospital ethics review
committee which was presented was a forged document.204 The implication is that two of
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the safeguards usually established to protect research subjects were either absent or faulty
in the trial conducted by Pfizer in Nigeria.205
The claims of Nigerian families involved in the Pfizer trial built on four sources
of international law that prohibited bio-medical experimentation on human subjects
without their consent, the Nuremberg Code, the Declaration of Helsinki, the CIOMS
Guidelines, and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR). The
district court acknowledged that conducting medical experimentation without the consent
of human subjects violates the laws of nations and invariably, the laws of the United
States. Nevertheless, the court argued that the law of nations does not authorize an
obligation for plaintiffs’ compensation.206 The court indicated that the “ law of nations
does not create private causes of action to remedy its violations, but leaves to each nation
the task of defining the remedies that are available for international law violations.”207
The court addressing the issue of claims of violations of international law based on the
Code and Declaration that endorsed jurisdiction under the ATS, argued that the nonbinding nature of these international documents, “does not create a private right of action
in US federal courts and is unlikely to give rise to obligations in any strict sense.208
Therefore, the court dismissed the claims of plaintiffs for failing to offer a justification
for ATS jurisdiction.
The precedent case which is far more important in our discussion of legal
enforcement of informed consent is the January 2009 opinion of the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit. The opinion reversed the district court’s decision and
sent the case back to the same court for another trial. The Second Circuit agreed that the
prohibition of nonconsensual medical experimentation on human subjects constitutes a
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norm of customary international law. It allows the Nigerian families to file a lawsuit
against Pfizer in the United States.209 This landmark decision offers a significant solution
to the enforcement problem of informed consent. In the first place, it recognized
informed consent as a universal legal norm. Secondly, it allows a lawsuit against a
pharmaceutical company based in America, for violation of human rights.210 Lee argues
that “in doing so, the court articulated a legally enforceable framework for a foreign
country’s nationals to pursue clinical trial violations.”211
The court also recognized that apart from the universal nature of the informed
consent as a customary international law norm, the norm also has requirements that is
specific and is of mutual concern among nations.212 The Second Circuit court argues that,
“The American tribunal’s conclusion that action that contravened the Code’s first
principle constituted a crime against humanity is a lucid indication of the international
legal significance of the prohibition on the nonconsensual medical experimentation.”213
The implication is that the court raised the issue of the medical experimentation on
human subjects without obtaining voluntary informed consent from them, to the status of
an international human rights violation and a crime against humanity that can be enforced
in the international court. Related to the issue of enforcement of informed consent is the
protection of the rights of potential human subjects with an adequate and thorough
independent review of research protocol by a well constituted ethics review committee.

C.

Ethics Review Committee

C.1. Preamble
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U.S. federal regulations generally referred to as the “Common Rule” require that
research funded by U.S. government or conducted by a government agency or institutions
that comply with common rule or intended for submission to the Food and Drug
Administration must be reviewed by a U.S. Institutional Review Board (IRB) and also by
a local, regional, or national committee in the country where the research is conducted.214
International ethical guidelines and declarations also emphasized the requirement of
review of research involving human subjects. For example, CIOMS stipulates that, “all
proposals to conduct research involving human subjects must be submitted for review of
their scientific merit and ethical acceptability to one or more scientific review and ethical
review committees.”215
Allegations of violations regarding ethical review of research protocols for trials
conducted in developing countries abound. Macklin reported two cases that involved U.S.
researchers from U.S. institutions that violated the requirement of review of research in
conducting international collaborative research. In one case, a researcher from the
Harvard School of Public Health conducted a series of epidemiologic genetic studies in a
rural province in China. The studies recruited vulnerable subjects who were poor and
illiterate. The studies entailed taking subjects’ blood samples and carrying out lung
function tests and x-rays. One of the violations reported about this research was that the
researcher failed to submit some studies to the IRB at Harvard School of Public Health
and to obtain approval from the committee before conducting the study. The researcher
also made changes in the research in some of the studies after the initial approval, but
failed to obtain approval for the changes he effected. Informed consent violations were
also reported. The informed consent documents were considered insufficient, both
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because they had no information about the right of subjects to refuse to participate, and
because they were too complicated for rural Chinese farmers to comprehend. There was
also another concern about the subjects risking being discriminated against in the area of
job, if their employers discovered health problems diagnosed in the studies. No
information was furnished regarding the level to which the subjects’ confidentiality could
be sufficiently protected in China.216
The second case of violation involved a professor of microbiology at the
University of California at Los Angeles (UCLA), who failed to obtain IRB approval for a
research he conducted in collaboration with another researcher in China. The study
involved analyzing data and blood samples of research subjects. The study also involved
injecting malaria-infected blood into Chinese AIDS patients which has been confirmed
by many scientists as fraudulent medical practice.217 These violations more prevalent in
research conducted in developing countries, where subjects are more vulnerable calls for
safeguarding their rights. Protecting the rights of research subjects requires a properly
constituted ethics review committee, so that it will be adequately equipped to discharge
its responsibilities.

C.2. Composition and Responsibilities of Ethics Review Committee
C.2.a. Composition of Ethics Review Committee
The composition of Ethics Review Committee or IRB has direct relationship
with its function, because function which is usually regarded as what an entity does, can
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as well in this context be defined in terms of structure. The implication is that proper
composition of ethics review committee directly influences the quality of the ethical
review of research protocols. For example, it will be hard for an ethics review committee
to adequately deliberate on the needs and viewpoints of adults with diminished capacity
for decision making, if none of the members has expertise or experience dealing with this
particular population.218 Lo articulates, “as a group, IRB members must have the
expertise, experience, and diversity of backgrounds needed to review the typical types of
research conducted at an institution. Diversity of backgrounds should include not only
areas of scientific or professional expertise but also culture, race and gender.”219
U.S. federal regulations stipulate the composition of an IRB to be a minimum
of five members from diversified backgrounds, whose primary responsibility is to
promote complete and adequate review of research carried out by the institution.220 The
ethics review committee must have at least one member who focuses mainly on scientific
themes. The ethics review committee is required to comprehend the science fundamental
to the studies it usually reviews, in order to conclude whether the study will generate
valid, generalizable knowledge, and whether minimized risky methods could be utilized
without compromising the science. The ethics review committee must also have at least
one member whose emphasis is on issues related to nonscientific themes. At least one
committee member must not be affiliated with the institution conducting the research.221
In general, ethics review committee members may include physicians, scientists, and
other professionals like nurses, lawyers, ethicists and clergy, also lay persons qualified to
stand for the cultural and moral values of the community and to guarantee that the rights
of the research subjects will be esteemed. The committee members should consist of men
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and women. When a study focuses on illiterate persons, they should be recruited as
committee members or given opportunity for their perspectives to be represented.222
A national or local ethics review committee charged with reviewing and
approving protocols for research sponsored by developed countries should recruit
members who are very acquainted with the customs and traditions of the population or
community involved. Ethics review committees that usually review research protocols
focusing on particular diseases or diminished mental or physical abilities, such as
HIV/AIDS or paraplegia, should recruit members who are knowledgeable and
experienced working with such populations or pay attention to the perspectives of
individuals or organizations advocating for patients with such diseases or impairments.
On the other hand, committees should call or listen to the perspectives of people who
represent or advocate for vulnerable subjects such as children, students, elderly persons
or employees involved in research.223 Members of ethics review committee should not
participate in any review of protocols in which they have conflict of interest and they are
required to offer background information to the committee.224

C.2.b. Responsibilities of Ethics Review Committee
There is a consensus among most scholars that the primary responsibility of an
ethics review committee is to protect the rights of research participants.225 Marshall
articulates that, “the primary aim of ethical review committees (ERCs) is to ensure the
protection of human participants by safeguarding their rights and determining that the
risks associated with participation in the study do not endanger the safety of individuals
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and are reasonable in relation to the anticipated benefits.”226 Guillemin et. al cautioned
regarding ethics review committees’ sometimes being overprotective and paternalistic
toward research participants.227 Ethics review committee accomplishes its task of
protecting the rights of research participants through providing oversight, review and
approval of research protocols. Before the approval of any research study by ethics
review committee, the following criteria must be fulfilled, “ (1) the risks of the study are
minimized; (2) risks are reasonable in relation to the anticipated benefits; (3) selection of
participants is equitable; (4) informed consent is obtained; (5) confidentiality is
maintained; (6) data are adequately monitored.”228 Ethics review committee must also
determine that research participation is voluntary and that withdrawing from the research
will not lead to any adverse consequences for the participants.229 The ethics review
committee in the host country must also determine whether the goals of the research are
responsive to the health needs and priorities of the identified host country.230
Ethics review committees especially in developing countries encounter many
significant challenges in their oversight and review of research. For instance, there may
be structural obstacles that are essentially inherent in their institutions that make it hard to
satisfy international ethical regulatory requirements. Some of these obstacles include lack
of resources, inadequate training among ethics review committee members, and
insufficient infrastructure. Accomplishing adequate ethical review of protocols requires
well equipped and trained ethics review members, which comprehend the necessity of
ethical review of protocols and the responsibilities linked with it. Furthermore, it requires
that institutions possess the technological resources that will enable them to carry out
effective reviews including funds for photocopying materials and staff for managing and
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tracking protocols. Nevertheless, it may be predominant in many developing countries
that there are no ethics review committees or that they are not well equipped to
implement adequate reviews due to inadequate resources or the absence of trained
professionals.231 Hyder et al. reported their findings from a survey that involved 670
health researchers in developing countries, which focused on the role of IRBs in
guaranteeing the adequacy of ethical standards in research carried out in those countries.
Forty four percent of the researchers surveyed indicated that their studies were neither
reviewed by an IRB from a developing country nor by ministry of health and one third of
these studies received their funding from organizations in the U.S. Their findings also
revealed that IRBs in the U.S. were significantly more likely to raise issues related to the
need for consent forms in the local language and approval letters from developing
country representatives, and the protection of confidentiality than by IRBs in the host
country.232
There were also significant concerns regarding conflicts of interests for IRBs in
developing countries. Kass and Hyder reported that some respondents indicated that local
review committees in some countries stress scientific, political, or funding issues rather
than ethical considerations.233 The political nature of decisions made by local IRB was
highlighted by some respondents. One respondent commented, “it is a political approval.
It is not an approval that is about ethics. It was more about whether we would be spies or
we would be real researchers that would benefit Asian Country.”234 In developing
countries with limited resources, corruption and bribes for government officials constitute
major concerns in the establishment and implementation of standards for research ethics
at the national level. Some respondents felt that external organizations exploited
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resource-poor countries, and imposed their wishes on them through controlling some
government officials.235 Some respondents also mentioned power differences between
United States and developing countries, which established a paternalistic situation for
negotiating the terms of research. The disparities in power unfairly impacted decision
making about research. One respondent remarked that, “the biggest problem in
developing countries is that our poverty puts us in a situation where the beggar has no
choice.”236
Ethics review committees in developing countries also encounter difficulties
regarding essential features required for their proper establishment and functioning.
Macpherson discusses the uncertainties that confronted the establishment of a research
ethics committee in Grenada. Some of the unanticipated issues focused on specific
guidelines and procedures to adopt and the appointment and training of members.237 In
another work, Macpherson indicates that international guidelines do not deal with issues
such as the connection between the IRBs and the governments that do not mandate them,
and what kind of procedures or documentation will function in a developing country. She
discusses doubts related to whether ways of guaranteeing confidentiality and obtaining
informed consent will be effective due to socio-cultural impacts in local circumstances,
and whether departures from western standards are justifiable. International guidelines
are considered beneficial in dealing with these issues, but they are prone to diverse
interpretations. She reports that the Grenada experience shows that it is possible for IRBs
in developing countries to adopt international standards. She further contends that there is
a significant need for educational programs not only to improve the capacity of IRBs, but
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as well to guarantee that leaders of developing countries are knowledgeable regarding the
importance of international research guidelines for their nations.238
Most national and international guidelines recommend dual independent ethical
review of research protocols both in the host country and sponsor country, for externally
sponsored research conducted in developing countries.239 Review of externally sponsored
research conducted in developing countries with poor resources poses several ethical
challenges. One problem identified in this area deals with the responsibilities for research
oversight when multiple ethics review boards are involved.240 Adhering to strict U.S
regulations by host country IRBs may present a significant challenge. Researchers from
Nigeria explained administrative concerns about the process of securing approval from
ethics review committees. Some researchers described the problems related to responding
to the requirements of U S funding agencies and at local institutions in Nigeria. A
physician researcher from Lagos, expressed frustrations regarding fighting with
Washington to change the consent form and adapting the form to be useful and suitable
for his Nigerian patients. He expressed frustrations also regarding the administrative
aspects of the process, comprising of paperwork and committee negotiation.241
Discrepancies between ethics review committees in the developed and developing
countries should be resolved. Mechanisms for effectively dealing with such conflicts
between multiple ethics review committees are currently nonexistent. In situations where
ethics review committees cannot resolve differences between themselves, a committee
may decide not to approve the research. The implication is that when a committee from
sponsor’s country decides not to approve the research, the sponsor cannot fund it.
Conversely, when an ethics review committee from a developing county chooses not to
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approve the research, at that point the research cannot be carried out within that
country.242
Apart from ethics review committees’ primary responsibility to protect the rights
of research participants, they also have responsibilities to society and to researchers.
Ethics review committees have a responsibility to society, since it provides the resources
for carrying out the research and it can be significantly influenced by research findings.243
This entails that ethics review committees have a responsibility to evaluate the scientific
merit of research protocols. Any research that does not possess potential benefit to
society should not be approved.244 Kent reports divergent views among local research
committee members, researchers and the public regarding the role of the ethics review
committees in assessing and maintaining the scientific merit of research.245 Some
scholars argue that there is a clear distinction between assessing the ethics of a proposal
and evaluating the scientific merit of a proposal.246 Researchers contend that the scientific
value of a research is usually recognized before requesting for ethical review and
approval, and that it is not within the scope of the ethics review committee’s
responsibility to evaluate scientific merit. Ethics review committees may consider
scientific aspects of research, but it has not been determined to what extent this
constitutes part of their function.247
CIOMS international guidelines stipulate that ethics review committees in both
sponsor country and host country have obligation to carry out both scientific and ethical
review of research protocols. They are also vested with the authority to refuse approval of
research protocols that did not satisfy criteria for their scientific and ethical standards.248
Gelling articulates that ethics committee is discharging its obligation to society, if it
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refuses to grant approval to research proposals that did not meet criteria for scientific
standards. The implication is that ethics committee is protecting society from research
that is not beneficial, so that available limited resources would not be squandered on it.249
Benatar describes this function of ethics review committees to the society as monitoring
and auditing research, as well as providing accountability to the public.250
Ethics review committees as well have responsibility to researchers. Kent
acknowledges researchers’ right to have their protocols treated with respect and due
consideration.251 Researchers expect ethics review committees to avoid unnecessary
delays in the review and approval of their protocols, since they are compelled to produce
outcomes.252 Benatar identified this role of ethics review committees to researchers as
educating and assisting researchers and the community in comprehending and
appreciating the ethics of research.253

C.3. Capacity Building in Clinical Research in Developing Countries
Ethics review committees in most developing countries have inadequate training
in research ethics, experience in reviewing complex protocols and resources to execute
their task. For instance, copying documents or transmitting them electronically to other
committee members may not be possible.254 Capacity building assists in empowering
local institutions in order to carry on the provision of interventions considered to be
effective at the end of the clinical research. Furthermore, strengthening local health
infrastructure helps to narrow global health disparities.255
Capacity building in developing countries may involve variety of activities such
as, “(1) establishing and strengthening independent and competent ethical review
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processes/committees; (2) strengthening research capacity; (3) developing technologies
appropriate to health care and biomedical research; (4) training of research and health
care staff; (5) educating the community from which research subjects will be drawn.”256
Building infrastructures such as clinics, hospitals etc. are also regarded as another area of
capacity development. Respondents in the survey conducted by Kass and Hyder indicated
that they regarded providing physical structure and technological equipment as a means
of giving something back to the communities where the study was conducted at the end
of the study.257
Capacity building must constitute an essential part of any study in developing
countries. Respondents in Kass and Hyder’s survey express the need for training people
in developing countries during every collaborative research in order to be able to
competently accomplish tasks such as grant writing, study design, data collection and
data analysis. The objective of researchers from the sponsoring country should be to
foster capacity development in such a way that studies in developing countries will be
staffed by greater number of local people.258 Kass and Hyder articulate, “researchers
should conceive of their role as facilitating host countries’ capacity to eventually conduct
most of their research independently and should aim for such capacity development as
one of the most significant benefits a study can provide.”259
Strengthening the capacity of ethics review committees or IRBs to carry out
rigorous independent review of protocols has been identified as a critical component of
capacity building initiative in clinical research. Educational programs for committee
members in developing and developed countries should focus on the significance of
comprehending ethical principles and their expression in guidelines for research. There is
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also emphasis on the necessity to acknowledge the impact of local social and cultural
contexts on the implementation of research and the utilization of ethical guidelines.260
Many national and international ethical guidelines stress the importance of
capacity building in international clinical research. NBAC highlights responsibilities of
sponsors of research from developed countries in developing countries as offering help in
building local and national capacity for designing and carrying out clinical trials, and for
the ethical and scientific review of research protocols, and for implementing the
outcomes of the research at the end of a trial.261
Various governments and organizations have established programs to offer
support and training on ethical guidelines for international research and the formation of
ethics review committees or IRBs. The established programs also develop expertise in
bioethics and carrying out independent and competent ethical review of research
protocols.262 For example, the Forgarty International Center of the National Institute of
Health (NIH) in the US is presently sponsoring international research and training
programs in bioethics for the purpose of building research capacity in developing
countries. The programs help in building the capacity of faculties from developing
countries to become competent local investigators who can effectively address ethical
and scientific challenges in international research. The Wellcome Trust established a
funding initiative for supporting research in ethical and social aspects of carrying out
biomedical research in developing countries.263
The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)/ World Bank/ WHO
Special Programme for Research and Training in Tropical Diseases (TDR) is currently
dealing with the importance of strengthening the procedures for ethical review of
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research protocols in developing countries through the training of important individuals
in main research institutions. The UNDP/United Nations Population Fund
(UNFPA)/WHO/World Bank Special Programme for Research, Development and
Research Training in Human Reproduction are presently organizing regional workshops
for training researchers and members of ethics review committees. The Strategic
Initiative for Developing Capacity in Ethical Review (SIDCER) organizes networks
within regions whose task is to identify needs for training and education.264 Enhancing
the capacity of ethics review committee members and researchers in developing countries
results in greater collaborative partnership in international clinical research.

C.4. Collaborative Partnership in Clinical Research in Developing Countries
Building collaborative partnerships between the host and sponsor ethics review
committees from the planning phase of the research is a crucial part for successful
completion of multinational clinical research.265 Research partners from the host country
can assist researchers from developed countries to comprehend the needs and priorities of
the host country, risks linked with circumstances in the country, issues that potential
subjects might have regarding the research and barriers to informed consent process. The
input of host country partners can help to resolve identified challenges and design an
ethically appropriate consent process.266 In contrast, researchers and sponsors from
developed countries should contribute to the infrastructure of the host country by
providing training for local health care workers and ethics review committee members.267
International guidelines for biomedical research emphasize the significance of
collaborative partnerships in international clinical research. The Nuffield Council on
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Bioethics acknowledging the necessity for developing local expertise in developing
countries, advises that sponsors of research promote collaborative partnerships between
researchers from developed and developing countries.268 The NBAC recommends that,
“researchers and sponsors should involve representatives of the community of potential
participants throughout the design and implementation of research projects.”269
Clinical research in developing countries is considered as a partnership between
researchers and sponsors from developed countries and stakeholders in the host country.
The stakeholders will comprise of scientists, clinicians, public and patient
representatives, community groups and government representatives. Preferably, involving
these stakeholders in the research from the planning phase is highly encouraged.270 WHO
and UNAIDS strongly advise researchers and sponsors from developed countries to
actively involve the developing countries’ communities where the research is conducted,
“in an early and sustained manner in the design, development, implementation, and
distribution of results of biomedical HIV prevention trials.”271 Participation of the local
communities in international clinical research should be “an open, iterative, collaborative
process that involves a wide variety of participants and takes place under public
scrutiny”272
Lack of effective engagement of local communities in multinational research from
the initial stages of research planning may lead to failure to successfully carry out and
complete some relevant international clinical trials. More so, active involvement of the
community may enhance not only local community ownership of the research, but as well
the bargaining power of communities and the expertise of local researchers. Communities
influenced by research should effectively participate in all stages of research including
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planning, implementation and dissemination of results. Effective participation in research
is attained by recognizing structural power differences between local communities on the
one hand and researchers and sponsors on the other hand, as well as making concerted
efforts to resolve them. This implies establishing practical strategies for outreach and
engagement of communities in order to bolster participation.273
Researchers must be thoughtful and sympathetic in relation to how community
power and authority are shown in different cultural environments.274 Adebamowo
explains the negative influence of local community dynamics on scientific research
conducted in sub-Saharan Africa. In the case study, researchers involved in international
collaborative research project focused on genetics, unintentionally endangered meddling
with the local power structure through the establishment of a community advisory
board.275 Researchers involved in collaborative partnerships in multinational clinical
research are encouraged to obtain sufficient knowledge regarding local community
dynamics and important power structures before engaging in a research.276
The notion of community engagement in clinical research transcends the
participation of the community. It encompasses the process of engaging in collaborative
partnerships with important research stakeholders who share common goals and
interests.277 In practical terms, this entails “building authentic partnerships, including
mutual respect and active, inclusive participation; power sharing and equity; mutual
benefit or finding the win-win possibility”278 in the collaborative enterprise. Different
models for collaborative partnerships have been utilized in international clinical research
comprising of community advisory boards and working with existing civil society
organization.279 In the same vein, active engagement of developing countries’
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communities in international clinical research has been described in various ways
including community engagement, community participation, community involvement,
community consultation, and collaborative partnership.280 For instance, a tool box for
community participation in HIV trials was created by HIV Prevention Trials Network.
The tool box focuses on promoting collaborative and participatory efforts of both
researchers and community members in order to guarantee that the research activities are
responsive to the needs and priorities of the host community.281
Community consultation is also another example of community engagement in
clinical research, which can be realized by establishing community advisory boards. 282
Ouinn contends that community advisory boards “provide a mechanism for community
consultation that contributes to protecting communities and fostering meaningful
research.”283
Another way of explaining community engagement is collaborative partnership.
Emmanuel et al. identify collaborative partnership as one of the required ethical
principles for clinical research in developing countries.284 They proposed six important
benchmarks for realizing collaborative partnership in multinational clinical research. The
first benchmark focuses on the importance of representing all parties and stakeholders in
developing countries. The second benchmark deals with collaboration, which entails
sharing responsibility for evaluating the significance of the health problem, the
importance of the research to the community, for planning and carrying out the research,
overseeing the research, publishing the results, and incorporating research into the health
care system. The third benchmark emphasizes mutual respect, which involves
acknowledgment and respect for the values, culture, traditions, and social practices of the
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community hosting the research, which should be integrated into the plan and conduct of
the research. The fourth benchmark stresses the importance of reducing inequalities in
relation to the research project between researchers and sponsors from developed
countries on the one hand, and the host community on the other hand. This is realized
through capacity building of research stakeholders in the host community. The fifth
benchmark places emphasis on guaranteeing that participants and host communities
receive fair benefits from the conduct and outcomes of research. The sixth benchmark
discusses the importance of a fair distribution of financial profits, intellectual property
rights, royalties and other rewards of research, among all parties involved in research. 285
Clinical trials in developing countries are still plagued by the inability of participants and
host populations to access successful drugs at the end of the trials.

D. Conclusion
Concluding reflections on the regulatory infrastructure and ethical oversight of
international clinical research emphasize the priority of safeguarding the rights of
research participants and host populations in the design and implementation of research
protocols. Obtaining voluntary informed consent from research participants and thorough
review of research protocols by well constituted and competent ethics review committee
were considered desiderata in conducting clinical trials in developing countries.
Cultural and language barriers were highlighted as challenges in conducting
clinical research in developing countries. They also posed serious challenges in
conforming to the substantive ethical standard of voluntary informed consent in clinical
research, but did not justify deviating from it. However, researchers and sponsors from
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developed countries were encouraged to respect the local culture and values of research
participants and host populations and to adapt standards of informed consent to the
cultural norms and practices of developing countries.
The prominent roles of the family and the community in personal decisionmaking for consenting to research participation in most cultures of developing countries
were acknowledged. Research participants were highly encouraged to discuss their
participation in clinical research with their family members before giving their consent.
The role of community leaders in the process of obtaining consent from research
participants in developing countries was seen as an initial step in the series of steps
involved in obtaining voluntary informed consent in clinical research. Creative strategies
for presenting information to research participants in developing countries were strongly
recommended as effective means of improving comprehension of essential information
regarding research study goals and procedures.
A landmark achievement in the legal enforcement of informed consent was
elevating the violation of rights of research participants in developing countries by
researchers and sponsors from developed countries to crime against humanity. A broad
and global application of this legal provision was emphasized.
There was an acknowledgment that clinical research in developing countries
encounters many problems with regard to inadequate material and human resources. It
was prevalent in developing countries to lack well equipped physical structures and
adequately trained personnel in ethics and science, which will conduct independent
review of research protocols. Building the capacity of developing countries for
conducting international clinical research was considered imperative.
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Similarly, collaborative partnership between developed and developing countries
in the design and conduct of international clinical research was seen as a critical
component for the successful completion of international clinical research. However,
clinical trials in developing countries are still plagued by the inability of participants and
host populations to access successful drugs at the completion of the trials. A related issue
in the discussion of international clinical research is the significant impact of the
intellectual property law and international trade agreements on affordable access to antiretroviral drugs in poor developing countries as discussed in the next chapter.
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CHAPTER THREE
AFFORDABLE ACCESS TO DRUGS IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES
A. Introduction
The pandemic nature of HIV/AIDS which decimates millions of people in
developing countries creates an urgent need for affordable access to anti-retroviral drugs.
Conducting clinical trials has been defended as a major means of providing medical
benefits to poor populations in developing countries through development of cheaper and
affordable drugs.1 Lavery articulates that, “it has become increasingly well-recognized in
recent years that an equitable distribution of the benefits of research is an important
component of international research ethics.”2
International guidelines such as CIOMS, Declaration of Helsinki and the United
Nations Joint Programme on AIDS (UNAIDS) Ethical Considerations in HIV Preventive
Vaccine Research allocate to researchers and sponsors the job of guaranteeing and
accomplishing benefits of research for participants and the host communities.3 These
obligations can be realized through three major requirements: (1) the negotiations of
agreements regarding the conditions for conducting the research before initiating the
research; (2) the guarantee of post-trial access to effective research interventions to
research subjects; and (3) instituting efforts for building the capacity of researchers and
their institutions in the host countries in order to participate in the research as full
partners.4
In the past decade, there has been a huge expansion in international clinical
research, especially clinical drug and vaccine trials sponsored by high-income countries
(HIC) and carried out in low-and middle-income countries (LMIC).5 There is an

139

acknowledgement of the presence of thousands of researchers from institutions, agencies,
and private companies in HIC at any specified time in various places around the world,
carrying out research in LMIC. International clinical trials sponsored by private industry
have significantly increased. Private pharmaceutical companies represented about fortyfour percent of global spending on health research in 1992,6 but after a decade the share
has been projected at about half of the seventy billion dollars globally spent on health
research.7
The history of international clinical research is marred by poor record with regard
to the transfer of benefits to the communities in LMIC which have helped in producing
interventions, especially novel drugs and vaccines.8 Most research privately sponsored
engage in clinical trials of drugs and interventions that will be solely marketed in HIC
and consequently, further broaden disparities in global health and health research
funding.9 Data shows that Africa which has estimate of about fourteen percent of the
world’s population and its greatest disease burden, which includes a little bit less than
thirty million people living with HIV/AIDS,10 represents about less than two percent of
the world market for drugs.11 On the other hand, North America, Europe, and Japan,
together with less than 1.5 times the population of Africa, represent more than forty times
more, or eighty percent, of the global market.12
The use of placebo controls in clinical research has been identified as a viable
way of developing cheaper drugs in developing countries, where majority of the
populations get nothing as the standard of care. There was disagreement among scholars
regarding the use of placebo-controlled research design in HIV clinical trials in
developing countries. The proponents of placebo-controlled research argue that it is
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ethically acceptable and contextually pertinent because the healthcare system of the
subjects offers nothing at the moment.13 They further argue that the standard of care in
developing countries is no treatment at all and that no harm was inflicted on the subjects
for participating in the research because they were not left worse off.14 They further
contend that comparing the experimental drug with the best current effective therapy
usually called equivalency trial provides the answer that is less reliable scientifically than
results obtained from a research design utilizing placebo controls.15 They indicate that a
placebo-controlled research can be carried out with fewer research subjects and
completed within a shorter period than an active-controlled trial. The implication is that
reliable and useful scientific information and effective interventions relevant to
developing countries will be available more rapidly.16
The proponents argue that testing the short course of anti-retroviral regimen
against nothing was the appropriate research design that was responsive to the health
needs of the developing countries. They also contend that this design does not disturb the
clinical equipoise, that is, uncertainty about the likely research study result.17 Varmus and
Satcher defending placebo-controlled trials argue that they address an urgent need in the
countries in which they are carried out and that they have been designed by extensive and
active participation of the scientific and public health communities of developing
countries. They further emphasize that such trials are carried out in accordance with
widely recognized principles and guidelines in bioethics.18 A placebo-controlled trial in
developing countries cannot be likened to a trial that treat research subjects as a means to
an end, and it does not mirror “a callous disregard of their welfare.”19
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On the other hand, critics argue that the research was asking the wrong question
of whether the experimental drug was better than nothing. They contend that based on the
findings and efficacy of AIDS Clinical Trials Group (ACTG) 076 regimen the correct
question was whether the long course of anti-retroviral regimen which has become
established effective therapy in developed countries was better than the short course,
which is the experimental regimen.20 They argue that the question has been clearly asked
in the research conducted in Thailand which states: “Can we reduce the duration of
prophylactic (zidovudine) treatment without increasing the risk of perinatal transmission
of HIV, that is, without compromising the demonstrated efficacy of the standard ACTG
076 (zidovudine) regimen?”21 The critics contend that such “equivalency studies of
alternative anti-retroviral regimens usually provide more useful results than placebocontrolled trials, without the deaths of hundreds of newborns that are inevitable if placebo
groups are used.”22 They further argue that data from ACTG 076 zidovudine regimen
provides researchers with adequate knowledge regarding the rate of perinatal
transmission and consequently, that they have no need to compare the short antiretroviral regimen to nothing, rather the effective thing to do was to compare the long
course anti-retroviral regimen to short course anti-retroviral regimen. The researchers
should have been convinced that well-designed shorter anti-retroviral regimens would be
more effective than placebo.23
The critics further argue that the standard of care in developing countries which is
not providing research subjects, that is, HIV-positive pregnant women with zidovudine is
not determined by a consideration of alternative effective treatments or clinical data, but
is rather decided on economic grounds that the poor developing countries cannot afford
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the exorbitant prices of anti-retroviral drugs established by drug companies.24 Critics also
charged that placebo-controlled HIV research conducted in developing countries when
there is established effective therapy violated international ethical guidelines as well as
US regulations.25 Angell charged that the placebo-controlled research conducted in
developing countries violated the ethical guidelines provided by Declaration of Helsinki.
She articulated that a placebo may not be used when established effective intervention
exists. In this context, research subjects assigned to the control arm of the trial must
receive the best known intervention available globally, rather than locally. Researchers
are entrusted with the responsibility of all subjects enrolled in a trial, not just some of
them. Furthermore, the goals of the research are always subordinate to the welfare of the
subjects.26 CIOMS guidelines specify that, “the ethical standards applied should be no
less exacting than they would be in the case of research carried out in the sponsoring
country.”27 Similarly, U.S. regulations governing research conducted with federal funds
both within and outside the United States stipulate that research procedures must “not
unnecessarily expose subjects to risk.”28
Despite the controversy regarding placebo-controlled research, the search for an
affordable treatment for HIV in developing countries is the most important justification
for conducting the research.29 However, it is pertinent to note that conducting placebocontrolled trials is no longer the only or best strategy for providing affordable drugs to
poor developing countries, especially given other reasonable alternatives that currently
exist.30
The lack of access to essential drugs has three components. First, pharmaceutical
research neglects drugs for diseases that have high prevalence among the poor.31 This
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occurrence is usually referred to as 10/90 gap, which implies that only 10 percent of
global health research is dedicated to diseases that represent 90 percent of the disease
burden globally.32 Diseases of poverty such as pneumonia, diarrhea, tuberculosis and
malaria, which represent about 20 percent of the global disease burden, get less than 1
percent of all private and public funds dedicated to global health research.33 Diseases
prevalent in the tropics are usually most neglected. Data shows that 1556 new drugs were
approved between 1975 and 2004, but only 18 were for tropical diseases and 3 for
tuberculosis.34
The second component of the access problem of the poor highlights that existing
drugs are priced out of reach for buyers in developing countries during the patent years
on the market. For example, Sanofi-Aventis a pharmaceutical company priced its drug
Clopidogrel 60 times more than the generic version and 250 times more costly than the
first-line counterpart, Aspirin. Similarly, the exorbitant prices of two important antiretroviral drugs manufactured by two different pharmaceutical companies impeded
Thailand’s ability to guarantee HIV treatment for current 80, 000 patients, and to extend
more treatment to another 20,000 patients that urgently need care.35 High prices of drugs
are enabled by patents, which offer pharmaceutical company the sole right to produce and
distribute drugs for many years. Patents are granted in most national jurisdictions in order
to incentivize and reward innovation. A pharmaceutical company that enjoys such market
exclusivity is allowed to price its drug in order to maximize profit and consequently make
it out of reach for poor people in developing countries.36 The profit-maximizing price for
essential medicines in many poor countries usually excludes a majority of the national
population.37 Data shows that in South Africa, about more than four million people
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infected with HIV, only 10,000 are able to afford access to anti-retroviral drugs at current
exorbitant prices. In Malawi, the figure stands at about 30 out of one million people
infected with HIV. In Uganda, an estimated 1.2 percent of about 820, 000 people infected
with HIV can afford anti-retroviral drugs.38 The same bleak picture is reported regarding
affordable access to anti-retroviral drugs in most developing countries, except in a few
countries that do not strictly enforce patent laws. Brazil is identified as one of such
countries. It began production of generic versions of essential AIDS medications in the
mid-1990s, which has resulted in significant decline of about 50 percent in AIDS
mortality rate.39
The third component of lack of access to essential drugs by poor people in
developing countries is lack of adequate local health infrastructure. Pogge, Rimmer and
Rubenstein articulate that, “In most of the less-developed countries, there is great scarcity
of clinics and hospitals, of diagnostic equipment, as well as of doctors and nurses who are
often very actively recruited to move to more affluent countries.”40 Data shows that in the
year 2000 about 65,000 physicians and 70,000 nurses born and mostly trained in Africa
were working in a developed country,41 which results in enormous gaps in covering
health care as well as in education budgets in developing countries. The affordable access
to anti-retroviral drugs must be discussed within the broader context of the impacts of
intellectual property law and international trade agreements. The non-patent factors must
also be explored in our discussion of affordable access to anti-retroviral drugs in
developing countries.
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B. Intellectual Property Law and Access to Anti-retroviral Drugs in Developing
Countries
B.1. Origin and Meaning of Intellectual Property Rights
The publication of John Locke’s Second Treatise on Government42 emphasizes
the priority of individual rights to property, and specifically private property, as one of
the tenets of philosophy of rights theory and one of the bases for justifying Western-style
free enterprise. The Western thinking developed the notion of intellectual property rights,
proprietary rights to what one invents, writes, paints, composes, or creates, from the idea
of property in Locke.43 Intellectual property is defined as “creations of the mind, that is,
intellectual creations, such as literary and artistic works, inventions and more.”44
Property rights regardless of how they are socially defined by a particular society,
establish obligations both for others and the state to protect property interests.45 The
advent of industrial revolution ushered in an era that emphasized the protection of ideas
as well as material property.46 There is recognition that patent protection promotes
invention and creativity by safeguarding ownership of new ideas, as well as authorizing
the inventor or creator to obtain benefits from that idea, in the same way the farmer
benefits from good agricultural practices on his or her land.47 However, distinguishing
farm land from ideas, Jefferson writes, “… ideas should freely spread from one to another
over the globe, for the moral and mutual instruction of man, and improvement of his
condition, seems to have been peculiarly and benevolently designed by nature ….
Inventions, then, cannot, in nature, be a subject of property.”48 In contrast to the farmer,
the inventor is encouraged to publicize her or his innovation while at the same time
safeguarding the right to copy or reproduce the invention.49
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Intellectual property has been defended from two different foundations, a standard
rights-based defense and utilitarian justification. The rights-based perspective is derived
from Locke’s theory of rights, which stresses that inventors have rights to what they
create. The utilitarian justification associates rights with utility, which implies that
inventors may not be likely creative without intellectual protection, since they will not
essentially reap honor or the benefits of their inventions.50 A more detailed discussion on
two different grounds for intellectual property follows.

B.1.a. Rights –Based Defenses of Intellectual Property
The perspective that intellectual property is a type of ownership which entitles
one to exclusive rights to use, copying, or distribution is usually the way intellectual
property is considered, especially in countries and companies that sponsor the
development of new processes or products. The implication is that from this point of
view, if a person or company creates a patentable process or product, due to the creativity
and work involved, the person or organization has exclusive rights to that creativity.51
Governments grant specific rights to the creators of intellectual property, in order to
motivate the continuous and useful enhancement of society with such creations. These
rights are termed intellectual property rights (IPRs), and entitle the holders to avert
misuse of their creation for a specified period of time by others.52
Although intellectual property (IP) rights are considered as time-limited protected
claims, they are in some situations especially Western countries conceived as perfect
rights in such a way that violations of copyrights, trademarks, or patents are always
wrong without exception.53 Rand captures this view when she writes, “patents and
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copyrights are the legal implementation of the base of all property rights: man’s right to
the product of his mind… patents are the heart and core of property rights, and once they
are destroyed, the destruction of all other rights will follow automatically, as a brief
postscript.”54 Rand argues that intellectual property rights are the most fundamental
rights, and the implication is that without them all other rights are endangered. This
implies that intellectual property rights might forestall other significant rights such as
right to life and right to liberty. This perspective supports that one’s liberty is given up
when one gives up control or some control over products of one’s mind.
There is a contention that some fundamental liberty rights are given up when our
intellectual agreements are violated. A pertinent distinction is relevant here between
liberty and creativity usually considered as acts of the mind, and the productivity or
products of the mind.55 Werhane and Gorman articulate, “I can sell, give away or
sacrifice my property or my creation, but I cannot, without being enslaved, give up my
entitlement to liberty and free choice.”56 There is a consensus that without intellectual
property rights we may not acknowledge our creativity and the fruits or our labor, but it is
rather more debatable whether we are forfeiting all our fundamental liberties. Locke’s
perspective indicates that we have rights to our bodies and to liberty and consequently we
can claim ownership of our own labor and its productivity, and are in position to use and
entitled to property rights. Locke contends that life, labor, and liberty are the grounds for
property rights and not the opposite.57 Werhane and Gorman argue that, “without rights
to liberty, I can be enslaved, and slavery erodes the justification for the natural or human
right to private ownership and thus for ownership of products of the mind.”58
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It may be questionable to argue as Rand implies that intellectual property rights
are the foundation for liberty, because that will entail that those without property are less
free. It may also be considered a stretch to argue that intellectual property rights can
override rights to life in some circumstances. In the past, it has been argued that liberty
rights can override rights to life, but it is not plausible to argue that property rights,
including the right to the product of our minds, override rights to life or liberty. It is
rather more defensible to argue that property rights grow out of, but are not the
foundation for, rights to life and liberty.59

B.1.b. Utilitarian Defenses of Intellectual Property Rights
Protection of intellectual property rights from utilitarian perspective has been
defended with a number of strong arguments. It is usually argued that protection of
intellectual property is crucial for the ongoing innovation, creation, and development of
novel ideas. Inventors and companies contend that they have rights to protect the patent
of their process and product and invariably control the access, because without such
protection there will be very limited incentives for new product or development of
innovative ideas.60 Werhane and Gorman argue that, “few people will write new material,
create new art, or invent new products without such protections, because there is little in
the way of honor, recognition, or profit in such activities.”61
A second argument in defense of intellectual property from utilitarian point of
view focuses on the importance of patent protection. Patent protection is built on the
notion that patents are private property rights that grant unconditional rights over
inventions and discoveries.62 Patent protection is critical to the survival and innovation of
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pharmaceutical companies that usually require big amounts of money for research and
development. It helps pharmaceutical companies and other patent holders to recoup profit
on their investments in research and development. The provision gives them the incentive
to continue investing in research and development for new drugs.63
A third argument regarding the utilitarian defense of intellectual property
emphasizes consumer benefits. There is a contention that consumers would benefit more
in the short term, if patents on drugs are removed, which will result in increase in the
competition with generic products. Implementation of this strategy will lead to lowering
of costs of all drugs. Nevertheless, in the long run consumers would be worse off. This
stems from the fact that pharmaceutical companies would not be able to recoup adequate
revenues in order to continue to invest in research and development which is crucial for
the development of new drugs. The implication is that the development of new drugs
would decline slowly, and new life-saving and life-enhancing interventions would not be
accessible to future generations.64
The fourth argument for the utilitarian defense of intellectual property argues that
in the absence of intellectual property protection, pharmaceutical companies such as
Pfizer, which relies on patent protection to earn profits and develop products, will not
enter countries such as India where patents are not strictly enforced. In countries such as
India, reverse engineering of the product development is allowed and it is not illegal
under Indian patent law for companies to copy other companies’ products, resulting in
decreased market share and hindrance from recouping company research and
development (R&D) investments.65 Data from World Bank’s early 1990s survey of
international executives shows that tax rates and intellectual property protection were the
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major factors in making decisions regarding global corporate investment.66 The World
Bank survey further indicates that lack of IP protection harms investment in less
developed countries, since companies such as Pfizer will not want to invest in countries
where patent protections are not enforced.67 Bale articulates that, “without strong and
effective global intellectual property rules, the gap between developed and developing
countries will only grow in the future.”68 The same line of argument was supported by the
World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO). In a new book sponsored by WIPO,
Idris contends that altering natural resources and products of indigenous populations into
intellectual property as well as safeguarding those ideas and others with a patent law can
significantly contribute to the affluence of any nation.69 There are two major
classifications of IP namely industry property and artistic and literary property. These
properties were formerly governed by the Paris Convention (1883) and the Berne
Convention (1896) respectively. Both conventions have undergone many revisions and
are currently administered by the World Intellectual Property Organization which is
based in Geneva.70 The emphasis in our discussion of affordable access to anti-retroviral
drugs is on the industry property. Rewarding pharmaceutical innovation through strict
enforcement of patent protection and ensuring affordable access to essential drugs for the
poor especially in developing countries stand in some tension with each other. The World
Trade Organization (WTO) has been a major actor in the debate concerning patent law
and access to essential medicines.71 The Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property
Rights Agreement (TRIPS) established by WTO was a significant attempt to deal with
the issue of global enforcement of patent protection for pharmaceutical products, which
adversely impacted affordable access to essential drugs in poor developing countries.
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B.2. Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights Agreement (TRIPS) and
Access to Anti-retroviral Drugs in Developing Countries.
B.2.a. Background on TRIPS Agreement
The end of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations resulted in the
establishment of the WTO, with the signing of the Marrakesh Agreement on April 15,
1994. TRIPS Agreement was also included in the new international trading regime,
governed by the WTO.72 All the members of WTO are required to be signatories and are
also obliged by TRIPS Agreement, which is managed by the TRIPS Council located in
Geneva. Members are required to conform to the TRIPS provisions, but with certain
exceptions and emphasis on the way they are implemented. Currently, TRIPS represents
a global indication that stresses the protection and enforcement of Intellectual Property
Rights (IPRs) at national levels for WTO members.73
Before the establishment of TRIPS Agreement, the protection of IPRs in various
countries differed significantly. In developed countries such as U.S. there was effective
protection,74 while in many developing countries, protection was either nonexistent or
enforcement was tepid.75 There was a consideration by developed countries such as U.S.,
that this situation was militating against their interests and consequently with U.S. at the
forefront they fought hard and succeeded in incorporating TRIPS in the Marrakesh
Agreement.76
The TRIPS Agreement includes a variety of intellectual property issues outside
patents, such as trademarks, industrial designs, and copyright applicable to any sector.77 It
offers minimum standards for intellectual property law, procedures and solutions and
grants rights’ holders exclusive rights to effectively enforce their rights. The chief rule of
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TRIPS for patents encompasses their availability for any invention, either product or
process, in all fields of technology with exception. Inventions included under the patent
law have to fulfil the standards for novelty, inventive step and industrial applicability.78
Article 7 of TRIPS makes provision for the global effective protection and enforcement
of IPRs, with emphasis also on easing technological innovation and diffusion of
technology.79
Some scholars contend that the primary objective of establishing TRIPS was the
promotion of the global protection and enforcement of IPRs.80 However, other relevant
provisions of TRIPS, such as Articles 8, 30 and 73, as well as the Doha Ministerial
Declaration of November 2001, attest to the fact that the primary objective of TRIPS
goes beyond the protection of IPRs.81 Article 8 of the TRIPS Agreement makes provision
for members to adopt measures essential to promote public health and nutrition, and to
promote the public interest in important areas relevant to their socio-economic and
technological development, as far as such measures conform to the provisions of this
Agreement.82 More so, at Doha representatives of various countries agreed that the least
developed country members classified by United Nations based on several indicators
comprising income, nutrition, health, education, literacy, and economic vulnerability,
were not required to implement patent law for pharmaceuticals until January 1, 2016.
Among the 50 least developed countries, 32 of them are WTO members.83
Article 27 (1) of TRIPS Agreement obliges all members to broaden patent
protection for a minimum period of twenty years to any invention in all fields of
technology. It encompasses pharmaceutical patents, which grant the holders exclusive
rights recognized globally to manufacture, use, sell and import patented medicines.84
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These developments are unprecedented. Before TRIPS, the Paris Convention did not
mandate the broadening of patents to any area of technology, neither did it require the
transfer of exclusive patents, nor stipulate a minimum duration for such rights.85 For
example, more than forty countries did not patent pharmaceuticals, several others such as
India patented only pharmaceutical processes, and others offered shorter patent periods.86
Countries such as Thailand granted pharmaceutical patents only for three years, while
South Africa limited the duration of patents to only sixteen years. Some countries in subSaharan Africa, Angola, Ghana and Malawi did not patent pharmaceutical products
before the introduction of TRIPS.87 Forman articulates that “introducing patents where
there were previously none drives up drug prices by enabling monopoly pricing and
excluding cheaper generic alternatives. Given how price sensitive drug access is in poor
countries, higher prices can significantly limit access for the poor.”88
However, the TRIPS Agreement makes provisions for protecting public health
and for governments to effectively respond to national health emergencies. Article 31 (f)
authorizes governments to issue a compulsory license for a patented drug without the
permission of the patent holder whenever it can be justified on the grounds of public
interest.89 The implication here is that in the event of a national health emergency, a
government who is a member of WTO is allowed to break a patent by authorizing a third
party to produce a generic version of patented drug without the permission of the patent
holder.90 For example, the threat of avian bird flu pandemic resulted in the pressure for
Roche to relax patent restrictions on a drug effective against bird influenza known as
oseltamivir.91 In another instance, during the fall of 2001 anthrax attacks, the US
government under pressure decisively stepped in to break Bayer’s patent on ciprofloxacin
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for the benefit of increasing availability of the drug.92 TRIPS also makes provision for
parallel imports in the interest of public health and social welfare. Parallel importing
authorizes countries to import cheaper priced patented drugs without any restrictions.93
Conforming to the TRIPS provisions is mandatory for all WTO members, and is a
requirement for the membership of the Organization. Members are sanctioned if they do
not comply with the provisions. A member who violates trade agreements could receive
summons from another aggrieved member for dispute settlement enforced by WTO
dispute panel known as Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU). DSU is a method
devised by WTO for resolving IP and other trade disputes among members. WTO
authorizes a member to use retaliatory trade measures against another erring member,
which usually have severe adverse effects on the domestic economy of the latter. The
erring member could also be impacted by other consequences such as negative
international publicity and poor perception as an untrustworthy trade partner,
inappropriate for foreign investment.94 For example, South Africa passed an amendment
to its Medicines and Related Substances Act, which permitted the utilization of
compulsory licensing and parallel importing in order to provide cheap priced medications
to South Africans in need.95 The amendment was not fully implemented due to the
pressure from the U.S. government and the multinational pharmaceutical companies
opposing the overruling of patents in order to enhance affordable access to essential
drugs in the world capital of the HIV/AIDS crisis.96 The United States utilized trade
sanctions against South Africa as a retaliatory measure by including it in the infamous
section 301 watch list. Section 301 which permits the United States to utilize unilateral
trade sanctions was a retaliatory measure against any trade partner that violates patents
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established under TRIPS Agreement.97 It has been argued that extremely strong legal
protection of patents realized through TRIPS Agreement under the auspices of WTO
plays a critical role in limiting access to essential drugs, including anti-retroviral drugs
for the developing countries.98

B.2.b. Implications of TRIPS Agreement for Access to Antiretroviral Drugs in
Developing Countries
There has been an ongoing vigorous debate on the impact of strict patent
protection on affordable access to Anti-retroviral drugs in developing countries. Two
major perspectives emerged. The first perspective championed by Pharmaceutical
companies and developed countries is articulated by supporters of strong patent
protection. The second perspective defended by human rights activists and developing
countries is articulated by critics of strict patent protection. Ferreira writes, “The United
Nations (U.N.) and non-governmental human rights organizations claim that patents are a
major factor in the lack of access to HIV/AIDS drugs, a point hotly disputed by the drug
industry and its proponents.”99 Pharmaceutical companies and developed countries
promote strong patent protection, disapprove of compulsory licensing and parallel
importing, and blame developing countries such as South Africa of violating their legal
obligations under TRIPS Agreement for adopting the stalled Medicines Act
Amendment.100 Supporters of strict patent protection contend that patents are not
responsible for lack of affordable access to HIV/AIDS drugs in developing countries,
rather, they attribute it to non-patent factors such as poverty, poor or inadequate health
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infrastructure, the lack of political will and commitment on the part of government to
fighting HIV/AIDS, and cultural barriers.101
On the other hand, developing countries and human rights activists strongly
advocate for the use of compulsory licensing and parallel importing in order to enhance
affordable access to HIV/AIDS drugs in developing countries. They also contend that
laws created to increase affordable access to drugs are legal under various public and
social welfare exceptions of TRIPS Agreement.102 They blamed lack of affordable access
to anti-retroviral drugs in developing countries on extremely strong legal protection of
patents. Donald argues that despite the impact of non-patent factors, the broadening and
strengthening of IP protection under TRIPS, especially patents, would further
significantly impede lack of access to essential drugs such as anti-retroviral drugs in poor
developing countries.103 A detailed analysis of the role of patent and non-patent factors in
impeding access to affordable HIV/AIDS drugs in developing countries follows.

B.2.b.i. Pharmaceutical Patents and Access to Anti-retroviral Drugs in Developing
Countries
Research and Development costs in pharmaceutical industry are very exorbitant
and high, as well as the risk of failure. Pharmaceutical companies would not be able to
recover their costs and make profit without patents.104 The primary objective of patents is
to offer a temporary monopoly to rights holders as a motivation to innovations and their
commercialization.105 The implication is that the monopoly rights enshrined in patents
enable pharmaceutical companies to recoup research and development costs and generate
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profit. Therefore, patenting pharmaceutical drugs would motivate them to engage in more
research in order to manufacture new drugs for the benefit of the society106
However, it is debatable whether pharmaceutical patents offer incentives also for
research on drugs for the treatment of diseases predominant in developing countries,
considering their small market and weak purchasing power. It has been estimated that
averagely, pharmaceutical companies require about a minimum profit of $1 billion in
order to embark on any risk of researching a particular disease.107 To this extent,
pharmaceutical patents offer very limited commercial incentive to pharmaceutical
companies to engage in research relevant to the diseases affecting majority of the poor
people in developing countries. For example, the amount of money invested globally on
pharmaceutical R&D for diseases prevalent in developing countries is estimated to be
less than 5%.108
Furthermore, out of the 1393 drugs approved from 1975 to 1999, only 13 were
related to diseases prevalent in developing countries.109 There is very limited research on
malaria, tuberculosis and sleeping sickness.110 Conversely, the story is completely
different for diseases such as HIV/AIDS affecting both developed and developing
countries. For example, in the U.S. as at 2002, there were 64 approved drugs for the
treatment of HIV/AIDS, while 103 are still in the process of development.111
Critics of patent protection have charged that monopoly pricing which has been
made possible by patents impedes affordable access to drugs to those who need them
most especially in developing countries.112 Proponents of pharmaceutical patents
countered that “poverty rather than patents is the main problem, and activists should
focus their energy on poverty alleviation rather than IPR protection.”113 They reframed
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the debate on two grounds. First, that very few drugs are patented in developing countries
and they cannot constitute a significant impediment in accessing drugs. Second, that even
if many more drugs are patented that they do not become a determining factor in pricing,
but rather that there are other superseding factors that impede access to drugs by the
poor.114
The prevalence of patenting pharmaceutical products was explored as driving the
debate. There was an indication that pharmaceutical companies do not usually seek to
patent their products in developing countries because they have small markets and limited
technological capacity. Pharmaceutical companies do not consider it lucrative to patent
their drugs and enforce the patent when the potential market is small and the risk of
infringement low.115
The International Intellectual Property Institute (IIPI), a pro-intellectual property
think tank established in 1999, and currently located in Washington, D.C. was among the
first to argue for lack of correlation between strong patent protection and impeding access
to essential drugs especially by the poor in developing countries. In 2000, IIPI published
a report that explores the prevalence of the HIV/AIDS epidemic in Africa from three
different perspectives. First, it examined the international community’s response, with
particular reference to the levels of foreign aid offered by Western countries such as the
United States.116 Second, it analyzed patent systems in various countries in Africa. Third,
it explored the number of HIV/AIDS drugs patented in these countries.117 The report’s
conclusion was that access to essential drugs comprises “numerous and complex issues,
including healthcare infrastructure, international pricing mechanisms, financing, debt,
tariffs and patents.”118
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Furthermore, the report came to a conclusion that the TRIPS Agreement does not
constitute a barrier to the distribution of HIV/AIDS drugs based on three reasons. First,
the TRIPS Agreement was not implemented in most countries in sub-Saharan Africa.
Second, the TRIPS Agreement allows adequate flexibility for countries to circumvent
negative effects. Third, most pharmaceutical companies have not sought patents for their
products extensively in Africa.119 The report did not attribute the primary barrier to
access of HIV/AIDS drugs to poverty, but rather stressed that the core issue stems from
sufficient financing of the overall health system as well as the development of healthcare
infrastructure. The report gave an indication for the need to do more research in order to
conclusively establish whether or not patents and TRIPS Agreement played any critical
role regarding access to affordable drugs.120
Two recent studies by Attaran and Gillespie-White have been cited to support
proponents’ argument. The first study examined the extent of patenting of 15 vital antiretroviral drugs in 53 African countries. They found that most of the anti-retroviral drugs
for treatment of HIV/AIDS were patented in only a few African countries estimated at
about 21.6 %. There were no patents at all on these drugs in 13 of the 53 countries. They
concluded that because the patenting rate was very small, patents generally do not
constitute a significant barrier to treatment access in Africa. However, it acknowledged
that there would be an issue when TRIPS becomes fully implemented by all WTO
members.121
The second study authored by Attaran explores the extent of patenting for
essential medicines in low-income and middle-income countries. The study reveals that
patenting for 319 drugs classified by WHO as essential drugs is infrequent in sixty five
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low and middle income countries, with estimated population of four billion people.
Patents exist for only seventeen essential drugs, but most of them were not actually
patented. The estimated rate of patent is as low as 1.4 percent and it was focused on
countries with larger markets and adequate technological capacity. There was a
conclusion in the study that patents for essential drugs are usually not common in poor
countries and consequently cannot easily explain why access to those drugs is frequently
lacking, indicating that poverty, not patents, accounts for more limitation on access.122
Both studies have been criticized on various grounds. The first study authored by
Attaran and Gillespie-White fails to recognize that not all existing antiretroviral drugs are
important to the same degree in treating the disease. Critics contend that the quantitative
method employed by Attaran and Gillespie-White is deceptive because the most effective
combinations of anti-retroviral drugs are usually obstructed in many of the African
countries.123 Another criticism is that the study did not recognize the significant impact
patents in one country can have on other countries. For example, South Africa has about
13 out of 15 antiretroviral drugs patented. Therefore, South Africa as the most affluent
country in Africa would have been in the best situation with its strong technological
capacity to manufacture and distribute generic drugs to its neighbors.124
Critics indicated that the first study conducted by Attaran and Gillespie-White has
fundamental scientific limitations. The study did not consider extraneous variables such
as levels of wealth and size of market and consequently it weakens any deduction that
was made regarding correlation of geographic patent coverage with anti-retroviral
treatment access in Africa. To examine whether patents cause lack of access to drugs in
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developing countries, it will be important to compare countries with the same
characteristics such as equally wealthy or equally large markets.125
The second study was also found to have fundamental limitations. Attaran utilized
WHO’s essential medicines lists for examining the patency prevalence of drugs. The
WHO considers the cost when preparing this list, which implies that cheap drugs are
favored. Consequently, it does not come as a surprise that so few essential drugs are
patented.126 Selgelid and Sepers argue that “if patents increase prices and thus make
medicines less likely to appear on the list, then it should be no surprise that few drugs on
the list turn out to be patented.”127 This view undermines the significance of Attaran’s
finding that so few essential drugs are patented.128 Critics also contend that Attaran and
Gillespie-White did not recognize the apparent failure of patents to provide incentives
that usually result in the global development of drugs. Patents provide slight incentive to
develop medical technologies precisely needed by the poor. Patents facilitate price
increases, but this does not result in profits if those in need are not able to pay high prices
for the products.129
There is extensive evidence from developed countries that prices fall fairly
sharply once drugs patents expire, and if there are generic competitors. The price fall
appears to be larger with entry of more generic competitors into the market.130
Governments can promote price reductions by easing generic producers’ early entry into
the market. For example, the 1984 Drug Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act in
the United States popularly known as the Hatch-Waxman Act accomplished this
objective, which lead to a significant increase in the delivery of generic versions of
prescription drugs from 19% in 1984 to 47% in 2000. The size of market for generic

162

drugs is even larger in other developed countries such as the United Kingdom.131
Pharmaceutical companies have instituted law suits in order to delay or block generic
entry of producers and to defend or extend a monopoly on a successful drug.132 A recent
study conducted in the US revealed that prices sharply fall when there is intense generic
competition in the market, but a minimum of about five generic competitors are required
to drive down prices to an extent.133
Developing countries can also mitigate the impact of patent protection for their
population by easing generic entry and generic competition. However, in most instances
their choices are strictly limited by the small size of their markets and lack of local
technological, productive and regulatory capacity.134 Commission on Intellectual
Property Rights articulates, “It is this lack of capacity to create a competitive
environment for both patented and generic products that makes the existence of patents
more contentious than in developed markets with greater capacity to enforce a strongly
pro-competitive regulatory environment.”135
Evidence abounds in the international arena that drugs patented in countries with
strong patent protection are much cheaper in markets which do not provide patent
protection. For example, the Indian market which does not offer product protection at a
time has the cheapest drugs in the world.136 Nevertheless, with the introduction of drug
product patents in India in 2005, there were expectations of significant increase in drug
costs. For example, a case study of the influence of introducing patents on four domestic
antibiotics projected that the total annual welfare losses to the economy of India
stemming from increases in price and limits in access would be about $305 million or
around 50 percent of the sales of the whole systemic antibacterial section in 2000.137
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Furthermore, introducing global drug patents result in a systemic influence on the
production and export of generic versions of new drugs. The implementation of TRIPS
will ultimately results in phasing out the generic production of patented drugs entirely,
unless this is completed through compulsory licensing. This will restrict domestic
production of generic drugs, especially in India, which has been a principal source of
generic antiretroviral drugs for other developing countries.138 The full implementation of
TRIPS by 2016 will specifically influence developing countries that depend on
importation of generic copies of drugs currently patented.139 There was an urgent need to
develop measures that will continue to guarantee that the patent system supports the right
of every country to protect human health and to enhance access to essential drugs in
accordance with the Doha Declaration on TRIPS and Public Health and WTO General
Council Decision of 30 August 2003.140

B.2.b.ii. Implications of Doha Declaration on TRIPS and Public Health
The TRIPS Agreement made provisions for parallel importation in Article 6 and
compulsory licensing in Article 31 as tools for protecting public health and increasing
access to essential drugs especially anti-retroviral drugs.141 However, some members of
WTO did not interpret and implement TRIPS in a way that promotes public health. Two
divergent interpretations of the TRIPS Agreement emerged at the special section of the
TRIPS council held in June 2001. The purpose of this special section was to clarify the
relationship between intellectual property rights and access to essential drugs under
TRIPS Agreement.142
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The objective of the African group and other developing countries was to
elucidate the degree to which TRIPS Agreement permits members to promote and
safeguard public health and other all-embracing public policy goals.143 Furthermore,
developing countries stressed that restrictive interpretation of TRIPS as advanced by the
United States and other developed countries would excessively restrict their ability to
tackle public health emergencies such as AIDS.144 Developing countries emphasized that
the TRIPS Agreement does not prevent members from taking measures to protect public
health.145 The implication is that “TRIPS does not remove a member’s sovereign power
to address public health emergencies within its own borders.”146
The United States and other developed countries argue that strict patent protection
would offer benefits to all countries, but at the same time recognizing the interests of
developing countries in access to essential drugs. They further argue that the TRIPS
Agreement strikes a balance between incentives for innovation and affordable access to
essential drugs.147 Developed countries contend that the most effective strategy for
tackling public health emergencies involves economic, social and health policies. These
policies need strong patent protection to support the development of new drugs.148
Despite these divergent perspectives in the interpretation and implementation of the
TRIPS Agreement, a Declaration on TRIPS and Public Health was released by a broad
unanimity of all WTO members at the Doha Ministerial meeting in Qatar in November
2001.149 Sell and Odell articulated that the Doha Declaration was enabled by a shared
and united efforts from a coalition of civil society organizations, developing countries
and mid-tier countries, such as Thailand, India and Brazil.150 Sridhar indicates that
although the Declaration may be imperfect and far from being an ideal document from
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moral view point, compromise was arguably essential to realize agreement on it, which
was extremely more desirable to no Declaration at all.151
The Doha Declaration affirming support for public health clearly articulates, “We
agree that the TRIPS Agreement does not and should not prevent members from taking
measures to protect public health. Accordingly, while reiterating our commitment to the
TRIPS Agreement, we affirm that the Agreement can and should be interpreted and
implemented in a manner supportive of WTO members’ right to protect public health and
in particular to promote access to medicines for all.”152 The Declaration acknowledges
that HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, malaria, and other epidemics are grave public health
problems afflicting developing and least developed countries. It also reasserts, “the right
of the WTO Members to use, to the full, the provisions in the TRIPS Agreement, which
provide flexibility for this purpose.”153 Paragraph 5(b) of the Declaration confirms
Members’ right to grant compulsory licenses, as well as the right to determine the
grounds for granting such licenses. Paragraph 5(c) stresses members’ right to determine
what constitutes a national emergency, or other circumstances of extreme urgency, such
as, but not limited to HIV/AIDS, malaria and TB. The Declaration also emphasized that
members were free to establish their own regimes for parallel importation without
challenge.154 The implication is that the Doha Declaration made provisions for TRIPS
Agreement to be responsive to the healthcare needs of developing countries and to
underscore how members could utilize its flexibilities to achieve that purpose.155
The Doha Declaration also acknowledged the problem presented by the TRIPS
requirement which specifies that compulsory licensing shall be “predominantly for the
supply of the domestic market.”156 This implies that developing countries without
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domestic manufacturing capacity will not be able to access generic drugs for their
population. Consequently, in paragraph 6, the Doha Declaration acknowledged the need
for an expeditious solution to the problem encountered specifically by developing
countries without local manufacturing capacity.157

B.2.b.iii. Post Doha - The WTO Decision of August 2003
Arriving at a consensus on what was dubbed the paragraph 6 problem resulted in
protracted debate among TRIPS council members. The US headed a relentless effort to
limit the provisions of paragraph 6 of the Doha Declaration to particular diseases such as
HIV/AIDS, malaria, tuberculosis, and other infectious diseases resulting in epidemics.158
Apart from restricting the use of compulsory licenses, the US intensified efforts to restrict
the number of countries that could benefit from the importation of generic drugs.159
In August 2003, the WTO General Council issued the decision on the
implementation of Paragraph 6 of the Doha Declaration, which specifies that countries
without local manufacturing capacity could issue compulsory licenses and on that
foundation legally import generic drugs.160 The export solution is aimed at authorizing
developing countries without local production capacity to import generic drugs made
under compulsory licensing in accordance with strict conditions.161 For example, some
conditions outlined include: both importing and exporting countries must declare
compulsory licenses; eligible importing members other than least-developed countries
must establish insufficient or no manufacturing capacities in the pharmaceutical sector
for the products in question; such drugs are restricted to the amount required to fulfill the
needs of the importing country and must be entirely imported to the member; the drugs
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must be clearly identified as manufactured under this system through labeling, marked by
packaging and/or shaping and coloring; and importing countries must utilize reasonable
measures to prevent re-exportation of products.162
However, the WTO August 2003 decision was only a temporary waiver, pending
a consensus on a permanent amendment.163 Efforts to reach a consensus on a permanent
amendment to TRIPS were accompanied by further disagreement among WTO members.
The US and other developed countries forcefully argued for formal approval of the
temporary waiver as a permanent amendment. Conversely, developing countries, led by
the African Group, contended that the temporary waiver contained too many procedural
problems that would still impede access to essential drugs including anti-retroviral drugs
for countries without local manufacturing capacity. 164 Furthermore, Medecins Sans
Frontieres objected to making the temporary waiver permanent arguing that it would be
imprudent because no country had really used it.165 So far, the export solution has been
scarcely used. As of 2009, Rwanda is the first and only country to utilize the WTO
General Council Decision of 30 August 2003 with its application for the importation of
inexpensive generic drugs from Canada.166 Several factors contributed to failure of the
WTO members especially developing countries to utilize the export solution, including
constant threats of legal or economic sanctions from pharmaceutical companies and
developed countries especially US, and the difficulty, cost and limited duration and scope
of the rules.167
Regardless of protracted debate on the status of the temporary waiver for the
export solution, WTO members reached a consensus in early December 2005, just before
the WTO Ministerial Conference in Hong Kong, to make it permanent if at least two-
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thirds of the 148 WTO members formally approved the amendment by December 1,
2007.168 Moreover, there have been concerns that the United States Trade Representative
has negotiated TRIPS-Plus bilateral and regional trade agreements that undercut the goal
and effect of the Doha Declaration and the WTO General Council Decision of the 30
August 2003.169

B.3. US Trade Policy and Access to Anti-retroviral Drugs in Developing Countries
In January 2003, President Bush announced in the State of the Union address to
Congress his five-year initiative for the United States to support the global effort to fight
the HIV/AIDS epidemic. The proposed allocation fund for the initiative now known as
the President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR) was $15 billion in order to
provide AIDS drugs for 2 million people living with HIV/AIDS, to provide education to
prevent 7 million new infections, and to support care for 10 million AIDS patients and
orphans.170
Eight months after the implementation of the US HIV/AIDS plan, significant
progress report was given by PEPFAR in accomplishing its goals. By March 2005, 155,
000 people were receiving anti-retroviral drugs, 1.2 million women and babies had
benefited from measures preventing mother-to-child transmission of HIV, and 1.7 people
infected or affected by HIV/AIDS were receiving supportive care with the help of
PEPFAR.171 Furthermore, at the 2005 Summit of the Group of Eight Nations (G8), the
heads of state of the eight affluent countries pledged extra aid for combating HIV/AIDS
in Africa, and projected the possibility of universal access to HIV treatment by 2010.172
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In spite of the aforementioned initiatives to promote universal access to antiretroviral drugs especially for developing countries, recent US negotiated trade
agreements threaten to undermine these gains in improving access to anti-retroviral
drugs.173 MSF writes “One by one, countries are trading away their people’s health in
free trade agreements with the United States. These countries are being pushed to accept
extremely restrictive intellectual property provisions that could put an end to competition
from generic medicine producers and to countries’ ability to make use of existing
safeguards against patent abuse.”174 The United States’ failure to promote free trade in
the hemisphere and the globe resulted in its engaging in a forceful campaign to liberalize
trade through bilateral, regional, and multilateral trade agreements. These recent
negotiated trade agreements by the United Sates have been based on the extension of
Intellectual Property (IP) law for multinational pharmaceutical companies that hold
patents for anti-retroviral drugs.175 Forman articulates that the intellectual property rules
in TRIPS are significantly less strict than the rules developing countries are more and
more accepting in free-trade agreements with the United States and other developed
countries. These TRIPS-plus measures require greater limitations on the use of TRIPS
flexibilities.176 The implication is that these Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) considerably
restrict generic competition and consequently affordable access to essential drugs
including anti-retroviral drugs.177
The United States plays a leading role in establishing bilateral and regional trade
and IP agreements. It signed bilateral trade agreements with 42 countries between 1986
and 2000.178 Furthermore, it has negotiated numerous regional trade agreements
involving about 50 countries, such as the Andean Free Trade Agreement (FTA), the Free

170

Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA), the Central American Free Trade Agreement
(CAFTA), the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), and the South African
Customs Union Free Trade Agreement (SACU FTA).179 These agreements have
extensive effects for affordable access to drugs not only in these regions but globally,
since a number of developing countries with generic local production capabilities, such as
Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico, will be obliged to comply with TRIP-plus IP rules.180
The import of TRIP-plus measures enshrined in FTAs is understood not just as a matter
of international trade law but of international human rights law. These agreements
considerably restrict government ability to achieve the human rights to health and life of
their population.181 Forman argues “Given the urgent need for increased access to
essential patented medicines (particularly for HIV/AIDS), there is no logical or palatable
way to justify trading off the instrumental value of patent protection (to provide rewards
and incentives for future innovation) at the present cost of the lives of millions of
people.”182 Similarly, the Commission on Intellectual Property Rights (CIPR) articulates
that, “there are no circumstances in which the most fundamental human rights should be
subordinated to the requirements of IP protection.”183 It is pertinent to point out that IP
rights are given by states for limited durations especially for patents and copyrights while
in contrast human rights are inalienable and universal.184
The United States attempts to procure or has already procured the inclusion of
various detrimental intellectual property provisions in its regional and bilateral trade
agreements.185 TRIPS-plus measures in FTAs usually comprise “limits on compulsory
licensing; prohibitions on parallel imports; limiting market approval for generic drugs;
data exclusivity; extended patent terms and evergreening provisions.186 A brief discussion
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on TRIPS-plus provisions and the likely impact on affordable access to essential drugs
for developing countries follow.
Compulsory licensing
The US FTAs restrict the bases or circumstances for issuing compulsory licenses
on pharmaceuticals to national emergencies or other conditions of extreme urgency, the
compensation of practices considered to be anti-competitive and use for public noncommercial use.187 This implies exclusion of any other bases for issuing compulsory
licenses, comprising “the denial of a voluntary license, or as a measure to protect public
health under TRIPS Article 8 that fell short of a national emergency.”188 While FTAs as
well restrict the recipients of licenses to government entities or legal entities, functioning
under the government’s authority, TRIPS on the other hand, requires no such limitations,
since licenses can be granted to independent private entities for commercial purposes.189
Restrictions on compulsory licenses would imply that countries would not be able to use
their basic right to grant a compulsory license in order to alleviate high prices that limit
access to essential drugs and to promote generic competition in the private sector to
increase affordable access to essential drugs.190 Compulsory licensing is as well being
undercut through restrictions on data exclusivity and marketing approval for generic
drugs.191

Parallel importing
FTAs such as with Singapore, Morocco and Australia authorize patent holders to
block parallel importation. Similarly, the FTAA orders regional exhaustion within five
years of being signed, and essentially excludes parallel importation from outside
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countries. These measures will prevent countries from importing cheap patented drugs
sold in other countries.192

Intellectual Property and Regulatory Authorities: Transforming Drug Regulatory
Authorities into Patent Police
The US has created a new role for national drug regulatory authorities (NDRAs)
through negotiating measures in FTAs that will entrust enforcement of drug patents to
NDRAs. They would be prohibited from approving or registering a generic drug that is
still under patent in a country unless the patent holder gives permission. This implies that
registration should not be granted to generic producer before the expiration of the
patent.193 MSF argues that, “Linking a drug’s registration (also known as its marketing
approval) to its patent status is an underhanded way of preventing generic
competition.”194 It also undercuts the utilization of compulsory licenses, since a generic
company that has been awarded a license would not be able to register that drug,
essentially making the license useless.195

Data Exclusivity: Preventing Competition to Non-Patented Drugs
Data exclusivity creates a new type of monopoly by blocking the registration of
generic drugs even for a drug that is non-patented. It blocks NDRA from utilizing data
offered by originator Company to approve the use of an equivalent generic drug,
consequently providing as such the original manufacturer’s monopoly.196 Most FTAs
make provisions for the protection of manufacturers’ drug testing data, that is, data
exclusivity to pharmaceutical products for five years from the date of the originator’s
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approval.197 The implication is that generic companies are discouraged from pursuing
registration for their drugs due to the tedious task of generating their own test data.
Generic manufacturers in developing countries would not be able to foot the bill for their
test data due to the exorbitant costs and low margins of generic production. Furthermore,
data exclusivity essentially blocks the use of compulsory licenses, because it prevents the
registration of a generic drug equivalent for the duration of exclusivity.198 Some trade
agreements such as the U.S.-Morocco and U.S.-Bahrain FTAs make provision for an
extra three years of data exclusivity when patent holders pursue marketing approval for
already unapproved uses of registered drugs, including older generic drugs with expired
patents.199

Extending Patent Life Beyond Twenty Years
FTAs extend the protection of patents beyond the 20-year period guaranteed
under TRIPS to compensate for delays in the process of awarding patents or marketing
approval by a national drug regulatory authority, as well as for unreasonable delays.
Some trade agreements such as the FTAA, U.S.-Singapore, U.S.-Australia, and U.S.Morocco FTAs as well make provisions for extending the patent life when delays in
granting the patent exceeds five years from filling, or three years after a request for
examination of the application, whichever is later. The idea of unreasonable delays is
contentious particularly considering that NDRAs and patent offices in developing
countries have resource constraints.200

New Use or Evergreening Provisions
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New use patent is a mechanism for prolonging the monopoly of pharmaceutical
companies. Patent holders as well could utilize new use patents to harass competitors by
arguing that they violated patent. TRIPS Agreement does not make any provision for
granting patents on new uses of existing drugs, whereas FTAs do make it possible for
pharmaceutical companies to extend patent durations on existing drugs, thus prolonging
or evergreening their monopolies,201 and endlessly block generic competition. Apart from
patent protection, there are also several non-patent factors that significantly impede
affordable access to essential drugs particularly antiretroviral drugs for developing
countries.

B. 4. Non-Patent Factors and Access to Anti-retroviral drugs in Developing Countries
It is pertinent to recognize that so many factors unconnected to the IP system play
a critical role in determining affordable access to essential drugs in developing countries,
including sub-Saharan Africa.202 Schuklenk and Ashcroft contend that, “It would be
wrong to paint a simplistic picture of the evil industry versus the brave governments of
developing countries trying to save the lives of their suffering peoples.”203 The
pharmaceutical industry argued that significant limitations to affordable access to drugs
in developing countries are not strong legal protection of patent, but the lack of spending
in developing countries, and the lack of adequate health infrastructure to administer drugs
safely and effectively.204 Similarly, a report by the US pharmaceutical industry
association succinctly articulates, “Handicapped by limited financial resources, these
nations’ ability to contain AIDS and address a host of other killer diseases is
compromised by inadequate infrastructure, cultural barriers to care, and mismanaged
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health care systems. Some developing countries also are hampered by political leadership
that lacks the will to confront or even acknowledge their nation’s health care needs.”205
The lack of political will contributes significantly to the denial of affordable access to
essential drugs.206 Most African countries grapple with the failure of political leadership.
The implication of this is usually the inability of their political leaders to step up to the
responsibility of making critical decisions in order to identify and fight for public
healthcare needs. However, there are some exceptions. For example, Senegal stood out
regarding the existence of strong political will, which was contributory to the early
identification of the HIV/AIDS crisis, the organization of financial resources, the
utilization of mass media campaign to counteract cultural and religious taboos, the
support for the use of condom, and the providing of universal access to anti-retroviral
treatment. The significant result was that Senegal had one of the lowest rates of HIV
infection in sub-Saharan Africa by the end of the 1990s.207
Poverty is also a critical factor limiting the ability of developing countries
including sub-Saharan Africa to afford even the basic essential healthcare needs. Their
poverty stems more from a combination of poor political leadership and an uneven
international political-economic structure.208 For example, in 1991 28 out of 48 African
countries had an average per capita income of less than $1 per day compared to 19 out of
36 countries in 1981.209 Furthermore, most developing countries in sub-Saharan Africa
spend less than an average of US$ 10 per person every year on healthcare, which is far
less than $60 per capita recommended by WHO as the minimum level of expenditure on
basic healthcare services, as well as, about 20 to 40% below the World’s Bank
recommended minimum level of healthcare services.210
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The International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank imposed reforms
known as Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs) on African Governments as
conditions for giving them loans in the 1980s, which exacerbated their poverty level and
further impeded the ability of the populations to procure essential drugs including
HIV/AIDS drugs. This scenario made them very vulnerable to deadly diseases, such as
HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis and malaria.211
Large debt interest payments made by developing countries especially subSaharan Africa also negatively impacted affordable access to essential drugs. For
example, sub-Saharan African countries by 1997 were previously remitting to Western
creditors more than four times the amount invested in their domestic healthcare systems.
A typical instance was that only Senegal expended more than five times the amount
expended on health in loan repayments.212 The total debt of Africa as of 2000 was US
$230 billion, with annual repayments of US $15 billion, which amounts to about 5% of
its income and 15% of its export earnings.213 This financial squash disordered the
healthcare systems of Africa, and resulted in people gradually more vulnerable to
diseases. The situation deteriorated with the privatization of healthcare supported by the
World Bank, which resulted in the commercialization of health services, consequently
impeding access to essential healthcare to more people.214
The recent global financial crisis worsened the situation, as it compelled
governments to reduce their already insufficient health budgets, notwithstanding the
epidemic of infection from major diseases such as HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, malaria and
sleeping sickness. The global financial crisis as well undercut the activities of
international donor agencies. For example, the global fund for AIDS, TB and Malaria in
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2009 reported about US$ 4 billion deficit in what was required to adequately fund
essential services for these diseases in 2010. This shortfall was in addition to a US$ 10.7
billion deficit in the funding for the implementation of the Global Plan to Stop TB at
regional levels.215
Poor international media coverage of diseases prevalent in developing countries is
another factor identified as impeding affordable access to essential drugs. HIV/AIDS in
sub-Saharan Africa only got international spotlight in the 1990’s when it was viewed as a
threat to U.S. national security.216 However, the media attention diminished when the
fears of catastrophic impact of the disease both in the US and other Western world
dispelled. The lack of international media coverage could significantly prevent or
constrain the organization of the resources required to guarantee a timely and constant
supply of drugs to assist people afflicted with the disease in sub-Saharan Africa.217
Finally, other non-patent factors militating against affordable access to essential
drugs in sub-Saharan include the brain drain of qualified medical professionals from subSaharan Africa to overseas countries,218 tariffs and other forms of indirect taxation,219
which could be as high as 30% in some circumstances.220 It is significant that national tax
systems function in a way that promotes public health policies, in the same way that the
patent system should.221 The adverse effects of the TRIPS Agreement, TRIPS-plus
provisions and non-patent factors in limiting access to anti-retroviral drugs for
developing countries create a context to address the issue of the social responsibility of
the pharmaceutical companies.

C. The Social Responsibility of the Pharmaceutical Companies
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C.1. Preamble
Two dominant perspectives emerge in the discussion of scholars about the social
responsibility of pharmaceutical companies. The leading proponent of the first
perspective known as Resnik argues that pharmaceutical companies are like moral agents
who have obligations to avoid causing harm and to promote social welfare. They have
social responsibilities and moral obligations to meet the health needs of the populations
in developing countries.222
On the other hand, the second perspective propounded by Brock argues that
corporations are unlike moral agents as long as their responsibilities are to their
shareholders. He appeals to an argument in support of role differentiation. He argues that
corporations do not have similar moral obligations like individuals due to the fact that
they serve a different social role that entails shareholder primacy.223 The shareholder
primacy view of corporations emphasizes maximization of shareholders wealth.224
An inclusive view of the corporation’s responsibilities is currently supported by
the enactment of corporate constituency statutes.225 The implication is that corporations
have both shareholder and social responsibilities. A brief discussion of the theoretical
approaches to the social responsibility of the pharmaceutical companies will be pertinent.

C.2. Theoretical Approaches to the Social Responsibility of Pharmaceutical Companies
The classical theory of the primacy of shareholder invoked by Brock maintains
the existence of a fiduciary relationship between directors and shareholders that
prioritizes the interests of shareholders.226 This position is supported by persuasive
statements from legal cases, scholars, and the economist Milton Friedman.227 The central
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legal argument supporting the shareholder primacy is focused on agency law, which
considers shareholders as the owners or the principals of the corporation and managers as
the agents. In this context, the agent must always act for the interest of the principal,
excluding the interests of other constituencies, including the manager himself. The
application of this line of thought to the modern cooperation falls short of a remote
possibility. The modern corporation significantly departs from the principal-agent model
because it is grounded on the separation of ownership and control of the corporation, with
managers shouldering a very active role and shareholders a comparatively passive one. 228
The idea of the primacy of the shareholder has as well been defended on the basis
that the shareholders own the corporation, that they are the principals, and that the
directors are obliged to maximize their wealth.229 This notion of the modern corporation
known as the property conception was originally articulated by authors such as Adolph
A. Berle and Milton Friedman. Berle argues that “all powers granted to a corporation or
the management of a corporation . . . are necessarily and at all times exercisable only for
the ratable benefit of all the shareholders as their interest appears.”230 He further argues
that corporations were solely mediums for advancing and protecting the interests of
shareholders and that corporate law should be interpreted within the context of this
principle. He contends that any other account of the function and purpose of corporations
would “defeat the very object and nature of the corporation itself.”231
Similarly, Friedman argues that in a free enterprise, private-property system, the
primary responsibility of a corporate executive is to conduct business in conformity with
the interests of the owners, which usually entails making as much money as possible
while complying with the basic rules of the society.232 The idea of maximization of

180

stockholders’ wealth stems from the fact that they are considered as owners of the
corporation. Nevertheless, the myth of shareholder primacy is debunked, because even if
they are considered as owners of the corporation, there is nothing as such that validates
that corporation must focus on shareholder profit, more especially when shareholders
make very minimal contribution of only money. More so, the popular practice of
extending stock options definitely undermines any assertion of shareholder ownership.233
A newer concept with a significant change to the argument in support of
shareholder primacy focuses on the agency costs’ view. This view broadens a
corporation’s constituencies and consequently, its priority interests. The agency costs’
view emphasizes that “in the best of all possible worlds, it would be preferable if
managers could consider the interests of all of a corporation’s constituencies (all those
who affect the organization and are affected by it), including among others employees,
clients, and the community.”234 In contrast, there is a conception that deviating from
shareholder primacy would involve giving managers who are also mere humans too much
discretion to the point that they become too opportunistic. A similar problem encountered
in the principal-agent model could also be experienced when managers are given such
discretion, because they would not necessarily act in the interests of society but instead
act in their own interest.235 Roe articulates, “… a stakeholder measure of managerial
accountability could leave mangers so much discretion that managers could easily pursue
their own agenda, one that might maximize neither shareholder, employer, consumer, nor
national wealth, but only their own.”236
Another perspective known as the social entity conception views the corporation
as a social construction, with social purposes.237 A leading scholar who originally
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articulated this idea in response to Berle’s shareholder primacy position was E. Merrick
Dodd, a professor at Harvard Law School. He argues that, “there is in fact a growing
feeling not only that business has responsibilities to the community but that our corporate
managers who control business should voluntarily and without waiting for legal
compulsion manage it in such a way as to fulfill those responsibilities.”238 He cited the
heads of some major corporations, such as General Electric, to buttress his argument that
business leaders had come to acknowledge that corporate managers are required to
consider social responsibility when running their companies.239
Dodd offered some interpretations of the social entity view in relation to corporate
law. He argued that if social responsibility entailed that corporate managers focused more
on the needs of their employees and consumers, this would in the long run result in the
shareholders’ benefit. His reasoning was based on the fact that employee satisfaction
results in greater productivity and eventually increased profits. The implication is that
managers could actually increase profits by concentrating on the needs of groups other
than shareholders.240
Dodd further argued that courts had offered enough leeway to corporate
managers, permitting them “a wide range of discretion as to what policies will best
promote the interests of the stockholders . . .”241 For example, he indicated that corporate
charitable giving, although may not directly increase shareholder wealth, but could
engender good will in the community.242 This good will could lead to shareholders’
benefit, because consumers would be more likely to think positively of the corporation
and purchase its products. By this logic, he thinks that corporations are “affected not only
by the laws which regulate business but by the attitude of public and business opinion as
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to the social obligations of business.”243 He asserted that the opinion of the society about
corporation as a purely private enterprise was shifting, and that corporate managers
should “recognize that the attitude of law and public opinion towards business was
changing….”244
He thinks the case for social responsibility is even more compelling with regard to
companies that have strong public dimensions, such as railways and public utilities.
Pharmaceutical companies may be classified under this category because of the strong
public health dimension. The social entity conception takes into account that corporations
have much broader social purposes and duties than merely maximizing the wealth of
shareholders.245 A review of the three major theories of the corporation indicates that the
duties of pharmaceutical companies will be determined by the particular theory one
adopts.
Allen highlights that the courts and legislatures have recognized the social entity
view and the social obligations it supports.246 The legal system realized this objective
with the enactment of corporate constituency statutes. These statutes have undercut
shareholders’ primacy, in support of other constituencies, such as employees and the
community. Currently, about 29 states have adopted corporate constituency statutes in the
United States.247 For example, the New York statute’s provisions of 4 and 5 authorize
directors to consider other constituencies when they act, and to act on behalf of these
other constituencies.248 Corporate constituency statutes significantly modify a
corporation’s duty of care to encompass others in addition to shareholders. This implies
that managers may have a legal right to consider interests of other constituencies in
addition to shareholders without infringing on their obligations to shareholders.249 The
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responsibilities of pharmaceutical companies to their shareholders do not protect them
from increased moral responsibilities for ensuring affordable access to anti-retroviral
drugs for developing countries.250

C.3. Global Pharmaceutical Companies and Social Responsibility
Assigning social responsibilities to global pharmaceutical companies has been
hotly contested by several authors. Resnik argues strongly in support of ascribing social
responsibilities to global pharmaceutical companies, appealing to the view that business
only functions well within the context of social values such as honesty, integrity, fidelity,
diligence and fairness. Business would be undercut by corruption, theft, fraud and
disloyalty without allegiance to such social values.251 In contrast, Daniels argues that
Resnik’s argument falls short, because the specific obligations or responsibilities
assigned to global pharmaceutical companies cannot be deduced from the list of social
values identified by him.252
Furthermore, Resnik argues that businesses have other social responsibilities
because they exist within societies where people are concerned about the environment,
public safety, public health and other values. Ignoring such social responsibilities
grounded in what society cares about may incur the wrath of the public and eventually
stringent regulations.253 On the other hand, Daniels argues that the specific
responsibilities or obligations ascribed to businesses within a society result from a
societal negotiation “in which the protection of business incentives and productivity are
weighed against the consequences to the public of failing to impose specific – legal and
administrative – duties and obligations.254
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Daniels postulates moral responsibilities that conform to and possibly justify the
legal duties and obligations that result from such a negotiation. However, he went further
to argue that the specific nature of any of these duties or responsibilities should result
from a kind of social contract that establishes them. They cannot be deduced simply from
what society is concerned about or what it impends. Daniels contends that the duties and
obligations we may impose on global corporations, internationally also result from both
domestic and international negotiation. He thinks we can have more clarity and
specificity regarding the social responsibilities that are ascribed to corporations in either
the domestic or international case only when we have executed the appropriate
negotiation within the appropriate social or inter-societal contract setting.255 Similarly,
Brock disagrees with Resnik argument of facing the public’s wrath if pharmaceutical
companies ignore their social responsibilities but for a different reasoning distinct from
Daniels. He thinks that this is not the reason why they have any moral responsibilities,
rather, it simply indicates that it is in their self-interest, not a moral obligation, to execute
some responsibilities.256
Resnik offered second reason for ascribing social responsibilities to
pharmaceutical companies, articulating that they are like moral agents in that their
decisions have significant consequences for people affected by them. Daniels agrees
partially with him that we all get involved in moral blame of some of these consequences
and some of these actions. However, he doubts the clarity of responsibilities that derive
from the fact that corporate decisions have consequences on people outside the
corporations. He thinks Resnik does not provide sufficient details regarding the
derivation. Furthermore, he contends that both in different nations and globally, societies
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and their legal institutions take these consequences into account, engage in evaluating of
benefits in contrast to consequences, including the consequences of corporate decisions
on the rights of other parties, and establish a legal and possibly moral framework for
discussing social responsibilities. Noteworthy, is that the specifics do not derive from the
nature of agency but from the kind of discussion he has identified.257
On the other hand, Brock argues that corporations are unlike moral agents in
many other ways, pointing to the fact that various social institutions are established for
specific purposes and functions, which make them unlike persons and influence their
responsibilities. More so, he contends that many people believe that the responsibilities of
corporations go to their shareholders and that they do not have moral responsibilities of
beneficence and justice similar to those of individuals. He thinks that Resnik too
hurriedly supposes that corporations have the moral obligations like those of
individuals.258
Resnik argues that global pharmaceutical companies have social responsibilities
or duties of beneficence and justice to developing countries. He appeals to such social or
moral responsibilities as a solution for providing affordable access to essential drugs in
developing countries. There are various ways that global pharmaceutical companies can
exercise their social or moral responsibilities to developing countries, including
sponsoring research and development for diseases that affect people in developing
countries such as malaria, tuberculosis and HIV/AIDS, providing free medications to
them, and offering substantial discounts on drug prices. He argues that these social
responsibilities are not absolute requirements and may be weighed against other
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obligations and commitments with respect to economic, social, political, legal and other
relevant conditions.259
Furthermore, Resnik argues that the degree to which a global pharmaceutical
company may exercise social responsibility in developing countries extensively hinges on
two major factors: (1) the expectations of a reasonable profit and (2) the expectations of a
good business environment.260 Developing countries can either assist or hinder the efforts
of pharmaceutical companies to execute social responsibility through several policies and
practices. They could guarantee a reasonable profit for pharmaceutical companies by
honoring pharmaceutical patents. If they do not comply with the patents, the
pharmaceutical companies will significantly lose some profits which will take away
money that could be invested in projects or programs aimed at promoting affordable
access to essential drugs in developing countries. Guaranteeing a good business
environment for pharmaceutical companies entails that developing countries should make
honest efforts “to promote the rule of law, ethical business practices, stable currencies,
reliable banking systems, free and open markets, democracy, and other social, economic,
legal and political conditions conducive to business.”261
Conversely, Brock thinks that more argument is required to buttress that global
pharmaceutical companies have a moral obligation to conduct business and exercise
social responsibilities in developing countries.262 He thinks that fulfilling basic needs of
individuals in a society is the responsibility of the government, citing Rawls’ concept of
the function of basic social institutions. For example, fulfilling the basic needs of food
and shelter is not a special responsibility of the food and real estate industries, but a
governmental responsibility. He asserts that providing prescription drugs coverage for the
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elderly acknowledged as a major political issue in the United States, has never been
argued by any of the parties in the debate as the pharmaceutical companies’ social
responsibility of beneficence and justice to fulfil the need.263
Furthermore, Brock points to large income inequalities between developed and
poorer developing countries, which impede the latter’s affordability of the prices of
patented drugs, and is acknowledged as one of the most grave injustices in the world
currently.

He argues that when developing countries fail to honor pharmaceutical

patents, in order to provide drugs essential to save lives and protect their citizens’ health,
it is debatably a step towards ensuring greater justice between developed and developing
countries, as well as, a situation where the threat of overruling pharmaceutical patents
may have greater influence on the voluntary efforts of pharmaceutical companies than
arguments regarding their social responsibility.264
Daniels also expresses some doubts regarding Resnik’s focus on social or moral
responsibilities as a solution to the problem of affordable access to essential drugs in
developing countries. He acknowledges that developing countries have endured for a
long time, a situation in which global pharmaceutical companies have hardly exercised
the social responsibilities that Resnik assigns to them. He contends that though debatable,
developing countries do a better job of fulfilling the health needs of their populations by
engaging in local manufacture of drugs as well as refusing to honor intellectual property
rights. Resnik’s contention that such action by developing countries takes away some
profits from pharmaceutical companies which they need in order to be competitive, falls
short because it cannot be buttressed from existing facts, and Resnik himself indicates
that they make a substantial profit regardless of renegade states.265
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Daniels challenges Resnik’s argument that in the long run, the global
pharmaceutical companies would better fulfill the health needs of developing countries if
both global pharmaceutical companies and developing nations reciprocally fulfilled their
social responsibilities. He indicates that Resnik may be right, but also recognizes that
there is no assurance to developing countries that global pharmaceutical companies will
fulfill their social responsibilities on a consistent basis, regardless of the abundant
evidence that they fulfill other commitments. In the absence of resolving the problem of
assurance which may rest on some reliable strategies for enforcement of those
responsibilities, there is no way to effectively deal with the behavior of developing
countries eager to resolve the problem of affordable access to essential drugs by their
local production. In fact, the international agreements on intellectual property, such as
TRIPS Agreement and TRIPS-plus provisions that establish international property rights
fall short of implementing the social responsibilities of global pharmaceutical companies
and concentrate only on the responsibilities of developing countries to honor property
rights. Daniels forcefully argues that, “Without the quid pro quo, there is no solution to
the assurance problem and so no basis for appealing to moral commitment to solve the
problem of public goods lurking in the background.”266 Finally, Daniels contends that the
solution to affordable access to essential drugs in developing countries rests on domestic
and international action to control global pharmaceutical companies and to standardize
their contributions towards fulfilling the needs of developing countries.267

D. Current Strategies for Dealing with Access Problem
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Global pharmaceutical companies, international agencies and national governments
exercise their social and moral responsibilities to ensure affordable access to essential
drugs, including anti-retroviral drugs for developing countries with the following
strategies: private donations, price reductions and differential pricing, International
collaborative initiatives and public-private partnerships and compulsory licensing. A brief
discussion of the strategies follows.

D.1. Private Donations
Several pharmaceutical companies embark on various programs to donate AIDS
drugs free of charge to developing countries. For example, Boehringer-Ingelheim pledged
to provide Nevirapene, an effective drug for significantly reducing the mother-to-child
transmission of HIV, free of charge for a limited period of time. Pfizer also offered to
provide Fluconazole free of charge to the people of South Africa affected by cryptococcal
meningitis.268
`Various pharmaceutical organizations also have donated funds to developing
countries aimed at ensuring affordable access to essential drugs, including anti-retroviral
drugs. For example, Merck donated US$3 million to the Harvard AIDS Institute for
developing and implementing a care program in Senegal and Brazil. Similarly, BristolMyers Squibb funded its own “Secure the Future Programme” with US$100 million, in
order to establish a large number of programs in African Countries, as well as for training
of health care professionals from Africa at US tertiary institutions.269
Most authors have questioned the sustainability and effectiveness of donations by
pharmaceutical companies in resolving the perennial issue of affordable access to
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essential drugs for developing countries. Schuklenk and Ashcroft articulate, “The
problem with these handouts is, of course, that such offers are fraught with conditions,
time and quantity-based limitations and a continuing dependence of the developing
country’s health care planning on the generosity of commercial organizations.”270
Philanthropic approaches to the issue of affordable access to essential drugs for
developing countries have both advantages and disadvantages. In a way, they depict an
acknowledgement by corporations that they possess the capacity to act morally and,
probably, possess an obligation to help those affected by disaster. The positive aspects of
such donations comprise that they take place, they are not coerced and they depict an
assumption of moral agency and moral obligations by corporations. Conversely, there is
recognition of the existence of moral distinction between charitable giving considered as
voluntary and honorable and acting on duty. In this context, duty implies duty to prevent
avoidable deaths where it is possible for one, is not optional but obligatory. Charity
entails the freedom to turn away one’s giving elsewhere if one considers it appropriate,
and to assume the right to cease if the recipient is not grateful or not deserving.271
Another case against charity is that “it morally degrades the individual by
fostering dependence, promoting an attitude of humility toward the giver, and depriving
the recipient of the ability to set terms and negotiate the terms of receipt.”272 Counting on
this argument presents serious problem because it may portray aid as such as wrong,
instead of particular type of aid, such as supererogatory, discretionary, and conditional
charity. However, donation of drugs has been argued as an improvised solution, which
may partly solve the problem of affordable access to essential drugs for developing
countries, but it comes with moral problem. This implies that on the one hand, from
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aretaic point of view, it deals with the motives and character of donor and recipient, and
on the other hand, from consequentialist viewpoint, the solution is not sustainable and it
ignores the perspective in which pharmaceutical companies and states have a duty to
prevent avoidable deaths when they possess the power to do so.273
D.2. Price Reductions and Differential Pricing
Price reductions and differential pricing or equity pricing are also ad hoc solutions
used by pharmaceutical companies to tackle the issue of affordable access to patented
essential drugs for people in developing countries. Initial efforts to reduce the exorbitant
price of AIDS drugs were made by UNAIDS. In 1997, UNAIDS started a collaborative
effort that engaged three pharmaceutical companies and health officials in Chile, Cote
d’Ivoire, Uganda, and Vietnam. However, prices of anti-retroviral drugs continued to be
very exorbitant for most people in these countries, despite this plan.274
Pharmaceutical companies also embarked on reducing the price of lifeprolonging, health preserving anti-retroviral drugs for poor developing countries. For
example, in February 2001, Oxfam launched a campaign to pressure multinational drug
companies to cut prices in poor countries. The charity initiative was not restricted to
HIV/AIDS, but encompasses other drugs such as effective antibiotics. More so, Oxfam
challenged the patent laws that have hindered poor countries from importing inexpensive,
generic drugs from other countries without fear of reprisal.275
Merck, a big pharmaceutical company in March 2001 also offered to sell two of
the AIDS drugs it produces to developing countries at much reduced prices than it
charges in the United States. For example, Crixivan and Stocrin were sold for $600 and
$500 per patient per year respectively, at a time when the US prices for these drugs were
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$6,000 and $4,700, respectively. Merck also offered to reduce the prices of both drugs in
Brazil, but at higher prices than it had provided other developing countries, $1,029 for
Crixivan and $920 for Stocrin. Merck explained that its decision was based on the
countries that would qualify for its lowest price on the United Nations Human
Development index. The Brazilian government as well exerted pressure on Hoffmann-La
Roche, which manufactures another AIDS drug to reduce its price.276
Novartis, another pharmaceutical company based in Swiss in May 2001 also
offered to cut the price of Riamet, a powerful drug to treat malaria. The price at the time
in industrialized countries was about $12, but Novartis decided to sell the drug to WHO
for $2 for a complete treatment. Overall, between March and May 2001, the companies
that chose to sell their AIDS drugs at considerably reduced prices in developing countries
were Merck, GlaxoSmithKline, Bistol-Myers Squibb, and Abbott Laboratories.277
Various pharmaceutical companies are also effectively advancing towards a
solution to affordable access that entails differential pricing or equity pricing in
developed and developing countries. Differential pricing or equity pricing is defined as
“setting the price of essential drugs in a way that reflects countries’ ability to pay, as
measured by their level of income.”278 Differential pricing uses a tiered pricing system
with emphasis on market segmentation based on the economic profile of a country.
Pharmaceutical companies provide countries with a differential pricing or an equity
pricing scheme, based on the economic profile of the poorest buyer in a country. This
utilizes the notion of price discrimination which allows a pharmaceutical company to sell
the same drug to different buyers at different prices. Prices are specifically not based on
the costs of production but on what the buyer would be able to pay.279
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The notion of differential pricing is distinct from the circumstance seen in various
countries where they price the same drugs differently. The latter condition stems the
policies adopted by individual countries that help them to control the drug market for
their own people. Differences are also traceable to taxes, import duties, whole-sale and
mark-ups, and several other factors. Variations in prices of the same drugs in different
countries are not usually accounted for by a deliberate and systematic international
policy, but differential pricing focuses on that purpose and structure.280
The purpose of differential pricing is to enable poor developing countries to
achieve access to essential drugs for their populations.281 In most poor developing
countries, both the government and the majority of the people are not able to afford
essential drugs that are required for various treatable diseases. On the other hand, in
affluent developed countries, public funding is the chief source for financing healthcare
services, varying from over 95 percent in the U.K., more than 90 percent in Norway, to a
low of less than 50 percent in the US. This implies that out of packet payments, instead of
prepaid insurance, are the major means for financing healthcare services, including
buying of essential drugs in most poor developing countries.282 Both price reductions and
differential pricing present serious challenges to pharmaceutical companies by opening
avenues for parallel trade or parallel importing, which undercuts their profits.283 They are
also ineffective solutions to the issue of affordable access to essential drugs for
developing countries. The failure of the market mechanism to guarantee affordable access
to essential drugs, as well as the limitations imposed by intellectual property rights
resulted in the establishment and growth of public-private partnerships.284
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D.3. International Collaborative Initiatives and Public-Private Partnerships
An astronomical growth in the establishment of public-private partnerships, and
numerous collaborations among international agencies was experienced in the 1990s.285
Pharmaceutical companies, international agencies, developed and developing countries’
governments were more readily willing to collaborate in order to ensure affordable access
to essential drugs for people in developing countries. Notable among those collaborative
initiatives were the Global Alliance for Vaccines and Immunization (GAVI), the
International AIDS Vaccine Initiative (IAVI), and the Global Fund to Fight AIDS,
Tuberculosis, and Malaria. These initiatives function by utilizing funds to support
research and development aimed at manufacturing new drugs that are badly needed for
people in developing countries who cannot afford them. The pharmaceutical companies
involved in these efforts benefit by utilizing patents that stem from their collaboration to
develop drugs they can market more profitably in developed countries. In return for
engaging in the partnership, they usually make a commitment to offer drugs to
developing countries at reasonable prices.286
GAVI was established in 1999 to guarantee the protection of children against
diseases that can be avoided by vaccines. GAVI supports new vaccine development,
organizes current immunization programs, and operates at international, regional, and
national levels. Its special focus is to expedite research and development of vaccines for
developing countries.287
GAVI has broadened its intiative by attracting several public and private partners,
comprising “the United Nations agencies, WHO, the World Bank, and UNICEF; private
foundations, the Bill and Melinda Gates Children’s Vaccine Program and the Rockefeller
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Foundations; the industry group, International Federation of Pharmaceutical
Manufacturers Association as well as public health and research institutions and national
governments.”288 GAVI created the Vaccine Fund, which offers direct support to
countries in two ways.The first is providing new and under-used vaccines, in addition to
safe immunization equipment; the second is providing funds in order to help governments
in fortifying their immunization services.289
The Global Fund is one of the most recent intiatives by various United Nations
agencies to establish private-partnerships for the purpose of ensuring affordable access to
essential drugs in poor developing countries. The Global fund was established for the
purpose of fighting AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria prevalent in development countries,
where the local populations are unable to afford drugs for treating these diseases. The
Global fund initiative was set in motion by the call from both Gro Harlem Bruntland, the
former Director General of the World Health Organization, and Kofi Annan, the former
Secretary General of the United Nations, for establishment of a large fund to combat
diseases that kill or disable millions of people in poor developing countries. Both leaders
envisioned the necessity for obligations from affluent and poor countries’ governments,
and also from private foundations, nongovernmental agencies, and the private sector, to
embark on this initiative.290 The Global Fund was structured to raise funds for broad
objectives, including the purchase of drugs from manufacturers, the launch of better
educational and prevention programs, the construction of new clinics or improvement of
current ones, training of healthcare workers, and fortifying the infrastructure in other
ways.291
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The Global Fund devised the strategy of supporting poor nations to buy generic
drugs rather than more exorbitant brand-name drugs currently under patent protections by
the global pharmaceutical companies. This strategy made it possible for countries such as
India and Brazil, which are large manufacturers of generic drugs to market their products
in other poor countries. Because, the Global Fund offers grants to countries that apply for
them, such countries are required to purchase the lowest priced drugs of guaranteed
quality, which is a more efficient and effective utilization of the fund’s money.292 One of
the major challenges which hampered the progress of the Global Fund was meager
funding from voluntary donations, which falls far short of its anticipated goal and the US
was blamed for setting a poor example for other countries.293 The TRIPS Agreement also
continued to impede the improved access to generic drugs by poor countries, making it
more imperative for such countries to use compulsory licensing in order to address their
public health emergency needs.

D.4. Complusory Licensing
The TRIPS Agreement makes provision for countries to respond effectively to
public health emergency situations such as HIV/AIDS epidemics by issuing compulsory
licensing. This provision authorizes countries to bypass patent protection and
manufacture or import copies or versions of patented drugs in a case of national health
emergency. The procedure for accomplishing this is to issue a compulsory license in
order to produce a generic copy of a drug, and the patent-holder is paid an affordable
royalty under this arrangement.294 Countries lacking manufacturing capacity were also
allowed under this provision to import a generic copy of a patented drug.
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A major contention among WTO member countries was the definition of what
constitutes a national emergency. Countries were invested with the right to determine
what constitutes a national emergency and there were express indications that public
health crises, such as HIV/AIDS,malaria, tuberculosis and other epidemics will be
considered as national emergencies.295
Another obstacle to countries issuing compulsory licensing was the pressure from
big multinational pharmaceutical companies, US and other western governments who are
opposed to invoking the provision. Their pressure sometimes resulted in litigations and
retaliatory sanctions against such countries as evident in the South African case.296
The validity of complusory licensing approach has been defended by several authors on
moral and pragmatic bases by elimination of other alternatives such as donation, ad hoc
price reduction, and public-private partnerships.297 Schuklenk and Ashcroft argue that,
“the effective prevention of avoidable deaths, the operation of efficient competitive
markets through lowering of artificial barriers to entry, and the assertion of legitimate
national sovereignty in the international arena are conclusive prima facie justifications of
compulsory licensing.”298
Some risks associated with compulsory licensing were also highlighted.
Pharmaceutical companies may have less capacity to shoulder the risks of research and
development (R&D), if their right to market their products with a substantial profit, in
order to recoup research and development costs is significantly undermined by the risk of
compulsory licensing. This scenario may also adversely impact their choice of drugs to
develop. For example, they may focus on luxury high-cost drugs for lifestyle conditions,
instead of essential drugs for life-threatening and chronic disease.299 Nevertheless,
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Compulsory licensing has been argued as the most effetive means available to developing
countries’
governments to provide essential drugs, including anti-retroviral drugs to their people in
a time-efficiently manner.300

E. Conclusion
Concluding remarks on the affordable access to drugs in developing countries
stress the compelling need and urgency for development of cheaper generic copies of
anti-retroviral drugs for addressing HIV/AIDS epidemics. Conducting international
clinical trials was considered as a primary strategy for providing affordable access to
essential drugs in developing countries, but available evidence shows that participants
and host populations usually do not share in the benefits that result from such trials.
Merits and demerits of placebo-controlled trials were argued, and it was established that
in the presence of other viable alternatives, it is no longer the best method for providing
affordable access to anti-retroviral drugs for poor populations in developing countries.
Most anti-retroviral drugs that result from international clinical trials conducted in
developing countries are not marketed in that setting, because they are unable to afford
them, rather they are usually sold in developed countries, where pharmaceutical
companies recoup substantial profits on R&D.
Three major factors were identified as contributing significantly to the problem of
lack of access to essential drugs in developing countries. First, is the meager investment
on R&D by pharmaceutical companies on diseases of poverty prevalent in developing
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countries. Second, is the adverse effects of strict enforcement of patent protection. Third,
is poverty and inadequate health infrastructure.
The affordable access to anti-retroviral drugs in developing countries was
discussed within the broader contexts of intellectual property law, international trade
agreements and non-patent factors. Intellectual property rights were defended from two
different bases, rights-based and utilitarian justification. Rights-based justiciation of
intellectual property emphasized exclusive rights to one’s creation of the mind, while
utilitarian defenses stressed the protection of intellectual property rights which guarantees
profits to the inventors.
The tension between enforcement of strict patent protection and affordable access
to essential drugs, including anti-retroviral drugs for the poor people in developing
contries was acknowledged. Pharmaceutical companies and Western governments
attributed lack of affordable access to non-patent factors such as poverty, inadequate
infrastructure, lack of trained healthcare officials and lack of political will for
governments of developing countries to combat HIV/AIDS.
On the other hand, human rights activists and developing countries blamed lack of
affordable access to anti-retroviral drugs on strict enforcement of patent laws. A
discussion on the analysis of the issue of affordable access to drugs established that both
patent and non-patent factors adversely impede access to affordable HIV/AIDS drugs in
developing countries.
The severe impact of international trade agreements currently negotiated by
United States, which further exacerbate impeded access to anti-retroviral drugs for people
in developing countries was clearly recognized. Two key aspects of TRIPS agreement
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was discussed, including strict patent protection in order to promote incentives for
innovation and promotion of public health interests, and maintaining a delicate balance
between them was considered imperative. Compulsory licensing and parallel importation
were encouraged in order to assist countries with dealing effectively with national health
emergencies. These provisions authorize countries to manufacture and import generic
copies of patented drugs respectively in order to address a national health crisis situation
such as HIV/AIDS.
The social responsibility of pharmaceutical companies was also argued.
Pharmaceutical companies were concluded to have broader responsibilities both to
shareholders and to the society. The broad responsibilities of pharmaceutical companies
were anchored in corporate constituency statutes currently enacted in some states in
United States. Corporate constituency statutes allow or require directors to take into
account the interests of non-shareholder constituencies in making business decisions. It
was strongly argued that pharmaceutical companies have broader social objectives and
responsibilities than simply maximizing shareholders wealth or profit. Pharmaceutical
companies in this regard have grave obligations to improve affordable access to antiretroviral drugs for poor people in developing countries.
Finally, current strategies for dealing with the issue of affordable access to antiretroviral drugs for developing countries were discussed, including private donations,
price reductions and differential pricing, international collaborative initiatives and publicprivate partnerships and compulsory licensing. Private donations and price reductions
were viewed as improved solutions that are not effective and sustainable. Compulsory
licensing was argued to be most effective stategy for countries to exercise their duty of
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providing essential drugs, including anti-retroviral drugs to their citizens, as well as for
preventing avoidable deaths from treatable conditions for millions of people in
developing countries. The combined problems of clinical research protocols in
developing nations (chapter two) and of affordable access to resulting drugs for host
populations (chapter three) establish the context for the ethical analysis in the subsequent
chapters: the issue of global justice to address affordable access to anti-retroviral drugs in
developing countries.
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CHAPTER FOUR
RAWLS AND POST-TRIAL ACCESS OF PARTICIPANTS AND HOST
POPULATIONS TO ANTI-RETROVIRAL DRUGS

A. Introduction
There has been a contentious debate about the issue of global justice to address
affordable access to anti-retroviral drugs in developing countries. Two major approaches
have emerged in this regard, cosmopolitan and statist.1 Millum acknowledges that, “a
central question that divides theorists writing about global justice, and that affects most
directly problems in international bioethics, concerns what people and governments of
rich countries owe to those outside their borders.”2 Cosmopolitans such as Pogge argue
that distributive justice principles that apply in the domestic realm apply equally globally.
The implication is that if Rawls’ difference principle were considered the right way to
distribute primary goods within a country, there should as well be a global difference
principle distributing primary goods among all people in the world.3 In contrast, statists
such as Rawls argue that the principle of distributive justice applies only within domestic
society, that is, individual nations.4 Underlying the approach of Rawls is the view that
justice deals with the basic structure of the society.5 The implication of the statist
approach of Rawls is to rely merely upon the duty of humanitarian assistance from the
perspective of global justice to provide affordable access to drugs in developing nations.
This chapter focuses on Rawls’s statist approach to the issue of access to antiretroviral drugs in developing countries. The first part of this chapter deals with Rawls
major contribution to political liberalism which begins with his landmark book titled A
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Theory of Justice (TOJ), first published in 1971 and later revised in 1999 that focuses on
domestic justice, that is, justice within societies. He presents a conception of justice
which he refers to as “justice as fairness.”6 Rawls’s conception of justice applied to a
basic structure of a society has some limitations. He conceives a domestic basic structure
which is fixed. He proposes a basic structure of society conceived as “a closed system
isolated from other societies.”7 He also conceives the basic structure of the society as
self-sufficient.8 Rawls’s idea of social justice focuses on establishing criteria for
evaluating the distribution of the primary social goods in a society.
The second part deals with health and essential drugs in a domestic society which
focuses on Rawls’s view about their classification. Health and health care are not
included among Rawls’s list of primary social goods. They are not regulated by the
difference principle.9 Daniels develops a different conception of the position of health in
Rawls’s theory. He argues that health care should be viewed as an essential contributor to
fulfilling Rawls’s principle of equality of opportunity. He argues that maintaining fair
equality of opportunity requires meeting health care needs of the individuals in a
domestic society.10
The third part of this chapter focuses on Rawls’s statist approach to providing
anti-retroviral drugs in developing countries which restricts the principle of justice to the
domestic society. Rawls’s principles on international justice discussed in “The Law of
Peoples” (LOP) fall short of a commitment to global distributive justice.11 Rawls
proposes that well-ordered societies have a duty to assist burdened societies to attain
required level of economic and social development to become well-ordered.12
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The fourth part tackles Rawls’s duty of assistance and access to anti-retroviral
drugs. Rawls’s notion of international responsibilities focuses on assisting burdened
societies to attain well-ordered societies. Providing affordable access to anti-retroviral
drugs as a transition strategy is argued as an important component of Rawls’s duty of
assistance to burdened societies in order to attain well-ordered societies. A more detailed
analysis of Rawls’s position on affordable access to anti-retroviral drugs in developing
countries begins with a discussion of justice as fairness.

B. Justice as Fairness
B.1. Society as a Fair System of Cooperation
Justice as fairness evolves from a political tradition that supports the public
culture of a democratic society which emphasizes a basic idea of society as a fair system
of cooperation.13 Rawls articulates that, “one practical aim of justice as fairness is to
provide an acceptable philosophical and moral basis for democratic institutions and thus
to address the question of how the claims of liberty and equality are to be understood.”14
The notion of society as a fair system of cooperation establishes a foundation for
developing a political conception of justice for a democratic regime.15
In conjunction with the fundamental idea of society as fair system of cooperation,
two other ideas are also considered central in understanding the concept of justice as
fairness. These ideas comprise of the idea of citizens which denotes people involved in
cooperation as free and equal persons; as well as the idea of well-ordered society, which
indicates a society controlled effectively by a public conception of justice.16
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Rawls identifies three important features of the notion of social cooperation. First,
social cooperation is distinguished from an activity simply socially organized. The
implication is that social cooperation is regulated by publicly acknowledged rules and
procedures which cooperating members recognize as suitable to govern their conduct.
Second, the notion of cooperation involves the idea of fair terms of cooperation, which
implies the terms every cooperating member accepts as reasonable in all cases. Fair terms
of cooperation stipulate an idea of reciprocity, and mutuality which entails that all those
who played their role as required by the publicly acknowledged rules would benefit as
stipulated by a public and consensus standard. Third, the notion of social cooperation
involves an idea of each participant’s rational advantage, or good. This idea of rational
advantage stipulates what those involved in cooperation are looking to accomplish from
the perspective of their own good.17
The idea of reciprocity in social cooperation rests between “the idea of
impartiality, which is altruistic (being moved by the general good), and the idea of mutual
advantage understood as everyone’s advantaged with respect to each person’s present or
expected future situations as things are.”18 In the context of justice as fairness, reciprocity
refers to a relation between citizens articulated by principles of justice that govern a
social institution in which everyone benefits with regard to a suitable benchmark of
equality delineated with respect to that institution.19 Furthermore, Rawls highlights that
“reciprocity is a relation between citizens in a well-ordered society expressed by its
political conception of justice.”20 For example, the idea of reciprocity is established
between citizens when you consider the two principles of justice with the difference
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principle emphasizing equal division as a benchmark.21 Noteworthy also is that the idea
of reciprocity is distinct from the idea of mutual advantage.22
Rawls also makes a distinction between two fundamental and complementary
ideas, reasonable and rational as they relate to the basic idea of society as a fair system of
social cooperation. In the context of persons involved in social cooperation and
positioned as equals in several regards, “reasonable persons are ready to propose, or to
acknowledge when proposed by others, the principles needed to specify what can be seen
by all as fair terms of cooperation.”23 There is a consensus that reasonable persons also
comprehend that they are to respect these principles, even when it is detrimental to their
own interests but with the caveat that other members engaged in the cooperation may be
required to respect them. It is deemed unreasonable not to be prepared to propose such
principles, or not to respect fair terms of cooperation that other cooperating members may
reasonably be required to consent to. Furthermore, it is worse than unreasonable if the
person simply fakes to propose or respect the principles but is prepared to infringe on
them to one’s advantage as the situation allows.24
Conversely, what may be deemed unreasonable, may in general, be deemed
rational. For example, we suggest this distinction in a situation when we concur that
among persons engaged in cooperation, certain people due to their superior bargaining
position, their proposal is clearly rational, but all the same unreasonable.25
The critical role of the principles of justice is to stipulate the fair terms of social
cooperation. These principles stipulate the basic rights and duties to be allocated by the
key political and social institutions, and they control the allocation of benefits and
burdens arising from social cooperation. The principles of a democratic conception of
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justice may be seen as stipulating the fair terms of cooperation between citizens in a
democratic society, where citizens are considered as free and equal persons from the
perspective of political conception.26 Another critical feature of justice as fairness is the
basic structure of the society which is considered as the primary subject of justice.

B.2 The Basic Structure of the Society as the Primary Subject of Justice
Rawls’s idea of the basic structure applies to a well-ordered society, which is a
society controlled effectively by a public conception of justice.27 Rawls contends that
“the primary subject of justice is the basic structure of society, or more exactly, the way
in which the major social institutions distribute fundamental rights and duties and
determine the division of advantages from social cooperation.”28 The major institutions of
basic structure of a society consist of political constitution, legal protection of freedom of
thought and liberty of conscience, legally recognized forms of private property, the
structure of the economy in the form of competitive markets and the monogamous
family.29 The activities of associations and individuals occur within the context of the
basic structure which is the background social framework. Thus, “a just basic structure
secures what we may call background justice.”30
The major institutions of the basic structure of a society specify rights and duties
of the citizens and significantly impact their life prospects, aspirations and opportunities,
as well as their ability to take advantage of them in order to be successful in the society.31
Therefore, the basic structure is the primary subject of justice because its impacts are
pervasive and present from the start of life.32 Significant inequalities are acknowledged in
the basic structure of the society, because of the impact of the natural and social lotteries.
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The purpose of the principles of justice applied to the basic structure of the society is to
address these inequalities.33
The principles of justice as fairness are limited to the basic structure and
consequently regulate this structure, but they do not apply directly to or control
institutions and associations internally within a domestic society. Constraints from the
principles of justice apply only indirectly to private associations and institutions such as
firms, labor unions, churches, universities and the family. For example, the two
principles of justice are not meant to regulate the internal organization of churches and
universities. The difference principle does not regulate how parents should treat their
children or distribute the wealth of the family among its members.34
The principles of justice as fairness which may be deemed reasonable and just for
the basic structure may not also be usually considered reasonable and just for institutions,
associations and social practices. Although, the principles of justice as fairness impose
restrictions on these social arrangements within the basic structure, the basic structure
and the associations and social forms within it are separately regulated by different
principles relative to their goals and their distinctive nature and peculiar requirements.35
Rawls articulates, “Justice as fairness is a political, not a general, conception of justice: it
applies first to the basic structure and sees other questions of local justice and also
questions of global justice (what I call the law of peoples) as calling for separate
considerations on their merits.”36
The principles of justice that apply directly to or regulate associations and
institutions within the basic structure may be termed principles of local justice. Rawls
identifies three levels of justice, first, local justice that entails principles that apply
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directly to institutions; second, domestic justice that implies principles that apply to the
basic structure of society; and third, global justice that involves principles that apply to
international law.37 Justice as fairness begins with domestic justice which is the justice of
the basic structure. It moves outward to the law of peoples and then inward to local
justice.38

B.3. Essential Elements of Theory of Justice
Original Position
The idea of original position is necessitated by the requirement to specify the fair
terms of cooperation in a fair system of cooperation between free and equal persons. In
the context of justice as fairness, the fair terms of cooperation are specified by an
agreement arrived at by free and equal citizens engaged in cooperation, which is reached
with the understanding of what they consider as their reciprocal advantage, or good.39
Rawls indicates that, “the original position is the appropriate initial status quo which
insures that the fundamental agreements reached in it are fair. This fact yields the name
“justice as fairness.”40
The original agreement must be reached under certain conditions that are ideally
fair if it is to be a valid agreement from the perspective of political justice. Specifically,
these conditions must position free and equal persons fairly and must not allow some to
possess unfair bargaining advantages over others.41 More so, certain impeding conditions
such as “threats of force and coercion, deception and fraud must be excluded.”42
The original position is a thought experiment, an imaginary condition where every real
citizen is represented and all these representatives reach an agreement on the principles of
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justice that would regulate the political institutions of the real citizens.43 In order to reach
the most impartial situation, the parties who enter the agreement are deprived of salient
information that might bias their choice of principles. This idea is captured by indicating
that the parties are to choose under a veil of ignorance.44 The conditions of original
position executed under the veil of ignorance “define the principles of justice as those
which rational persons concerned to advance their interests would consent to as equals
when none are known to be advantaged by social and natural contingencies.”45 The veil
of ignorance is introduced in order to nullify the influences of natural and social
circumstances which could be exploited by some citizens to their own advantage. In this
context of the veil of ignorance, the parties do not know how numerous options will
impact their own specific case and they are bound to assess principles exclusively on the
basis of general considerations.46
Rawls argues that citizens should not be favored or disfavored by social
institutions based on for example characteristics such as their race, class and gender.
Each party in the original position is deprived of information regarding the race, class,
and gender of the real citizen they represent. The parties in the original position are
deprived of all particular facts regarding citizens that are irrelevant to the choice of
principles of justice: not only their race, class, and gender but as well their age, natural
assets and abilities, etc. The veil of ignorance also eliminates specific information
regarding the society of the citizens in order to acquire a clearer opinion of the enduring
features of a just social system.47 However, the parties know that citizens in the society
possess different comprehensive doctrines and plans of life. They know as well that all
citizens are interested in more primary social goods.48 The parties also know the general
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facts about human society and whatever general facts influence the choice of the
principles of justice.49
The veil of ignorance is aimed at positioning the representatives of free and equal
citizens fairly with regard to one another. Parties in the original position cannot push for
agreement on principles that will randomly favor the particular citizen they represent,
because they do not know the particular attributes of the citizen they represent. The
condition of the parties therefore symbolizes reasonable conditions, within which the
parties can enter a rational agreement. Each party makes honest efforts to agree to
principles that will be most advantageous for the citizen they represent, which implies
maximizing the share of the citizen’s primary goods. The implication is that because the
parties are fairly situated, they will reach an agreement that will be fair to all actual
citizens.50 The primary task of the parties in the original position is to choose the
principles of justice that will regulate the social life and the basic structure of the society
that are ideally fair.

Principles of Justice as Fairness
Rawls establishes principles that he thinks would be chosen in the original
position. The principles are considered as ones that free and equal persons could accept
as a fair basis for social cooperation. The principles are presented as guiding ideas of
justice as fairness thus: “… Each Person has the same indefeasible claim to a fully
adequate scheme of equal basic liberties, which scheme is compatible with the same
scheme of liberties for all (the equal liberty principle); … Social and economic
inequalities are to satisfy two conditions: (a) They are to be attached to offices and
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positions open to all under conditions of fair equality of opportunity (fair equality of
opportunity principle); (b) They are to be to the greatest benefit of the least-advantaged
members of society (the difference principle).”51 These principles mainly apply to basic
structure of society and rule the assignment of rights and duties and control the
distribution of social and economic advantages.52
The principles of justice as fairness in all consist of the equal liberty principle, fair
equality of opportunity principle and the difference principle. The difference principle
requires that any social and economic inequalities work to the greatest benefit of the least
advantaged. Fair equality of opportunity principle requires that all citizens of a domestic
society have equal opportunities for obtaining position of power.53 Rawls’s difference
principle and fair equality of opportunity principle provide protection and compensation
for people who are disadvantaged by natural and social lotteries.54
Rawls’s general conception of justice is that, “all social primary goods - liberty
and opportunity, income and wealth, and the social bases of self-respect – are to be
distributed equally unless an unequal distribution of any or all of these goods is to the
advantage of the least favored.”55 A brief discussion of the principles of justice as
fairness follows.

Equal Liberty Principle
The equal liberty principle guarantees equal basic rights and liberties for all
citizens, including “political liberty, (the right to vote and to hold public office) and
freedom of speech and assembly; liberty of conscience and freedom of thought; freedom
of the person, which includes… the right to hold personal property; and freedom from
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arbitrary arrest and seizure as defined by the concept of the rule of law.”56 The equal
liberty principle requires equal rights for all in all normal conditions because unequal
rights would not be to the advantage of those who would get a lesser share of rights.57
The history of democratic thought reveals that emphasis has been on realizing certain
specific rights and liberties as well as specific constitutional guarantees, as enshrined in
various bills of rights and declarations of the rights of man. Justice as fairness conforms
to this traditional view of human rights.58
A list of basic liberties can be established in two different ways, historical and
analytical.59 In the historical context, various democratic regimes are reviewed and a list
of rights and liberties gathered that appear fundamental and firmly guaranteed in
apparently more historically successful regimes. Obviously, cognizant of the veil of
ignorance, the implication is that this type of specific information is not accessible to the
parties in the original position. On the other hand, it is accessible to you and me in
establishing justice as fairness.60
In the analytical context, the focus is on what liberties offer the political and
social circumstances critical for the sufficient development and full exercise of the two
moral powers of free and equal persons. In line with this thought, some conclusions are
made: first, that equal political liberties and freedom of thought make it possible for
citizens to cultivate and to exercise these powers in evaluating the justice of the basic
structure of the society as well as its social policies. Second, that liberty of conscience
and freedom of association make it possible for citizens to cultivate and exercise their
moral powers in establishing and reviewing and in pursuing rationally their notions of the
good either individually or collectively.61 Rawls argues that, “those basic rights and
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liberties protect and secure the scope required for the exercise of the two moral powers in
the two fundamental cases just mentioned….”62 It is pertinent to point out that exercising
our moral powers in these ways is important to us as free and equal citizens.63
Noteworthy also is that the equal liberty principle of justice applies not only to the
basic structure of society but more precisely to either written or unwritten constitution.
Some of these liberties, such as the equal political liberties and freedom of thought and
association, are securely protected by a constitution.64 Rawls argues that constituent
power distinguished by Locke as people’s power to constitute the legislative as the first
and fundamental law of all commonwealths, in contrast to ordinary power is to be
enshrined in the bill of rights, in the right to vote and to occupy office and in the
measures for amending the constitution.65
Rawls stipulated the strict lexical priority of the equal liberty principle over fair
equality of opportunity principle and the difference principle. This implies that one may
not trade off one’s basic liberties for gains either in difference principle or in fair equality
of opportunity. It is also important to note that fair equality of opportunity, the nondiscrimination principle, has strict lexical priority over the difference principle.66

Fair Equality of Opportunity Principle
Fair equality of opportunity requires that not only that public offices and social
positions be open in the proper sense, but that all should have a fair opportunity to
achieve them.67 Fair equality of opportunity further requires that citizens with the same
talents and abilities and the same disposition to utilize them should have the same
educational and economic opportunities regardless of whether they were born rich or
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poor.68 Rawls argues that, “in all parts of the society there are to be roughly the same
prospects of culture and achievement for those similarly motivated and endowed.”69
The fair equality of opportunity principle specifies what types of inequalities are
allowed in a domestic society. In this context, inequalities are regarded as “not any
differences between offices and positions, but differences in the benefits and burdens
attached to them either directly or indirectly, such as prestige and wealth, or liability to
taxation and compulsory services.”70 Inequalities are understood here as differences
stemming from distribution established by a practice or enabled by it, of the things
citizens endeavor to achieve or avoid.71
Rawls identifies fair equality of opportunity with liberal equality. Fair equality of
opportunity achieves its purpose by imposing certain requirements on the basic structure
of the society. For example, a free market system must be regulated by political and legal
institutions in order to avoid excessive concentrations of property and wealth, which may
likely result in political domination.72
Fair equality of opportunity is linked to pure procedural justice.73 From this
perspective, issues regarding distributive shares are handled as pure procedural justice.
The implication is to establish a social system that guarantees just result.74 Rawls argue
that, “pure procedural justice obtains when there is no independent criterion for the right
result: instead there is a correct or fair procedure such that the outcome is likewise correct
or fair, whatever it is, provided that the procedure has been properly followed.” 75 The
function of the principle of fair equality of opportunity is to guarantee that the system of
cooperation conforms to pure procedural justice.76
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The social and economic process is established within the appropriate framework
of political and legal institutions. The result of the distributive process will not be just
without a suitable system of these background institutions. This implies that background
fairness is absent.77 The government attempts to guarantee equal opportunities of
education and culture for those who are equally gifted and motivated either by funding
private schools or by setting up a public school system. Moreover, it implements and
guarantees equality of opportunity in economic activities and in the free choice of
occupation.78 Inequalities of any sort can only be authorized by the government if they
are to the greatest advantage of the least privileged.

Difference Principle
The difference principle requires that social institutions be arranged so that
inequalities of wealth and income work to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged.79
The emphasis here is that every party involved in the social cooperation must benefit
from the inequality. The implication is that every person involved in the social
cooperation “must find it reasonable to prefer his condition and prospects with the
inequality to what they would be under the practice without it.”80 The principle in essence
rules out the justification of inequalities on the basis that the disadvantages in one
position are overshadowed by the greater advantages of those in another position.81
The difference principle is established within the context that “social cooperation
is always productive, and without cooperation there would be nothing produced and so
nothing to distribute.”82 A system of cooperation is established mainly by how its rules
organize productive activity, stipulate the division of labor and allocate various roles to
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the members engaged in it. Beginning from an imagined baseline of equality, greater
returns to the more advantaged can be produced by permitting inequalities in wages and
salaries. In this context, higher wages can cover the costs of training and education, and
can offer incentives to fill jobs that are in more demand.83
The difference principle requires that inequalities which increase the total product
work to the advantage of everyone, and precisely to the greatest advantage of those least
favored. The difference principle does not permit the affluent in the society to get richer
at the expense of the poor. The difference principle exemplifies “equality-based
reciprocity: from an egalitarian baseline it requires inequalities that are good for all, and
particularly for the worst-off.”84
Rawls argues that inequalities of birth, natural endowment and historical
circumstances are undeserved, and, in a fair system of cooperation where justice is
promoted, every effort should be invested in compensating those who have been
disadvantaged by the identified factors.85 He further argues that advantages that people
have over others that are the outcomes of accidents of biology and history appear
arbitrary from the moral point of view, and should then be redressed as far as possible.86
He emphasizes the notion of redressing the bias of contingencies emanating from the
inequalities of birth and natural endowment in order to maximize equality for the least
privileged in the fair system of cooperation.87 Citizens endowed with different talents and
abilities can use them for the benefit of everyone. In a society regulated by the difference
principle citizens consider distribution of natural endowments as an asset that benefits all.
Those better endowed are encouraged to utilize their talents and abilities to make
themselves better off, but provided that they as well contribute to the good of those with
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less endowments.88 Rawls contends that, “in justice as fairness men agree to share one
another’s fate.”89 Daniels extends Rawls’s theory of justice to health care90 in the
domestic society which will be the focus of the discussion in the next section of the
chapter.

C. Health and Essential Drugs in a Domestic Society
C.1. Rawls’s Idealized and Simplified Index of Primary Goods
The basic structure of society as contended by Rawls distributes certain primary
goods which imply the things that every rational person is supposed to want. These goods
usually play a significant role in a person’s rational plan of life.91 Rawls argues for index
of primary social goods which is a truncated scale of well-being utilized by moral agents
pursuing a hypothetical social contract.92 His list of primary social goods includes rights,
liberties and opportunities, income and wealth, and social bases of self-respect.93
Evidently absent from his list of primary social goods are health and health care. He
classified them as natural goods that can be influenced by the basic structure in their
possession but are not considered to be regulated by the difference principle.94
Rawls simplified the construction of his theory that he assumed individuals
engaged in the social contract would be fully functional, active and normal over the
course of their life span and that no one would become ill or die prematurely. 95 Daniels
argues that “Rawls index of primary goods seems to be too truncated a scale, once we
drop the idealizing assumption that all people are normal. People with equal indices will
not be equally well-off once we allow them to differ in health care needs.”96 Similarly,
Kenneth Arrow argued that Rawls’s index of primary goods was inadequate because it
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fell short in articulating for us how to compare the ill rich with the well poor.97 Amartya
Sen also argued that the index is not sensitive to the way in which disease, disability, or
other individual variations would produce inequalities in people’s capabilities for those
who had the same primary social goods.98
Arrow pointed out some shortcomings related to merely including health care to
the list of primary goods. He argued that the import of Rawls’s difference principle which
requires inequalities to work to the benefit of the least advantaged individuals, would be
to invest all social resources into fulfilling special needs of persons with excessive health
care needs, probably to a situation where the rest of society is impoverished.99 He further
argued that including health care to the creation of the index, and permitting its exchange
against income and wealth, would compel Rawls into interpersonal comparisons of utility
he had intended his index would avoid.100 Nevertheless, Daniels argues that extending
Rawls’s theory to include health care through the equal opportunity account undermines
some of Arrow’s and Sen’s criticisms.101
Despite Rawls simplified idealization of his theory, it still provided a clue about
how to extend it to the real world of illness and premature death. The objective of public
health and medicine is to restore people as close as possible to the ideal of normal
functioning, within the reasonable constraints of the resources. Resources are essentially
limited because maintaining health cannot be the society’s only social good or
objective.102
Daniels adopted a different conception of the place of health in Rawls’s theory as
articulated in his theory of just health care discussed in his 1985 work Just Health
Care.103 He argues that health care institutions should be regulated by a principle of fair
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equality of opportunity, but under two conditions: (1) an adequate general theory of
justice encompasses a principle which obliges basic institutions to guarantee fair equality
of opportunity, and (2) the fair equality of opportunity principle functions as a control on
allowable economic inequalities.104 Daniels strongly advocates for the fair equality of
opportunity as a suitable principle to regulate macro decisions regarding the health care
system’s design. He further articulates that, “such a principle defines, from the
perspective of justice, what the moral function of the health-care system must be – to help
guarantee fair equality of opportunity.105 A brief discussion of fair equality of opportunity
and Daniels’s just health care theory follows.

C.2. Fair Equality of Opportunity and Just Health Care
The most viable strategy for extending Rawls’s theory in Daniels’s just health
care entails adding health care institutions and practices to the basic institutions engaged
in guaranteeing fair equality of opportunity.106 Daniels acknowledges that “meeting the
health needs of all persons, viewed as free and equal citizens, is of comparable and
special moral importance.”107 Daniels contends that since meeting health care needs has a
critical influence on the distribution of opportunity, the health care institutions are
governed by a fair equality of opportunity principle. He further argues for a special
correlation between species functioning and the opportunity range open to an individual
in a society.108 Daniels clearly writes “since meeting health needs protects the range of
opportunities people can exercise, then any social obligations we have to protect
opportunity imply obligations to protect and promote health for all.”109
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Similarly, Beauchamp and Childress articulate that, “Daniels’s thesis is that social
institutions affecting health care distribution should be arranged, as far as possible, to
allow each person to achieve a fair share of the normal range of opportunities present in
that society.”110 The normal range of opportunity entails the range of life plans that a
reasonable person could pursue, taken into account his or her talents and skills in a given
society. Daniels’s just health care theory, like Rawls’s acknowledges a positive
obligation of the society to eliminate or reduce obstacles that prevent fair equality of
opportunity, an obligation that encompasses programs to rectify or compensate for
numerous disadvantages.111 Daniels writes “just health requires that we protect people’s
shares of the normal opportunity range by treating illness when it occurs, by reducing the
risks of disease and disability before they occur, and by distributing those risks
equitably.”112
Daniels contends that if it is critical to utilize resources to compensate for the
advantages in opportunity some people suffer in the natural lottery, it is equally critical to
utilize resources to compensate for the natural disadvantages caused by disease.113
Disease etiology has been noted as significantly impacted by social conditions which
varies with class and which refutes the conception that disease is a product of the natural
lottery.114 Daniels et.al argue that health status is principally determined by choices
regarding what are termed the social determinants of health. They articulate, “properly
understood, justice as fairness tells us what justice requires in the distribution of all
socially controllable determinants of health.”115 There is no intention to engage in a futile
goal of eradicating all differences between people. Daniels highlights, “health care has
normal functioning as its goal: it concentrates on a specific class of obvious
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disadvantages and tries to eliminate them. That is its limited contribution to guaranteeing
fair equality of opportunity.”116 Disease and disability are seen as unjustified constraints
on persons’ opportunities to fulfill basic goals. Health care is then necessary to attain,
restore or maintain adequate or “species-typical” levels of functioning, in order to
accomplish basic goals.117
Another important point noted by Daniels in extending Rawls’s theory to health
care is that Rawls’s contractarian theory requires a thick veil of ignorance in order to
ensure the impartiality of free and equal moral agents. However, Daniels advocates for a
thinner veil of ignorance in selecting principles to regulate health-care resource allocation
decisions. This is important because in this context, parties involved in the negotiations
must know about some essential features of the society, for instance, its resource
limitations.118 It would be a futile effort for individuals to negotiate behind the veil of
ignorance for benefits in the realm of health care that end up being completely
unaffordable in real life. Health care is one of those contemporary societal benefits that
cannot be available in any society without limitations.119
Daniels identifies four levels of health care institutions that should be provided in
order to reflect the original idealization under which Rawls’s theory was constructed. The
idealization entails the ideal to enable normal, fully functioning persons to complete their
normal life span. The four levels of health care institutions include: (1) Preventive healthcare institutions that reduce the prospect of departures from the normality assumption. (2)
Institutions that deliver personal medical and rehabilitative services that restore normal
functioning. (3) Institutions that provide more extended medical and social support
services for people who are moderately chronically ill or disabled, comprising the frail
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elderly. (4) Institutions that provide health care and related social services to people who
are seriously ill and cannot be restored closer to the idealization comprising terminally ill
people and mentally and physically disabled people.120 The implication is that forms of
health care that have a substantial influence on preventing, limiting and compensating for
declines in normal species functioning should be prioritized in designing health care
institutions and distributing health care.121 Just health emphasizes the priority of
preventive measures, since it is preferable to avoid the burdens of disease than to
decrease them when they happen. Daniels argues that “it is more effective to prevent
disease and disability than it is to cure them (or to compensate individuals for loss of
function when cure is not possible).”122 Rawls proposes basic health care which
encompasses essential drugs,123 as one of the five guarantees of any constitutional
democracy.124 A related issue of Rawls’s view of the nature and scope of international
responsibilities in providing affordable access to anti-retroviral in developing nations is
discussed in the next part of this chapter.

D. Rawls’s Statist Approach
D.1. Rawls’s Concept of Statism
Rawls briefly outlined some principles of international justice in A Theory of
Justice. In this context, he talked about deriving justice within the state and used a second
hypothetical contract at which representatives of states choose principles to govern
international relations from behind a veil of ignorance. Rawls contends that such
representatives would not choose any principles of international distribution.125 Rawls’s
extensive discussion about international relations and international justice was presented
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in The Law of Peoples (LOP). The central aim of The Law of Peoples is to explore how
the content of a theory of international justice “might be developed out of a liberal idea of
justice similar to, but more general than, the idea of justice as fairness.”126
In the LOP, Rawls’s first task which is the first stage of his global project was to
extend the idea of the social contract from the domestic society discussed in TOJ to
society of liberal peoples, deriving what he dubbed the “Law of Peoples.”127 The LOP is
described as a “political conception of right and justice that applies to the principles and
norms of international law and practice.”128 One of the key features in Rawls’s argument
is his typology of societies. He distinguishes between the five kinds of regime including
liberal peoples, decent hierarchical peoples, outlaw states, societies with unfavorable
conditions, and benevolent absolutisms.129
Rawls argues that representatives of liberal peoples ignore any knowledge of the
people’s comprehensive conception of the good, because a liberal society with a
constitutional regime does not have a comprehensive conception of the good.130 The first
task of the parties in the second original position is “to specify the Law of Peoples – its
ideals, principles, and standards – and how those norms apply to political relations among
peoples.131 Rawls argues that both liberal and decent hierarchical societies would be able
to agree to eight principles of justice. He contends that just principles are those that
liberal and decent societies will approve. Among the principles avowed here is the duty
of humanitarian assistance, which clearly states that “peoples have a duty to assist other
peoples living under unfavorable conditions that prevent their having a just or decent
political and social regime.”132
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The second aspect of Rawls’s ideal theory which relates to one of the principal
ideas of the Law of Peoples, focuses on how and why representatives of certain
nonliberal but well-ordered societies would also approve the same set of principles. The
nonliberal societies do not approve the standard range of liberal democratic rights such as
the freedoms of expression and association, religious equality and the right to equal
participation.133 Furthermore, individuals in nonliberal societies are “not regarded as free
and equal citizens, nor as separate individuals deserving equal representation (according
to the maxim: one citizen, one vote).”134 However, nonliberal societies respect basic
human rights, including right to life, to the means of subsistence and security, to freedom
from slavery, serfdom, and forced occupation, and are respectful of other peoples135 as
demanded by the law of peoples. Rawls points out that these nonliberal decent people
qualify as “societies in good standing,” and are, thus, to be tolerated by liberal societies.
The implication is that liberal societies are “to recognize these nonliberal societies as
equal participating members in good standing of the society of peoples,” and not merely
to “refrain from exercising political sanctions – military, economic, or diplomatic – to
make a people change its ways.” 136 Kok-Chor Tan notes that “nonliberal peoples are
tolerated as a matter of liberal principle, and not merely accommodated on account of
practicality.”137
The Law of Peoples aims to attain a global stability with regard to justice, and not
stability as a way of life, that is, stability as a balance of forces.138 The first two aspects of
Rawls’s ideal theory is critical to understanding his Law of Peoples, because it tries to
show that the global principles adopted by liberal peoples conform to the principles that
can be endorsed independently by decent nonliberal peoples. More so, it is important to
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note that it is not the case that liberal peoples did not adapt their global principles
precisely with respect to accommodating nonliberal peoples or existing global
institutional arrangements.139
The first two aspects just discussed conclude the ideal theory part of the Law of
Peoples. The goal of ideal theory is to recognize the principles that should regulate the
relationship between societies with the necessary political and economic conditions to be
well ordered and to conform to the Law of Peoples. This implies that the goals of justice
and stability for the right reason between societies can be accomplished in this ideal
situation.140
The Third part of the Law of Peoples focuses on societies without the economic
resources to support well-ordered institutions or societies that deliberately refuse to
conform to the principles of the law of Peoples. It grapples with the issues that arise from
the “highly non-ideal conditions of our world with its great injustices and widespread
social evils.”141 The nonideal theory part of the Law of Peoples therefore tackles (1) the
issue of noncompliance, with reference to conditions when outlaw societies “refuse to
comply with a reasonable Law of Peoples,”142 and (2) the issue of unfavorable
conditions, which entails that burdened societies lack the basic resources to become well
ordered.143 A comprehensive approach in the Law of Peoples has to deal with these
nonideal issues, and provide direction on how well-ordered peoples may protect
themselves against outlaw regimes and assist in establishing needed reform within these
regimes in the long run.144 It needs to further address how they may assist burdened
societies and help to bring them “into the society of well-ordered peoples.”145
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Rawls’s focus on burdened societies and a duty of assistance clearly shows that he
does not support an isolationist foreign policy which advocates for liberal and decent
peoples’ indifference to the concerns of burdened societies. He stresses that societies that
are better off have a duty of assistance towards burdened societies so as to help them
attain the required level of economic and social development to become well ordered.
The duty of assistance would stem from the principle avowing basic human rights which
consist of the right to subsistence.146 The duty of assistance has been referred to as
humanitarian duty because its goal is to fulfil individuals’ basic needs and their collective
capacity to sustain decent institutions. However, Rawls also emphasizes that this duty of
humanitarian assistance is clearly different from, and does not involve a duty of
distributive justice.147 Tan also notes “so while a duty of humanitarian assistance is
required by the Law of Peoples as part of its nonideal theory, a distributive principle has
no place at all here.”148
Elucidating this point further, it implies that the principles in Rawls’s Law of
Peoples are clearly principles of justice, but the LOP is a theory of justice exclusively for
the society of peoples. Furthermore, the LOP cannot be regarded as merely advocating
for the status quo, that is, the current state of affairs. The requirement of a duty of
assistance by the LOP inevitably will result in a fundamental change in the contemporary
world, where a fifth of the world’s population live in absolute poverty, 1.2 million people
lack access to clean water, about 17 million people yearly die from curable diseases of
poverty, and millions more lack access to essential drugs, including anti-retroviral drugs
especially in developing countries. The requirement in the LOP’s nonideal theory that
liberal and decent peoples assist burdened societies to attain the required level of
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economic and political developments to be well-ordered institutions, entails a substantial
change. More so, the requirement that liberal and decent peoples honor and defend basic
rights, which encompass individuals’ access to subsistence, constitute fundamental
departures from how individuals that are better-off currently understand their global
responsibilities towards the poor.149 Nevertheless, Tan acknowledges that “what is
lacking in Rawls’s account of global justice is the commitment to distributive justice.
That is there are no ongoing distributive principles regulating the inequalities between the
rich and the poor of the world beyond the duty of the better-off to ensure that the badlyoff are able to meet a certain threshold level of basic needs.”150 There is a contention that
Rawls’s account of international justice discussed in the LOP made some progress in
international relations and politics, but did not go far enough. The critical issue under
consideration is “whether there should be distributive principles to regulate global
relations, as many cosmopolitans think, or whether Rawls is right that there is no place
for distributive principles in the global setting.”151 A brief discussion of the distinctive
features of humanitarian duty and duty of justice is the task of the next section of this
chapter.

D.2. Humanitarian Duty and Duty of Justice
Rawls provides two arguments for rejecting the concept of global distributive
justice. The first is that global principles of distributive justice would be redundant, since
a duty of humanitarian assistance is presently required by the Law of peoples as an
integral part of nonideal theory. The second is that more so, global distributive principles
would produce unacceptable results.152 The redundancy argument is defended in the first
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instance by Rawls’s acknowledgement of gross injustices, huge inequality and dismal
poverty in our nonideal world and the need for well-ordered societies to assist burdened
societies to bring them into the society of well-ordered peoples.153 Furthermore, he argues
these “goals of attaining liberal and decent institutions, securing human rights, and
meeting basic needs … are (adequately) covered by the duty of assistance.”154 The
implication is that a global distributive principle does not have any additional role to play
in this context.
Rawls’s redundancy argument obfuscates an essential distinction between duties
of humanity and duties of justice, which is not merely a distinction in semantic. The
implication is that if we agree that affluent countries have only duty of humanity to
poorer countries, we are as well agreeing that the current criterion for resource and
wealth distribution is fair, and that the global basic institutions established around and
justifying the existing allocation of wealth and resources are satisfactory. In this context,
duties to assist each other entail duties that occur within an institutional framework that is
fair. Duties of humanity focus on how states should interact with one another without
paying attention to the global basic structure including the norms regulating the allocation
and ownership of resources and wealth where the interactions take place. On the other
hand, duties of justice focus directly on the basic structure, hence, justice is related to the
criterion for distribution of wealth and resources, and the basic institutions and principles
that justify and rationalize this distribution.155 Tan writes, “to put it perspicuously, while
duties of humanity aim to redistribute wealth, duties of justice aim to identify what
counts as a just distribution in the first place.”156 Put succinctly, the goal of justice is not
to transfer wealth per se, which entails taking it from its just owners and redistributing it
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to others, but, rather to establish the conditions of just ownership, to reformulate “what
justly belongs to a country.”157 Duties of justice would require us to reevaluate our
current global basic structure, whereas duties of humanity regard this to be more or less
sensible, and merely urge countries to do more within this particular framework. Brian
Barry argues that justice is prior to humanity in that “we cannot sensibly talk about
humanity unless we have a baseline set by justice. To talk about what I ought, as a matter
of humanity, to do with what is mine makes no sense until we have established what is
mine in the first place.”158 Barry also distinguishes the obligations of humanity and those
of justice based on goals and rights respectively. He argues that “the obligations of
humanity are goal-based, whereas those of justice are rights-based.”159
On the other hand, the long-term goals of humanity and justice are entirely
distinct, not only in their objective or duration, as indicated by Rawls, but as well in their
scope and focus. The long-term goals of humanity require greater humanitarianism
between countries within the present institutional framework, whereas the long-term
goals of justice require a critical assessment of that framework. This distinction is critical
because tackling issues of global dimension such as poverty, inequality, access to
essential drugs etc. requires reforming global institutions and arrangements.160
Furthermore, the distinction in focus has some implications for foreign policy. For
example, if foreign aid is viewed from the perspective of humanitarian aid, it could be
exposed to criteria compelled by donor countries. However, if foreign aid is seen as a
matter of justice, it would not be subject to a redistribution which denotes a transfer from
the rightful owner to poorer ones, but to an alteration of an initial unjust distribution.161
Barry notes that discussing global inequality as a matter of humanity obfuscates the

248

fundamental point, “that if some share of resources is justly owed to a country, then it is
(even before it has been actually transferred) as much that country’s as it now normally
thought that what a country produces belongs to that country.”162
There is a significant difference when distribution of wealth between countries is
viewed as a matter of humanitarian assistance or as a matter of justice. Discussing duties
between countries as a matter of justice emphasizes the proper place to be concerned
about, which are the institutions and their fundamental norms. It also highlights that the
critical issue is eventually the issue of rightful ownership instead of humanitarian
contribution. In the context of nonideal case of burdened societies, it makes a significant
normative distinction whether we are assisting from the point of view of humanitarian
concern, or whether we are assisting as a result of acknowledging the current injustices in
our global arrangements.163
It is pertinent to note that humanitarian assistance within the context of the current
global arrangement merely deals with the symptoms of injustice rather than deals with
the fundamental cause of it.164 Tan writes, “Humanitarian assistance applies as long as
there are burdened societies, but principles of justice would push us to assess the
framework within which such assistance is being rendered.”165 Furthermore, justice
focuses on structural equality of some kind, whereas humanitarianism emphasizes mainly
fulfilling basic needs.166
It is evident that Rawls’s concept of domestic egalitarianism aims at structural
transformation of the basic structure of the society in such a way that his second principle
offers a framework for evaluating and criticizing the basic institutions of society. In this
context, institutional arrangements which preserve and justify inequality of opportunity
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between citizens are disallowed. Therefore, it will appear that for Rawls to be consistent
with his basic philosophical ideals that he should evaluate the basic structure of the
society of peoples against his principles of justice, rather than take it as a given.167
Therefore, Rawls is cognizant of the significant distinction between humanitarian duties
and duties of justice. His contention is that the global distribution of resources and wealth
is not an issue of justice. He argues that a global distribution of wealth that does not fulfil
the egalitarian requirement of his difference principle is acceptable provided that
assistance is offered to help burdened societies.168
Rawls’s second argument rejecting global distributive principles throws some
light with respect to his position above regarding a global distribution of resources and
wealth. He believes that in contrast to domestic distributive principle, global distributive
principles would have unacceptable results. He argues that a duty of humanitarian
assistance is a “principle of transition… (it) holds until all societies have achieved just
liberal or decent basic institutions. (It is) defined by a target beyond which (it) no longer
hold(s).”169 The implication is that the duty of assistance is accomplished when all
societies have achieved the basic level of development adequate for establishing and
maintaining decent institutions. On the other hand, distributive “principles do not have a
defined goal, aim, or cut-off point, beyond which aid may cease.”170 Therefore, whereas,
the duty of humanitarian assistance is aimed at improving the circumstance of societies
burdened by unfavorable conditions, such assistance is not needed as part of ideal theory
for societies that have achieved the basic level of development required for a decent
society. Conversely, distributive justice principle is an essential component of ideal
theory, and therefore would apply so long as there are inequalities, excessive injustices
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and impairing poverty between societies, even “after the duty of assistance is fully
satisfied.”171
Rawls’s central argument is that upholding global distributive principle would
have unacceptable results because we should not be able to distinguish between societies
which have increased their wealth through foresight and prudence;172 or, societies which
have succeeded to curtail their population growth through sound population policies and
consequently boosted their wealth, and societies which have failed to control their
population and consequently remain worse-off.173 He argues that in both cases identified,
a global egalitarian principle without target would maintain that resources be transferred
from the more affluent societies to the poor ones, despite the fact that both may have
begun with an equal amount of wealth and resources. He contends that this is
unacceptable because it would imply punishing some societies for their sound domestic
policies so as to reward other societies for their imprudent policies.174
Rawls is repudiating a situation where “distributive principles would insist on
redistribution as long as there is inequality between peoples no matter what the cause of
this inequality.”175 The underlying implication of Rawls’s argument is that there is a
distinction between inequality due to choice and inequality attributable to circumstance.
In the same way that we don’t want a domestic scheme to compensate individuals for
their poor decisions by taking from those who have made good decisions, we also don’t
want a global scheme to compensate societies for their poor governance by punishing
other societies for their good governance.176 The goal of distributive justice is to offset
the influences of unchosen inequality due to circumstances on persons, rather than to
compensate them for their poor decisions.177 Rawls’s concern is that a global distributive
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principle would not take into account the distinction between inequality as a result of
either choice or circumstance, rather it would unfairly deal with citizens of properly
managed economies by transferring their benefits to citizens of poorly managed
economies unceasingly so long as global inequality persists.178 Tan articulates, “the
choices a people make about its domestic arrangements would not be respected if the
gains or losses due to these choices were annulled by a distributive principle between
peoples.”179
The fundamental premise of Rawls’s argument is that the reasons for a country’s
inability to espouse good social and economic policies are mainly internal, and thus
freely espoused by governments of worse-off countries. Rawls alludes to several
domestic factors that are instrumental to society’s economic and social performance,
consisting of its political culture and virtues (comprising a respect for basic human
rights), its civic society, “its members’ probity and industriousness,” and its population
policy.180 However, this premise which was dubbed “explanatory nationalism” was
refuted by Thomas Pogge on the basis of empirical fact.181 Explanatory nationalism
“present(s) poverty as a set of national phenomena explicable mainly as a result of bad
domestic policies and institutions that stifle, or fail to stimulate, national economic
growth and engender national economic injustice.”182 On the other hand, Pogge indicates
that this explanation “leave(s) open important questions, such as why national factors
(institutions, officials, policies, culture, natural environments, level of technical and
economic development) have these effects rather than others”183 by disregarding the
causal influences of global factors, for example, trade practices, patterns of consumption
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by wealthy countries, international law, etc. on a country’s domestic policies and their
results.184
If the distributive goal is to counter the impacts of these unchosen global factors
and not the influences of chosen national policies on a people’s welfare, then, distributive
arrangements between societies should not be indifferent to choice. A poorer country that
benefits from a global distributive principle need not be viewed as a society that is being
funded unfairly for the domestic decisions it has made, but is more accurately being
compensated for the impacts of global factors imposed on it without its choice.185 So
worthy of note is that “global distributive justice and national self-determination, the
latter being the underlying premise in Rawls’s argument, are not incompatible goals.”186
Despite Rawls’s lack of commitment to global distributive principles and his inherent
flaws and inconsistency with his own moral individualism as argued in the domestic case,
his statist approach implies relying merely upon humanitarian assistance from the
perspective of global justice to provide affordable access to drugs in developing nations.
The analysis will focus on the account of international responsibilities as
presented in the LOP. Rawls’s notion of international responsibilities focuses on assisting
burdened societies to attain well-ordered societies. Providing affordable access to antiretroviral drugs as a transition strategy is argued as a critical component of Rawls’s duty
of assistance to burdened societies in order to attain well-ordered societies.

E. Rawls’s Duty of Assistance and Access to Anti-Retroviral Drugs
Acknowledging Rawls’s imperative position that we have a duty to assist burdened
societies, this part explores whether it is in consonant with a Rawlsian approach to extend
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these duties to health care, and specifically to provision of essential drugs especially antiretroviral drugs. It examines three arguments regarding the claim that enhancing access to
essential drugs is a desideratum for fulfilling Rawls’s duty of assistance.

E.1. Argument Based on Rawls’s Defense of Minimal Human Rights
The first argument focuses on Rawls’s defense of human rights. The human right
to health is codified in the 1948 United Nations’ Universal Declaration of Human Rights.
Article 25 states that “Everyone has the right to a standard of living adequate for the
health and well-being of himself and of his family, including food, clothing, housing and
medical care and necessary social services….”187 The right to essential medicines is
increasingly receiving support as a sub-right of the right to health. In Montreal Statement
on the Human Right to Essential Medicines, Pogge writes, “we have a responsibility to
achieve a social and international order in which human rights – including the right to
essential medicines – are fully realized.”188
An initial consideration about the duty of assistance is that it would strongly favor
policy interventions supporting the human right to health, comprising the sub-right to
essential medicines, based on three reasons. The first reason focuses on the sixth Law of
Peoples which affirms: “Peoples are to honor human rights.”189 Second, Rawls stresses
the importance of policies that support human rights over economic transfers.190 Third,
Rawls emphasizes the importance of policy interventions supporting women’s basic
rights and interests.191 Among the global poor, women and girl children
disproportionately bear the burden of disease consisting of problems of unsafe abortion
and childbirth. The health of women and children are significantly adversely affected by
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HIV/AIDS pandemic especially in sub-Saharan Africa. Data shows that they are
increasingly among the victims of HIV/AIDS and disproportionately among many new
HIV/AIDS infections especially in sub-Saharan Africa. In many poor countries, women
and girl children lack access to treatment for various diseases because they are excluded
due to gender discrimination.192 Gender-based violence and gender inequality are
increasingly mentioned as critical determinants of women’s HIV risk.193 Maternal
mortality also continues to be astronomically high especially in many developing
countries, as a result of limited health infrastructure, inadequately trained birth attendants,
and women’s unavoidable resort to illegal and unsafe abortions.194 Cognizant of these
vast inequalities affecting women, a policy favoring access to drugs can be certain to
possess a strong pro-female effect.195
The argument in support of improving access to essential drugs based on Rawls’s
restrictive notion of human rights does not go through, because his use of the term human
rights is equivocal. Rawls refused to favor an expansive definition of human rights that
might encompass all rights codified in international treaties in support of a minimum that
he views as more reasonable basis for international consensus.196 The human rights
supported by Rawls in LOP reveal a sub-set of human rights that he sees not only as
widely supported by liberal democratic societies, but as well capable of receiving similar
support in decent non-democratic societies. These human rights “express a special class
of urgent rights, such as freedom from slavery and serfdom, liberty (but not equal liberty)
of conscience, and security of ethnic groups from mass murder and genocide.”197 Rawls
argue that societies whose political institutions and legal order fulfil this special class of
human rights are well-ordered, and cannot justifiably be subjected to the use of sanctions
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or military force. These urgent human rights establish a minimum framework for use
among peoples that Rawls sees as non-ethnocentric.198
There is a charge that Rawls’s account of minimal rights is ad hoc. Rawls’s
global minimum is not compatible with his views about domestic justice. It does not fulfil
the condition of a theory of human rights – the criterion of domestic-compatibility. Rawls
attempts to ground civil and political rights in persons’ moral powers and interests but at
the same contradictorily refute that all persons enjoy these very same civil and political
rights.199 Caney argues that “the force of the scope claim is that one cannot, as it were,
apply these universalist arguments for citizens and not apply them to foreigners when the
very terms of the arguments (the moral powers and interests of persons) do not justify
this kind of domestic/international split.”200 One cannot logically support Rawls’s
domestic theory and stick to his international theory. It fails short of the criterion of
domestic-compatibility.201
In short, Caney argues that “one cannot coherently both embrace the rights that
Rawls does embrace and also reject some of the rights that Rawls rejects. The claim is
that they stand or fall as a package.”202 There is an apparent contradiction between
Rawls’s account of minimum rights and his domestic theory on the one hand, and a
contradiction between his account of minimum rights and his rejection of other proposed
human rights on the other hand. The charge is that his theory does not fulfil the criterion
of coherence.203 Caney also employs what he termed rights holism in his criticism of
Rawls’s minimal rights account. Rights holism “maintains that the acceptance of some
specific rights implies the acceptance of some other specific rights. It claims that certain
rights are interconnected.”204 Based on Rawls’s minimal rights account, the policy
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supporting improving access to essential drugs including anti-retroviral drugs would not
be favored by Rawls’s duty of assistance.

E.2. Argument Based on Redress for the Unjustified Distributive Effects of Cooperative
Organizations
The second argument is based on redress for the unjustified distributive effects of
cooperative organizations. Rawls indicates that parties to the second original position in
LOP would not only agree to the eight basic principles or laws, they would as well
formulate guidelines for establishing cooperative organizations and criteria for fairness in
trade. Rawls posits that three such organizations would be established: one to ensure fair
trade among peoples, another to institute a cooperative banking system, and a third to
play a diplomatic and coordinating role similar to that of the United Nations.205 With
regard to fair trade, Rawls contends that the parties to the original position negotiating
behind the veil of ignorance would agree to fair standards of trade to keep the market fair
and competitive as well as to everyone’s mutual advantage in the long run, irrespective of
whether its economy is large or small. He stressed that these standards must guarantee the
fairness of market transactions, and guarantee that unjustified inequalities among people
do not develop over time. Their function is therefore similar to that of the fair background
structure in the domestic case discussed in TOJ.206 In a situation where these cooperative
arrangements should lead to unjustified distributive effects between peoples, Rawls
argues that “…these would have to be corrected, and taken into account by the duty of
assistance….”207
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The pharmaceutical industry and its advocates claim that the TRIPS agreement
established by WTO signifies “the optimal balance between stimulating innovation and
promoting access.”208 The impact of the TRIPS agreement is non-symmetrical and the
distributive benefits accrue mainly to the high-income nations where pharmaceutical
industry is concentrated.209 Rawls’s duty of assistance would support compensating those
who have suffered the unintended distributive consequences of this situation.
Interventions for providing affordable access to essential drugs including anti-retroviral
drugs for developing countries would constitute logical approaches for redress.210
Rawls also includes another condition to his explanation of fair trade: “A further
assumption here is that the larger nations within the wealthier economies will not attempt
to monopolize the market, or to conspire to form a cartel, or to act as an oligopoly.”211
Violating this condition of fairness implies violation of the ideal of reciprocity among
peoples and which calls into question the legitimacy of trade arrangements.212 In the
history of access to drugs debate, an abundance of evidence shows that government of
wealthy countries and multinational pharmaceutical companies defend their own interests
at the cost of access to essential drugs for the poor.213

E.3. Argument Based on Access to Drugs as a Transition Strategy Favoring the
Establishment of Politically Well-Ordered Nations
The third and final argument is based on access to drugs as a transition strategy
favoring the establishment of politically well-ordered nations. This implies considering
whether a policy improving access to drugs can be viewed as an effective strategy that
enables burdened societies to become politically well-ordered, and therefore as a policy

258

that should be supported by Rawls’s duty of assistance. The argument is presented in two
aspects. The first focuses on the assertions that countries with a high burden of disease
and severe lack of access to drugs do not fulfil Rawls’s criteria for well-ordered societies.
The second contends that improving access to essential drugs would help in the transition
to attaining politically well-ordered.214
According to Johri et al. “ the principal correlates of a high burden of disease and
lack of access to medicines are economic.”215 More so, poor and middle-income countries
accepted various types of governance structures, ranging from democracies and
dictatorships.216
Clarifying the correlation between disease and being well-ordered requires a
review of the characteristics of well-ordered societies. Well-ordered societies include
liberal or decent societies. Rawls explains societies that satisfy a liberal conception of
justice as fulfilling three characteristic principles. The first guarantees basic rights and
liberties of the sort familiar to constitutional democracies. The second allocates a special
priority to these rights, liberties and opportunities, with regard to claims of the general
good and perfectionism values. The third guarantees for all citizens the required primary
goods to assist them to make intelligent and effective use of their freedoms.217 One
preferred interpretation of these principles was presented by Rawls’s in the domestic case
as justice as fairness. However, other interpretations that represent liberal perspectives
can be accepted provided that they fulfil conditions consistent with the idea of the social
contract that supports the freedom and equality of all citizens, and of society as a fair
system of cooperation over time.218

259

Rawls in exploring why democratic nations are peaceful explains in a nutshell the
five features of the basic structure of society that he views as important to a reasonably
just constitutional democracy that can endure over time. He contends that, peace is made
more secure internally among citizens and externally among states to the degree that
these features are fulfilled. He delineates five institutions, without which “excessive and
unreasonable inequalities tend to develop.”219 (1) A guaranteed fair equality of
opportunity, particularly in education and training. (2) A decent distribution of income
and wealth fulfilling the third condition of liberalism which assures all citizens the
necessary means for intelligent and effective use of their basic freedom. (3) Society
playing the role of employer of final recourse through general or local government, or
other social and economic policies. (4) Basic health care guaranteed for all citizens. (5)
Public financing of elections and means of guaranteeing the ability of public information
on issues of policy.220 Furthermore, decent societies considered as well-ordered are
required to fulfill strict conditions. Rawls sees them as jointly fulfilling the following two
criteria: (1) lack of aggressive aims and means; and (2) a system of law guaranteeing
human rights.221 In addition to these human rights that are principally political, Rawls
stresses the importance of basic economic entitlements. He indicates that the right to life
includes a claim “to the means of subsistence and security.”222 Therefore, decent societies
must show a respect for human rights which includes economic subsistence.
Based on these important preliminary clarifications, we will now discuss whether
a high burden of disease constitutes a barrier to attaining a politically well-ordered
society in Rawls’s perspective. Rawls’s account supports that all liberal societies have a
domestic responsibility to ensure provision of basic health care that involves access to
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drugs. Providing these basic health care services varies among liberal societies.
Furthermore, there are also clear indications that some low and middle-income societies
that guarantee political rights, liberties and freedoms, but have not been successful in
providing basic health or access to essential drugs to all citizens. Countries like South
Africa, India and Guatemala have been cited as examples.223
The social determinants of health indicate that poor health is correlated with lower
socio-economic status.224 Poverty is also established to have a correlation with health.225
Based on the assertions, an inference could be made that health problems are
concentrated excessively in population sub-groups that are disadvantaged and inability to
provide access to essential drugs reveal and exacerbate social and economic inequalities
between the members of these groups.226
The implication of this situation is that the principle of equality of opportunity as
argued by Rawls in TOJ is violated. The prevalence of high burden of disease in any
situation results in very considerable mortality differentials between the members of
different social groups. This in turn results in a situation where the chance to survive to
the adult stage of life when freedom, liberties and opportunities can be achieved varies
considerably across social classes and other group separations, comprising gender.227
Similarly, “morbidity differentials aggravate this situation by compounding inequalities
in the ability to flourish.”228
Rawls’s explanation of the principle of equality of opportunity in LOP necessary
to fulfil the criteria of a liberal society is less rigorous than that discussed in TOJ.
Nevertheless, he still emphasizes some type of equality of opportunity particularly in
education and training. Both childhood mortality and school performance are universally
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predicted to be significantly affected by preventable and treatable conditions such as
malaria, pneumonia, diarrhea and nemotodes and parasites.229
Furthermore, LOP acknowledges the significance of fulfilling basic economic
entitlements such as subsistence rights, in the absence of which one would have “not
liberalism at all but libertarianism.”230 It is pertinent to note that “a high burden of disease
contributes to the entrenchment of poverty and threatens subsistence rights.”231 Data
shows that the influence of this burden is usually distributed among groups disadvantaged
in other means, such as income, wealth, power and prestige.232 This situation is
exacerbated by lack of access to essential drugs. There is an indication that calamitous
illness is a major cause of household poverty in developing countries, and expenditure on
drugs account for the biggest out-of-pocket costs.233
Some authors argue that there are many societies in Europe, the Americas, Asia
and Africa that have lively democracy and thus in the process of becoming well-ordered,
but unfortunately lack of the social determinants of health and health care consisting of
access to essential drugs continues to be an impediment to accomplishing this political
goal.234 Johri et al. further argue that societies confronting these problems fall short of not
merely to correspond to the formal characteristics of liberal democracies articulated by
Rawls, but as well to fulfil spirit of the criterion of reciprocity which entails not
embodying principles of social organization that is reasonable to consent to as free and
equal persons behind the veil of ignorance. These problems as well endanger the ability
of societies to comply with the conditions argued by Rawls for decent societies,
especially by jeopardizing subsistence rights.235
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On the other hand, Johri et al. argue “that where the burden of disease is still high,
guaranteeing effective access to medicines would speed the process of transition to wellordered societies, by making it possible for individuals to enjoy real exercise of rights,
liberties and opportunities and to avoid destitution.”236 More so, decreasing the burden of
disease in low- and middle- income countries would provide these countries with an
opportunity to advance economically which is a critical condition to be satisfied if a basic
standard of living is to be offered to all, without external aid.237 Policies supporting
access to drugs and other health sector interventions may then be more effective than
monetary transfers in promoting sustainable economic growth and relieving poverty.238
This policy as well would deal with threats to international peace which can be
significantly reduced by the international community. For example, situations such as the
spread of HIV/AIDS pandemic may be linked with food security, drought and famine, 239
and act as a harbinger to war. The magnitude of this threat was acknowledged by the
2001 UN Special Session on HIV/AIDS, which indicated the first time that the General
Assembly convened specifically for an issue related to a disease. This meeting led to the
Declaration of Commitment on HIV/AIDS with the international community favoring
provision of antiretroviral treatment for the first time, which as well improves prevention
efforts in developing countries as one strategy to fight the pandemic, as well as a matter
of social justice.240
Well-ordered societies have an obligation to assist burdened societies in becoming
well-ordered. Johri et al. writes “…we believe that there are good empirical grounds for
seeing a policy of improving access to medicines as an effective transition strategy that
should be favored by Rawls’s duty of assistance to burdened societies. Commitment to
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this policy is to be seen as a duty of charity, and is highly circumscribed.”241 This policy
would be appreciated in view of its contribution to the aim of promoting a society of
well-ordered peoples, and may not relate to individuals living in outlaw states, or
benevolent absolutisms. The commitment will terminate as soon as burdened societies
become well-ordered. Furthermore, improving access to drugs has a potentially critical
role in attaining the goals established by Rawls in LOP. Essentially, this is the case even
if obligation for present lack of success to ensure access to drugs or to guarantee a
favorable distribution of the social and economic determinants of health is thought to rest
at the national level as Rawls’s account proposes.242

F. Conclusion
Concluding remarks recapitulate the analysis of Rawls’s post-trial access of
participants and host populations to antiretroviral drugs. The analysis began with a
controversial debate between two major approaches, including cosmopolitan and statist in
the issue of global justice to address affordable access to anti-retroviral drugs in
developing countries. The focus of the chapter was on Rawls’s statist approach in dealing
with the issue of post-trial access to anti-retroviral drugs in developing countries
especially for trial participants and host populations.
Rawls’s two different approaches to justice both in the domestic society and in the
international arena were discussed. His account of domestic justice was dubbed justice as
fairness which emphasizes the idea that fundamental agreements of the parties to the
original position were fair. The concept of veil of ignorance which implies depriving the
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parties of the information that might bias their choice of principles was introduced in
order to ensure impartiality and to maximize fairness in mutual bargaining.
A constellation of ideas critical to understanding justice as fairness were
discussed. The notion of society as a fair system of cooperation is characterized by a
political conception of justice in which citizens involved in the cooperation are regarded
as free and equal persons. The idea of reciprocity which emphasizes the ideas of
impartiality and mutual advantage in social cooperation was discussed. The idea of
impartiality focuses on altruism and being motivated by the general good, while that of
mutual advantage pertains generally to everyone’s advantage relative to his or her present
and future conditions. The notion of a well-ordered society explained in the context of
being effectively regulated by a political conception of justice was also discussed.
The idea of the basic structure of the society which applies to a well-ordered
society was considered fundamental because it is the primary subject of justice. The basic
structure of the society consists of the primary social institutions responsible for
distributing fundamental rights and duties, as well as for determining the division of
advantages from social cooperation. Rawls argues for a basic structure of a society that is
fixed, sufficient, as well as closed and isolated from other societies. The background
justice for a well-ordered society is considered guaranteed by a just basic structure. The
major institutions of the basic structure of a society have exclusive role to specify rights
and duties of the citizens and to considerably impact their life prospects, aspirations and
opportunities. The basic structure of the society accommodates significant inequalities
stemming from natural and social lotteries. Principles of justice were considered
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imperative in order to address the inherent inequalities in the basic structure of the
society.
Essential elements of theory of justice including original position and two
principles of justice were highlighted and discussed. The notion of original position was
considered necessary because of the requirement to specify the fair terms of cooperation
in a fair system of cooperation between free and equal persons. The original position
guarantees no leverage for any of the parties involved in the mutual bargaining, and thus,
entrench fairness in the fundamental agreements reached. The object of the original
agreement is argued to be principles of justice aimed at regulating the political
institutions of the real citizens. Impartiality was guaranteed for the parties in the original
position by executing the agreement under the veil of ignorance. This essentially nullifies
the effects of natural and social conditions which could be ordinarily exploited by some
citizens to their own advantage. The primary task of the parties in the original position
was to choose the principles of justice that will regulate the social life and the basic
structure of the society that are ideally fair.
Rawls identified two principles of justice as fairness. The first principle is called
equal liberty principle. The second principle is divided into two parts, including the
difference principle and fair equality of opportunity principle. Equal liberty principle
guarantees equal basic rights and liberties for all citizens. The difference principle
requires that any social and economic inequalities work to the greatest benefit of the least
advantaged. Fair equality of opportunity requires that all citizens of a domestic society
have equal opportunities for obtaining positions of power. Rawls argued that the
difference principle and fair equality of opportunity principle offer protection and
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compensation for those who are disadvantaged by natural and social lotteries. Strict
lexical priority of the first principle that is, equal liberty principle over the second
principle was stipulated. Similarly, strict lexical priority of fair equality of opportunity
over the difference principle was emphasized. These principles primarily were applied to
the basic structure of the society and they governed the allocation of rights and duties and
control the distribution of social and economic advantages.
In the analysis about health and essential drugs in a domestic society, Daniels
extended Rawls’s theory of justice to health care in the domestic society. Rawls classified
health and health care as natural goods that are not regulated by the difference principle.
Rawls simplified the construction of his theory and made unrealistic assumption that all
people are normal and as a result made no provision for people who would become ill or
die prematurely in his hypothetical social contract. On the other hand, Daniels argues that
health care institutions should be regarded as basic institutions that have exclusive
responsibility of guaranteeing fair equality of opportunity. He further argues that health
care institutions should be regulated by fair equality of opportunity principle, since
meeting health care needs has a significant impact on the distribution of opportunity. He
contends that fulfilling health care needs protects people’s normal opportunity range and
helps them to maintain or restore normal species-typical functioning.
Rawls’s statist approach discusses the two aspects of Rawls’s account of
international relations and international justice, including ideal theory and non-ideal
theory. The ideal theory focuses on how the laws of peoples should regulate the political
relations among liberal and decent hierarchical peoples. It also emphasizes that well-
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ordered societies such as liberal and decent hierarchical societies would independently
adopt the same global principles of justice and basic human rights.
On the other hand, the non-ideal theory focuses on burdened societies that lack
basic resources to become well-ordered. Rawls argues that well-ordered societies have a
duty of assistance to burdened societies in order to help them attain required level of
economic and political developments to become well-ordered. The aim of duty of
assistance also involves securing basic human rights and fulfilling basic needs.
However, Rawls’s account of global justice lacks a commitment to distributive
justice. He did not commit to distributive principles that would regulate global
inequalities and global relations among countries because he thinks that such principles
would be redundant and would produce unacceptable results. Rawls argues that such
principles should be rejected because they often lack a clear target and a cutoff point. He
further argues about the significant role that the political culture of a society plays in its
development. Rawls’s restrictive vision on the role of distributive principles in global
relations obscures the critical distinction between duties of humanity and duties of
justice. Duties of humanity focus on redistribution of wealth and resources, while duties
of justice emphasize the criterion for the distribution and the basic institutions and
principles involved in justifying and rationalizing the distribution.
In analyzing Rawls’s duty of assistance and access to anti-retroviral drugs, three
arguments were explored, including argument based on Rawls’s defense of human rights,
argument based on redress for the unjustified distributive effects of cooperative
organizations and argument based on access to drugs as a transition strategy favoring the
establishment of politically well-ordered nations. The argument based on Rawls’s
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defense of human rights did not go through because of Rawls’s minimal and ad hoc
account of human rights. Regarding the argument based on redressing the unjustified
distributive effects of cooperative organizations, there is a consensus that interventions
for providing affordable access to essential drugs including anti-retroviral drugs for
developing countries would constitute logical approaches for redress. The third argument
based on access to drugs as a transition strategy that favors the establishment of
politically well-ordered nations was validated. It was argued that countries with a high
burden of disease and severe lack of access to drugs do not fulfil Rawls’s criteria for
well-ordered societies. Furthermore, it was argued that improving access to drugs would
help as an effective transition strategy that would enable burdened societies to become
politically well-ordered. Therefore, Rawls relies upon the duty of humanitarian assistance
from the perspective of global justice to provide affordable access to antiretroviral drugs.
This reliance is merely a transition strategy until the nation can develop its own resources
as a well-ordered society. In contrast, as discussed in the next chapter, Pogge’s
cosmopolitan approach adopts a more robust and expansive international perspective to
global justice to justify access to antiretroviral drugs in developing countries.
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CHAPTER FIVE
POGGE AND POST-TRIAL ACCESS OF PARTICIPANTS AND HOST
POPULATIONS TO ANTI-RETROVIRAL DRUGS

A. Introduction
Post-trial access to anti-retroviral drugs in developing countries is argued also
from the perspective of another dominant approach to global justice, cosmopolitanism.1
Pogge argued for a stronger interpretation of global responsibilities for providing
affordable access to anti-retroviral drugs for participants and host populations in
developing countries. His work establishes that we have a critical duty of justice to take
action on the issue of affordable access to essential drugs including, anti-retroviral drugs.
This duty is grounded on human rights, and extends universally to all individuals.2
In his landmark work on World Poverty and Human Rights: Cosmopolitan
Responsibilities and Reforms published in 2002, Pogge develops a perspective on global
justice that challenges Rawls’s account on several dimensions. He contends that severe
poverty and global inequality persist because citizens of affluent countries do not
consider their eradication compelling. He offers two common prejudices for the
complacency of the citizens of affluent countries: (1) that the persistence of poverty in
developing countries does not require the moral attention of more wealthy countries and
(2) that there is nothing seriously wrong with their conduct, their policies, and the global
economic institutions they establish and support.3 Pogge challenges the thesis of
explanatory nationalism propounded by Rawls, which indicates that the persistence of
world poverty and inequality is adequately explained by appeal to local factors.4 Rawls
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insists that the significant factor in how a country fares in general is its political culture
rather than factors such as poor luck in its share of natural resources or external factors
linked with interactions between states.5 On the other hand, Pogge’s primary contention
to Rawlsian perspective relates to the “suggestion that the causes of severe poverty lie
within the poor countries themselves.”6 Rawls’s duty to assist encompasses positive
duties of action in an attempt to help those who are in need. Pogge contends as unjust the
way the global institutional order regulates global policy. He further argues that in view
of this injustice, “the institutional order perpetuates harm, and so violates negative rights
or human rights.”7 Pogge articulates, “if the global economic order plays a major role in
the persistence of severe poverty worldwide and if our governments, acting in our name,
are prominently involved in shaping and upholding this order, then the deprivation of the
distant needy may well engage not mere positive duties to assist but also more stringent
negative duties not to harm.”8
Pogge develops a theory motivated by human rights that emphasized negative
rights and duties not to be harmed or not to harm.9 Pogge crafts his theory of global
justice on a minimalist account of negative duty not to harm. He contends that the
violation of the negative duty not to harm represents an injustice. The implication is that
this injustice entails the act of harming without appropriate compensation or reform to
institutions and policies to protect the victims that suffered the harm.10
Pogge succinctly presents his general hypothesis in his paper Severe Poverty as a
Human Rights Violation, “that any institutional order that foreseeably produces a
reasonably avoidable excess of severe poverty and of mortality from poverty-related
causes manifests a human rights violation on the part of those who participate in
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imposing this order.”11 He draws a causal relationship between the developed and the
developing world, which asserts that citizens of affluent countries cooperate in imposing
an unjust institutional order and in the long run responsible for the government they vote
into power. These governments in turn are responsible for establishing the policies,
guidelines, and institutions that, Pogge argues avoidably perpetuate injustice through the
violations of human rights. The emphasis here is that the developed world avoidably
imposes policies that violates negative rights, and ultimately, perpetuate severe poverty.12
Pogge acknowledges his inspiration from the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,
which does not simply propose social and economic human rights: “Everyone has the
right to a standard of living adequate for the health and well-being of himself and of his
family, including food, clothing, housing and medical care.”13 He further stresses the
significance of such social and economic human rights in relation to the design of the
national and global institutional order: “Everyone is entitled to a social and international
order in which the rights and freedoms set forth in this Declaration can be fully
realized.”14 Pogge argues that the critical requirement of any coercive institutional
scheme constitutes being designed, as reasonably as possible, to ensure human rights. He
explains this to imply that “such a scheme should afford each human being secure access
to minimally adequate shares of basic freedoms of participation, of drink, clothing,
shelter, education and health care.”15
However, in his paper Human Rights and Global Health: A Research Program,
Pogge presents a very bleak picture of massive incidence of mortality and morbidity
especially in many poor countries.16 Data shows that about eighteen million people perish
yearly from curable medical conditions, which amounts to about fifty thousand avoidable
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deaths each day, or one third of all human deaths.17 Furthermore, hundreds of millions
suffer gravely especially among the global poor due to communicable diseases.18 The
lives of other hundreds of millions are critically affected by severe illnesses or premature
deaths in their family. The astronomical increase in the global burden of disease
adversely impacts the economies of many poor countries, and invariably perpetuates their
poverty, which on the other hand, contributes to the ill health of their populations.19
Poverty was seen as the most critical causal determinant of global burden of disease, such
that nearly all the avoidable mortality and morbidity happens in the poor countries,20
predominantly among their poorer populations.21
Pogge presents two different strategies for dealing with the increasing global
burden of disease particularly in many poor countries which results in massive mortality
and morbidity rates. The First approach emphasizes the eradication of severe poverty.22
In this sense, the very poor are narrowly defined as “those who suffer the deprivations
(such as) lack of access to safe food and water, clothing, shelter, basic medical care, and
basic education.”23 This narrow and absolute definition of severe poverty approximately
tallies with the World Bank’s $2.50 per day current international poverty line, which
entails a household complete consumption, per person per day, having less purchasing
power than $2.50 had in the United States in 2005. Data shows that an estimate of about
48 percent of the world’s population, that is, about 3,085 million people were living
below poverty line as at 2005,24 so averagely, 45 percent below it – denoting their
collective shortfall from poverty line represents only 2 percent of global household
income.25 Based on this data on the moral significance of global poverty, Pogge argues
that, “A 2 percent shift in the distribution of global household income could wholly
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eradicate the severe poverty that currently blights the lives of nearly half of the human
population.”26
The second strategy identified by Pogge for tackling the massive mortality and
morbidity rates is guaranteeing improved access to medical treatments, including
preventive and remedial.27 Pogge articulating the complementary nature of both strategies
in tackling the issues of severe poverty and global disease burden writes, “Just as the
eradication of severe poverty would greatly reduce the global disease burden, so
improved access to essential medicines would greatly reduce severe poverty by
enhancing the ability of the poor to work, and to organize themselves for their own
economic advancement.”28 The focus of this chapter is on the second strategy and in line
with this, Pogge delineates that significant reduction of global disease burden can be
attained by providing medical innovators with stable and reliable financial incentives to
tackle the medical conditions of the poor.29 Pogge argues that his primary goal is to
“develop a concrete, feasible, and politically realistic plan for reforming current national
and global rules for incentivizing the search for new essential drugs.”30 Pogge argues that
the reformed plan will be cost effective and fairly distribute the cost of global health-care
spending among countries, generations, and between healthy and unhealthy people. He
also argues that the implementation of the new plan would be overseen by national
parliaments and international organizations, such as WTO and the WHO.31
This chapter focuses on Pogge’s cosmopolitan approach to the issue of access to
anti-retroviral drugs in developing countries. The first part of the chapter deals with
meaning of cosmopolitanism and four different approaches of cosmopolitanism with their
nuances on the application of global distributive principles. The four approaches to
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cosmopolitan justice focuses on contractarian, consequentialist, rights based and duty
based.
The second part deals with current rules for incentivizing pharmaceutical research
which focuses on seven problems identified by Pogge in the current globalized patent
regime. Pogge also argues that the TRIPS agreement is responsible for avoidable death
and disease on a massive scale by pricing advanced essential drugs beyond the reach of
the poor and encouraging neglect of diseases concentrated among them.32 The problems
created by the current patent system led Pogge to propose new rules for reforming and
incentivizing pharmaceutical research.
The third part of this chapter focuses on Pogge’s new rules for reforming and
incentivizing pharmaceutical research in which he proposes two basic reform strategies
for dealing with monopoly pricing issues of the current patent system, a differential
pricing strategy and a public good strategy. Pogge argues that a differential pricing
strategy may not be able to yield a plan of reform to make a significant improvement on
the current patent system. On the other hand, he argues that a public good strategy is
more promising to yield a reform plan that will circumvent the major failings of the
current monopoly patent regime and retain most of the benefits.33
The fourth part tackles the critical role of the Health Impact Fund (HIF), a global
institution proposed by Pogge for the implementation of his new plan for reforming and
incentivizing pharmaceutical research. The HIF is proposed as a global agency financed
primarily by governments of various countries that would give pharmaceutical innovators
the option to register any new drug. Pogge clearly describes the HIF as “a pay-forperformance mechanism.”34 In this context, pharmaceutical companies are rewarded
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based on the global health impact of their registered drugs, which would be measured in
quality-adjusted life years (QALYs) saved. The HIF would estimate to what extent this
drug has added to the length and quality of human lives. Making the registered drugs
available as widely as possible to the world’s global poor is also a critical component of
this plan. The five chief advantages of the HIF over conventional innovation prizes,
encompassing advance market commitments and advance purchase commitments will be
discussed. The HIF’s solution to the current seven failings of the current patent system
will be addressed. Critics’ demerits of Pogge’s HIF will also be discussed. A more
detailed analysis of Pogge’s position on affordable access to anti-retroviral drugs in
developing countries begins with a discussion of the meaning of cosmopolitanism.

B. Pogge’s Cosmopolitan Approach
B.1. Meaning of Cosmopolitanism
Cosmopolitanism emphasizes that everyone should be treated as equals regardless
of nationality and citizenship. Tan articulates, “from the cosmopolitan perspective,
principles of justice ought to transcend nationality and citizenship, and ought to apply
equally to all individuals of the world as a whole.”35 Succinctly put, “cosmopolitan
justice is justice without borders.”36
One of the major interpretations of cosmopolitan justice is that this impartiality
with regard to nationality and citizenship as well relates to distributive justice in such a
way that a person’s lawful material entitlements would be independently regulated by his
or her national and state membership.37 From this perspective, Tan explained that Charles
Beitz and Thomas Pogge took their inspiration from John Rawls’s A Theory of Justice to
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contend that Rawls’s arguments for social and economic equality should apply as well to
the global setting.38 Tan writes, “Just as Rawls considers a person’s race, gender, talents,
wealth, and other natural and social particularities to be “arbitrary from a moral point of
view,”39 so too, they argue, are factors like a person’s nationality and citizenship morally
arbitrary.”40 Furthermore, it was argued that in the same way that the influences of
contingencies of the natural and social lotteries on a person’s life chances were
invalidated in the domestic realm by specific principles of distributive justice, conversely,
the influences of global contingencies should be diminished by specific principles of
global distributive justice. The implication is that Rawls’s principles of justice
comprising the principle regulating social and economic equality “should apply between
individuals across societies and not just within the borders of a single society.”41
Cosmopolitan accounts of distributive justice defend some basic claims. Pogge
claims that all cosmopolitan views share three essential features. The first is
individualism which emphasizes that the ultimate units of moral concern are human
beings, or persons, rather than, units such as family lines, tribes, or ethnic, cultural, or
religious communities, nations, or states. The Second is universality which stresses that
the status of ultimate unit of concern ascribes equally to every living human being, not
simply to some subgroup, such as men, aristocrats, whites, or Muslims. The third is
generality which emphasizes that the special status identified has global force. Here, the
ultimate units of moral concern for everyone are persons.42 Similarly, Charles Jones
points out that the cosmopolitan perspective is “impartial, universal, individualist, and
egalitarian.”43 It is pertinent to note that there are seemingly some extreme positions
among cosmopolitans. For example, some authors liken giving priority to members of
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one’s nation to racism44 or to “bad faith.”45 More so, some authors contend that we have a
duty to engage in getting rid of nations and national identification completely. 46 Some
cosmopolitans as part of advancing the aim of decreasing the significance of national
identities have argued for the establishment of a world state, or at least strengthening of
the power of international political structures.47 There is an acknowledgement by some
cosmopolitans that one severe flaw of the cosmopolitan perspective is its apparent
inability to recognize and appropriately explain the significance of the special ties and
commitments that typify the lives of ordinary men and women.48
On the other hand, other cosmopolitans advocate for the strengthening of
international political institutions without getting rid of national attachments and
loyalties.49 In this context, more moderate cosmopolitans acknowledge that in some
instances there are special duties owed to co-nationals and citizens provided that they
promote realization of the global justice. Robert E. Goodin endorsed this idea in his
efficiency argument. He argues “that we all have general duties to all persons, but these
duties may be effectively fulfilled through a system of special responsibilities towards
compatriots.”50 He discussed assigned responsibility model which entails that special
responsibilities are in his own perspective “merely devices whereby the moral
community’s general duties get assigned to particular agents.”51 In a similar vein, Jones
articulates “It can be morally permissible, even required, that one be patriotic and loyal to
one’s country, but such permissions and requirements can never override the demands of
impartial justice.”52 Moral obligations are recognized beyond the requirements of justice.
There is a consideration that various local attachments may engender some of these
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supplementary moral obligations, but that they are not the basic foundation of any
obligations of justice.53
Another important basic claim of cosmopolitans deals with who is owed the
goods transferred. There is a consensus among most contemporary cosmopolitans that
obligations of justice are owed to individuals and not states.54 Addressing global
inequality between states without any focus on the well-being of the individuals falls
short of an effective global justice theory. Tan writes, “It is myopic to think that the
problems of global injustices that impact on individuals can be settled by focusing solely
on justice between states. A “morality of states” approach does not go far enough if we
are interested in improving individual lives.”55 A contrary perspective was at a time
espoused by Brian Barry who argued that states were entitled to receive resources. 56
However, in his later works he discards this earlier view and aligns his position with
cosmopolitanism’s individualist claims.57
Another important point worth noting regarding cosmopolitanism is the various
classifications in the literature. Millum provides two distinctions of cosmopolitan
perspectives based on the foundations that are considered to motivate them. The first is
humanitarian cosmopolitans who assert that obligations of justice do not stem from
associations like the state, but from persons’ characteristics per se, irrespective of their
associations with other persons. He cites an example with any utilitarian theory of global
justice, which emphasizes that the ultimate justification for justice principles is their
contribution to aggregate utility, and it is immaterial in whom that utility is situated.58
The second is political cosmopolitans who claim that some associations’ characteristics
like those exemplified by the state are the bases for applying justice requirements, but
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contend that these characteristics are actually located as well in international
associations.59 A typical example is to argue that mutually beneficial cooperation
between individuals is necessary and adequate to establish justice requirements in the
distribution of the cooperation’s products. The global trade based on its magnitude and
significance has been cited as an indication that mutually beneficial cooperation goes
completely beyond national borders. The implication is that the requirements of justice
go beyond national borders as well.60
Pogge also offered two distinctions of cosmopolitan perspectives. He
distinguishes first between legal and moral cosmopolitanism. Legal cosmopolitanism
focuses on a global order in the political realm which grants equal legal rights and duties
to all persons considered to be fellow citizens of a universal republic. On the other hand,
moral cosmopolitanism claims that all persons are in moral associations with one another,
and in this context, there is a requirement to respect one another’s status as ultimate units
of moral concern, which imposes restrictions on our conduct and on our attempts to form
institutional schemes. The dominant notion of moral cosmopolitanism entails that every
human being possess a global stature as an ultimate unit of moral concern.61
Pogge’s second distinction of cosmopolitan positions is between institutional
cosmopolitanism and interactional cosmopolitanism. Institutional cosmopolitanism holds
that principles of justice apply to institutions which encompass schemes of trade,
communication, and interdependence largely. On the other hand, interactional
cosmopolitanism holds that principles of justice apply still without a common
institutional setting.62 In this context, principles of justice apply directly to the conduct of
persons and groups.63 Pogge argues that “interactional cosmopolitanism assigns direct
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responsibility, for the fulfilment of human rights to other individual and collective agents,
whereas institutional cosmopolitanism assigns such responsibility to institutional
schemes.”64 The institutional approach also establishes a shared responsibility for all
persons not only to refrain from cooperating in imposing a harmful institutional order that
impedes fulfillment of human rights, but also to promote institutional reform. Pogge
argues that “our negative duty not to cooperate in the imposition of unjust social
institutions triggers obligations to promote feasible reforms that would enhance the
fulfillment of human rights.”65 A discussion of the four different approaches of
cosmopolitanism is the next task of this chapter.

B.2. Four Approaches of Cosmopolitanism
The four different approaches of cosmopolitanism with their nuances on the
application of global distributive principles comprise contractarian, consequentialist,
rights based and duty based. A detailed discussion of the four approaches follows.

Contractarian Approach to Cosmopolitanism
The two major proponents of the contractarian approach to cosmopolitanism are
Charles Beitz and Thomas Pogge. Beitz and Pogge applied Rawls’s Original Position to
the world stage. Martha C. Nussbaum writes, “for both of them, the right way to use
Rawlsian insights in crafting a theory of global justice is to think of the Original Position
as applied directly to the world as a whole.”66 Pogge and Beitz contend that the only way
to adequately recognize the individual as a subject of justice, within the framework of
Rawls’s perspective, is to envisage that the whole global scheme is available, and that the
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parties are bargaining for a just global structure as individuals. Both argue in different
ways that the outcome of a global original position will be a global structure that
maximizes the advantage of the least well off.67 Different specific arguments offered by
Beitz and Pogge in defense of cosmopolitan view of justice are presented as follows.
Beitz unlike Rawls proposes principles of distributive justice that apply globally
rather than within states. He presents two arguments to support his defense of
cosmopolitan principles of distributive justice. The first argument focuses on the arbitrary
distribution of natural resources. Beitz defended the view that the distribution of natural
resources is morally arbitrary and that the representatives at the global original position
will adopt a condition that will favor equal distribution of the natural resources. He
supports a global principle of distributive justice which outlines the criteria for the
distribution of natural resources.68 He forcefully argues, “not knowing the resource
endowments of their own societies, the parties would agree on a resource redistribution
principle that would give each society a fair chance to develop just political institutions
and an economy capable of satisfying its members’ basic needs.”69
Beitz’s second argument defends the existence of a global system of cooperation,
drawing on an extensive amount of empirical research.70 He argues that “international
economic interdependence constitutes a scheme of social cooperation like those to which
requirements of distributive justice have often been thought to apply.”71 Beitz discounts
the importance of domestic original position, but forcefully defends only the global
original position, where the participants will adopt a global difference principle. Caney
writes, “So whereas Rawls’s domestic contract delivers a difference principle with a
domestic scope, Beitz’s global contract delivers a global difference principle.”72 The
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strength of Beitz’s argument is based on the premise that global distributive principles
apply to schemes of social cooperation.
Beitz’s position was criticized by some authors. Barry refuting Beitz’s position
argues that there is no global interdependence of the suitable type. Barry writes, “Beitz’s
argument for extending the Rawlsian difference principle is in essence that the network
of international trade is sufficiently extensive to draw all countries together in a single
cooperative scheme. But it seems to be that trade, however multilateral, does not
constitute a cooperative scheme of the relevant kind.”73 While, Barry’s major contention
is that principles of distributive justice apply only to schemes of cooperation that are
mutually beneficial,74 Beitz on the other hand, argues that they apply to groups of people
who are engaged in interdependence of some kind, even if their interdependence is not
mutually advantageous or cooperative.75 Beitz clearly notes that “everyone need not be
advantaged by the cooperative scheme in order for requirements of justice to apply.”76
Another criticism of Beitz’s position comes from David A.J. Richards who
defends an original position that encompasses all persons in the world not on the bases of
social cooperation but merely on the bases that persons are entitled to be involved in the
contract as a result of their rights and interests as human beings. Richards argues that fair
principles are the ones that would be adopted in a contract that involves all persons and in
which people are behind a veil of ignorance.77 He validates the utilization of such a
global hypothetical contract on the bases that “ones membership in one nation as opposed
to another and the natural inequality among nations may be as morally fortuitous as any
other natural fact.”78 The implication is that all persons as such are entitled to be involved
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in the hypothetical contract. A consideration of everyone being a member of a common
institutional system is basically irrelevant.79
Beitz reformulated his position following Richards’ criticism. He maintains that
the morally pertinent aspects of persons are the “two essential powers of moral
personality – a capacity for an effective sense of justice and a capacity to form, revise,
and pursue a conception of the good.”80 This entails that all those who possess these
universal properties are eligible to be represented in a global original position.81
The second exponent of contractarian approach to cosmopolitanism is Pogge who
defends the assertion that the global distributive principles apply to a scheme of
international cooperation. Pogge who is usually considered as an unrestricted
institutionalist argues that all principles of justice apply only within schemes of
cooperation.82 An institutional perspective maintains that persons have obligations to
defend the civil and political rights of people who are members of the same scheme,
rather than those who are not part of the cooperation.83 Darrel Moellendorf argues within
the framework of an institutionalist when he insists both that justice applies within
schemes of cooperation84 as well as that there is a global scheme.85
Pogge distinguishes between positive and negative duties in his institutional
approach to cosmopolitan justice. He contends that principles of justice require that
persons possess a negative duty not to support an unjust socio-economic structure. He
clearly articulates that persons have a “negative duty not to uphold injustice, not to
contribute to or profit from the unjust impoverishment of others.”86 Membership of
institutions is imperative because each member is bound by a negative duty not to support
unjust institutions. In interpreting justice as requiring a negative duty not to uphold unjust
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institutional structures to which one belongs we come to the inference that duties of
justice apply to, and among, members of institutions. On the other hand, if we assert that
there are global institutional structures we can also come to the inference that persons are
bound by a negative duty not to impose unjust global institutional structures on the rest of
the world.87 Critics argue that Pogge’s unrestricted institutionalist perspective focuses a
lot more on duty bearers without adequate attention to entitlement bearers which include
the needy, the hungry and the sick.88
Pogge proposes what he calls a global resource dividend (GRD) which requires
that people should be taxed for utilizing the resources in their territory and the proceeds
expended for improving the poor all over the world.89 He proposes a global resource tax
(GRT) as a way for controlling global inequality. He maintains that the proceeds from the
global resource tax will be invested in alleviating the global poverty. Pogge argues that
proceeds from GRD are to be utilized for improving the lives of the global poor through
provision of “access to education, health care, means of production (land) and/or jobs to
sufficient extent to be able to meet their own basic needs with dignity and to represent
their rights and interests effectively against the rest of humankind: compatriots and
foreigners.”90 Revenues from GRD would assist poorer governments in providing people
with education, health care, microloans, infrastructure, and maintaining lower tax rates
and higher tax exemptions.91 A discussion of the outcome-based approach to
cosmopolitan justice is the task of next section of this chapter.

Consequentialist approach to Cosmopolitanism
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The second approach to cosmopolitanism is consequentialist approach to
cosmopolitan justice. Consequentialist approach to global justice focuses on the
consequences and results of actions and structures. The major proponents are utilitarians.
Consequentialists assert that “the present global economic order has stark consequences:
it leaves hundreds of millions in profound poverty, with all its associated insecurities, illhealth and powerlessness.”92 Consequentialists support cosmopolitan principles of
distributive justice. Some proponents of consequentialist approach to cosmopolitan
justice include Peter Singer, Robert Goodin and Martha Nussbaum. A brief discussion of
their different perspectives follows.
Singer proposes a utilitarian approach to global inequality in his article titled
Famine, Affluence and Morality published in 1972. He argues that the richer nations in
the developed world have obligations to aid the poorer nations in the developing world. 93
Singer begins with the assertion that poverty is evidently a bad.94 He argues that we all
have an obligation to prevent bad things from happening. Singer posits two versions of
this claim. The first claim, which is pretty strong states, “if it is in our power to prevent
something bad from happening, without thereby sacrificing anything of comparable
moral importance, we ought, morally, to do it.”95 The second claim which is a weaker
claim states, “if it is in our power to prevent something very bad from happening, without
sacrificing anything morally significant, we ought, morally, to do it”96 In the second
claim which is a weaker one, a person can be relieved of the duty if it imposes a
substantial moral cost on him or her. On the other hand, in the first claim which is a
stronger one, a person can only be relieved of the duty if that moral cost is comparable to
the cost to the poor person that the person involved would otherwise assist. Singer
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acknowledges only an important point that our rendering assistance need not make a bad
situation worse or bring about a comparable harm.97 Based on these premises, Singer
proposes that wealthy persons have obligations to aid the needy regardless of where they
live and what country they come from.98 The implication is that special attachments like
nationality and citizenship are irrelevant when we consider our obligations to others.
Singer further argues that the obligation of the affluent towards the poor is not minimized
by the physical distance between rich and poor, or by the fact that there are many other
people likewise able to assist.99 He argues that giving to the distant poor generally
regarded as an act of charity and/or supererogatory, is rather a matter of duty or
obligation.100
Singer’s claim regarding our obligation to assist has been criticized on the
grounds that it is unrealistically overdemanding.101 Deborah Zion citing John Arthur, for
instance, proposes that “Singer’s formulation produces a duty for healthy people to
donate one eye or one kidney, on the grounds that the inconvenience caused to the
donating agent is seriously outweighed by the good such organs might do to the blind or
dying.”102 Singer’s obligation to assist which is characterized by its
“overdemandingness” has been strongly criticized by Michael Slote when he proposes
that persons should not have their major life plans disturbed by the obligation to help
others.103 The important point established by critics is that there is need to set limits to
beneficence.104 Singer was also criticized for equating actions with omissions. Caney
acknowledges that someone may contend that not saving a person’s life is not the same as
killing them. However, it is still pertinent to argue in consonant with Singer’s perspective
that we are bound by an obligation to distribute resources to the needy.105
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In order to mitigate the overdemanding claim of Singer, Robert Goodin proposes
a modest consequentialist theory of cosmopolitan distributive justice which does not
oblige the sacrifice of people’s own commitments. Goodin insists that we have an
obligation to aid the vulnerable106 and he further argues that this principle authorizes
international aid.107 He contends that this is required by justice,108 even though he thinks
it can be explained a lot better in terms of humanity.109 The implication is that Goodin
argues for a global application of his duty to aid the vulnerable and rebukes the present
world order but does not endorse Singer’s overdemandingness.110 Goodin also
acknowledges the significance of collective action in his discussion of foreign aid and
world hunger.111 He indicates that personal donations to schemes that focus on
individuals, such as sponsor a child, do not account for massive restructuring required in
needy communities. Therefore, Goodin argues that when contemplating aid to the
severely impoverished, giving money is not adequate, but rather individuals must as well
engage in political action to organize effective schemes.112 Zion articulates, “the main
advantages of collective action are, therefore, efficacy and an easing of the burden on
individual donors, thus once again answering to some degree the “overdemandingness”
objection.”113
Another exponent of consequentialist approach to cosmopolitanism is Martha
Nussbaum who proposes an Aristotelian and modest version of consequentialism. Her
version is termed Capabilities approach, which is outcome based. Nussbaum writes,
“Some theories, such as Rawls, begin with the design of a fair procedure. My capabilities
approach begins with outcomes: with a list of entitlements that have to be secured to
citizens, if the society in question is a minimally just one.”114 She argues that we have a
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collective obligation to ensure adequate protection of human entitlements. Her emphasis
is to promote capabilities that will enhance living a fulfilled and dignified life for every
human person irrespective of one’s nationality or citizenship. She writes, “Humanity is
under a collective obligation to find ways of living and cooperating together so that all
human beings have decent lives.”115 Caney noted that Nussbaum convincingly advocates
for global principles of distributive justice that defends persons’ capacity to flourish and
lead fulfilling lives.116 Nussbaum clearly articulates, “We insist that a fundamental part
of the good of each and every human being will be to cooperate together for the
fulfillment of human needs and the realization of fully human lives.”117 She describes
fully human life as comprising of “adequate nutrition, education of the faculties,
protection of bodily integrity, liberty for speech and religious self-expression and so
forth.”118
Nussbaum argues that justice requires that we have entitlements to a minimum of
each of these basic goods.119 Capabilities approach defends providing people with the
necessary conditions to lead lives with human dignity. Consequentialist accounts of
cosmopolitan justice fall short in providing a criterion for distributing the benefits and
burdens of the society.120 It is pertinent to note that an emphasis on capabilities naturally
evokes the notion of human rights approach to cosmopolitan justice which is discussed
next.

Rights-Based Approach to Cosmopolitanism
The third approach to cosmopolitanism is rights-based approach to cosmopolitan
justice. Some key proponents of rights-based approach to cosmopolitanism are Henry
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Shue, Charles Jones, David Held and Thomas Pogge. Shue121 and Jones122 defend the
human right to subsistence. Shue argues that the right to subsistence is necessary for
persons to enjoy other rights. As such it is a basic right.123 He articulates that subsistence
is one of several inherent necessities for the exercise of any right.124 The implication is
that for Shue to enjoy other civil and political rights you must first of all exercise the
right to subsistence. He contends that the right to subsistence is logically a necessary
component of other rights.125 Shue argues that every human person has a basic right to
minimum economic security or subsistence which encompasses “unpolluted air,
unpolluted water, adequate food, adequate clothing, adequate shelter, and minimal
preventive public health care.”126
Jones proposed a similar version of right to subsistence. He argues that civic and
political rights should protect important human interests. He reasoned that civil and
political rights should not be indifferent to what people care about but should protect
fundamental human interests.127 These basic assumptions support the claim that persons
have a right to subsistence.128 An important human interest was identified as a person’s
interest in good health as well as preventing malnutrition, starvation, and disease.129
Caney writes, “Any credible account of people’s rights reflects what is important to
persons – their fundamental interests.”130 Taking into consideration that subsistence is an
important interest and taking into account this interpretation of rights, an inference is
drawn that persons have a right to subsistence.131
Held proposed an expansive set of human rights in his discussion of global
justice. He proposes seven types of rights that should be defended based on an ideal
autonomy.132 He identifies three types of rights which focus on economic entitlements,
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including health rights, social rights and economic rights. Health rights encompass the
right to good health and non-harmful environment.133 Social rights entail the right to child
support and education.134 Economic rights involve the right to a minimum wage and the
opportunity to be economically independent.135

Pogge also proposed a rights-based approach to global justice, which persuasively
defends Articles 25 and 28 of the Universal Declarations of Human Rights.136 Pogge
defends an institutional conception of rights. He argues that a just world order is one that
secures peoples enjoyment of their human rights, which includes economic rights. His
defense of an institutional conception of rights disposes him to support Article 28 of the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights which emphasizes institutional full realization of
these rights.137
The pitfall of the rights-based approach to global justice is that it does not give
account of the persons who have corresponding obligations to fulfill the right. Onora
O’Neill forcefully articulates, “Rights are demands on others. Liberty rights demand that
others not interfere with or obstruct the right-holder, rights to goods and services that
others provide for the right-holder.”138 A global principle of distributive justice requires
both an account of people’s entitlements as well as an account of people who have
obligations to provide them. A rights-based approach therefore needs to be
complemented by a duty-based approach.

Duty-Based Approach to Cosmopolitanism
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Some cosmopolitans favor a duty-based approach to global justice as against a
rights-based approach.139 O’Neill is one of the major proponents of duty- based approach
to cosmopolitanism. In international politics, the focus on duties over rights is articulated
in some countries’ proposal for a “Universal Declaration of Human Responsibilities” to
complement the “Universal Declaration of Human Rights.”140 Advocates of this proposal
argue that a biased emphasis on rights has resulted in minimizing the fact that rights are
complemented by corresponding duties, comprising economic and social ones.141
There is a contention that a duty-based approach presents a different, and
certainly superior, conceptual view on global justice.142 In this context, Tan writes that
O’Neill articulates that “rights theories are conceptually incomplete because while rights
must have certain corresponding duties, not all rights correspond to an assigned dutybearer and a clearly specified duty.”143 The implication is that every right has a
corresponding obligation. Furthermore, a right is ineffective and unclaimable when there
is no agent clearly assigned to bear the responsibility for the right. 144
O’Neill defends the view that a right is effective only when a corresponding
obligation is clearly specified and allocated. She argues, “When obligations are
unallocated it is right that they should be met, but nobody can have an effective right –an
enforceable, claimable, or waiveable right-to their being met. Such abstract rights are not
effective entitlements.”145 She distinguishes between perfect obligations and imperfect
obligations. Obligations are perfect when they are assigned and specified and therefore
claimable and in theory enforceable.146 Obligations are imperfect when no particular
agent has been recognized, when there is substantial leeway on how an agent may fulfill
the obligation, and when it is unstipulated for whom the act is to be performed147. O’Neill
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writes, “Imperfect obligations can be enforced only when they are institutionalized in
ways that specify for whom the obligation is to be performed.”148
A right without a corresponding obligation is an empty right. For example, if the
claimants of a particular right such as right to food or development are unable to locate
where to settle their claims, these are construed as empty manifesto rights.149 O’Neill
argues that manifesto rights are only claimed when corresponding obligations are
specified and allocated. The enforcement of a right requires a corresponding duty which
needs to be institutionalized. She pointed out a relationship between a meaningful right
and an enforceable duty. She clearly stressed the need to institutionalize the duties of
justice so as to allocate, stipulate, and enforce them.150 She asserts that institutionbuilding is required to specify and allocate obligations to the needy.151
O’Neill argues that the goal of such institutions is to regulate the actions of
powerful investors who are given “excessive tax concessions” and to curb the
vulnerability of poor nation states who frequently agree to terms of trade that are
harmful.152 She favors establishing a global institutional structure which will bear the
obligations of fulfilling economic rights. O’Neill clearly states “…without one or other
determinate institutional structure, these supposed economic rights amount to rhetoric
rather than entitlement.”153
At the international level, no institution exists that has adequate power to coerce
the states, societies and investors to agree to the Rawlsian “difference Principle” on
global scale.154 Therefore, the organizations that are focused on are networking
institutions such as banks, corporations, NGO’s, internet etc. which are frequently outside
the bounds of the state and consequently escape the bounded justice of the state,
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particularly in the less developed state.155 Jones-Pauly notes that “the solution is not to
bring these institutions back into the state. Rather, the state has to deal with them as being
within the bounds of a global, rather than national system of justice.”156 This entails
negotiation between the bounded state and the “boundary-less”157 non-state agents who
are influencing the vulnerable in the global context.158 While O’Neill argues for
establishing of determinate institutional structure in order to fulfill economic rights of the
vulnerable especially in developing countries, the current institutional arrangements and
international practices are considered unjust so long as they significantly contribute to
human rights violation of the poor.159 Pogge in line with this thought argues that “… the
existing medical-patent regime (trade-related aspects of intellectual property rights –
TRIPS – as supplemented by bilateral agreements) is severely unjust – and its imposition
a human-rights violation on account of the avoidable mortality and morbidity it
foreseeably produces.”160 A review of current rules for incentivizing pharmaceutical
research is discussed in the next part of this chapter.

C. Current Rules for Incentivizing Pharmaceutical Research
C.1. Globalized Patent System as an Institutional Failure
The WTO contends that the crucial issue in authorizing patent protection for
pharmaceutical products is to entrench a balance between two complementary public
health goals, that of offering incentives for future inventions of new drugs, and that of
guaranteeing affordable access to existing drugs.161 But, unfortunately affordable access
to essential drugs has not been realized for the global poor especially in developing
countries. Data from WHO shows that in 2003, more than one-third of the population of
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the world continued to lack access to the drugs on the WHO Model List. The statistics
was very bleak in the poorest parts of Africa and Asia that it increases to more than
50%.162 Pogge attributes this morally troubling situation to a global institutional
failure.163
Pogge calls attention to the huge challenge of the responsibility that wealthy
countries’ citizens might shoulder regarding the persistence of severe poverty and
inequality in developing countries, and especially, on the correlation between their
persistence and current decisions regarding the avenue for globalization.164 Pogge
articulates, “my focus is… on the present situation, on the radical inequality between the
bottom half of humankind, suffering severe poverty, and those in the top seventh, whose
per capital share of the global product is 180 times greater than theirs (at market
exchange rates).”165 He identified two ways of perceiving severe poverty as a moral
challenge. First, is as a positive duty when we fail to accomplish our positive duty to
assist persons in severe distress. Second, is as a negative duty when we fail to accomplish
our stricter negative duty not to support injustice, not to promote or benefit from the
unfair impoverishment of others.166
Pogge offers two reasons why the new global economic order is so cruel on the
poor. First, is that the governments of the affluent nations have an overwhelming edge
relative to bargaining power and expertise. Second, is that the representatives in
international negotiations seek to advance the best interests of the people and
corporations of their own country. The consideration of the needs of the global poor is
excluded as part of the mandate of any of the influential parties to the negotiation. The
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cumulative result of such negotiations and agreements with vast power differentials is
obvious: a grossly unjust global order in which benefits flow largely to the affluent. 167
The features of vast unjust global institutional order detrimental to the global poor
are shown in the history of the debates regarding the design and interpretation of the
TRIPS agreement, and in concerted attempts to strengthen intellectual property rights
(IPRs) beyond TRIPS requirements. IPRs are further strengthened through TRIPS-plus
provisions established in the current Free Trade Agreements (FTAs).168 The distinct
characteristic of many of the bilateral trade agreements currently negotiated by US is that
they go beyond the multilateral standards required by the TRIPS agreement.169 Some
authors indicate that developing countries consented to the TRIPS agreement with
predictable disadvantage on public health so as to obtain concessions in other aspects of
economic relevance to them, such as the reducing of subsidies in agriculture in highincome countries. Economic considerations are essentially fundamental in countries in
which poverty is extreme and prevalent, and critical to realizing subsistence rights of
their citizens.170
Pogge offers rebuttal to the claim that consent to the WTO and consequently
TRIPS is voluntary, for four different reasons. First is that the appeal to consent can
surmount the charge of violation of rights, as long as the rights under consideration are
alienable and, more precisely, can be waived by consent. However, in the context of the
common notion of human rights, they cannot be thus waived.171 Pogge argues that,
“persons cannot waive their human rights to personal freedom, political participation,
freedom of expression, or freedom from torture.”172 Second is that an appeal to consent
obstructs the complaint of people who lack guaranteed access to the objects of some of
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their human rights only as long as they have themselves acceded to the government that
continues their impoverishments. However, most people who are threatened by diseases
or are severely deprived reside in countries that are not profoundly democratic, and
consequently consent to the current global economic order by their despotic rules cannot
be considered as consent by their citizens. A typical example was Nigeria’s accession to
the WTO in 1995 which was achieved by its ruthless military dictator Sani Abacha.173
Third is that consent to an onerous global regime can be justified only if it was not
provoked by the danger of even more burdens. Therefore, one’s consent cannot validate
one’s enslavement when one’s consent was one’s only option to evade continued torture
or, certainly, accidental drowning. Pogge argues that, “an appeal to consent thus blocks a
complaint by the poor against the present global economic order only if, at the time of
consenting, they had an alternative option that would have given them secure access to
the objects of their human rights.”174 Fourth is that an appeal to consent cannot validate
the severe deprivation of children who are considerably overrepresented among people
experiencing serious poverty and represent about two-thirds of all deaths from causes
associated with poverty estimated at about thirty-four thousand daily.175 Pogge argues
that, “the claim that the present global economic order foreseeably and avoidably violates
the human rights of children cannot be blocked by any conceivable appeal to consent.”176
A vast body of literature indicates that IPRs as enforced in the TRIPS agreement
and numerous US FTAs result in a number of ethical problems. The ethical problems
highlighted by IPRs are most relevant when it involves socially valuable goods such as
life-saving or essential drugs and genetically modified seeds that are granted Intellectual
Property (IP) protection. The focus of the discussion in this chapter is on life-saving or
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essential drugs in order to explore the broader moral problems or issues precipitated by
the enforcement of IPRs.177
Pogge presents a good synopsis of how innovation is currently incentivized within
the context of TRIPS agreement and how this agreement might result in significant
morally problematic results.178 The advent of the AIDS crisis in developing countries
especially in Africa has shown that the current TRIPS agreement set the critical needs of
poor patients against the need of pharmaceutical companies to recover their research and
development investments.179 Producing new, safe and effective life-saving or essential
drugs for the market is an exorbitant, time consuming and financially risky enterprise.
This involves undertaking long clinical trials for the research and development of new
drugs as well as lengthy testing and approval process. Furthermore, newly developed
drugs regularly end up to be unsafe or not adequately effective, to have severe side
effects, or to be unsuccessful with obtaining government approval for a specific reason,
which may result in the loss of the whole investment.180 Taken into account that
pharmaceutical companies must shoulder all the costs associated with development
process, it is no astonishment that such companies are hesitant to carry out research and
development (R&D) of new drugs unless there are clear indications of positive financial
prospects of doing so. However, such positive financial prospects cannot be realized
without strict enforcement of IPRs on pharmaceutical innovations.181
The reason for this situation is that whenever an inventor firm brings a new
innovation to the market, other companies would copy the innovation usually through
reverse engineering, and considering that these other companies did not incur any costs
relative to R&D, they would be able to charge a price for the product that is considerably
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lower than the one charged by the inventor firm. As a result, the market price for the
product would be driven down to simply above marginal costs of production, and the
inventor firm would not be able to recover its R&D costs. A macroeconomic arrangement
for the buying and selling of drugs that does not grant innovators IPRs to their
innovations is thus probably to result in a market failure of undersupply of
pharmaceutical innovations.182
The solution to a market failure of undersupply of pharmaceutical innovations
was enshrined in the TRIPS agreement established under the auspices of WTO in the
Uruguay Round. The TRIPS agreement grants patent protection usually for twenty years
to inventor firms on their inventions from the period of filing a patent application to
protect them from free riding and to encourage medical innovation.183 Furthermore,
strengthening of IPRs has been continued by US through a series of bilateral FTAs that
encompass additional TRIPS-plus provisions. These TRIPS-plus measures authorize
patent holders to extend, or evergreen, their monopolies and they as well suppress,
obstruct, and delay the production of generic drugs in various ways: through enforcement
of data exclusivity, and through limitations on and political pressure against the effective
utilization of compulsory licenses.184 IPRs are construed as a socio-economic tool that
establish a temporary monopoly for inventor firms and authorize such firms to charge
prices for their innovations that are considerably higher than the marginal cost of
production of the innovations. This enables the inventor firms to recoup their R&D costs
and obtain a profit on their innovations. Therefore, in terms of increasing the financial
appeal of participating in the process of producing pharmaceutical innovations, IPRs are
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frequently influential in rectifying the market failure of undersupply of pharmaceutical
innovations.185
On the other hand, the introduction of IPRs for pharmaceutical innovations
frequently results in another market failure that involves excluding several mutually
beneficial transactions between seller and buyer. The reasonably high price of an IP
protected drug drives out particular potential buyers out of the market: specifically those
buyers who are able and willing to buy the product at a price fairly above its marginal
costs of production but cannot afford to pay the profit-maximizing sale price that obtains
during the period in which the product is patented.186 This scenario is dubbed deadweight
losses in economic theory, which describe the type of losses that take place when
someone is able and willing to pay more fairly above the marginal cost of production for
a product but unwilling or unable to pay the patent price for it.187 The characteristic of
IPRs that they drive out particular potential buyers from the market establishes what
might be dubbed the “exclusion problem” or “access problem.”188 Pogge contends that
the exclusion or access problem is morally disturbing especially when a group of people
usually the global poor are excluded from life-saving or essential drugs and not simply
from computer software, music CDs or movie discs.189
In the advent of the TRIPS agreement which enforces strong IPRs on all product
types, the exclusion or access problem is not the only outcome. A distinct problem that
also emerges is “availability problem.”190 This problem is successfully established in the
context of R&D of drugs for diseases that are prevalent among people in low-income
countries. Diseases which primarily result in suffering and death in low-income countries
comprise malaria, leishmaniasis and Chagas’ disease.191 R&D of drugs for diseases that
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are prevalent among people in low-income countries is very restricted. Available data
shows that less than 1% of the 1223 new drugs introduced to the international market
between 1975 and 1997 were designed precisely for tropical communicable diseases.192
The principal reason for the prevalence of this situation among the global poor especially
in developing countries is that many poor people basically do not have adequate money
to pay for drugs for their sicknesses. Based on this information, for-profit pharmaceutical
companies then have limited or no incentive for investing resources into the R&D of
drugs for these diseases usually referred to as “neglected diseases.”193
The availability problem stems from the fact that the incentivizing method for
innovation instituted by IPRs establishes a correlation between the incentive to innovate
and the price of the innovative product. In the context of TRIPS agreement, profits accrue
entirely from sales, so that the greater a price a product can be marketed, the greater is the
incentive to invest resources into the R&D of the product.194 Sonderholm articulates that,
“the TRIPS agreement with its strong protection of IPRs is therefore not an agreement
that is conducive to the investment in R&D of products that are socially valuable to
predominantly poor populations or populations that are small.”195 Socially valuable goods
comprising life-saving or essential drugs are readily available abundantly for the global
rich far more than they are available for the global poor.196
Pogge argues that the TRIPS agreement has radically limited the access to
inexpensive generic copies of advanced drugs to the global poor. The lack of generic
competition multiplies the prices of advanced drugs frequently 10-15 times and so
effectively excludes the global poor.197 Pogge further identified and extensively discussed
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the seven shortcomings of the current pharmaceutical innovation regime which is the next
task of this chapter.

C.2. Shortcomings of the Current Pharmaceutical Innovation Regime
Pogge insists that the quest for a systematic solution to pharmaceutical innovation
regime can begin from an analysis of the key disadvantages of the current globalized
monopoly patent regime.198 He identified seven failings of the current pharmaceutical
innovation regime, including high prices, neglect of diseases concentrated among the
poor, bias toward maintenance drugs, wastefulness, counterfeiting, excessive marketing
and the last-mile problem.199 A brief discussion of the seven failings of the current
pharmaceutical innovation regime follows.

High Prices
A patented drug is sold close to the profit-maximizing monopoly price which is
essentially determined by the demand curve of the rich. In situations where many rich or
well insured people certainly need a drug, the tendency has been to significantly raise the
price of the drug far above the cost of production. Pogge acknowledges that mark-ups
exceed 1000% for the most part when dugs are still under patent.200 For example, SanofiAventis sold its cardiovascular disease drug in Thailand for $2.20 each pill, which is
about 6000% above the price the Indian generic company Emcure agreed to sale the same
drug.201 The implication is that the exorbitant prices for drugs result in significantly
limiting access to just a few of the poor who can receive aid from others.202
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Neglect of Diseases Concentrated Among the Poor
Rewarding innovators with patent-protected mark-ups results in lack of appeal
and focus by pharmaceutical companies on diseases concentrated among the poor for
pharmaceutical research regardless of the severity and prevalence of these diseases. This
is obvious, since the demand for such a drug drops off sharply as the patent holder
broadens the mark-up. The implication is that there is likely no prospect for realizing
huge sales volume and a large mark-up. More so, the potential risk of driving down the
price of a successful new drug to the marginal cost of production or even free of charge
which results in a big loss of the innovator’s investment was acknowledged as
detrimental. In virtue of these concerns, pharmaceutical companies certainly target drugs
for the affluent for pharmaceutical research considerably more than those of the poor. 203
The problem of neglected diseases is as well recognized as the 10/90 gap, indicating that
only 10% of all pharmaceutical research is being concentrated on diseases that represent
90% of the global burden of disease.204

Bias towards Maintenance Drugs
Drugs are classified into three categories, including curative, maintenance and
preventive drugs. Curative drugs deal with getting rid of the diseases from the patient’s
body. Maintenance drugs focus on improving well-being and functioning but without
eliminating the disease. Preventive drugs focus on decreasing the probability of becoming
infected with the disease from the onset. The maintenance drugs are considerably the
most lucrative under the current patent regime, since patients would continue to buy the
drugs without being cured and do not die until after the expiration of the patent. The
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pharmaceutical companies gain a huge profit from such patients more than they would if
they drew the same health benefit from a cure or vaccine. Vaccines are far less profitable
because they are usually bought in big quantities at discounted prices by governments. 205
Pogge argues that current regime directs pharmaceutical research in the wrong direction
to the disadvantage of both the poor and the rich.206

Wastefulness
Within the current regime, innovators must shoulder the patents’ filing cost in
several national jurisdictions as well as the cost of checking these jurisdictions for likely
breaches of their patents. Enormous amount of money are also expended on expensive
litigation in many jurisdictions against patent holders who want to extend and prolong
their patent-protected mark ups.207 A more significant loss is incurred from the
deadweight loss which stems from obstructed sales to buyers who are willing and able to
pay some price between the marginal cost of production and the greater monopoly
price.208

Counterfeiting
Big mark-ups promote the illegal production of counterfeit products that are
watered down, contaminated, inactive or even lethal. Such fake products frequently
jeopardize patient health. They as well significantly contribute to the emergence of drugspecific resistance, when patients consume very limited active ingredient of a watered
down drug to exterminate the more resilient pathogenic agents. For example, the
emergence of greatly resistant disease strains of tuberculosis presents risks to all of us.209
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Excessive Marketing
Pharmaceutical companies usually make frantic efforts to increase their sales
volume through frightening patients or by recompensing doctors especially when they
keep up with very huge mark-ups. This result in fighting over market share among
similar “me-too” drugs as well as incentives that persuades doctors to prescribe drugs
even when they are contra-indicated or when competing drugs are expected to do better.
Given big mark-ups, it is profitable to sponsor huge direct-to-consumer advertising that
induces people to take drugs they don’t actually need for diseases they don’t actually
have, usually referred to as invented pseudo diseases.210

The Last-Mile Problem
Whereas the current regime offers strong incentives to sell unwanted patented
drugs to people who can pay or possess insurance, it offers no incentives to guarantee that
poor people benefit from drugs they need immediately. This problem is exacerbated in
poor countries, which frequently do not have the infrastructure to dispense drugs as well
as health care professionals to prescribe them and to guarantee their appropriate
utilization. There is an understanding that the current regime offers incentives to
pharmaceutical companies to discount the medical needs of the poor. A pharmaceutical
company that assists poor patients to benefit from its drug under patent undercuts its own
lucrativeness in three different ways: by paying for the attempt to make the drug available
to them in a proficient way, by curbing a disease that its profits hinge on, and by losing
rich customers who discover means of buying from inexpensive drugs intended for the
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poor.211 The problems created by the current patent system led Pogge to propose new
rules for reforming and incentivizing pharmaceutical research.

D. Pogge’s New Rules for Reforming and Incentivizing Pharmaceutical Research
Pogge proposes two basic reform strategies for dealing with monopoly pricing
issues of the current patent system, including the differential pricing strategy and the
public good strategy.212 A brief analysis of the two strategies follows.

D.1. The Differential Pricing Strategy
The differential pricing strategy usually comes in three different forms. The first
form entails going back to the era before the TRIPS agreement, when IPRs, that is, patent
monopolies for advanced drugs were granted and implemented in rich countries, but not
in most of the poorer countries. The second form involves that inventor firms offer
different prices of their patented drugs to different customers such as affluent buyers and
poor buyers. In this way, the firms will realize a big profit margin from sales to the more
affluent customers, without giving up sales to poorer buyers at a lower margin.213
Theoretically, pricing the product this way enables the inventor firms to obtain the best of
two worlds. The firms would secure high profits on the products in markets with a high
buying power without forfeiting the medium to low profits that originate from selling the
product in markets with a reasonably low buying power. Furthermore, the significantly
reduced price of the product in low-income countries implies that the populations of these
countries would have an easier access to the product than they would have if the product
was priced at high-income countries’ level.214 In this context, access problem which has
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been regarded as morally problematic especially relative to life-saving drugs may have
been fairly alleviated, because this feature of differential pricing makes the strategy “a
prima facie attractive pricing scheme for life-saving medicines.”215
The third form of differential pricing strategy involves the rights conferred on
governments as acknowledged under TRIPS rules, to issue compulsory licensing for
drugs that are urgently needed in public health emergency situations.216 For example,
with the advent of the devastating impact of HIV/AIDS pandemic in Sub-Saharan Africa
which has been considered a public health emergency for several countries in that region,
the governments of these affected countries might authorize the manufacture and
marketing of cheaper generic copies of patented HIV/AIDS drugs on the condition that
the authorized generic firms pay a little license fee to the patent holders. The market entry
of pharmaceutical companies manufacturing generic copies of HIV/AIDS drugs will most
probably drive down the price of these drugs to simply above their marginal cost of
production, and this will invariably improve access to the drugs.217 The US has always
recognized this right under 28 USC 1498, especially for cases where the licensed
manufacturer is either an agency or contractor affiliated with the government, but has
also been unwilling to invoke the right in the context of life-saving drugs, apparently to
refrain from setting an international example disadvantageous to its pharmaceutical
industry.218 Poor countries have been encouraged in the wake of AIDS pandemic to
invoke their rights to compulsory licensing in order to deal with their public health crises,
but the pressure from the US and other affluent countries has barred most of them from
not utilizing this alternative.219
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Implementing differential pricing and compulsory licensing in the real world to
deal with the problem of access to essential drugs has several limitations. Ravvin offers
an overview of some of the problems that relate to these solutions to access problem.
With regard to differential pricing, the principal concern is that of leakage of
inexpensively sold drugs from poor countries to affluent ones through parallel trade and
smuggling.220 This view is as well stressed by other authors.221 Pogge also discusses the
risk of diversion and parallel trade.222 He further indicates that cognizant of this risk that
patent holders usually don’t make efforts to defeat the second market failure through
differential pricing, rather they refuse to give in to pressures to do so, and wrestle efforts
to impose compulsory licensing upon them.223 He contends that consequently, differential
pricing has not gained traction and several poor buyers who would be willing and able to
buy the drug at a price reasonably above the marginal cost of production are excluded
from this drug because they are not willing and able to pay the much higher monopoly
price.224 Pogge argues that differential pricing strategy cannot stop the neglect of diseases
that are prevalent among the poor. Differential pricing can assist in improving access to a
drug at competitive market prices for the poor but only on the condition that this drug is
available. However, this drug will only be available if there is adequate market demand
for it, in order to make investment in its development attractive and profitable.225 Pogge
stresses that, “nearly all diseases and research avenues neglected under the current regime
would continue to be neglected under a differential pricing regime.”226
More so, an issue of social justice was also highlighted, because, the affluent
people in low-income countries will have access to a specified drug at a reasonably low
cost, while poor people in high-income countries will have to pay a high price for exactly
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the same drug. Love and Hubbard indicate that 50 million customers in India have
comparable incomes to that of Europeans, and to some people it is contentious that this
section of people would have access to a specified drug at a low price while uninsured,
poor people in, for instance in the US would have to pay a high price for exactly the same
drug.227
Compulsory licensing also has several limitations. First, the WTO initially just
authorized national governments to issue compulsory licenses to generic producers that
would manufacture products exclusively for domestic consumption. It was immediately
acknowledged that this entailed that compulsory licensing cannot be utilized by countries
that had no domestic capacity to manufacture generic drugs.228 Most low-income
countries except Brazil, India and China do not have such capacity. In 2003, the WTO
General Council developed a decision that grapples with the export of pharmaceutical
drugs to countries that lack domestic manufacturing capacity. In this context, countries
with a domestic drug manufacturing capacity were authorized to issue a compulsory
license to a domestic manufacturer which would in that case be legally allowed to export
the specified drug to a low-income country that urgently need the drug to deal with a
national health emergency. Some literature on compulsory licensing indicated that the
2003 WTO amendment to TRIPS has been a debacle because the judicial process
involved in obtaining an export license is complicated and pervaded with practical
obstacles and red tape.229 Rimmer acknowledging this fact and based on a study of 2007
Rwanda’s effort to import HIV/AIDS drugs under the WTO General Council Decision
2003 and the resulting process involving Apotex, a Canadian generic drug manufacturer,
writes that it is objectionable to codify the WTO General Council Decision 2003, because
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it has been unsuccessful to offer a swift, efficient, and cost-effective distribution of
essential medicines.230
Second, compulsory licensing has social costs that may counteract the short term
benefits it engenders relative to improving access to life-saving medicines.231 Paramount
among these social costs include: (1) a risk of reduced direct investment in countries that
turn to compulsory licensing because proprietors of patented products will look up more
business-friendly legal environments, (2) a risk that the pharmaceutical company which
gets a compulsory license will shadow price the original price of the patented product and
so engender dead weight loss of its own in search of profits, (3) a risk that compulsory
licensing will decrease the incentives of the research-driven pharmaceutical sector to
innovate, (4) a risk that the governments of countries that accommodate pharmaceutical
companies whose products have been bound by a compulsory license by a foreign
government will hit back with trade sanctions that could gravely hurt the economy of the
nation that has issued the compulsory license.232 Bird’s third point was also reiterated by
Pogge as the likely long-term drawback of compulsory licensing. Pogge argues that if
compulsory licenses are extensively utilized, then pharmaceutical companies are
probably to be discouraged from investing in R&D of drugs that are likely to be bound by
compulsory licensing. For-profit pharmaceutical companies are as a result likely to avoid
this type of R&D completely. From this perspective, compulsory licensing will be
tantamount to a further obstacle to R&D of drugs for diseases that predominantly exist in
developing countries.233 Since differential pricing and compulsory licensing could not
provide an attractive and effective means for easing the access problem engendered by
IPRs, Pogge proposed the public good strategy as a more effective and promising strategy
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for improving access to essential drugs especially for the global poor in developing
countries.

D.2. The Public Good Strategy for Improving Access to Essential Drugs
Pogge contends that the public good strategy is more promising to yield a reform
plan that would circumvent the major failings of the current monopoly patent regime
while simultaneously retaining most of its significant benefits.234 The public good
strategy has three critical components comprising “open access, alternative incentives,
and funding.”235 A brief discussion of the three components follows.
The first component focuses on providing successful and approved new drug as a
public good that all pharmaceutical companies may use free of charge. This component
of the reform plan will drastically reduce the exclusion or access problem created by
monopoly pricing issue. Since the new essential drugs can be freely reproduced by all
pharmaceutical companies and launched in the market, the price of such drugs will most
probably drop to a level simply above their marginal cost of production. Pogge argues
that if this component known as open access is implemented in isolation, all economic
incentive to attempt to develop new essential drugs will be destroyed.236 Such an
unpleasant situation is, nevertheless, circumvented implementing the second component
of the reform plan which entails offering some alternative reward to inventors. This
involves the notion that the inventor firms should be qualified to take out a multiyear
patent on any essential drug they invent, and during the life of the patent, the companies
should be rewarded from a centralized public fund in proportion to the impact of their
invention on the global disease burden.237
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Pogge contends that the second component of the reform plan can be identified
clearly and definitely in distinct ways. These ways can be generally classified as “push”
and “pull” programs. A push program chooses and finances some particular innovator
such as a pharmaceutical company, maybe, or a university or a national health agency to
embark on a specific research endeavor. The implication here is that, given sufficient
funding, the chosen innovator will develop the required innovation, which can
subsequently be made available freely for production by rival pharmaceutical
manufacturers in order to guarantee broad availability at competitive market price. 238
On the other hand, a pull program is addressed to all potential innovators, hopeful
to reward whoever is the first to accomplish a valued innovation. Pull programs possess
two interconnected advantages over push programs: first, they never fund failed research
endeavors and second, they produce strong financial incentives for innovators to toil
towards early success. The reverse of these advantages is that, in order to evoke such a
considerable research attempt, the reward must be adequately big to recompense for the
risk of failure. The risk is bifold, as a research endeavor may fail either because the
required drug proves evasive or because some rival innovator gets there first. Potential
innovators have incentives to attempt to develop a new drug simply if the reward for
success, disregarded by the likelihood of failure, is considerably greater than the
anticipated cost of the research and development endeavor. From these perspectives, a
pull program is akin to the current regime.239
Pogge contends that pull programs can be more effective than push programs
because of three reasons. Push programs are more probably to fail because they obtain
just one rather than several rival innovators to work on a problem. Push programs are
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more probably to fail because the innovator is selected on the grounds of the confidence
of some outsiders in it while in pull programs the decision of each innovator to attempt is
based on its own, more capable and better stimulated evaluation of its capacities. Push
programs are more probably to fail because the selected innovator has much weaker
incentives to toil and cost-effectively toward early success. The drawback that push
programs are more probably to fail is exacerbated in reality that such failures are fully
paid for, contrary to pull programs, which pay nothing for unsuccessful efforts. This
reality has propensity to make push programs harder to maintain politically. 240
Pogge further indicated that the second component of the reform plan has a
number of attractive consequences. First, it will engender a strong incentive for any
inventor firm to (1) sell its innovative drug inexpensively, frequently below the marginal
cost of production, and (2) authorize, and even promote, other pharmaceutical companies
to copy the drug.241 Taking these steps, an inventor firm guarantees that its innovative
drug would be accessible to a greater number of people in the low-income bracket, and as
a result of this, the drug will have a greater impact on the global disease burden. Second,
the component will establish a condition in which an inventor firm has incentives to
ensure that patients are completely instructed in the proper use of its drug, including
dosage and compliance. The implication is that ensuring that its product is utilized
properly assists an inventor firm to circumvent the adverse situation in which its product
is widely utilized but fails to make a considerable impact on the global disease burden.
Third, the component will establish a condition in which an inventor firm has incentives
to work hard to enhance the health systems of the low-income countries as well as to
generate a lucrative market for pharmaceutical companies. Strong economic incentives
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would be established for pharmaceutical companies to attempt to develop drugs for
neglected diseases such as malaria, tuberculosis and pneumonia. Taken into account that
these diseases predominantly affect the global poor in the most grisly of ways, an
effective drug for any of these diseases would possess an enormous impact on the global
disease burden. An inventor firm that could manufacture an effective and safe drug for
any of these diseases would as a result be the recipient of a reward of significant
proportions.242 This characteristic of the Health Impact Fund (HIF) is likely to ease the
availability problem that exists under the current IPR driven TRIPS regime.243
A major task related to the second reform component involves establishing a set
of principles that can guide the reward process. Pogge argues that “when two or more
different medicines are alternative treatments for the same disease, then the reward
corresponding to their aggregate impact must be allocated among their respective
inventors on the basis of each medicine’s market share and effectiveness.”244 However,
Pogge recognized that things get more complicated when an essential drug is not a single
product but a drug cocktail that combines a variety of drugs that have been developed and
manufactured by different pharmaceutical companies.245
The third component of Pogge’s reform plan involves developing a fair, feasible,
and politically realistic allocation of the costs associated with the second component.246
Pogge and Hollis contend that effective implementation of the reform entails that much
of its cost be shouldered by high-income countries. A reasonable estimate for minimum
funding level for the reform plan is about US$ 6 billion which approximately amounts to
0.01 percent of global income.247 To make this increased spending for the reform plan
realistic, it is pertinent to offer convincing reasons for supporting it to taxpayers and
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politicians of the high-income countries. Pogge opines that his plan can be substantiated
by prudential considerations.248
First, the new incentivizing regime will result in considerably lower prices for
essential drugs for consumers in high-income countries. Under the current free-market
regime, consumers in these countries pay high prices for essential drugs either directly or
through contributions to commercial insurance companies.249 Second, giving the poor
citizens of low-income countries no charge on the pharmaceutical research carried out for
the advantage of citizens in the rich countries, the latter citizens are establishing goodwill
toward themselves in the developing world by showing in a concrete way their concern
for the terrible public-health problems these populations are encountering.250 Third, the
reform plan will create excellent medical-research jobs in high-income countries. Fourth,
it will allow these countries to respond more effectively to public-health crises and
problems in the future by securing them more briskly increasing medical knowledge
combined with a stronger and more diverse arsenal of medical interventions.251 Pogge
proposes a global institution known as the Health Impact Fund (HIF) for the effective
implementation of his new plan for reforming and incentivizing pharmaceutical research
and innovation.

E. The Health Impact Fund
E.1. Meaning of the Health Impact Fund
Pogge describes the HIF as “a proposed pay-for-performance mechanism that
would offer innovators the option – no obligation – to register any new medicine or,
under certain conditions, also a traditional medicine or a new use of an existing
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medicine.”252 The HIF is a proposed global agency that would be primarily financed by
governments of various countries. The innovator of a product would register the product
at the time of marketing approval, which entails accepting responsibility to make it
available, during its first 10 years on the market, wherever it is needed at the lowest
possible cost of production and distribution. The innovator would additionally commit to
authorizing, free of charge, generic manufacture and distribution of the product at the end
of the 10 year reward period, especially if the innovator’s patent has not expired on the
product. In return, the registrant would receive, during those ten years, yearly reward
payments based on the assessed health impact of its product. Each reward payment would
be a piece of a huge yearly pay-out with every registered product getting a share equal to
its share of the assessed health impact of all HIF-registered products in a given year. If
the HIF would function effectively, its annual reward pools could go up to draw an
increasing share of new drugs.253
The HIF can be viewed as maintaining a lasting competition among innovators
that spans over all countries and all diseases, with earnings linked to impact on health.254
Health impact can be calculated in quality-adjusted life years (QALYs) saved. The
QALY metric has been improved in the past 20 years and is already widely utilized by
insurers in determining the new drugs to cover. The baseline is usually taken as the
pharmaceutical arsenal before a registered drug was launched, then the HIF would
measure to what extent this drug has increased the length and quality of human lives.255
The assessment would depend on clinical and practical trials of the product, on tracking
down random samples of the product to end-users made easier by serial numbers, and on
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statistical analysis of associations between sales data and variations in the occurrence of
the target disease.256
The projected fund for the HIF annually would be $6 billion at the minimum,
which is less than 1% of current global spending on pharmaceuticals and about 5% of
current global investment in pharmaceutical research. If all countries were to participate,
each would need to contribute about 0.01% of its gross national income (GNI). However,
if countries representing about a third of the global product were to participate, each
would need to contribute at least a fairly small 0.03% of its GNI, which is significantly
reduced by enormous cost savings their governments, firms and citizens would enjoy
from low-cost HIF registered drugs.257
Providing stable incentives entails that the HIF would need assured financing for
the next 15 years in order to guarantee pharmaceutical innovators that, if they sponsor
costly clinical trials now, they can receive a full decade of health impact rewards after
market approval. Such a firm guarantee is as well for the advantage of the funders who
would not want the incentive power of their contributions to be weakened through
doubtful disregarding by potential innovators. The guarantee may be in the form of an
agreement which requires each participating country to commit to the HIF a fixed part of
its future gross national income (GNI). Supported by such an agreement, the HIF would
naturally adjust the contributions of the different partner countries to their variable
economic possessions. Furthermore, it would refrain from prolonged struggles over
contribution sizes, and would guarantee each country that any additional cost it agreed to
shoulder through an increase in the contribution schedule would be balanced by an
equivalent increase in the contributions of all other partner countries.258
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Kathleen Liddell presented several distinctive features of the HIF as argued by
Hollis and Pogge: (1) It is committed to the sale of drugs at marginal cost production,
which is the cost price. This significantly decreases the number of people priced out of
the market as a result tackling the critical issue regarding cost. (2) The size of the reward
is contingent on the extent to which a new drug decreases disease, rather that the
affluence of the patient, which is likely to make research on neglected diseases a more
appealing proposal and, more commonly, to assess rewards in accordance with objective
measure of value rather than a market-based measure. (3) The scheme is scalable. It can
be extended to diagnostics, devices, mechanical inventions and Western disease research,
after conducting a pilot with drugs useful in the treatment of neglected disease research.
(4) It offers an incentive not just for the creation and production of new drugs, but as well
private investment in health-service infrastructure. Taking into account that HIF
payments are commensurate with clinical impact, pharmaceutical companies should
guarantee that the correct drug gets to the correct patient, in the correct dosage, at the
correct time. (5) It does not involve any considerable changes to the structure of
intellectual property protection or licensing. (6) It will supposedly result in more cooperative, and then cost-efficient, relationships between patent proprietors and
manufacturers of generic versions of drugs. Patent proprietors will be less probably to
refuse reasonable licenses and manufacturers of generic versions of drugs less probably
to violate the rights of patent proprietors by manufacturing without permission. (7) Its
normative bases are both moral and prudential.259
The HIF has five major advantages over conventional innovation prizes,
comprising advance market commitments and advance purchase commitments. First, it is
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a structural reform creating a lasting source of high-impact pharmaceutical innovations.
Second, it is not disease-specific and consequently much less susceptible to lobbying by
firms and patient groups.260 Third, conventional prizes must elucidate the exact finish
line, stating clearly at least which disease the new drug must attack, how effective and
suitable it must slightly be, and how severe its side effects may be. Such precision is
difficult because it presumes the very knowledge that is currently not available and
whose attainment is yet to be supported. As sponsors lack this knowledge in advance,
their specifications are probably to be severely suboptimal. They may be too challenging,
in order that firms capitulate the effort, albeit something close to the desired drug is
within their reach, or they may be inadequately challenging, in order that firms, to save
time and expense, provide a drug that is just hardly good enough to win even when they
could have done much better at small additional cost.261 The HIF refrains from the
problem of finish line through adaptable rewarding of any new registered drugs in
proportion to its impact on the global health. Fourth, designed to avert failure and in
ignorance of the real cost of innovation, specific prizes are usually much too large and
therefore overpay for innovation. The HIF resolves this problem by allowing its health
impact rate to adjust itself through competition. For example, a high reward rate would
rectify by bringing extra registrations, engendering an increase in the number of
registered drugs, and an unappealingly low reward rate would rectify by discouraging
new registrations, engendering a decrease in the number of registered drugs. Fifth, the
HIF offers each registrant powerful incentives to encourage the optimal end-use of its
product: to seek its extensive and effective utilization by any patients who can benefit
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from it.262 The HIF provided a complete systematic solution to the major disadvantages
of the current globalized patent regime which is the task of the next theme.

E.2. The HIF’s Systematic Solution to the Disadvantages of the Current Globalized
Patent Regime.
Pogge contends that all seven disadvantages of the current globalized patent
regime can be significantly alleviated by supplementing the patent regime with a
complementary source of incentives and rewards for developing new drugs.263 The HIF is
that mechanism Pogge argues that would provide a complete systematic solution to the
seven drawbacks engendered by the current globalized patent regime. A discussion of the
systematic solution by the HIF follows.
High Prices
High prices would be nonexistent for HIF registered drugs. Innovators would
usually not even desire a higher price as this would decrease their health impact rewards
by obstructing access to their product by most of the world’s population especially the
global poor. The HIF considers health benefits to the poorest of patients as equally
important as the health benefits of the richest.264

Diseases Concentrated Among the Poor
As long as diseases concentrated among the poor considerably exacerbate the
Global Burden of Disease (GBD), they would no longer be neglected. Actually, the more
catastrophic ones among them would constitute some of the most profitable R&D
opportunities for biotechnology and pharmaceutical companies. This would occur
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without undercutting the profit opportunities such companies currently have by
developing interventions for the diseases prevalent among the affluent.265

Bias towards Maintenance Drugs
Bias towards maintenance drugs would be non-existent in the HIF-promoted
R&D. The HIF measures the health impact of each registered drug related to how its
utilization decreases mortality and morbidity globally – without consideration of whether
it realizes this reduction through cure, symptom relief or prevention. This would help
pharmaceutical companies to determine how potential research projects would maximize
global public health especially as regards the expected global health impact of the new
drug corresponding to the cost of developing it. The lucrativeness of research projects
would be in order with their cost-effectiveness related to global public health.266

Wastefulness
Wastefulness would be drastically less high for HIF-registered products. Deadweight losses from large mark-ups would not exist. There would be very limited
expensive litigation since generic competitors would be deficient of incentives to
compete and innovators would lack incentives to restrain generic products because they
improve the health impact reward of the innovator. Innovators may thus usually not even
worry to acquire, police, and protect patents in many national jurisdictions. Registering a
drug with the HIF, just involves that innovators demonstrate simply once that that they
have an effective and innovative product.267
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Counterfeiting
Counterfeiting of HIF-registered products would be unappealing. With the real
item extensively available close to or even below the marginal cost of production, there is
little to be obtained from manufacturing and selling forged products.268

Excessive Marketing
Excessive marketing would as well be greatly decreased for HIF-registered drugs.
Since each innovator is rewarded for the health impact of its addition to the medical
arsenal, incentives to produce “me-too” drugs to compete with a current HIF-registered
drug would be feeble. Under the current patent system, getting a patient to switch from a
competitor’s product to one’s fairly good product is very lucrative. However, if the latter
product is HIF-registered, then the switch is not lucrative because it produces no health
improvement. Moreover, innovators would have incentives to recommend an HIFregistered drug for doctors and patients simply as long as such marketing leads to
calculable therapeutic advantages for which the innovator would afterward be
rewarded.269

The Last-Mile Problem
The Last-mile problem would be alleviated since each HIF-registered innovator
would have powerful incentives to guarantee that patients are completely instructed and
appropriately provisioned so that they maximize the use of its drugs with focus on
dosage, compliance etc., which will in that case, through extensive and effective
utilization, have their best possible public-health impact. Instead of ignoring poor
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countries as unlucrative markets, pharmaceutical companies would, furthermore, have
incentives to collaborate with one another and with national health ministries,
international agencies and NGOs towards improving the health systems of these countries
so as to increase the impact of their HIF-registered drugs there.270 Despite Pogge’s
breathtaking HIF proposal for resolving the flaws of the current globalized patent system
and incentives for pharmaceutical innovation in order to significantly improve affordable
access to the essential drugs for the global poor especially in developing countries, critics
still raised some objections to the HIF.

E.3. Criticisms of the HIF
Several objections have been raised by some authors regarding the HIF. The first
major criticism focuses on its practical barriers to effective implementation.271 First, the
second component of the reform plan makes provision for the involvement of an
international agency with the responsibility of assessing the impact of various HIFregistered drugs on the global burden of disease and implementing pay rewards to
pharmaceutical companies. The participation of such an agency in the macroeconomic
arrangement increases transaction costs and offers abundant opportunity for corrupt
behavior with respect to the staff of the agency and those who can influence them.272 The
current system for incentivizing research and development of essential drugs also
involves transaction costs. More so, this system requires both patent offices and patent
courts, but, as Alex Rosenberg articulates, “a patent system’s greater reliance on
individuals to pursue their own interests directly, instead of through an intervening
government, is generally more effective than any alternative.”273 It is projected that about
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10% of the monetary resources being invested in the reform plan will be expended on
administration and assessment.274
In respect to the issue of corruption, it is pertinent to point out the bleak empirical
evidence that corrupt behavior is a critical issue prevalent among government officials in
numerous developing countries in which data collection needs to be carried out.275 Pogge
has maintained that data regarding the global burden of disease and the health impact of
various drugs collected in the context of the reform plan would be beneficial beyond the
precise purposes of this plan.276 The susceptibility of the assessment process to corruption
would, then, undermine the value of the collected data in contrast to data generated by
standard academic and governmental research programs.277
Second, it will be hard for the identified agency to obtain accurate and valid
information regarding the assessed impact of various drugs on the global disease burden.
The problem does not rest simply on establishing a reasonable metric that can be utilized
to ascertain a drug’s impact on the global disease burden.278 There is a general consensus
among the supporters of the HIF that the most favorable metric candidate is the QALY
system which is presently being utilized by national health systems in Australia, Canada,
the UK and US to assess the health impact of pharmaceuticals.279 Additional practical
concern is also highlighted with regard to applying the metric and conducting the actual
field work of visiting vast, poor and frequently geographically remote populations and
obtaining and an accurate summary of what the disease burden is in the region and how
various drugs are contributing to its decrease.280
On the other hand, Liddell raised a practical barrier issue of the HIF that focuses
on inadequate commitments and contributions from participating countries. She
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acknowledges that the authors are mute regarding the number of partners that must
participate to make this a feasible proposal. If some of the more affluent countries decline
to participate, the contributions at 0.03% for each country will be inadequate. She also
asserts that US$6 billion estimated as projected annual fund for the HIF appears to be a
small sum, considering that the estimate of the total global spending on pharmaceuticals
in 2008 was about US$735 billion. More so, she indicates that it is revealing that the total
operating budget for the United Nations’ initiative is estimated at US$4.19 billion, and
even at this rate numerous countries are late in their payments. From this perspective, she
inferred that the HIF proposal is an enormous sum of money, and may not likely be
fulfilled by foreign aid budgets.281
Another concern raised by Liddell relates to the issue of the relationship between
the HIF and the patent system. She acknowledges that it is not clear whether it is essential
to attach the HIF system to patent protection, because it establishes eligibility criteria of
uncertain assistance and the territorial nature of patent protection introduces a lot of
difficult policy questions for a system with global ambitions.282
On the other hand, Liddell also notes that there is an unnerving feeling that the
HIF proposal plays right into the hands of the pharmaceutical companies. She argues that
“it fuels their search for profits, offering them yet another optional method to increase
their existing profit margins at the expense of the public purse, when they are already
amongst the very wealthiest industries.”283 The explanation is that there is a general false
assumption that anything that falls short of an appealing profit stands little opportunity of
being endorsed by the politically influential pharmaceutical companies and their
governments.284
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Furthermore, Liddell identifies another issue which recognizes that there is
inadequate empirical evidence to support the crucial premises in the HIF proposal or to
demonstrate that the benefits of the HIF validate such a substantial policy enterprise. She
indicates that this offers an uncomfortable contradiction in the sense that “the HIF is a
proposal that seeks to organize the cost and direction of scientific research on the basis of
proven utility, yet the regulatory tools enlisted to achieve this lack an equivalent evidence
base.”285
Sonderholm on the other hand, raised concerns regarding the prudential appeal of
the HIF.286 He cites an example with two distinct drugs with varying cost of production
and impact on the global disease burden. The first drug decreases the symptoms of
diarrhea in infants and averts the symptoms for four weeks. It is effective in 40% of cases
and sales in the form of two pills at the cost of production of $2. The second drug also
decreases the symptoms of diarrhea in infants and averts the symptoms for four weeks. It
is effective in 90% of cases and sales in the form of a powder that requires to be
dissolved in 25 centiliter of clean water. It should also be stored at refrigerator
temperature. The cost of production is one quarter of the first drug.287.
In this situation it is expected that the manufacturer of the first drug would receive
a greater reward than the manufacturer of the second drug. This is based on the analysis
that the first drug is probably to have a greater impact on the global disease burden than
the second drug. This results from the fact that the effectiveness of the first drug does not
require something which is frequently lacking in developing countries and which the
second drug requires so as to be effective, including clean drinking water and cooled
storage capacity. Therefore, specific infrastructure features of the regions in which

337

infants with diarrhea generally live contribute in a very substantial way to the fairly small
reward that the manufacturer of the second drug would receive under Pogge’s reform
plan.288
The implication is that pharmaceutical companies that are motivated by the profit
would recognize that the economic prospects of developing high-tech essential drugs
intended for the medical needs of the populations in developing countries are
inadequate.289 A high-tech drug means a drug that needs clean drinking water, electricity
and/or educated health professionals to be effective. On the other hand, a low-tech drug
does not need any of these things to be effective.290 From this perspective,
pharmaceutical companies would inevitably reorganize some of their R&D efforts
towards low-tech drugs. There would also inevitably be a rise of new pharmaceutical
companies that would exclusively focus on the development of low-tech essential drugs
that tackle the medical needs of the populations in developing countries.291
Sonderholm indicates that Pogge would embrace these developments, but,
however, he challenges the prudential reasons for citizens of high-income countries to
support a reform plan that engender these developments.292 It is pertinent to note that the
rise of this new opportunity of drug development will probably generate new jobs, but the
funding of these jobs would come from the fund that pays for the second component of
the reform plan. This implies that the huge resources that are required to fund these new
jobs in developed countries would come from these developed countries.293
The final issue was raised by Michael Selgelid which emphasized a problem of
causal attribution for the reimbursement process critical to the HIF.294 This is the problem
that focuses on assessing the extent to which any decrease in the global disease burden, or
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the burden of any particular disease, is the outcome of one intervention in contrast with
another.295 The causal attribution problem is considered a serious danger to the feasibility
of health impact measurement by either QALYs or Disability-Adjusted-Life Years
(DALYs). Successively, it is also a danger to the feasibility of the HIF per se. This is as
result of the fact that the critical reimbursement process of the HIF is precisely premised
on the notion that pharmaceutical companies are rewarded proportionate to the effect of
their products on the size of the global disease burden. The import of the problem is
additionally highlighted by the fact that numerous successful medical interventions are
ones that include a number of different active ingredients.296

F. Conclusion
Concluding remarks on this chapter focuses on a recapitulation of Pogge’s
contention for a stronger interpretation of global responsibilities for providing affordable
access to anti-retroviral drugs for participants and host populations in developing
countries. This dominant approach invoked by Pogge in arguing for post-trial access to
anti-retroviral drugs is called cosmopolitanism. He forcefully argues that our critical duty
of justice to take effective action on the issue of affordable access to essential drugs,
including anti-retroviral drugs is grounded on human rights which extend universally to
all individuals.
In contrast to Rawls, Pogge challenges the thesis of explanatory nationalism
which appeals to domestic factors as engendering persistent severe poverty and global
inequality. He insists that global factors perpetuate severe poverty and global inequality
and calls for moral responsibility on the part of affluent countries to redress this situation.
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He contends that unjust global institutional order imposed on the global poor perpetuates
harm and consequently violates their negative rights. He argues then, that citizens of
affluent countries have not merely positive duties to assist, but also more stringent
negative duties not to harm the global poor.
Pogge argues for a correlation between poverty and the global disease burden and
acknowledges the prevalence of avoidable mortality and morbidity mostly in poor
countries. He contends that increasing massive mortality and morbidity rates prevalent in
developing countries can be addressed through guaranteeing improved access to essential
drugs. To accomplish this objective of significantly reducing the global disease burden
especially among the global poor in developing countries, Pogge proposes a concrete,
feasible and politically realistic plan for reforming current globalized patent rules for
incentivizing pharmaceutical research.
In discussing Pogge’s cosmopolitan approach to the issue of access to antiretroviral drugs in developing countries, meaning of cosmopolitanism and four different
approaches to cosmopolitanism were explicated as prelude. Cosmopolitanism was argued
as justice without borders, in which principles of justice go beyond nationality and
citizenship, and apply equally to all individuals globally. The four approaches to
cosmopolitan justice discussed comprises contractarian, consequentialist, rights-based
and duty-based. Contractarian approach to cosmopolitanism defends global principles of
distributive justice based on international scheme of social cooperation and the rights and
interests of all persons as human beings. Consequentialist approach to global justice
focuses on the consequences and results of actions and structures. The proponents
emphasize that richer nations in the developed world have obligations to aid the poorer
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nations in the developing world. Giving to the distant poor was argued by Singer as a
matter of duty or obligation. Rights-based approach to global justice vigorously defends
affordable access to anti-retroviral drugs as a basic human right. An account of people’s
rights or entitlements must be complemented with an account of people who have
obligations to provide them. Duty-based approach to global justice argues that a right is
effective only when a corresponding obligation is clearly specified and allocated. O’Neill
advocated for establishing a global institutional structure which bears the obligations of
realizing economic rights.
The current rules for incentivizing pharmaceutical research were discussed. In this
context, the current globalized patent system was argued as an institutional failure,
because the TRIPS agreement and the TRIPS-plus provisions significantly impede
affordable access to essential drugs, including anti-retroviral drugs for the global poor in
developing countries. The TRIPS agreement and TRIPS-plus provisions created access
problem and essentially excluded the global poor from life-saving or essential drugs.
Generic manufacture of essential drugs was drastically suppressed in the wake of TRIPS
agreement and TRIPS-plus provisions. The lack of generic competition results in the
astronomical increase of the prices of essential drugs which effectively excludes the
global poor. The TRIPS agreement and TRIPS-plus provisions also created availability
problem because there was very limited R&D of drugs for diseases prevalent among lowincome countries. Seven major problems of the current globalized patent regime were
identified and discussed, comprising high prices, neglect of diseases concentrated among
the poor, bias towards maintenance drugs, wastefulness, counterfeiting, excessive
marketing and last-mile problem.
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Pogge’s proposed new rules for reforming and incentivizing pharmaceutical
research were discussed in response to the problems engendered by the current patent
system. He proposed two basic reform strategies for dealing with the monopoly pricing
issues and for improving access to essential drugs, including the differential pricing
strategy and the public good strategy. The differential pricing strategy comes in three
forms. First, focuses on the era before the TRIPS agreement when patent protection was
enforced only in rich countries excluding most poor countries. Second, involves inventor
firms offering different prices of their patented drugs to affluent buyers and poor buyers.
Third, entails invoking the right to issue compulsory licensing by governments in order to
address public health emergency. Differential pricing and compulsory licensing were
argued as falling short in resolving the drawbacks from the current patent system and in
providing an attractive and effective means for improving affordable access to essential
drugs.
The public good strategy was defended as more promising in generating a reform
plan that would prevent the chief failings of the current monopoly patent regime, while at
the same time, preserving most of its important benefits. The three crucial components of
the public good strategy were discussed, including open access, alternative incentives,
and funding. The first component focuses on providing successful new products such as
essential drugs as a public good by pharmaceutical companies. The second component
entails offering some alternative reward to inventors. The second component makes
provision for the inventor firms to take out about 10 years of patent protection as in the
current patent system. The firms also will be rewarded from the public funds in
proportion to the impact of their invention on the global disease burden. The third
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component focuses on developing a fair, feasible and politically realistic allocation of the
costs involved.
The HIF was discussed as a global institution for the effective implementation of
Pogge’s new plan for reforming and incentivizing research and innovation. The HIF’s
significant structural reform of the current globalized patent system was discussed. Five
key advantages of the HIF were discussed. Furthermore, the HIF’s systematic solution to
seven disadvantages of the current globalized patent scheme was discussed. Some key
objections by some authors were also discussed. The objections focus on practical
barriers, corruption, prudential appeal, causual attribution for reimbursement process,
relationship between the HIF and the patent system and inadequate empirical evidence to
support the critical premises in the HIF proposal. Just as the weakness of the statist
approach of Rawls is its exaggerated emphasis upon each individual nation, similarly the
weakness of the cosmopolitan approach of Pogge is an exaggerated emphasis upon
international relations. The strengths of each approach, avoiding the main weaknesses in
each, can be combined to establish a paradigm of global health justice to provide
affordable access to drugs in developing nations, as discussed in the next chapter.
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CHAPTER SIX
A PARADIGM FOR GLOBAL HEALTH JUSTICE: A SLIDING SCALE OF
NATIONAL AND GLOBAL RESPONSIBILITIES

A. Introduction
The World Health Organization (WHO) views health in the 21st century as “a shared
responsibility, involving equitable access to essential care and collective defense against
transnational threats.”1 Lawrence O. Gostin et al. articulate that these two critical aspects
of global health identified by the WHO “require global leadership, sustainable resources,
collaboration, and mutual support among states, businesses, philanthropy, and civil
society.”2 The Global Strategy for Women’s and Children’s Health emphasizes that,
“Global partnership and the sufficient and effective provision of aid and financing are
essential.”3 In essence, improved global health governance is a desideratum for global
health.4
A logical and consistent system of global health governance can be rooted on the
common interests of states and their partners. All states possess self-interests in
promoting global health governance as a collective protection from transnational health,
controlling infectious diseases where they arise and preventing global spread of health
hazards.5 More so, states possess self-interests in guaranteeing equitable access to
essential services which involve “health systems, including cost-effective drugs and
vaccines, and other human health needs (e.g., safe water, nutrition, sanitation, vector
control, and tobacco reduction) to all people.”6 There is a contention that guaranteeing
essential health services and goods establishes safer, more secure, and more prosperous
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conditions for all countries and that a foreign policy grounded on enhancing the global
health is an effective type of diplomacy.7
Every person has a basic human right to the highest attainable standard of health8
and, thus, has a legitimate belief that the state would guarantee essential health goods and
services for all its citizens, in spite of its constraint on resources, and broaden beyond this
core requirement as resources allow.9 Recognizing the right to health is a necessary
criterion for any community to function. If individuals cannot secure access to health
goods and services essential to function and achieve wellbeing, they cannot be
instrumental to social and economic wellbeing – “generating wealth, educating children,
creating art, providing for the common security – and they will feel abandoned by their
community, national and international.”10 The right to health is crucial to guaranteeing
human security and defending people from “critical and pervasive threats to human lives,
livelihoods and dignity, and to enhancing human fulfillment.”11
The responsibility for guaranteeing the right to health for all rests not exclusively
with states and their obligations to their own people, but as well with the global
community.12 About half of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) tackle basic
human needs, indicating an understanding that all states possess an interest in
guaranteeing that crucial needs are fulfilled for all human beings everywhere.13 The
Millennium Declaration affirms, “We recognize that, in addition to our separate
responsibilities to our individual societies, we have a collective responsibility to uphold
the principles of human dignity, equality and equity at the global level. As leaders we
have a duty therefore to all the world’s people, especially the most vulnerable, and in
particular, the children of the world, to whom the future belongs.”14
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Nevertheless, more than a decade following the endorsement of the MDGs,
notwithstanding some progress, such as the decrease in child mortality15 and broadening
of AIDS treatment16 the global community has not attained essential improvements in
global health or considerably reduced health inequalities.17 The devastating impact of
HIV/AIDS is still significantly evident in developing countries especially in Sub-Saharan
Africa, where millions are not yet able to afford anti-retroviral drugs for treating
HIV/AIDS. The global community has fallen short of effectively achieving basic human
needs. There are profound structural reasons for the lack of substantial progress, such as
“the absence of leadership, fragmentation and lack of coordination of multiple actors,
persisting inadequate levels of domestic and international health spending, and foreign
aid and programs that do not match national priorities.”18
However, the international community has recorded some progress in tackling
these challenges. The Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness19 and the Accra Agenda for
Action,20 for instance, appeal for clearer targets and indicators of success for
harmonization among partners, calibration of country strategies, and mutual
responsibility for development results.21 The International Health Partnership and related
initiatives22 attempts to implement these principles.23 The Global Fund to Fight AIDS,
Tuberculosis and Malaria is motivated by country insistent request and obtains funding
proposals from inclusive Country Coordinating Mechanisms, whose members comprise
government officials, civil society, development partners, and the private sector.24
Meantime, both domestic and global health investments have increased. Spanning from
2000 to 2007, sub-Saharan African governments expanded their health sector spending
from 8.7% to 9.6% of their budgets, resulting in more than a doubling of their per capita
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health spending, rising from an average of $15 to $34 per capita in nominal dollars and
encompassing external assistance.25 Official development assistance for health grew from
$7.6 billion in 2001 to $26.4 billion in 2008 in nominal dollars and encompassing water
and sanitation.26
It is pertinent to indicate that core changes in global health were not realized even
with these innovative approaches and the increased spending.27 Preventable and treatable
injuries and diseases continue to devastate sub-Saharan Africa, the Indian subcontinent,
and other poor areas of the world. In sub-Saharan Africa, healthy life expectancy is 45
years, a full quarter-century beneath in high-income countries.28 Furthermore, the
diseases and health issues that are the emphasis of the MDGs including child and
maternal mortality, and serious diseases such as AIDS, tuberculosis, and malaria continue
as critical health threats, as neglected tropical diseases do. More so, new infectious
diseases continue to arise, despite the fact that the huge burden of non- communicable
diseases, comprising mental illness, and of injuries, increasingly persist.29
Rawls’s and Pogge’s approaches for global health justice as discussed in chapters
four and five respectively are insufficient. Rawls’s statist version of relational justice
emphasizes the national responsibility of each country to fulfill the right to health of all
its citizens and effectively excludes the global responsibility of individual nations.
Pogge’s cosmopolitan approach focuses too much on global responsibility without a
sufficient attention to the national responsibility of individual societies.30
The paradigm proposed in this chapter combines these two approaches by
adopting their strengths and avoiding their weaknesses. The paradigm refers to a sliding
scale of national and global responsibilities about the right to health in general and
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affordable access to drugs in particular. This combined approach considers “global
responsibility as supplementing, not replacing national responsibility for health.”31 The
implication is that the primary responsibility for realizing the right to health is a national
responsibility. However, when poor countries exhaust their domestic resources and are
still not able to fulfill the right to health of their citizens, rich countries can step in to
exercise their global responsibility as a secondary responsibility for the realization of the
right to health.32
The first part of the chapter deals with the theoretical framework for a paradigm
for global health justice: a sliding scale of national and global responsibilities. This
involves discussing Daniels’ critique of Rawls’s statist version of relational justice and
Pogge’s cosmopolitan approach, highlighting areas of agreements and disagreements
with the proposed paradigm for global health justice. Justification of the focus on
government programs to deal with the affordable access to essential drugs including antiretroviral drugs for participants and host populations rather than requiring pharmaceutical
companies to fund the cost of these programs will be discussed. The obligation of
researchers and their sponsors to participants and host populations and whether such
obligation can be transferred for example, by building hospitals for host populations will
be explored.
The second part deals with four critical issues of global health as well as the
global responsibility for increasing health inequalities. The third part focuses on the
global capacity to redress health inequalities which consists of the health development
paradigm, the medical relief paradigm and the new global health paradigm. The new
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global health paradigm evolved from the global AIDS response and is at the intersection
of health development paradigm and medical relief paradigm.
The fourth part focuses on international human rights law as a foundation for
global health justice which involves discussion of meaning and scope of the right to
health, progressive realization of the right to health, core obligations and the obligation to
provide assistance and the sliding scale of national and global responsibilities for the
realization of the minimum level of the right to health which involves illustration of how
a sliding scale would work. The fifth part of the chapter addresses Global Health Fund
and affordable access to essential drugs which includes discussion regarding impeding
factors to the Global Health Fund and functions of Global Health Fund which result in
the effective realization of the core content of the right to health including affordable
access to essential drugs for all. A more detailed explanation of a paradigm for global
health justice will begin with the theoretical framework for a paradigm for global health
justice: a sliding scale of national and global responsibilities.

B. The Theoretical Framework for a Paradigm for Global Health Justice: A Sliding Scale
of National and Global Responsibilities.

B.1. Daniels’ Critique of Approaches of Rawls and Pogge to Global Health Justice
In his landmark work, Just Health: Meeting Health Needs Fairly published in
2008, Daniels develops a complicated theory of justice with a concluding challenge
regarding International health inequalities and Global Justice.33 He made a compelling
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case for national health justice which involves a case for obligations of mutual assistance
to decrease health inequalities at the national level. However, Daniels doubts whether he
can extend his theory to the global level to as well make a convincing case for obligations
of mutual assistance beyond state borders. He concedes that arguments of relational
justice which serve as the foundation of his theory of health justice cannot simply be
extended to the global level. Nevertheless, in his call for action, he articulates, “Despite
the lack of closure on these matters, the account developed here provides an integrated
theory that helps us see the path to pursue in promoting population health and distributing
it fairly, globally as well as domestically.”34
This chapter in response to Daniels’ challenge for action pursues the path to
global health justice by developing a paradigm for global health justice which emphasizes
a sliding scale of national and global Responsibilities. The paradigm combines
approaches of Rawls and Pogge to global health justice by adopting their strengths and
avoiding their weaknesses. Rawls’ strength is his acknowledgement of the national
responsibility of each country to fulfill the right to health of all its citizens. Pogge’s
strength is his recognition of the global responsibility of individual nations. The paradigm
also builds on Daniels’s several arguments but goes further to develop a thesis that
emphasizes the global responsibility for health.35 The implication is that global
responsibility is viewed as augmenting, not substituting, the national responsibility. Other
areas of agreements and disagreements with Daniels in developing the paradigm will be
highlighted in this chapter.
Daniels thoroughly investigates two approaches of attempting to resolve the
impasse between the statist and cosmopolitan perspectives. One approach which is
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cosmopolitan involves a minimalist strategy that emphasizes an international obligation
of justice to avoid harming people by engendering deficits in fulfilling their human
rights.36 The minimalist nature of this perspective stems from the fact that people may
concur on negative duties not to harm even if they are not in agreement regarding
positive duties to aid. Daniels contends that this approach deals with some international
health issues better than others, but its limitations were clearly exposed in relation to
sources of international health inequalities, some of which are not tackled by negative
duties.37 Daniels as well explores a more encouraging relational justice approach that
requires that we determine a more intermediary conception of justice suitable for
developing international institutions and rule-making bodies, leaving it open simply how
fundamental issues of equality would be in such a context.38 Such an approach if
appropriately developed could tackle broader sources of international health
inequalities.39 Therefore, the broader sources of inequality can only be tackled by more
robust accounts of global justice.40
Daniels argues that Pogge’s minimalist strategy articulated in his harms to health
argument has severe limitations. There is no clarity for identifying the baseline for
measuring harm. Determining when there is a deficit in a human right to health is also not
clear. There is no clear way of specifying what to utilize as a baseline in measuring a
deficit in the right to health. Pogge’s minimalist strategy was applied to the brain drain
of health personnel from low-income countries to the Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries.41 Shortcomings were also identified in
applying the minimalist strategy to some international health issues. For example, the
issue of international property rights and the incentives they generate goes beyond the
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problem of access to existing drugs, such as the anti-retroviral cocktails that have been
the emphasis in recent years. Patent holders on anti-retroviral drugs championed a fight to
limit access to generic copies of their drugs. The consequence was direct harm to people
who could have benefited from anti-retroviral drugs and died in alternative. However,
these generics that apparently save other lives would not have surfaced without the
incentives engendered by the current patent system. Furthermore, large multinational
pharmaceutical companies have been faulted for a research and development bias against
drugs needed in developing countries. They have responded to current incentives by
focusing on “blockbuster” drugs for more affluent markets, encompassing many “me too”
drugs that slightly enhance the effectiveness of older drugs or decrease their side effects
marginally.42
Daniels contends that despite the issue of vagueness, Pogge’s proposal cannot be
defended by appealing exclusively to the “no-harm” principle. He articulates that, “the
proposed incentive fund would better help to realize human rights to health as Pogge
argues, but “not optimally helping” is not the same as “harming,” and so the justification
has shifted.”43 There may be cogent reasons for an account of global justice to take into
consideration the interests of people impacted by existing property right protections more
meticulously than those agreements currently do, but that leads us into more disputed
area than the minimalist strategy.44
International harming is complicated in several ways. The harms are usually not
deliberate and occasionally benefits were debatably intended. Harms are frequently
mixed with benefits. At any rate, great caution must be employed to explicate the
baseline in measuring harm. Daniels argues that, “such a complex story about
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motivations, intentions, and effects might seem to weaken the straightforward appeal of
the minimalist strategy, but the complexity does not undermine the view that we have
obligations of justice to avoid harming health.”45
Gorik Ooms and Rachel Hammonds indicate that Daniels presents the differences
between global and national responsibilities in health justice as characterized by “an
innate tension, with the path to a successful integration being one that requires careful,
constant negotiation between dangerous but opposing alternatives.”46 The proposed
paradigm discussed in this chapter on the other hand, envisages the space between these
alternatives which implies the space to devise and establish global health justice. Ooms
and Hammonds figuratively compare this scenario to the narrow strait between Scylla
and Charybdis, the two great sea monsters in Greek mythology that Odysseus had to hold
equally distant to guarantee the security of his journey through the strait, even when the
equally distant, the adjacency of each endangered his ships and its sailors.47 The
implication in the context of the two extreme poles of the debate on global health justice
refers to the pull of the cosmopolitan intuition of Pogge and strongly statist versions of
relational justice of Rawls which carry severe risks. Daniels in response to this situation
advocates for an intermediary ground that resists the pull of two opposing alternatives.
He contends that investigation should concentrate on a middle ground between strongly
statist claims which indicate that egalitarian requirements of social justice are exclusively
the realm of the nation-state and its well-defined basic structure as articulated by Rawls
and Thomas Nagel and strongly cosmopolitan claims that principles of justice apply
globally to individuals, despite the relations in which they stand or the institutional
structures that provide framework for them to interact.48 He calls for some explanations
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of what it would imply for these intermediary institutions to make decisions or enforce
practices that tackle gross global health inequalities as issues of justice.49
The paradigm of global justice proposed in this chapter also acknowledges the
risks of both of these claims highlighted by Daniels. The paradigm also supports Daniels’
call to resist the pull of Pogge’s cosmopolitan intuition which focuses too much on global
responsibility, without a sufficient attention to the preeminence of national responsibility
that could easily and significantly undermine the latter.50 Daniels acknowledges the lack
of institutions from the cosmopolitan perspective that can provide just outcomes in a
consistent and sustained fashion for individuals. He thinks that the cosmopolitan theory
inherently does not offer any meaningful clue to how a commitment to justice can be
maintained by global institutions. It also does not make provision for any difference in
justice concerns that may be suitable to institutions of different types.51 He considers
justice as a “stable product of institutions structured in certain ways.”52 There is a
consensus that the global institution essential to regulate the relationship between
national and global responsibility is deficient, and that this lack should offer adequate
motivation to establish such an institution.53
Similarly, it is critical to resist what Daniels regards as “strongly statist versions
of relational justice.”54 There is a contention that beyond the state that a moral order
exists, but it is restricted to more basic humanitarian obligations to help those grappling
with serious risks and possessing pressing needs. More so, it must as well not infringe on
some basic human rights, and the agreements must be complied with.55 There are no
obligations of justice to “distribute health fairly, or to protect equality of opportunity, or
to assist other societies to become as well off as they can be in satisfying rights to health
368

or education or political participation.”56 Actually, if States were seen exclusively as
institutions that could regulate health justice, the lack of a “global state” would absolve
states from all responsibility for the consequences of their behaviors outside their
borders.57
Daniels rejects the idea of anchoring the global health justice on international
human rights law. He writes, “Recasting the problem as one of human rights, specifically
a human right to health and health care, does not help us answer these questions about
international justice for two reasons.”58 First, the international legal obligation to obtain a
human right to health for a population rests primarily with each state for its own
population. In spite of the fact that international human rights agreements and
proclamations postulate international obligations to assist other states in fulfilling human
rights,59 the international obligations cannot constitute the principal elements of the
human right to health and health care.60 Second, health inequalities may persist, even
when a right to health is obtained to the extent possible in different states.61 In contrast,
the new paradigm proposed in this chapter grounds the global health justice on
international human rights law. In this context, the international human rights law
provides a theoretical framework for national and global responsibility for health.
Establishing a global institution to govern the relationship between national and global
responsibility for health forms a critical part of the paradigm. Ooms and Hammonds
consider the Global Fund to fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria (the Global Fund) that
already is in existence as a prototype.62 The structure of the Global Fund is currently
explained more by its practical action than by any theoretical foundation of global health
justice established in advance. Envisaging the Global Fund as a paradigm effective for
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realizing the global health justice based on a middle ground can as well offer a theoretical
basis to fortify the work of the Global Fund itself.63 A critical component of the paradigm
for global health proposed in this chapter is the focus on government programs to resolve
the problem of affordable access to anti-retroviral drugs in developing countries which is
discussed next.
B.2. The Justification of the Focus on Government Programs to Resolve the Problem of
Affordable Access to Anti-retroviral Drugs in Developing Countries.
The paradigm proposed in this chapter advocates for affluent developed countries
to fund government programs for resolving the problem of affordable access to antiretroviral drugs in developing countries. There is a contention that this view is in contrast
to the perspective argued by article 34 of the recent version of the Declaration of
Helsinki, which stipulates, “In advance of a clinical trial, sponsors, researchers and host
country governments should make provisions for post-trial access for all participants who
still need an intervention identiﬁed as beneﬁcial in the trial. This information must also
be disclosed to participants during the informed consent process.”64 A discussion
regarding the justification of the emphasis on government programs to address the
problem of affordable access to anti-retroviral drugs for participants and host populations
in developing countries is therefore imperative here.
The affordable access to essential drugs including anti-retroviral drugs for
participants and host populations of clinical trials in developing countries falls within the
scope of right to health. Realizing the right to health belongs to the state. The state still
has the primary responsibility to fulfill the progressive realization of the right to health of
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its citizens including affordable access to essential drugs even after the initiation and
execution of clinical trials by multinational pharmaceutical companies. The State would
not abdicate its responsibility to multinational pharmaceutical companies but can
collaborate with pharmaceutical companies at the end of clinical trials to enhance
affordable access to essential drugs including anti-retroviral drugs for participants and
host populations in developing countries. Daniels writes, “Primary responsibility for
realizing rights to health and health care in a population should rest with each state.”65
Despite the fact that the primary responsibility for population health is shouldered by
each state, this does not imply that the state has sole responsibility.66 Other actors such as
multinational pharmaceutical companies, international agencies or institutions and
governments of various countries especially affluent countries could also contribute
significantly in improving the population health, but they simply supplement the efforts
of the state in fulfilling the rights to health of its citizens. Ashcroft argues that realizing
the requirement of post-trial provisions of successful products to participants and host
populations would inevitably involve a more pronounced “collaboration between
researchers, funders, hosts, and health systems, if this part of the Declaration is to be
more than simply aspirational.”67 Pharmaceutical companies can assist in providing
access to anti-retroviral drugs to participants and host populations in developing
countries, but this does not mean that the state is relieved of its primary responsibility to
provide access to essential drugs including anti-retroviral drugs for its citizens. Improving
the population health of each state falls to state’s ability to establish and implement good
health policy.68 Ruger also articulates that, “Individual nation-states have primary and
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prior obligations to deal with health inequalities.”69 The implication is that states have
obligations to maintain health equity at the state level.70
On the other hand, Grady discusses broadened possible strategies for guaranteeing
continued post-trial access of successful products to participants and host populations.
The first strategy emphasizes that various stakeholders in a clinical research including
investigators, sponsors, communities, national health systems, and international
organizations should shoulder responsibility for guaranteeing continued post-trial access
of beneficial treatment to participants and host populations. Possible strategies of dealing
with continued post-trial access should be discussed and negotiated before starting a
clinical research. Researchers and sponsors are instructed not to ignore this critical issue.
Similarly, it is pertinent to note that researchers and sponsors cannot be burdened with
the exclusive responsibility of treating people who should be obtaining treatment through
the regular health care infrastructure.71 Grady articulates that, “expecting researchers and
sponsors to fill that gap is not only an unrealistic expectation but would also act as a
powerful negative disincentive.”72 The clinical research for possible prevention of HIV in
Cambodia was cited as an example in which the research was stopped because the
Women’s Network for Unity, a Cambodian sex workers union insisted that participants
would receive health care for thirty years at the end of the clinical trial. 73
Stakeholders involved in research and health care delivery should continue to
collaborate in order to devise creative strategies to provide continued treatment for
participants and host populations at the end of the clinical research. A typical example of
a creative strategy with multiple stakeholders is “the HIV Netherlands, Australia,
Thailand Research Collaboration (HIV-NAT) co-payment and sliding scale drug fund
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program.”74 HIV-NAT is a non-government, non-profit organization that involves three
collaborators including the Thai Red Cross AIDS Research Center in Thailand, the
National Center in HIV Epidemiology and Clinical Research in Sydney, and the
International Antiviral Therapy Evaluation Center in Amsterdam.75 The HIV-NAT drug
fund program at first assess all patients who applied and thereafter reassess them yearly
by experienced social workers to ascertain their ability to pay, and the case is at that
moment reviewed by the drug fund committee who determines an amount to be
subsidized. The committee is entrusted with the responsibility of exploring possible ways
to decrease costs without endangering the patient as well as supervising the bulk purchase
of drugs to get low prices. The support provided to patients might be in the form of cash
or drugs or a combination of the two.76
The second strategy stresses that the problem of post-trial access to beneficial
treatment for participants should be examined in the context of other considerations for
ethical research. Providing treatment to a few individuals during or at the end of a
research does not completely remove or tackle concerns regarding exploitation.
Negotiating fair benefits in the context of research in order to minimize exploitation of
participants and host populations is a critical part of collaborative research.77
The third strategy emphasizes that the world health community must continue to
be dedicated to discovering strategies to encourage improved access to required health
care and treatment globally. This involves the energy and creativity of policymakers,
scientists, clinical providers, politicians, and communities.78
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The fourth strategy stresses that sponsors and researchers should shoulder
responsibility for certain short-term solutions when suitable. For instance, it would be
essential to offer medications to participants while waiting for the approval of the tested
drug, or to establish or promote patient assistance programs for costly treatments.
Continued focus on reducing the costs of treatments for people who need them is as well
demanded.79
Justifications that would put the burden or responsibility on government programs
such as beneficence and justice entails that the governments would have similar
responsibilities to people not enrolled in the clinical research. They would not usually
justify merely moving resources from non-participants to participants. Conversely,
justifications that would entail an obligation owed exclusively to research participants
such as compensation for harm or the research-participant relationship have a tendency to
be those that oblige simply the researchers and their sponsors.80
Justifications given for providing post-trial anti-retroviral drugs need to coincide
with mechanisms proposed for providing it. Joseph Millium offered several justifications
for providing post-trial antiretroviral drugs to participants and host populations of clinical
research. Six different justifications offered for providing post-trial antiretroviral drugs
for participants and host populations include harm to participants, fiduciary relationship,
reciprocity, duty of rescue, imperfect duty of beneficence and global justice.81
Justifications focused on obligation owed only to participants such as harm to
participants, fiduciary relationship and reciprocity place obligation on researchers and
their sponsors. On the other hand, justifications focused on obligation owed to people in
urgent need, people in need and people in unjust situations such as duty of rescue,
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imperfect duty of beneficence and global justice respectively place obligation on all those
who can help82 including researchers, sponsors, host country governments, international
governmental or non-governmental aid agencies and governments of affluent developed
countries.
Duties of beneficence are general duties that might be shouldered by everyone.
Moral agents have general duties simply as a consequence of their agency, and general
duties are owed to moral patients simply as a consequence of their moral status.83 Millum
argues that, “… unlike, say, duties arising from the researcher-participant relationship, a
duty of beneficence to supply (antiretroviral) ART could fall to governments or
international bodies who are entirely independent of the research enterprise.”84 The
implication is that all the mechanisms that have been proposed for providing ART to
research participants would be valid strategies to fulfill a duty of beneficence.85
Similar to duties of beneficence, the duty to promote global justice is probably to
be general which implies that everyone is responsible and not simply those people who
are actively involved in the research and in the interaction with the global poor.
Therefore, “there is no reason to think that researchers working in the developing world
have any greater duty to promote justice than people who are not, where those people
could also make a difference.”86 The implication is that similar to beneficence, that all the
proposed mechanisms for providing ART could be valid strategies to accomplish a duty
to promote justice. Duties of beneficence and duties to correct injustice are based on the
unfortunate condition of the beneficiaries; they are not contingent on the beneficiaries
engaging in clinical trials.87
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The Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights allude to resources
within the state as well as “those available through international cooperation and
assistance”88 in fulfilling the core obligations of the right to health. From this perspective,
it is evident that developed countries have obligations of international assistance and
cooperation for access to essential drugs89 including anti-retroviral drugs to participants
and host populations in developing countries. Another component of the proposed
paradigm is the special obligations of researchers and their sponsors to participants and
host populations and whether such obligations can be transferred to other benefits other
than just providing anti-retroviral drugs is discussed next.
B.3. Obligations of Researchers and Sponsors to Participants and Host Populations in
Developing Countries.
There is a general consensus that researchers and sponsors have obligations to
participants and host populations at the end of a clinical trial. However, there is a
contentious debate regarding what exactly is owed to participants and host populations,
whether it is the successful product or intervention or whether it is other benefits
negotiated by the stakeholders. Furthermore, there is a controversy regarding whether
providing a successful intervention adequately and fairly compensates the participants
and host populations of the clinical research.
International ethical guidelines and comprehensive reports on international
research address the post-trial obligations of sponsors and researchers to participants and
host populations. All of the guidelines and reports indicate the common notion that
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research must be responsive to the health needs and priorities of the population where the
research is executed and should likely benefit that population.90
Previous versions of the Declaration of Helsinki (DoH) did not mention a
requirement regarding making successful products available to participants or to host
populations at the conclusion of a trial. However, the 2000 revision of DoH tackles the
issue in paragraphs 19 and 30. Paragraph 19 indicates that, “Medical research is only
justified if there is a reasonable likelihood that the populations in which the research is
carried out stand to benefit from the results of the research.”91 The rendering of this
paragraph presents some limitations such as difficulty to ascertain the criteria for the
likelihood of benefit and the degree of likelihood necessary. DoH as well tackles in a
strong requirement the issue of benefits that accrue to the participants in paragraph 30:
“At the conclusion of the study, every patient entered into the study should be assured of
access to the best proven prophylactic, diagnostic and therapeutic methods identified by
the study.”92 The strong requirement articulated by DoH coincides with Guidance Point
2 of the UNAIDS Guidance Document for preventive vaccine research, about what
should be made reasonably available to research participants: “Any HIV preventive
vaccine demonstrated to be safe and effective… should be made available as soon as
possible to all participants in the trials in which it was tested as well as to other
populations at high risk of HIV infection …plans should be developed at the initial stages
of HIV vaccine development to ensure such availability”93 Unlike DoH, UNAIDS
Guidance document stresses the importance of extending the benefits to others in the
community or country at the end of successful trials. It also emphasizes the discussion
regarding making a successful vaccine available before the commencement of the trials.94
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The Council for International Organizations of Medical Sciences (CIOMS) in its
2002 version emphasizes two important aspects of international research including the
research being responsive to the health needs and priorities of the community in which it
is conducted and making any successful product reasonably available to the population or
community that hosted the trial.95
The US National Bioethics Advisory Commission (NBAC) report and the
Nuffield Council report tackle two significant points concerning availability of successful
products at the conclusion of a trial: “availability to the research participants themselves
(the only point addressed in the Declaration of Helsinki), and availability of successful
products to others in the country or community.”96 The NBAC recommends that research
proposals must incorporate an explanation how effective new interventions would be
made available to some or all the populations of the countries that are hosting the
research, simultaneously with research participants themselves at the conclusion of the
research.97 The Nuffield Council report stresses that researchers must commit before
beginning a trial, to guarantee post-trial access to effective interventions to participants
and host populations at the end of the trial. The research proposals are also required to
incorporate an explanation of how new proven interventions would be made available to
both research participants and the host populations. The report also acknowledges that
post-trial access to effective interventions would be contingent on several factors, such as
the result of the research, the cost of providing the intervention and overseeing its
provision, threat engendered by the disease and the obligation of making a successful
intervention available is primarily shouldered by national government.98 The Universal
Declaration on Bioethics and Human Rights signed by 191 countries articulated in Article
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15 that “benefits resulting from any scientific research and its application should be
shared with society as a whole and within the international community, in particular with
developing countries.”99 However, the benefits can take several forms, in agreement with
the principles of the Declaration, but not essentially continuity of treatment.100
A vast number of available literature endorsed post-trial obligations of researchers
and sponsors to participants and host populations at the conclusion of a clinical trial. A
survey conducted in developing countries, with researchers in the HIV/AIDS area,
endorsed that the participant population of the studies should benefit from the study, and
about more than half of the researchers from U.S. and developing countries surveyed
endorsed that interventions proven effective should be provided to the host population at
the conclusion of the study for two to five years.101
A qualitative study, conducted through focal groups in Kenya, with 89 research
participants comprising potential patients for HIV/AIDS studies, researchers and
administrators concluded that it would be unreasonable to stop providing therapy after
HIV/AIDS studies to patients, except in cases where it is completely justified.102 Zhiyong
Zong also discussed the issue of post-trial provision of beneficial experimental
interventions especially in developing countries citing international guidelines and
recommendations that addressed the subject. Zong endorses planning in advance and
establishing a collaborative partnership among pertinent parties such as sponsors,
researchers, local healthcare system, the Research Ethics Committee and participants as a
viable strategy for addressing the issues concerning post-trial provision.103
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A study published in 2009 by Seema Shah, Stacey Elmer and Christine Grady
discusses planning for posttrial access to antiretroviral treatment for research participants
in developing countries with focus on the implementation process. The study investigated
whether the National Institutes of Health (NIH) guidelines have been implemented in
ART trials funded by NIH in developing countries. The 18 studies identified in the
database of the Division of AIDS (DAIDS) included plans for post-trial access for
participants. More than 70% that is, about 13 of 18 trials had specific mechanisms for
realizing posttrial access, but none of them ensured long-term access. Half of the trials
incorporated explanations of post-trial access that involved collaboration with outside
sources or national access programs, established by the governments of the countries
hosting the trials. None of the studies advocated for priority access for trial participants in
connection to other patients in the country. The authors contend that the strength and
form of the NIH guidelines support researchers to explore alternatives and collaboration
to expedite access to antiretroviral treatment. Similarly the flexibility of the guidelines
expedites and promotes the learning of practical difficulties, a more effective strategy
than establishing stringent requirements that researchers may be unable to fulfill.104
Two competing paradigms have been proposed regarding providing benefits to
participants and host populations at the conclusion of a trial including reasonable
availability and fair benefits framework. The concept of reasonable availability is
ambiguous. CIOMS recognizing this ambiguity of reasonable availability indicates that
“the issue of reasonable availability is complex and will need to be determined on a caseby-case basis and then enumerates countless “relevant considerations.”105 Four primary
issues require stipulation: “(1) the nature of the commitment; (2) who is responsible for
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fulfilling the requirement; (3) what constitutes making something reasonably available;
and (4) who must have access.”106 Each of these issues has attracted a variety of answers.
Therefore, regardless of the consensus on reasonable availability requirement, there is a
considerable controversy on how it should be stipulated and essentially implemented.107
Nevertheless, proponents of reasonable availability consider it as a requirement of
ethical research in developing countries that is critical to avert exploitation of
communities.108 CIOMS articulates, “If there is good reason to believe that a product
developed or knowledge generated by research is unlikely to be reasonably available
to…the population of a proposed host country or community after the conclusion of the
research, it is unethical to conduct the research in that country or community.”109
Reasonable availability requirement has been criticized for several reasons. First,
it grapples with a mistaken conception of exploitation, because, while reasonable
availability concentrates on a type of benefit such as a proven intervention, exploitation
concentrates on a fair level of benefits. The emphasis is not on what people obtain but
how much they obtain. Second, reasonable availability struggles with a narrow
conception of benefits, because it considers only access to a drug, vaccine or intervention
as a benefit, and disregards others benefits such as training, infrastructure, or health
services. Third, reasonable availability deals with excessively broad group of
beneficiaries. It requires post-trial access for host community or country. On the other
hand, tackling exploitation requires benefits just for those shouldering risks or burdens of
research, without any justification to bestow benefits on a whole country that does not
shoulder a burden or risk of research. Fourth, reasonable availability grapples with the
issue that no single trial is conclusive. It requires access to a drug, vaccine, or
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intervention after a single trial. However, it frequently requires many confirmatory trials
to justify the safety and efficacy of an intervention. Fifth, reasonable availability that
entails providing one drug can be “golden handcuff” because if research demonstrates
that another intervention is more effective, the community may be assured the old drug
not the newer and more effective one.110 Sixth, it is not within the scope of the authority
of researchers and numerous sponsors to ensure reasonable availability. Clinical
researchers as well as some sponsors in developed countries, such as the NIH and the
Medical Research Council of the United Kingdom (MRC), do not regulate drug approval
processes in their own countries, let alone other countries. In the same way, they do not
regulate budgets for health ministries or foreign or development aid in order to put into
practice research results such as provision of drugs or vaccines, and may be, by law,
prohibited from providing successful interventions at the conclusion of trials as in the
case of NIH. Seventh, the requirement of reasonable availability implies that the
population is deprived of making its own autonomous decisions regarding what benefits
merit the risks of a research trial.111 Due to numerous shortcomings of reasonable
availability requirement, the fair benefits framework was proposed by the participants of
the 2001 Conference on Ethical Aspects of Research in Developing Countries at
Malawi.112
The fair benefits requirement was highlighted by the DoH paragraph 33 with its
reference to “access to interventions identified as beneficial in the study or to other
appropriate care or benefits”113 at the conclusion of the trial. The UNESCO Universal
Declaration on Bioethics and Human Rights also makes allusion to sharing various forms
of benefits from scientific research with the entire society especially in developing
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countries. It provides a comprehensive list of benefits such as: (a) special and continuous
aid to, and recognition of, the individuals and groups that have participated in the
research; (b) affordable access to quality health care; (c) provision of new therapeutic
interventions originating from scientific research; (d) assistance for health services; (e)
access to knowledge generated from science and technology; (f) capacity-building
facilities for research goals; (g) other types of benefits in consonant with the principles
established in this declaration.114
The fair benefits framework enunciates two basic assumptions. First, the solution
to avoiding exploitation is to guarantee that people who shoulder the risks and burdens of
research obtain fair benefits through the conduct and/ or results of research. Second, all
forms of benefits that accrue from research, not only access to a tested drug, vaccine or
intervention, must be examined in ascertaining the fair benefits.115 The population at risk
for exploitation is the pertinent group to obtain benefits; this encompasses the participants
in the clinical research and any members of the community who might as well shoulder
burdens and risks for conducting the research.116 Providing benefits just to research
participants would broaden health inequalities in the resource-poor host country and
consequently highlight issues regarding causing injustice.117 Therefore, providing
benefits to the host country should be executed in a fashion that improves rather than
exacerbates health inequalities.118
The fair benefits framework maintains that “there should be a comprehensive
delineation of tangible benefits to the research participants and the population from both
conduct and the results of research.”119 Some of the benefits consist of: (a) Improved
health of research subjects; (b) Posttrial access to medications for research subjects; (c)
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Health services and public health measures accessible to the population; (d) Employment
and economic activity; (e) Availability of interventions at the conclusion of research; (f)
Improvements to the health care infrastructure, training of health care and research
professionals and research capacity; (g) Long-term research collaboration; (h) Sharing of
financial rewards, including intellectual property rights.120 Such benefits guarantee that
community where the research is conducted will obtain benefits in return for engaging in
the research. Building infrastructure has been identified as a good way, researchers can
help offer sustainable improvements that will assist to shrink health inequalities between
rich and poor nations.121
The form and amount of such collateral or secondary benefits to participants and
communities should be negotiated among the sponsors, researchers, and host-country
partners before the research is initiated. Overcoming disparities in negotiating power
requires that agreements should be made public in order that other communities and
countries will know what benefits might be realized.122
The fair benefits framework would seem to be effective at averting exploitation at
the level of the individual research participants and the level of the host population,
community, or country, and it provides more understandable guidance than DoH or
CIOMS guidelines.123 Nevertheless, some authors contend that someone could give a
justification for any research with human participants as long as other benefits, not
connected to the research itself, can be utilized to justify unneeded research. Most people
agree that research on male pattern baldness and cosmetic surgery, currently, should not
be considered to be highly significant, but it might be justified in the context of fair
benefits approach.124 Some authors argue that fair benefits framework does not go far
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enough to tackle issues of exploitation or benefit for the host population.125 Alex John
London points out the shortcoming of the fair benefits framework on the basis that its
idea of exploitation and justice are too restricted. He contends that to comprehend
exploitation and justice one must examine beyond specific transactions or relationships
and examine the larger social, economic, cultural, and political context. For London, the
fair benefits framework is contingent on a fair agreement between researchers/sponsors
and a host population, community, or country. The agreement is fair if both parties give
their assent and benefits are fairly distributed. He contends that the issue with this notion
is that it disregards the broader context in which the agreement is established, such as
extreme poverty, famine and disease in the host country, or the history of relationship
between two countries which may involve racism, slavery, theft, or exploitation. He
argues that an agreement cannot be really fair without one tackling this broader context.
Accomplishing this goal requires that researchers and sponsors do more than merely
providing fair benefits. They must engage in rectifying past injustices and support social,
economic, and political development in the host country. This perspective was dubbed
the human development approach by London.126 In a nutshell, he contends that “a better
approach will reframe the question of justice in international research in a way that makes
explicit the links between medical research, the social determinants of health, and global
justice.”127
Several criticisms were leveled against the human development approach.
Shamoo acknowledges London’s human development approach being admirable in
several ways, but argues that it is as well too idealistic and unrealistic. It overly requires
researchers and sponsors to do a lot more for the host countries than they can probably be
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expected to do. The human development approach if implemented would make
biomedical research in developing countries exorbitant and complex. Sponsors would opt
to refrain from research in developing countries to circumvent paying the exorbitant costs
of nation building.128 In as much as promoting economic, social, and political
development in developing countries is a valuable goal, it is a responsibility best
entrusted to the United Nations, the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, and
other organizations whose primary goal is development. The primary goal of research is
research. Researchers and sponsors should offer meaningful and fair benefits to the
population hosting the research, but they need not overextend themselves in what they
do.129
On the other hand, Emmanuel criticized the human development approach in
various areas. He highlights the abstract nature and ambiguity of the human development
that makes it hard to be sure what it requires. The human development approach
misconstrues the problem that guaranteeing benefits to host countries is intended to
tackle. The majority of people agree that global injustice and exploitation are critical
ethical issues in the world. Nevertheless, the aim of identifying clearly the extent of the
obligation to provide benefits to developing countries that participate in biomedical
research is to reduce the possibility of exploitation by developed country researchers and
sponsors. Such benefits are not intended to tackle fundamental background global
injustice. The human development approach is therefore pointing to a different problem
from that being tackled by the reasonable availability requirement or fair benefits
framework. There is a detach between the ethical challenges presented by conducting
clinical trials in developing countries and the issues the human development approach
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considers itself to be tackling.130 Furthermore, the human development approach appears
most pertinent in helping to identify clearly what research questions are being pursued in
developing countries, rather than the benefits that result from particular research
protocols.131 Another critical issue addressed in the context of a paradigm for global
justice is the global responsibility for growing health inequalities discussed in the next
part of this chapter.
C. The Global Responsibility for Growing Health Inequalities
C.1. Four Critical Challenges of Global Health
The increasing global health inequalities resulting in poor health outcomes
especially among the world’s global poor in developing countries created an urgent need
for “fair and effective global governance for health – the organization of national and
global norms, institutions, and processes that collectively shape the health of the world’s
population.”132 The relevance of global governance for health extends beyond the health
arena. It entails rectifying the presently unfair and harmful health effects of international
regimes such as international trade, intellectual property and finance, and establishing
secure, active, democratic political institutions.133
The Joint Action and Learning Initiative on National and Global Responsibilities
for Health (JALI) was established by a coalition of civil society and academics, with a
shared vision of the right to health.134 JALI attempts to establish a post-Millennium
Development Goal (MDG) framework for global health, one entrenched in the right to
health and intended for obtaining universal health coverage for all people.135 JALI
establishes an international agreement regarding solutions to four critical challenges of
global health: (I) explaining essential health services and goods; (II) elucidating
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governments’ obligations to their country’s populations; (III) investigating the
responsibilities of all governments towards the global poor; and (IV) introducing a global
structure to enhance health as a matter of social justice.136 A brief discussion of the four
critical challenges of global health follows.
I. Essential Services and Goods Ensured to Every Person under the Human Right to
Health
The first crucial challenge for JALI is to ascertain essential health services and
goods that every person has a right to anticipate. Gostin et al. writes “without articulating
these, it is impossible to define each state’s obligation to its own inhabitants, as well as
the duties of high-income countries towards low- and middle-income countries.”137 The
World Health Organization (WHO) has highly prioritized the place of universal health
coverage on the global health agenda,138 expounding three dimensions of coverage: “(1)
the proportion of the population served; (2) the level of services; and (3) the proportion of
health costs covered by prepaid pooled funds.”139 Universal coverage is defined “as
access to key promotive, preventive, curative and rehabilitative health interventions for
all at an affordable cost.”140
The human right to health which is an international treaty obligation offers crucial
understanding about how states should work towards realizing universal coverage.141
Core obligations provide criteria to evaluate progress towards universal coverage, for
example “non-discrimination, equitable distribution of health facilities, and essential
services for all, including those addressing underlying determinants of health.”142
States are required by the core principle of equality to emphasize covering 100%
of their populations. Even though 100% coverage of all health services may not be
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feasible right away, full coverage of essential health interventions should be an initial
standard or criterion towards universal coverage.143 The right to health framework works
against a restricted definition of essential services. The essential services should entail
WHO’s building blocks for health services such as “services, workforce, information
and financing and governance; essential vaccines, medicines and technologies; and
fundamental human needs (e.g., sanitation, nutritious food, potable water, safe housing,
vector abatement, tobacco control, and healthy environments).”144
The provision of each of these essential services should signify just one critical
step towards attaining the highest attainable standard of health. States, including affluent
ones will need to continue to work towards achieving universal coverage.145 The right to
health requires these essential services to be universally available, acceptable, accessible
and of good quality.146
II. States’ Responsibilities for the Health of their Populations
States possess the primary responsibility to fund and guarantee all the essential
goods and services within the context of the right to health.147 The estimate of the WHO
as the minimum annual cost for providing all the essential goods and services under the
right to health is US$ 40 per person,148 with the exclusion of basic survival needs.
Nevertheless the obligation of states should not be restricted just to their populations, but
also to the global community to control health threats that jeopardize other countries and
region. Gostin et al. argue that in most cases, “state obligations should extend to fostering
a functioning inter-dependent global community, in which everyone recognizes that our
mutual survival is a matter of common concern.”149
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There is no consensus on the level of health sector funding sufficient to fulfill the
population’s needs. African heads of state pledged to allocate at least 15% of national
budgets to the health sector in 2001, in Abuja, Nigeria.150 More so, about 32 African
countries established an aspirational target of public sector budget allocations for
sanitation and hygiene programs to attain at least 0.5% of gross domestic product.151 In
2007, the average per capita of government health investment in Africa is US$ 34,
corresponding to a mean of 9.6% budget allocation, which is compared with US$ 1374
and 17.1% in the Americas.152 This encompasses 15 African countries that invest as small
as US$ 2-10 per capita, which cannot start to fulfill the population’s health needs.153
Furthermore, numerous low- and middle-income countries decrease domestic health
spending for every dollar they obtain in foreign health assistance.154
Additionally, States have a responsibility to “govern well – honestly,
transparently and accountably – with the full participation of civil society.”155 However,
data shows that health systems among low-income countries are among the ones that are
most badly governed.156

III. Responsibilities of All Countries to Guarantee the Health of the World’s Population.
Resource-limited countries lack capacity to guarantee all of their populations even
the essential health goods and services, let alone a fuller realization of the right to health.
Countries well-placed to assist are required to do so in the context of the principles of
international law and global social justice.157 The Committee on Social, Economic and
Cultural Rights has affirmed that cooperation towards fulfilling the right to health is “an
obligation of all states,” especially those “in a position to assist others.”158 All countries
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have mutual responsibilities towards guaranteeing the health of the most disadvantaged
population of the world.159
Formulating global health funding as “aid” is basically faulty because it presumes
an intrinsically unequal benefactor – dependent relationship. Essentially, global
collaboration obliges a collective response to shared risks and basic rights, where all
states possess mutual responsibilities.160 Charitable giving generally signifies that “the
donor decides how much to give, and for what and to whom.”161 Therefore, “aid” is “not
predictable, scalable or sustainable.”162 It undercuts ownership of and responsibility for
health programs of the host country.163
Apart from development assistance, coordination and coherence is desperately
needed across sectors, as global health can be enhanced or harmed through state and
international policies and rules that regulate areas such as international trade, intellectual
property, health worker migration, international financing, and debt relief. These
responsibilities include the use of state authority and influence over global institutions
such as the World Bank, International Monetary Fund, and World Trade Organization. 164
Furthermore, high-income countries have not come nearer to realizing their pledge made
in 1970 to spend 0.7% of their gross national product annually on Official Development
Assistance (ODA).165 After four decades, their average contribution is at 0.31%.
Exploring innovative strategies to guarantee sufficient and lasting funding with agreedupon priorities, will be critical in guaranteeing that poor countries obtain the capacity to
realize the right to health.166
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IV. Global Health Governance Required to Guarantee that All States Live up to their
Mutual Responsibilities
Global health governance is necessary because states will not embrace
international norms without true global partnerships, fair burden sharing and efficient
programs that enhance health outcomes.167 Gostin et al. writes “translating a shared
understanding of national and global responsibilities into new realities requires effective
and democratic governance for health.”168 Despite the Paris Declaration on Aid
Effectiveness, global health grapples with grand challenges of poor leadership, poor
coordination and underfunded priorities, and a deficiency in transparency, accountability,
and enforcement.169 More so, political, legal and economic challenges obstruct effective
governance. Health ministries of various countries frequently lack fundamental
knowledge of, and control over, foreign-supported programs. Gostin and Mok contend
that we need a system of governance that promotes effective partnerships and coordinates
initiatives to establish collaborations and circumvent destructive competition.170
More importantly, global health governance should strengthen the leadership and
normative function of WHO which, as a United Nations agency, must have the
legitimacy, authority and resources to assist all countries in ensuring the right to health. 171
Furthermore, state policies such as agricultural subsidies, intellectual property, and
foreign affairs can effectively impact health in resource-poor countries. Consequently,
states should endorse a “health-in-all-policies” approach where all ministries deal with
the health effects of their policies and programs.172 Effective governance must encompass
active participation of the citizen to guarantee “transparency, collaboration, and
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accountability while maximizing creativity, and resource mobilization by states,
international organizations, businesses, and civil society.”173
The global health structure should make provision to hold stakeholders
accountable, with clear criteria for success, monitoring progress and enforcement all of
which have been deficient.174 Lack of adequately exact obligations and compliance
mechanisms in the context of the right to health impedes accountability, although
encouraging signs of better approaches abound.175 Human rights organizations and UN
special rapporteurs are increasing the clarity of state obligations in the context of the right
to health, which is imperative for meaningful accountability, just as are constitutional
court decisions affirmed in Argentina, India, and South Africa.176 Establishing the global
responsibility for growing health inequalities among nations is discussed next.

C.2. The Global Responsibility for increasing Health Inequalities between Nations
Ooms and Hammonds argue that there is global responsibility for global health
and there are obligations of justice to help fulfill the right to health in other countries,
because of the increasing wealth inequality between nations which has significant direct
impact on health inequity.177 Health inequity is explained as the “unjust distribution of
the socially controllable factors affecting population health and its distribution,”178 The
concept of “health-related goods” introduced by John Arras and Elizabeth Fenton has
been used as short hand of Daniels’ “socially controllable factors affecting population
health and its distribution”179 in the discussion of growing health inequalities between
nations.
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There is a direct correlation between wealth inequalities and health inequalities
between nations. Health-related goods are associated with costs in money. Health-related
goods such as health care, prevention, water, sanitation, and nutrition involve a
substantial spending for any nation. The implication is that what governments can spend
on the distribution of health-related goods is exclusively determined by their revenue,
which is invariably affected by their wealth.180
Studies on the evolution of global wealth inequalities conducted by Branko
Milanovic showed that wealth inequalities between countries, articulated as an intercountry Gini coefficient, are progressively growing.181 A Gini coefficient of zero utilized
for inter-country wealth distribution would signify that all countries have precisely the
same average Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita, which denotes complete intercountry equality. Additionally, Gini coefficient of one used for inter-country wealth
distribution would signify that one single country would have the whole GDP of the
world’s economy, which denotes maximum inequality. Milanovic examines the intercountry Gini coefficients between countries from 1980-2000 and indicates how wealth
inequality between countries is actually increasingly moving toward maximum inequality
and away from maximum equality.182
The increasing inter-country inequality is attributed to several factors. The longlasting effects of slavery and colonization183 which constitute a significant factor in the
inter-country inequality should not be minimized. Nunn attributes Africa’s poor
economic performance and underdevelopment in the second half of the twentieth century
to its history of extraction, characterized by the events of slave trades and colonialism.184
Nunn argues that there is a strong negative correlation between the number of slaves
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exported from a country and current economic performance. He argues further that
evidence indicates that slave trades had an adverse effect on economic development of
various countries in Africa.185 Another important factor is that rich countries use their
economic and political power to negotiate unequal or unfair trade agreement.186 Stiglitz
argues that the WTO rules governing international trade are extremely unfair because
they have been intended to benefit the developed countries, to a certain extent at the
expense of the developing countries.187 Another factor worth noting is the shift of
financial resources from poor to rich countries that are traced to illegal or at least illicit
activities and causes, that is, “illicit financial flows” that significantly contribute to
increasing inter-country inequality and can obfuscate international assistance from rich to
poor countries.188 The report findings show that developing countries lost an estimated
$858.6 billion-$1.06 trillion in illicit financial outflows in 2006.189
Robert Merton’s “Matthew Effect”190 can as well be utilized in explaining the
increasing inter-country inequality. This alludes to a verse in the biblical Gospel of
Matthew – “For to all those who have, more will be given, and they will have an
abundance; but from those who have nothing, even what they have will be taken
away,”191 – Merton highlights the improper allocation of credit for contributions in
science. He explicates how scientists with significant reputation in their field are more
likely to be acknowledged and awarded for their scientific work than scientists who have
not created any impression, even when both equally contribute to a scientific
advancement.192
Gunnar Myrdal built on the same biblical quotation to explicate his theory of
“circular and cumulative causation,” which estimates growing inequalities within and
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between countries engaging in a free market.193 Myrdal’s theory contends “that the play
of the forces of the market normally tends to increase, rather than decrease, the
inequalities between regions.”194 Centers of strong economic growth draw capital and
skills, and can fund an efficient logistical infrastructure, as a result growing even faster.
In their direct outskirts, they may engender “spread effects,” that is, benefits for regions
that are within the direct outskirts of economic growth centers. On the other hand, further
from the center, the existence of these “economic growth centers” engenders “backwash
effects,” as far away regions experience the flight of their capital and skills toward
economic growth centers. Within affluent countries, spread effects can be stronger than
backwash effects, and “state policies have been initiated which are directed toward
greater regional equality: the market forces which result in backwash effects have been
offset, while those resulting in spread effects have been supported.”195 Conversely, poor
countries are inclined to mainly experience the backwash effects from economic growth
centers, since such growth centers are frequently situated in other countries. Myrdal
indicates that if from one perspective the explication of the current and ever-increasing
global inequalities is the cumulative propensity intrinsic in the unimpeded play of the
market forces in circumstances where the effectiveness of the spread effects is feeble,
from another perspective the explication is the lack of a world state which could
intervene in the interest of equality of opportunity.196
It is pertinent to note that the influence of apparent global misconduct such as
colonization and slavery, unfair trade rules, and illicit financial flows should not be
underrated.197 Pogge posited various ways in which affluent countries are contributing to
both the continued severe poverty of poor countries and severe poverty within poor
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countries. He contends that obligations of global justice are primarily obligations of
rectification to recompense for failure to accomplish the negative duty of doing no
harm.198 Ooms and Hammonds assert the crucial importance of rectifying the apparent
harm that is being done by affluent countries to the world’s poor. However, even if it
were feasible to rectify or recompense for all past and prior apparent misconduct, even if
an equal opportunity could be created for global free trade, global free trade would
nonetheless engender some winners and some losers.199 They further argue that “…if
winners are allowed to invest their present gains in future comparative advantages
without global corrective measures, the Gini coefficient for inter-country wealth
inequality will continue to grow toward one and away from zero.”200 The global-level
Matthew Effect is apparently a less type of harm and may then not require rectification
on the basis of the negative duty of doing no harm. However, it requires rectification
from the point of view that it decreases the capacity of some countries to distribute
health-related goods. From this perspective, Daniels argues that obligations of mutual
assistance at the national level are imperative. He emphasizes the special moral
significance of health “because protecting normal functioning helps to protect the range
of exercisable opportunities open to people and because various theories of justice
support the idea that we have an obligation to protect opportunity and thus health.”201
Obligations of mutual assistance beyond borders are desiderata, to defend equal
opportunity globally and taking the Matthew Effect into consideration at the global
level.202
Another option for addressing inter-country wealth inequalities which undercuts
the ability of poor countries to buy health-related goods for its populations was proposed
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by Robert Archer. Archer describes the great inequalities that occurred between rich and
poor over a century ago in the industrialized nations. As a result of this difficult and
challenging situation, “many governments in richer countries came to realize, or were
pressured to accept, that extreme social and economic inequities were unsustainable.”203
To surmount these inequalities, Archer insists that “systems of universal health care,
social security, unemployment insurance and public housing were put in place.”204 These
social protection schemes fundamentally function by collecting financial resources in
conformity with participants’ means and directly redistributing them “in the form of
health-related goods, education-related goods, or other social rights related goods, in
accordance with participants’ needs.”205 The just distribution of these goods was not
ensured by the primary distribution of wealth, ensuing from free markets. It was then
imperative to introduce a secondary system for redistribution of wealth, through
redistribution that included either money transfers or social rights-related goods transfers,
such as funding of health care services for individuals who need it by the government. 206
Some societies rather than establishing a secondary redistribution to correct the primary,
attempted to change the primary distribution of resources, and espoused communism.
These attempts seemingly resulted in establishing other types of injustice. 207 Ooms and
Hammonds argued for an analogous system of secondary redistribution of wealth at the
global level which could favorably counteract the Matthew Effect, and authorize a less
unfair distribution of health-related goods to occur.208 They further articulate “it is
precisely because a secondary redistribution of wealth system fails to occur at the global
level, as Myrdal notes, that we argue for the need to recognize and support global
responsibility for growing health inequalities.”209 Essentially, the global free market
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should not be abrogated but rather attuned to tackle and rectify the inequalities on the
global level that impede the ability of poor countries to buy and distribute health-related
goods for their citizens.210 Critical to the solution of redressing growing global health
inequalities is to establish the global capacity for the needed intervention which is
discussed in the next part of this chapter.

D. The Global Capacity to Redress Health Inequalities
There are two global elements drawn from the World Health Organization
mandate, “a globally shared responsibility for the health of all people, and global threats
posed by infectious diseases.”211 These two global elements seen as critical components
of an emerging global health paradigm are considered not mutually exclusive. The fact
that infectious diseases do not respect national borders significantly contributes to a
consciousness of global responsibility for the health of all people. More so, the risk of
uncontrolled pandemic increasing rapidly from low-income to middle- and high-income
motivates the more affluent to assist poor people because the more affluent do not want
to contract diseases of the poor people.212 This explains most likely why Official
Development Assistance (ODA) for health appears to concentrate excessively on
infectious diseases.213
Nevertheless, a global responsibility for the health of all people should go beyond
a readily disposition to address the global threats presented by infectious diseases and
guarantee that there is equal focus and solidarity for non-infectious diseases.214 Ooms
argues that “there is some trans-national solidarity to promote the health of all people, but
it is limited and it is most often intended to be temporary: the objective is to help other

399

countries assume their responsibilities towards their inhabitants, within a foreseeable
future.”215 He acknowledges basic differences between the way people residing in highincome countries exercise solidarity for health within their countries’ borders, and the
way those same people exercise solidarity in health beyond the borders of the countries
they reside in.216
First, there is an enormous difference in quantity. It is not unusual for people in
high-income countries to expend higher than 10% of their Gross Domestic Product
(GDP) on health. For example, in 2005, people in Germany spent equal to 10.7% of their
GDP on health.217
The Second significant difference refers to the intention guiding the exercise of
solidarity. Solidarity in health, within the borders of a country does not have an objective
to be temporary, its objective entails continuing reciprocal solidarity. Concluding the
solidarity is not the intention guiding the act of solidarity in this context. The intention is
to help the beneficiary to recover soon and possibly become prolific in such as a way as
to contribute to continuing reciprocal solidarity. On the other hand, the intention guiding
solidarity changes basically beyond the borders of a country. The intention of transnational solidarity does not entail that the beneficiaries would turn into contributors to a
continuing reciprocal solidarity mechanism between countries. The intention is that all
beneficiaries would turn out to be self-sufficient within a foreseeable future, and
consequently trans-national solidarity could terminate, as solidarity within countries
would be adequate.218 Ooms points out that “for some reason, we can endorse the
metaphor of a “single global market,” but not the metaphors of a “single global hospital”
and a “single global school.”219
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The consequences of dealing with trans-national health solidarity as a temporary
issue and invariably a rejection of a Global Health paradigm can be far-reaching
especially for the 1.3 billion people residing in low-income countries. In low-income
countries which had the total GDP of US$810 billion for 1.3 billion people, or US$600
per person per year, domestic public health expenditure of US$18 per person per year is
certainly a severe challenge. It involves government revenue except for grants of 20% of
GDP, and 15 % of government revenue for public health expenditure. The identified two
targets are fairly challenging.220 Provision of universal access to primary health care at
US$18 per person per year is considerably a huge challenge, and thus considered a
“mission impossible.”221 Data from the Commission on Macroeconomics and Health
(CMH) shows that governments are required to spend at least US$40 per person per year
on basic health, and this does not completely include comprehensive primary health
care.222
The domestic public health expenditure can be complemented by ODA for health,
but providing ODA for health within the context of the present development paradigm
which implies without a global health paradigm, constitutes a severe problem, primarily
because ODA has been in the past unreliable. The unreliability of ODA for health is
actually expected as ODA is meant to be temporary and thus not reliable in the long
run.223
One critical consequence that is identified regarding the unreliability of ODA for
health in the long run is that occasionally the fund is being poorly utilized, which may
mean not being used where it is greatly needed or could offer the largest benefit, or even
not used at all. Moreover, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank
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deter low-income countries’ governments from growing the levels of recurring health
expenditure, including health professionals’ salaries, utilizing ODA for health since ODA
for health is ultimately unreliable.224 Information from the Independent Evaluation Office
of the IMF, indicates that more ODA is rechanneled to grow the foreign exchange
reserves of low-income countries, than is utilized for the objective for which it was
meant, which is to grow public expenditure.225
Furthermore, Nancy Birdsall explains Overseas Development Assistance (ODA)
as guilty of “seven deadly sins.”226 She identifies seven deadly sins associated with ODA
as (i) “impatience”- in relation to institution building and possessing a restricted
commitment to longer-term support; (ii) “envy” – focuses on lack of success to
effectively coordinate and at other times to conspire with one another and not essentially
in the involved developing countries’ interests; (iii) “ignorance” and a lack of success to
effectively assess development interventions; (iv) “pride” – refers particularly to a lack of
success to exit when suitable; (v) “sloth” – refers to carelessness with concepts and their
application, and notably feigning that participation is the same with developing country
ownership; (vi) “greed” – distinguished by unreliable and insufficient “stingy transfers” ;
and (vii) “foolishness” – distinguished by insufficient obligations to funding global and
regional public goods.227
Despite the inherent impediments associated with the ODA for health, the global
AIDS response which is a synthesis of medical relief and health development paradigms
creates a promising global health paradigm. Hammonds and Ooms argue that “the
approach adopted by AIDS activists – and their ability to remain outside the development
paradigm, often termed “AIDS exceptionalism” – is at the root of their success.”228 A
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brief discussion of the three paradigms, including the health development paradigm, the
medical relief paradigm and the new global health paradigm for redressing the health
inequalities follows.

D.1. The Health Development Paradigm
The health development paradigm aims for sustainability which is usually defined
within the context of self-sufficiency.229 The Office of Sustainable Development of the
Bureau for Africa of the United States Agency for International Development provides
the definition of sustainability as “the ability of host country entities (community, public
and/or private) to assume responsibility for programs and/or outcomes without adversely
affecting the ability to maintain or continue program objectives or outcomes.”230 It
describes financial sustainability as “having enough reliable funding”, meaning funding
“generated from a country’s own resources.”231 The International development
organizations, such as the World Bank, are motivated by global solidarity but their
emphasis is on sustainable interventions that result in self-sufficiency. They focus on
guaranteeing an exit plan. Development practitioners concentrate on enhancing health or
education for all within a country for a restricted time and view the long-term
sustainability of an intervention a critical factor in establishing the goal, design,
implementation and evaluation of a project.232
In the area of international assistance for health, Enrico Pavignani and Sandro
Colombo remark: “Sustainability is continuously invoked as a key criterion to assess any
aid-induced activity or initiative. Sometimes, the concept is given the weight of a
decisive argument. Thus, to declare something “unsustainable” may sound as equivalent
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of “worthless” or even “harmful”, in this way overruling any other consideration.”233
Akin to this perspective is the observation of Pablo Gottret and Georges Schieber that
“Sustainability has generally been described in terms of self-sufficiency.”234 The
implication is that from this context, international assistance would not promote any
distribution of health-related goods that could not be sustained by the beneficiary
country. Therefore, international assistance would merely endorse distribution of healthrelated goods endeavors that the beneficiary country could sustain on its own, and if it
could sustain these endeavors on its own, the international assistance then would not be
required. This explains why the international assistance has not made a significant impact
in some areas of global health especially in “maternal and child health.”235
More so, if US$40 per person per year is needed for equitably providing a basic
set of required health services, in that case, sustainability in the sense of financial selfsufficiency might not be practical. First, let us suppose that developing countries can
raise government revenue equivalent to 20% of the GDP and assign 15% of government
revenue to health expenditure, both of which are fairly ambitious. Second, if a
comparison of these assumptions was made with current levels of government revenue
and allocation to health expenditure, just countries with a GDP of US$1,333 per person
can attain government revenue of US$266 per person per year and government health
expenditure of US$40 per person per year. It is quite evident that low-income countries
cannot attain this, based on the categorization of the World Bank in which their Gross
National Income (GNI) is just US$935 or less.236 Ooms also observes that “All trendy
development approaches point out that sustainable health care – narrowly defined as
independent from international aid – is illusionary in the world’s poorest countries.”237
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Therefore, public health budgets in low-income countries must be grown and critically
need more guaranteed national and international financial commitments.238
Sustainability in the sense of self-sufficiency is then not compatible with an
equitable provision of a basic set of health services for the 1.3 billion people residing in
low-income countries. It makes it hard to associate medical relief with health
development.239 Ooms contends that “In the field of health care, the issue of
sustainability creates a dichotomy between medical relief and health development,
because relief is unaffected by the condition of self-reliance.”240 The dichotomy creates
turf battles between the proponents of medical relief and the proponents of health
development.241 Essentially, sustainability as the criterion is not actually taken into
account when ascertaining the appropriateness of the medical relief response, due to the
fact that the crisis is supposed to be temporary and consequently there is an assumption
that long-term response would not be required. It is not completely accurate that
sustainability in the sense of self-sufficiency is appealed to as a criterion for all aidinduced activities. Definitely, it is not needed in humanitarian or medical relief
interventions.242

D.2. The Medical Relief Paradigm
The medical relief paradigm was initially established to respond to severe health
crises. In the event of a natural disaster or war that significantly devastates a population,
emergency humanitarian organizations such as the International Red Cross and Red
Crescent Movement or Medecins Sans Frontieres (MSF) usually respond. They typically
appeal also to global solidarity in requesting for funds and their commended work
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responds to the pressing desire that the majority of people feel to “do something” to assist
those they perceive suffering.243 Until lately, humanitarian organizations were controlled
by the notion of “temporary disruption of a pre-existing equilibrium”, or as humanitarian
aid opponents explain, to “help populations get back to where they were before disaster
struck.”244 From this perspective, the issue of sustainability is not taken into consideration
when ascertaining the scope of the medical relief response. For example, one can utilize
helicopters to rescue people following severe incidents of floods in countries that would
not be able to fund a helicopter fleet themselves; since the incidents of floods are
exceptional, the response is then not supposed to be sustainable.245
Nevertheless, numerous humanitarian crises continue for decades and in such
cases some type of sustainability is then needed. In such cases, the sustainability of
medical relief depends on sustained international aid as an alternative type of
sustainability different from self-sufficiency.246
The practitioners of medical relief paradigm have been seriously challenged by
chronic health crises especially the epidemics of AIDS, tuberculosis and malaria, but as
well as recurring occurrences of malnutrition, or still prevalent lack of access to the most
basic level of health care.247 The World Disasters Report 2008 of the International
Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescents Societies (IFRC) concentrates on the AIDS
epidemic, as “a disaster in many ways.”248 Data shows that more people are currently
dying in Mozambique as a result of these chronic crises than during its 20 years of war,
and average life expectancy has decreased from 40 to 27 years.249 In some areas of the
Democratic of Congo not ravaged by conflict, mortality goes beyond emergency
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thresholds.250 Taking into account these prevalent situations in developing countries, the
goal to “help populations get back to where they were before disaster struck” is futile.251
The Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) describes
“humanitarian crises” or “emergencies” as “any situation in which there is an exceptional
and widespread threat to life, health or basic subsistence, that is beyond the capacity of
individual and the community.”252 If the lack of capacity of the affected individuals,
communities or countries to deal with a situation is what changes a development problem
to a humanitarian crisis, therefore 1.3 billion people residing in low-income countries are
experiencing a permanent humanitarian crisis as neither they nor their communities are
capable to offer what it takes to deal with the situation.253
This widespread state of emergency is not merely rhetoric because it has resulted
in humanitarian actors and providers of medical relief such as the IFRC and Medecins
Sans Frontieres (MSF) broadening their meanings of humanitarian crises or disasters to
intervene in the fights against AIDS, tuberculosis and malaria.254 More so, there is a
contention that if the President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR),
established by the United States, includes “relief” in its name, it is not simply because
“PEPFAR sounds better than PEPFADA – which could have been the acronym of a
President’s Emergency Plan For AIDS Development Assistance – but because PEPFAR
was conceived as a medical relief programme: not aiming for self-reliance within a
foreseeable future, but an emergency response to a crisis.”255
It is pertinent to note that some people are not contented with this situation.
Firstly, the more expanded meaning of humanitarian crises establishes a field of
intervention that is too huge for humanitarian organizations. Consequently, criteria for
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intervention unavoidably encompass some arbitrary choices.256 Alan Whiteside and Amy
Whalley condemn humanitarian actors for their lack of success to “provide clear
guidelines as to when an event is severe enough to be declared an emergency” and
“recognize change in the nature of disasters”, and consequently for not addressing the
real humanitarian crises.257 It might be possible that basically, humanitarian
organizations were not designed to respond to chronic crises because their dependence on
expatriate implementers and parallel management systems and their need to remain
independent from governments which coincidentally are all strategies intended for acute
crises in armed conflicts especially, severely restricted their potential as a mobilizer to
respond to chronic health crises and to improve primary health care for all.258 In fact, the
two health paradigms namely the health development paradigm and the medical relief
paradigm were not sufficiently designed to effectively redress global health
inequalities.259 Ooms and Hammonds articulating their limitations write, “One is too
focused on domestic self-reliance; the other has to remain independent from the
governments of the countries in which it operates.”260 It was then imperative to introduce
another health paradigm known as Global Health paradigm which is designed to
effectively redress global health inequalities.

D.3 Global AIDS Response – A New Global Health Paradigm
The global AIDS response started with a medical relief paradigm because of
necessity, not only because the HIV/AIDS pandemic produced a crisis situation in
developing nations with high prevalence, but also because the health development
paradigm could not contain the costs of AIDS treatment.261 The global AIDS response
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constitutes a new global health paradigm which is at the intersection of health
development paradigm and medical relief paradigm.262
Pavignani and Colombo remark: “Sustainability tends to be employed as an allencompassing term, but it seems useful to distinguish between technical sustainability,
which relates to the capacity to carry out certain functions, and financial sustainability,
which results from resource availability, fiscal capacity and the relative priority of health
care provision.”263 Exploring a clear distinction between technical sustainability and
financial sustainability is critical to establishing the foundation of a Global Health
paradigm. The Global Health paradigm would aim for operational sustainability in the
conventional sense of self-sufficiency at the national level borrowed from the health
development paradigm. It would also give authorization for unlimited reliance on
international financial support like the medical relief paradigm.264 Ooms argues that “In
doing so it would recognize a globally shared responsibility for the health of all people
and respond to the need for a new approach to providing basic health care to people in
middle-income and low-income countries.”265
Actually, the Global Fund is already implementing this: it has discarded financial
sustainability in the conventional sense as a criterion for support, but unlike PEPFAR it
does oblige technical or operational sustainability of the interventions it endorses.
Therefore, the Global Fund did not discard financial sustainability entirely; rather it
coined a new concept of sustainability, sustainability at the international level, depending
on sustained international solidarity as well as on domestic resources. This implies that
when countries utilize their grants from the Global Fund judiciously and effectively, they
can depend on continued support from the Global Fund.266 Michel Kazatchkine, the
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executive director of the Global Fund, highlighted the invented new concept of
sustainability in his closing speech at the XVII International AIDS Conference: “The
Global Fund has helped to change the development paradigm by introducing a new
concept of sustainability. One that is not based solely on achieving domestic self-reliance
but on sustained international support as well.”267
The Global Fund did not coin this new concept of sustainability without prior
concerted efforts from the global community. The United Nations General Assembly
Special Session on HIV/AIDS of June 2001 resulted in a declaration in which member
states pledged to “make every effort to provide progressively and in a sustainable
manner, the highest attainable standard of treatment for HIV/AIDS.”268 Furthermore, the
follow-up assembly of June 2006 also resulted in a declaration, in which member states
committed themselves “to supporting and strengthening existing financial mechanisms,
including the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria, as well as relevant
United Nations organizations, through the provision of funds in a sustained manner.”269
The WHO’s 2008 report recognizes that the sudden increase in external funds aimed at
health through bilateral channels or through the new generation’s global financing
instruments has improved the energy or enthusiasm of the health sector.270 However, the
report highlights immediately that “these additional funds need to be progressively rechanneled in ways that help build institutional capacity towards a longer-term goal of
self-sustaining, universal coverage.”271
The Global Health paradigm with its emphasis on the new concept of
sustainability within which the Global Fund functions was established out of necessity
rather than theory. Establishing a theoretical framework will be necessary to ground the
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practice of the global fund and other associated practices in realizing global health
justice.272

E. International Human Rights Law as a Foundation for Global Health Justice
The Global Health paradigm is argued as grounded on international human rights
law. Ooms and Hammonds articulate that “Ethics and value lie at the heart of the formal
framework of international human rights law.”273 This part of the chapter discusses the
scope to which the formal framework of international law offers a basis for a different aid
paradigm, particularly the Global Health paradigm, in which international assistance
becomes an obligation, responding to an entitlement, and hence unlimited rather than
temporary, under specific conditions.274
The 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights275 is the basis of the modern
human rights movement, and despite the fact that it is not a legally binding document in
itself, later international human rights treaties that are established on the values originated
from the Universal Declaration of Human Rights engender legally binding obligations on
governments.276 Sofia Gruskin and Daniel Tarantola explicate that “in practical terms,
international human rights law is about defining what governments can do to us, cannot
do to us and should do for us.”277
The two crucial treaties ensuing from the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights278 and the International Covenant
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights279 include legally binding obligations for the
states that approve them.280 The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights is the most pertinent and the focus for this discussion because it explicates states
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obligations with respect to the right to health. Nevertheless, it is pertinent to note that
human rights cannot be achieved separately, which basically implies the right to health
cannot be realized without improving the right to education and respect for civil and
political rights.281 A more detailed discussion of international human rights law as a
foundation for global health justice begins with the definition and scope of the right to
health.

E.1. Definition and Scope of the Right to Health
Clearly, the right to health does not imply “the right of everyone to be healthy or
to be provided with health.”282 Asbjorn Eide argues that “No state and no institution can
guarantee our health, but more or less optimal conditions for the enjoyment of good
health can be created, and this is what the rights to health is all about.”283 States can
neither guarantee good health nor provide defense against every likely cause of human
disease. Genetic factors, individual vulnerability to disease and the acceptance of
unhealthy or perilous lifestyle may play critical roles with regard to an individual’s
health.284 Eide writes “The right to health is therefore a right to have optimal conditions
for as many as possible to live a long and healthy life.”285
Furthermore, article 12 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights defines the right to health as “the right to the highest attainable standard
of physical and mental health”286 and the associated obligations of the state encompass
the provisions of medical services and the underlying preconditions necessary to health,
comprising of things such as clean water, sanitation, hospitals, clinics, trained medical
and professional officials and essentials drugs.287 This basic definition of the right to
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health has been endorsed and broadened in later international conventions, comprising
the 1989 Convention on the Rights of the Child, as well as other national and
international legislation.288 Additionally, numerous United Nations Committees have
engaged in an active role in more explication of essential elements of the right to health
in their General Comments and in assessments of States’ compliance with obligations in
the context of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights as
well as other more current treaties. Therefore, there is a dynamic development of the
understanding of the right to health in international law; “it is not just frozen in the bare
bones definition from the mid 1960s.”289
The 1989 Convention on the Rights of the Child, which has been approved by all
States with the exception of the United States and Somalia, can be seen as a sign of
global intentions on the development of understanding of the right to health and the
obligations it requires.290 Article 24 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child offers
more direction in understanding what the right to health implies as well as creating norms
for governments concerning the right to health of children.291 A typical example of how
these legal documents help form government policy stems from the UN Committee on
the Rights of the Child which has elucidated Article 24 of the Convention on the Rights
of the Child as obliging governments to take some particular actions to guarantee the
right to health of children. First, a government must offer reliable data on the health of
children to the Committee on the Rights of the Child. Second, a government must
demonstrate that it is taking necessary steps to guarantee that it sufficiently funds the
health of children. Third, a state must take necessary steps to guarantee that the health of
all children is respected. Individual government conformity to these actions and other
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obligations is examined by the Committee on the Rights of the child, when governments
turn in their periodic reports.292
A further significant development took place in 2000 when the Committee on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights released a General Comment 14 on the right to
health, tackling the scope of the right to health and the significance of international
cooperation in realizing the right to health.293 The general comment on the right to health
elucidates the scope of national and international obligations which was not clearly
addressed by the language of article 2(1) of the ICESCR.
The scope of the right to health was addressed with the introduction of the
concept of the progressive realization. A critical element of economic and social rights is
that they can simply be realized in a progressive fashion, in due course and not
immediately, as it relates to numerous civil and political rights.294 With respect to the
right to health the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights remarks: “The
concept of progressive realization constitutes a recognition of the fact that full realization
of all economic, social and cultural rights will generally not be able to be achieved in a
short period of time.”295 The principle of progressive realization is “critical for resourcepoor countries that are responsible for striving towards human rights goals to the
maximum extent possible.”296
Furthermore, the concept of progressive realization should not be misunderstood
as validating incessant delays in the achievement of economic, social, and cultural rights,
while expecting for economic growth and adequate domestic resources to become
accessible.297 It is not to be seen as “an escape hatch (for) recalcitrant states.”298 Such an
elucidation would divest economic, social, and cultural rights of any meaningful value,
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particularly for the deprived and vulnerable.299 Hence, the Committee on Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights comments that States parties have “an obligation to move as
expeditiously and effectively as possible.”300 Pertinent to note is that progressive
realization as well applies to resource-rich countries.301
To refute the notion that “progressive realization” may entail “no immediate
obligations,” the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights stresses a variety
of principles that explicate the nature of obligations of States parties: the principle of nonretrogression which entails that a State should not take steps backwards, the obligations
to provide international assistance and the principle of core obligations.302 The focus here
is on the principle of core obligations and the obligation to provide international
assistance because they engender obligations of global health justice as well as offer
useful framework for grounding a Global Health paradigm.303

E.2. Core Obligations and the Obligation to Provide Assistance
The Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights explained the core
content of the right to health within the context of its explanation of the core obligations
that stem from the right to health.304 Esin Orucu in 1986 provided a detailed explanation
of the notion of the “core content” of a human right: the essential substance of a right, its
reason for being, in the absence of which it would be devoid of meaning.305 The
Maastricht Guidelines prepared in 1997 by international legal experts further broadened
on this idea with reference to requirements for the fulfillment of a minimum core
obligation.306 The concept of “core content” was approved by the Committee in General
Comment No. 3. It elucidated that there are limits to the compromises that states can
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make with respect to achieving economic, social and cultural rights by appealing to the
clearly acknowledged unfeasibility of achieving all of them entirely and at once. More so,
there is a minimum threshold, a minimum essential level or core content, which must be
achieved without further delay.307 The Committee further explained that neither resource
constraints nor progressive realization can justify non-conformity to the core obligations
remarking that the burden lies with the State to show that it has utilized all available
resources to fulfill its core obligations, which are non-derogable.308
Brigit C.A. Toebes explaining the core content of the right to health categorized
the elements that contribute to the health status of persons separating them into two subgroups: elements of healthcare and the underlying preconditions for health.309 In 2000,
the Committee’s General Comment No. 14 on the right to health acknowledged the
existence of a minimum essential level of the right to health.310
The Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights explains the minimum
essential level of the right to health indirectly, through the explanation of the core
obligations of States parties concerning the right to health. Core obligations encompass
obligations to ensure access to essential health services and support for preconditions of
health. The core obligations also entail the obligation to provide essential drugs, as
defined by the WHO. The fundamental significance of non-discrimination is stressed all
through, since it is the obligation for a state to focus particularly on vulnerable or
marginalized groups.311
Basing on their experience, most health practitioners in developing countries
think that this definition of the minimum essential level of the right to health is a distant
dream. Public health expenditure was less than US$10 per person per year in 2004, in
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about 37 of the world’s low-income countries.312 The implication is that low-income
countries are just very poor to provide a basic package of health services, including AIDS
treatment which is estimated to cost US$40.00 per person per year by WHO.313 Taken
into consideration the principle of ultra posse nemo obligatur, which implies in this
context that no person (or country) can be obligated beyond what he, she or it is able to
do, there is then some doubts whether it is reasonable to define core obligations that
cannot be afforded in low-income countries. It is perfectly relevant to do so appealing to
the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights which notes that “Each State
Party to the present Covenant undertakes to take steps, individually and through
international assistance and cooperation, especially economic and technical, to the
maximum of its available resources.”314 To consider the ability or inability of low-income
countries to realize their core obligations, it is pertinent that one should not simply
consider their national resources, but as well resources they obtain from international
assistance.315
At the May 2000 Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights session
Paul Hunt noted: “if the Committee decided to approve the list of core obligations, it
would be unfair not to insist also that richer countries fulfill their obligations relating to
international cooperation under article 2, paragraph 1, of the Covenant. The two sets of
obligations should be seen as two halves of a package.”316 It is important to note that if
the right to health is considered meaningless without the achievement of at the minimum
its core content, and if some countries lack resources required to achieve the core content
of the right to health, then the right to health itself cannot exist in the absence of
international obligations to provide assistance.317 Ooms and Hammonds argue that
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“Without international obligations to provide assistance – without global responsibility,
that is – the right to health is not a right but a privilege reserved for those who are born
outside of the world’s poorest countries.”318 However, it would not be misunderstood that
such global responsibility does not imply that low-income countries have an
unconditional and unlimited claim to international assistance in order to achieve the core
content of the right to health.319 Philip Alston succinctly writes, “The correlative
obligation would, of course, be confined to situations in which a developing country had
demonstrated its best efforts to meet the (Millennium Development) Goals and its
inability to do so because of a lack of financial resources.”320 Although, Alston makes
reference to Millennium Development Goals, instead of core content of socioeconomic
human rights, there is a contention that the same argument can as well be made for the
achievement of the core content of socioeconomic human rights.321 Therefore, any claim
to international assistance would be contingent on countries that show their best
efforts.322
Ooms and Hammonds further contend that “a claim to international assistance
would not only be conditional, but also limited.323 Article 2, paragraph 1 of the ICESCR
endorses both domestic obligations and international obligations of assistance but doesn’t
show clearly the difference between both. If international obligations of assistance result
only when domestic obligations have been entirely realized, actually they would never
result because the right to health is a dynamic goal and the fact is that “the highest
attainable standard of physical and mental health” would never be fully realized. In this
context, high-income countries could incessantly contest international obligations of
assistance, alluding to their domestic obligations. The concept of core content actually
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dictates a hierarchy which stresses that it is more pressing to achieve the minimum
essential standard of health for all humans, in the absence of which the right to health
itself becomes meaningless, than to strive for the very highest attainable standard of
health within the domestic setting. The hierarchy would cease to exist as soon as the
minimum essential standard of health were achieved everywhere. At that moment, in
consonant with the concept of core content, affluent countries could appeal to the
primacy of domestic obligations to contend a change from offering international
assistance to give preference alternatively to the highest attainable standard in domestic
setting.324 Ooms and Hammonds argue that “interpreting the core content of the right in
this way would also provide for the possibility of a sliding scale of responsibility, one
that falls between exclusively national responsibility and wholly global responsibility.” 325
The combination of national and global responsibilities in realizing the right to health in
poor developing nations establishes the context for a sliding scale of responsibility which
is discussed next.

E.3. The Sliding Scale of National and Global Responsibilities for the Realization of the
Minimum Level of the Right to Health.
A general consensus on making necessary efforts to guarantee for everyone
globally the core components of the right to health, makes it imperative to examine the
costs involved and how those costs should be allocated between the various nations and
the international community, and among those nations that are well positioned to
assist.326 Eide however acknowledges the difficulty associated with the calculation of
costs for numerous reasons. There is currently a prevalent recognition of the social
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determinants of health, which implies that convincing efforts towards global health must
take into consideration factors that are frequently not incorporated in the calculation of
health expenditure.327
The rough calculation by the Commission on Macroeconomics of Health deduced
that the minimum expenditure obligation within the health sector narrowly explained
would come to US$ 40. These rough calculations are currently about ten years old and
the amount would have to be likely increased. The calculations simply incorporated the
expenditures on health within the health sector narrowly defined, and thus did not
encompass the costs of guaranteeing access to preconditions of health.328
Critics including Ooms indicated that the calculations provided by the
Commission on the Macroeconomics of Health were seriously flawed.329 Ooms however
endorses that the figures provided by the Commission may be helpful as a point of
departure for reflections on how the costs, narrowly restricted to the health sector, could
be allocated as well as a recognition that many developing countries could not realize the
core content of right to health for their citizens without foreign assistance.330 In
consonant with this perspective, Ooms and Hammonds proposed the creation of a Global
Health Fund, in line with the current Global Fund to fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and
Malaria which will be extensively discussed in the next part of the chapter.
As a basis for the sliding scale of national and global responsibilities for the
realization of the minimum level of the right to health, Ooms and Hammonds made some
critical proposals in relation to the costs of core obligations for global health justice. First,
they assume that achieving the content of the right to health would require that
governments must be able to spend at least US$40 per person per year on health-related
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goods recognized by WHO as essential for an “adequate package of healthcare
interventions” (taking into account an adjustment for inflation).331 Second, they also
assume that government revenue, with the exclusion of grants could reach the target of
20% of GDP in low-income countries.332
The sliding scale paradigm proposed by Ooms and Hammonds requires each
country to spend at least 3% of average Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per person on
health related goods distribution. The 3% approach to GDP refers to a benchmark for
spending on national health by developing countries that would qualify them to receive
global assistance. Each developing country would need to spend 3% of its GDP in order
to show that it has exhausted its efforts and resources in realizing the core content of the
right to health.333 This 3% approach to GDP is worth US$40 per person per year as
proposed by the World Health Organization. They proposed using GDP per capita as the
starting foundation for allocation and then calculating the domestic responsibility as well
as global responsibility that would be required to fulfill the target of US$40 per person.
For example, an identified country has a GDP per person of US$333 and is supposed to
be able to spend 3% of this amount, or US$10 per person per year, on health-related
goods distribution. Then, the global responsibility towards the identified country is
restricted to guaranteeing that it can realize the distribution of health-related goods valued
at US$40 per person per year, presuming that this level of financing is what it entails to
achieve the core content of the right to health, or the equivalent of US$30 per person per
year.334 The implication is that if a country can only afford US$10 per person as its
national responsibility, then evidently the global responsibility towards the country is
US$30.
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Based on their calculation, the amount required for funding the cost of global
responsibility for the right to health, or the cost of obligations of global health justice is
estimated at US$50 billion per year. This is an estimate of the amount of assistance that
would be required by about 59 low-income and lower-middle-income countries with a
population of 2.5 billion. The 66 countries classified by the World Bank as high-income
countries have a collective GDP of US$43 trillion in 2008, and US$26 trillion in 2000. It
is projected that they will reach a collective GDP of US$49 trillion in a moment, despite
setbacks from global financial crisis. It implies then that to discharge their global
responsibility, affluent countries would need to allot just about 0.1% of their GDP to
international assistance for health.335 This is considered “a modest share of their
wealth.”336 It is pertinent to note that as a result of the revised assessment by WHO ten
years following the Commission’s report, from US$40 to US$44, the total amount would
be accordingly higher.337
Eide contends that the figures demonstrate that it should be feasible for the global
community constituting primarily the high-income countries to provide the funds needed
to supplement the resources of poor nations, in order that the minimum core of the right
to health can be guaranteed globally.338 He further calls for significant efforts “to
establish the institutions and the procedures necessitate determining the scope of
contributions, the allocation between donors, and the supervision of compliance both by
the home state and by the external contributors.”339 The analysis further deals with an
explanation of how a Global Health Fund can be established and operated in order to
affirm the feasibility of the Global Health paradigm for improving affordable access to
drugs.
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F. Global Health Fund and Affordable Access to Drugs
The critical need for an international agency for the distribution of health-related
goods that would rectify the injustice arising from the current global system has been
forcefully argued by Ooms and Hammonds.340 This global basic institution that may
govern the distribution of health-related goods in a fair approach could take a number of
forms. Ooms and Hammonds suggest two different forms: a Framework Convention on
Global Health proposed by Lawrence Gostin341 and a Global Health Fund proposed by
Gorik Ooms and Rachel Hammonds.342 This implies that some type of conventional
global institution is imperative for enforcing “the interactive and practical applications of
national and global responsibility.”343 A Global health fund in line with the current
Global Fund to fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria is viewed as one way to effectively
handle an agreement between most of the countries on critical parameters regarding
realizing the core content of the right to health which involves improved access to
essential drugs. A more detailed discussion on the Global Health Fund and affordable
access to drugs begins with addressing impeding factors to the Global Health Fund.

F.1. Addressing Impeding Factors to the Global Health Fund
The international community was pressured by AIDS activists to establish the
Global Fund to fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria, which when examined from a
human rights framework is nothing except a tool for conformity to the transnational
obligation to realize a critical component of the core content of the right to health. The
existence of the Global Fund applied more pressure on governments of countries in need
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of assistance to develop AIDS intervention plans and on government of countries well
positioned to assist to offer the required assistance.344 It established entitlements for
individual countries and to a reasonable extent the “equitable contributions framework”
already alluded to, that is, duties for individual countries.345
It is almost an impossible mission to realize progress in the fight against a single
disease or even three diseases without effectively tackling the weakness of the public
health systems in developing countries.346 Ooms and Hammonds argue that “to address
this fundamental problem the world needs a Global Fund to fight poor health, including
AIDS treatment but not excluding other essential health care, or a Global Health Fund to
realise the core content of the right to health.”347
The approach utilized by the Global Fund involves a serious limitation. It
primarily concentrates on deadly diseases in Sub-Saharan Africa such as AIDS,
tuberculosis and Malaria and supports simply interventions to deal with those diseases.
This situation does not create any problem for most middle-income countries which can
fund their public health systems from domestic resources. Nevertheless, the same
situation which is Global Fund’s limitation creates a significant problem for low-income
countries which results in a two-tier system: the fight against AIDS, tuberculosis and
malaria is not impeded by the limitation of financial self-sufficiency, while the fight for
primary health care in general is.348 Ooms contends that “the result is the current
paradox; international health aid to strengthen the backbone of the health systems is
much harder to find (because of the financial self-sufficiency restriction) than
international health aid for extra muscle to fight AIDS, tuberculosis or malaria.”349
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This two-tier system has engendered an increasing difference between adequately
funded muscle to fight AIDS, tuberculosis and malaria, and heavily under-funded
backbone of the health systems.350 Global Fund has been criticized on this ground. Roger
England argued that “HIV is receiving relatively too much money, with much of it used
inefficiently and sometimes counterproductively.”351 He further raises objections to the
cost-effectiveness of HIV interventions and calls for utilizing money intended for HIV
interventions for other health needs.352 He ends his argument with a passionate call for
transforming the Global Fund into a Global Health Fund. He writes “A global basket
fund is needed to transfer sustainable and predictable funding to countries, avoiding
hugely unpredictable aid flows from fickle donors that make planning impossible. The
Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria could abandon disease dedicated
support to become this fund... Improving health systems should form the platform for
action and research now, transcending HIV and other disease-specific programmes.”353
It is pertinent to note that while most critiques essentially faults the Global Fund
for having a very restricted mandate, none of them faults the conventional health
development approach and its aim of self-sufficiency, which is actually the crux of the
problem. These critiques are apparently condemning the Global Fund for the favorable
outcomes of its exceptional approach partly because they prefer this exceptional approach
to be employed for primary health care generally.354 Ooms further contends that they
should be pressing for expanding the Global Fund mandate rather than preoccupying
themselves with condemning its success.355 The Global Fund is counteracting these
critiques by assuming or reestablishing its responsibility in funding the backbone of
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health systems. However, this would involve more funding, which would invariably just
occur if donor countries entirely support an expanded mandate for the Global Fund.356
The IMF application of the concept of fiscal space to health financing in
developing countries was very detrimental to Global Health Fund. Peter Heller from the
IMF defines fiscal space as “room in a government’s budget that allows it to provide
resources for a desired purpose without jeopardizing the sustainability of its financial
position or the stability of the economy.”357 He claims that fiscal space is a more urgent
issue in developing countries than in developed countries or advanced economies due to
more urgent needs for expenditure currently. Nonetheless, longer-term issues are as well
included, still for lower-income countries, because of the need to guarantee that there
would be room to deal with unexpected challenges.358 Thus, he articulates “Countries that
receive significant flows of foreign resources for a specific sector (such as health care)
may, as a result of the associated expansion of the sector, face additional future spending
needs that may essentially preempt a share of the growth of future domestic budgetary
resources.”359
The IMF presumes that aid-driven health sector growth would unavoidably
forestall a share of domestic resources. It is not disposed to envisage that international
health aid could finance the growth of the health sector ultimately.360 Hence, it
incessantly warns countries against utilizing excessive international aid for broadening
the health sector, a warning also reiterated by the World Bank: “Obviously, then, it is not
prudent for countries to commit to permanent expenditures for such items as salaries for
nurses and doctors on the basis of uncertain financing flows from development assistance
funds.”361
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The IMF presses for its message about the unreliability of international solidarity
with the objective of scaring recipient governments regarding growing expenditures. It
carries out this by continuously reechoing the findings of Ales Bulir and A. Javier
Hamann who discovered that international aid is “substantially more volatile than
domestic revenues.”362 It vehemently refuses to pay attention to another pair of relevant
data on the issue by Paul Collier who discovered that international aid is, actually, more
reliable than domestic revenue363 and by Oya Celasun and Jan Walliser who discovered
that whereas international aid is to some extent less reliable than domestic revenue,
international aid deficits previously did not compel recipient countries to decrease
recurrent expenditure, as these deficits were compensated by decreased investments.364
A report published in March 2007 by the Independent Evaluation Office of the
IMF showed that only 27% of the extra international aid to sub-Saharan Africa from 1999
to 2006 was in fact permitted or authorized to be spent.365 The remaining 73% was placed
in savings. This practice permits the IMF to impose conformity to fiscal space
constraints: whenever a country is in danger of going beyond fiscal space, the IMF can
program international aid to be saved by the recipient nation rather than being spent, for
instance, to broaden health services to vulnerable populations. This obviously falls short
of an incentive for donors to grow international aid.366
Pertinent to note also is that the global AIDS response discovered a breakthrough
strategy at the intersection of the medical relief and health development paradigms.
International aid in the type of medical relief is not impeded by fiscal space
constraints.367 This issue may have prompted Peter Piot, the former general director of
the United Nations Joint AIDS Programme (UNAIDS), to clearly compare countries
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affected by AIDS with countries in or emerging from conflict, when he requested for a
general exception for AIDS expenditure from fiscal space constraints.368
Nevertheless, the unreliability of international aid over a long period of time
constitutes a problem. It is hard for health ministries of various low-income countries to
commit to long-term salaries for more health workers, for instance, if those commitments
are simply supported by short-term international health aid commitments. On the other
hand, the practice of fiscal space austerity establishes a vicious circle: it is defended by
the unreliability of international aid over a long period of time; it engenders international
aid being saved instead of being spent, hence generating frustrations for donors who do
not observe the expected outcomes; which results in a feeling that “all that aid is not
helping anyhow” and hence increases the unreliability of international aid.369
It has been forcefully argued by Ooms that “a Global Health paradigm – in the
sense of a globally shared responsibility for the health of all people – would solve this
problem, or turn it into a merely technical matter.”370 Some technical solutions are
already in place in order to address the issue of the unpredictability and unreliability of
international health aid: the “replenishments” of the International Development
Association (IDA) – as well known as the soft loan arm of the World Bank – are
grounded on the principle of burden-sharing between affluent countries,371 and at least
some of those countries regard them as mandatory.372 Ooms contends that “if we would
copy this practice of burden-sharing and mandatory contributions to the financing of
primary health care in low-income countries, we would not need to place limits on
increases in recurrent health expenditure in low-income countries that are funded by
increased international health aid.”373 Despite these impeding factors, a Global Health
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Fund that effectively discharges its functions would enhance the realization of the core
content of the right to health including affordable access to essential drugs which is
discussed next.

F.2. Functions of Global Health Fund
First of all, a Global Health Fund would establish a convention that extensively
outlines the scope of national and global responsibilities for all the nations involved. It
would pool and monitor contributions from high-income nations and redistribute to lowincome nations that need assistance in realizing the right to health which includes
affordable access to drugs.374
Furthermore, a Global Health Fund would work out a burden-sharing mechanism
between all high-income nations. The level of the contribution for each nation would
reflect the nation’s capacity based on the relative wealth of its economy. The solidarity of
all high-income countries would have to continue, if they accept mutual accountability
for the health compacts they assisted in endorsing.375
A Global Health fund would have to recognize that the primary responsibility for
achieving the right to health lies with the state. It would have to establish a double
benchmark for domestic contribution to health care that can be required from developing
nations. One benchmark would focus on the amount of domestic resources a developing
nation can adequately mobilize for government expenditure. A second benchmark would
focus on the amount of domestic resources a developing nation can adequately allot to
health care, which includes affordable access to drugs.376 These benchmarks without
much emphasis on the details and the figures represent a method, not exact estimates. The
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figures simply need to be adequately pragmatic to show the feasibility of a Global Health
Fund, as “a method to transpose collective entitlements and duties into individual states’
entitlements and duties, and not to provide precise estimates.”377
To make a pragmatic proposal for the first bench-mark involves examining
current levels of government revenue with the exclusion of grants in low-income
countries of Sub-Saharan Africa, as roughly calculated by IMF in its October 2007
Regional Economic Outlook report for Sub-Saharan Africa.378 These countries succeeded
in increasing government revenue with the exclusion of grants from 15.6 per cent of GDP
in 2003 to 17.8 per cent of GDP in 2008. This is obviously an increase of 0.44 percent of
GDP per year. It is projected that progressing at this rate, by 2015, government revenue
with the exclusion of grants might be 20 per cent.379
Regarding the second benchmark, allocating 15% of government revenue to
health care could be established as condition for international aid for developing
nations.380 This idea coincides with the pledge made by African Heads of state and
government in the 2001 Abuja Declaration.381 Ooms remarks that “this idea may sound
like “patronising conditionality”, but it should be understood as “emancipating
conditionality”: a human rights approach, considering both national and international
responsibilities and duties, or simply mutual accountability.”382 Combining these two
benchmarks results in a general benchmark which requires low-income countries to
mobilize and allot 3% of their GDP to healthcare in order to demonstrate that they have
made their best efforts to achieve the core content of the right to health.383
A Global Health Fund would involve civil society as a watchdog to detect and
fight corruption and misuse of funding disbursed to developing nations.384 The success of
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a Global Health Fund would considerably be contingent on the involvement of civil
society. Civil society will play a critical role in pressuring low-income countries’
governments to allot the equivalent of 3% of their GDP to health. Civil society will as
well play a significant role in guaranteeing that the increased health expenditure is
utilized judiciously; that is primarily for broadening essential healthcare to remote rural
districts and not simply for additional, exorbitant and non-accessible health services in
low-income countries’ capitals.385
On the other hand, civil society would assume the responsibility of ensuring that
the Global Health Fund receives adequate funding to finance the approved proposals. It
would launch campaigns to push high-income countries’ governments to increase their
contributions during every replenishment cycle.386 Ooms aptly describes this as “a rare
example of mutual accountability at the level of civil society: civil society of the “Global
North” mobilising to generate the international health aid needed; civil society of the
“Global South” mobilising to generate increased domestic health financing and to make
sure that all health financing is well spent.”387
A Global Health Fund rooted in the new concept of financial sustainability would
result in a considerable increase in international health aid.388 Ooms argues that “it would
also change the nature of international aid for health: it would change from temporary to
ongoing and from charity to a collective obligation corresponding to a collective
entitlement, or a global dimension to social protection.”389 The sustained domestic and
international financial support through a Global Health Fund would help in realizing the
right to health including affordable access to anti-retroviral drugs for developing nations.
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G. Conclusion
Concluding remarks on this chapter focuses on a summary of a proposed
paradigm of global health justice which emphasizes a sliding scale of national and global
responsibilities in realizing the core content of the right to health, including affordable
access to anti-retroviral drugs. Essentially, improved global health governance was
considered a desideratum for global health. There was a consensus that health is a shared
responsibility especially in relation to affordable access to essential health services and
collective defense against transnational threats, including communicable diseases. Hence,
it was forcefully argued that the responsibility for guaranteeing the right to health for all
does not rest exclusively with states and their obligations to their populations, but as well
with the global community.
It was argued using Daniels’ works that Rawls’s and Pogge’s approaches for
global health were insufficient. Rawls’s statist version of relational justice narrowly
stresses the national responsibility of each country to realize the right to health of all its
citizens and effectively excludes the global responsibility of individual nations. In
contrast, Pogge’s cosmopolitan approach concentrates too much on global responsibility
without adequate focus on the national responsibility of individual nations. Daniels
criticizes the two extreme positions of Rawls and Pogge and advocated for a middle
ground that resists the pull of the two opposing alternatives. Hence, the proposed
paradigm combines these two approaches by espousing their strengths and avoiding their
weaknesses. The paradigm refers to a sliding scale of national and global responsibilities
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concerning the right to health in general and affordable access to drugs in particular. This
combined approach emphasizes that global responsibility supplements rather than
replaces national responsibility for health.
From this perspective, it was argued that the primary responsibility for realizing
the right to health rests with every nation. However, cognizant that most developing
countries are too poor and that they could exhaust their domestic resources without still
able to realize the right to health of their citizens, affluent countries can intervene to
exercise their global responsibility as a secondary responsibility for the realization of the
right to health.
The justification of the focus on government programs to address the issue of
affordable access to anti-retroviral drugs for participants and host populations rather than
requiring multinational pharmaceutical companies to fund the cost of these programs was
extensively discussed. The duty to promote global justice justifies broad collaboration of
all stakeholders involved in the clinical research, including researchers, sponsors,
governments of the host country, governments of affluent countries and international
governmental and non-governmental aid agencies to provide anti-retroviral drugs to
participants and host populations at the conclusion of the clinical research. The reference
to available resources through international cooperation and assistance buttressed that
developed countries have obligations of international assistance for access to essential
drugs, including anti-retroviral drugs to participants and host populations.
The obligations of researchers and sponsors to participants and host populations
was argued to be transferable in the form of building healthcare infrastructure,
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contributing health care and research equipments, training local health care workers,
researchers and members of the research ethics committee, and providing basic health
services. Three different approaches for sharing benefits of clinical research with
participants and host populations were discussed in conjunction with their shortcomings,
including the reasonable availability requirement, the fair benefits framework and the
human development approach.
The four critical challenges of global health were discussed consisting of
explaining essential health services and goods, elucidating government’s obligations to
their country’s populations, investigating the responsibilities of all governments towards
the global poor and introducing a global structure to enhance health as a matter of social
justice. It was discussed that the focus of the Joint Action and Learning Initiative (JALI)
was on establishing post Millennium Development Goal (MDG) framework for global
health which is rooted in the right to health and intended for obtaining universal health
coverage for all people.
It was further strongly argued that there is a global responsibility for global health
and that there are obligations of justice to realize the right to health in other nations due
to increasing wealth inequality between nations which has considerable direct impact on
health inequity. A direct correlation between wealth inequalities and health inequalities
between nations was also defended. The increasing inter-country inequality was
attributed to several factors, including the long lasting effects of slavery and colonization,
unfair trade agreements negotiated by rich countries and illicit financial flows from poor
to rich countries. The inequalities on the global level impede the ability of poor countries
to buy and distribute health-related goods for their citizens.
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The global capacity to redress health inequalities was discussed, consisting of the
health development paradigm, the medical relief paradigm and the new global health
paradigm. The health development paradigm focuses on sustainable interventions that
lead to self-sufficiency. The medical relief paradigm concentrates on responding to
severe health crises in order to assist those perceived as suffering. It was argued that due
to the generally unending nature of crises in the contemporary era as in the case of
HIV/AIDS epidemics, that medical relief would require some kind of sustainability in the
sense of sustained international aid as an alternative type of sustainability different from
self-sufficiency. The health development paradigm and the medical relief paradigm were
argued as not sufficiently designed to effectively redress global inequalities, and thus the
need to introduce a global health paradigm was imperative. The global health paradigm
evolved from the global AIDS response and is at the intersection of health development
paradigm and medical relief paradigm. The new concept of sustainability introduced by
the global health paradigm entails sustainability at the international level, relying on
sustained international support as well as on domestic resources.
International human rights law was argued as a foundation for global health
justice and global health paradigm. International human rights law was defended as
providing a theoretical framework for national and global responsibilities for realizing the
core obligations that arise from socio-economic human rights and for addressing global
health inequalities. The critical role of the principle of core obligation and the obligation
to provide international assistance in realizing the core content of the right to health and
consequently engendering obligation of global health justice was emphasized. The
progressive realization of the right to health was recognized which establishes the need to
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realize at least the minimum essential level of the right to health without delay. It was
emphasized that without international obligations to provide assistance as well as without
global responsibility, the right to health would simply be a privilege meant for the
affluent. Any claim to international assistance would be based on countries that showed
their best efforts.
The combination of national and global responsibilities in realizing the right to
health in poor developing countries establishes the context for a sliding scale of
responsibility.

The sliding scale paradigm requires each developing country to spend

at least 3% of average Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per person on health related goods
distribution. The 3% approach to GDP alludes to a benchmark for spending on national
health by developing countries that would qualify them to receive global assistance. This
3% approach to GDP is worth US $40 per person per year as proposed by the World
Health Organization. If a country can only afford US $10 per person per year as its
national responsibility, then, the global responsibility towards the country is US $30 per
person per year. A projected estimate for funding the cost of global responsibility for the
right to health, or the cost of obligations of global health justice was US$50 billion per
year.
There was a consensus for a crucial need for an international agency such as
Global Health Fund for the distribution of health-related goods that would rectify the
injustice stemming from the current global system. The existing Global Fund to fight
AIDS, tuberculosis and malaria was viewed as a prototype, but required expansion of its
current mandate in order to include interventions for other diseases as well as addressing
the weakness of the public health systems in developing countries. It was argued that the
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Global Health Fund would be designed to effectively fight for primary health care and to
realize the core content of the right to health, including affordable access to essential
drugs. The fiscal space constraints imposed on low-income countries by IMF due to the
unreliability of the international aid was seen as detrimental to their public health systems
and invariably to the proposed Global Health Fund. Several critical functions of the
Global Health Fund were discussed, including working out burden-sharing mechanisms,
pooling, monitoring and redistributing contributions, establishing a double benchmark for
domestic contribution to health care and involving the civil society as a watchdog in
order to detect and fight corruption and misuse of funding disbursed to developing
countries. A well constituted and efficiently operated Global Health Fund rooted in the
new concept of financial sustainability would enhance the realization of right to health
and affordable access to drugs, including anti-retroviral drugs in developing countries. A
brief summary of the entire debate on the ethical justification of post-trial access to antiretroviral drugs for participants and host populations in developing country anchored on
the Universal Declaration on Bioethics and Human Rights which links human rights and
bioethics, and emphasizes the principles of human dignity, human rights and
fundamental freedom in its efforts to promote responsible biomedical research and
clinical practice is discussed in the final chapter and the conclusion.
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CHAPTER SEVEN
CONCLUSION – Anchoring A Paradigm of Global Health Justice: A Sliding Scale of
National and Global Responsibilities on the UNESCO Universal Declaration on
Bioethics and Human Rights
The concluding reflections of this dissertation is anchored on the UNESCO
Universal Declaration on Bioethics and Human Rights, because the aim of the
Declaration coincides with the critical aspect of the dissertation which is guaranteeing the
protection of the participants and host populations of developing countries in clinical
research under the auspices of International Human Rights Law. The Declaration aims to
accomplish this singular objective by setting “global minimum standards in biomedical
research and clinical practice.”1 The Declaration, ipso facto, aims “to guide the actions of
individuals, groups, communities, institutions and corporations, public and private.”2
Most importantly, the Declaration prioritizes the principles of “human dignity, human
rights and fundamental freedoms” in its efforts to promote responsible biomedical
research and clinical practice. It further emphasizes the priority of the individual over
science or society.3
The dissertation extensively discussed an ethical justification for post-trial access
to anti-retroviral drugs for participants and host populations in developing countries
within the context of global justice, emphasizing the combination of national and global
responsibilities in realizing this objective. Drawing on the strengths of Rawls’ statist and
Pogge’s cosmopolitan theories and on the International Human Rights Law, the
dissertation argued for a paradigm of Global Health Justice involving a sliding scale of
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national and global responsibilities for the realization of the right to health in general and
access to drugs in particular.
The dissertation began the discourse by identifying the ethical issues in global
health inequalities and global health research which established the context of the debate.
It highlighted the alarming ethical issue of global health inequalities between developed
and developing countries which was exacerbated by the advent and calamitous impact of
HIV/AIDS in developing countries, where many people living with HIV/AIDS lacked
access to anti-retroviral drugs.
The dissertation also acknowledged the critical role of two major ethical issues,
including distributive justice and responsiveness of research to the needs and priorities of
host populations in evaluating the ethical justification of any global health research
especially in developing countries.
The dissertation also discussed the regulatory infrastructure and ethical oversight
of international clinical research which emphasizes the priority of safeguarding the rights
of research participants and host populations in the design and implementation of
research protocols. Obtaining voluntary informed consent from research participants and
thorough review of research protocols by well constituted and competent ethics review
committee were considered desiderata in conducting clinical trials in developing
countries.
Cultural and language barriers were acknowledged as critical challenges in
conducting clinical research in developing countries especially with regard to complying
with substantive ethical standard of voluntary informed consent, but were not justified as
grounds for deviating from it. On the other hand, the Declaration acknowledges the
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significance of “cultural diversity” and “pluralism” but emphasizes that “such
considerations are not to be invoked to infringe upon human dignity, human rights and
fundamental freedoms ….”4 Researchers and sponsors from developed countries were
encouraged in the dissertation to respect the local culture and values of research
participants and host populations and to adapt standards of informed consent to the
cultural norms and practices of developing countries. A milestone which was realized
with the legal enforcement of informed consent was the elevation of the violation of
rights of research participants in developing countries by researchers and sponsors from
developed countries to crime against humanity. Capacity building and collaborative
partnership in the design and conduct of international clinical research were viewed as
crucial components for the successful completion of international clinical research.
The dissertation as well discussed the affordable access to drugs in developing
countries with emphasis on the compelling need and urgency for development of cheaper
generic versions of anti-retroviral drugs for fighting HIV/AIDS pandemic. The affordable
access to anti-retroviral drugs in developing countries was discussed within the broader
contexts of intellectual property law, international trade agreements and non-patent
factors. The tension between enforcement of strict patent protection and affordable access
to essential drugs, including anti-retroviral drugs for the poor people in developing
countries was recognized. A discussion on the analysis of the issue of affordable access
to drugs established that both patent and non-patent factors adversely impede access to
affordable HIV/AIDS drugs in developing countries.
The severe impact of international trade agreements currently negotiated by
United States, which further exacerbate impeded access to anti-retroviral drugs for people
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in developing countries was clearly acknowledged. Two key aspects of TRIPs agreement
were discussed, including strict patent protection in order to promote incentives for
innovation and promotion of public health interests, and maintaining a delicate balance
between them was considered imperative. Compulsory licensing and parallel importation
that authorize countries to manufacture and import generic versions of patented drugs
respectively in order to address national health crises like HIV/AIDS were encouraged.
Some current strategies for addressing the issue of affordable access to antiretroviral drugs for developing countries were discussed, including private donations,
price reductions and differential pricing, international collaborative initiatives and publicprivate partnerships and compulsory licensing. Private donations and price reductions
were viewed as improved solutions that are not effective and sustainable.
The dissertation also discussed Rawls’s statist approach in dealing with the issue
of post-trial access to anti-retroviral drugs in developing countries especially for trial
participants and host populations. Rawls’s two different approaches to justice both in the
domestic and in the international arena were discussed. His account of domestic justice is
known as justice as fairness emphasizing the idea that fundamental agreements of the
parties to the original position are fair. The idea of the basic structure of the society
which applies to a well-ordered society was considered fundamental because it is the
primary subject of justice. The principles of justice as fairness were discussed, including
equal liberty principle, difference principle and fair equality of opportunity principle.
Daniels’s extension of Rawls’s theory of justice to health care in the domestic
society was discussed. He argued that health care institutions should be regulated by fair
equality of opportunity principle, since meeting health care needs has a significant impact

464

on the distribution of opportunity. He further contended that fulfilling health care needs
protects people’s normal opportunity range and helps them to maintain or restore normal
species-typical functioning.
Rawls’ statist approach discussed the two aspects of Rawls’s account of
international relations and international justice, including ideal theory and non-ideal
theory. The ideal theory focuses on how the laws of peoples should regulate the political
relations among liberal and decent hierarchical peoples. The non-ideal theory focuses on
burdened societies that lack basic resources to become well-ordered. Rawls argued that
well-ordered societies have a duty of assistance to burdened societies in order to help
them attain required level of economic and political developments to become wellordered. His account of global justice lacks a commitment to principles of distributive
justice, because according to him such principles would be redundant and would produce
unacceptable results. He argued further that they often lacked a clear target and a cutoff
point.
The dissertation explored three arguments in analyzing Rawls’s duty of assistance
and access to anti-retroviral drugs, including argument based on Rawls’s defense of
human rights, argument based on redress for the unjustified distributive effects of
cooperative organizations and argument based on access to drugs as a transition strategy
favoring the establishment of politically well-ordered nations. The argument based on
Rawls’s defense of human rights did not go through because of his minimal and ad hoc
account of human rights. Concerning the argument based on redressing the unjustified
distributive effects of cooperative organizations, there was a consensus that interventions
for providing affordable access to essential drugs, including anti-retroviral drugs for
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developing countries would constitute logical approaches for redress. The argument
based on access to drugs as a transition strategy that favors the establishment of
politically well-ordered nations was justified. More so, it was argued that improving
access to drugs would help as an effective transition strategy that would enable burdened
societies to become politically well-ordered.
The dissertation in contrast also discussed Pogge’s cosmopolitan approach which
is a more robust and expansive international perspective to global justice for providing
affordable access to anti-retroviral drugs for participants and host populations in
developing countries. He forcefully argued for a stronger interpretation of global
responsibilities grounded on human rights for providing affordable access to antiretroviral drugs for participants and host populations in developing countries.
Pogge’s challenge of Rawls’s thesis of explanatory nationalism which appeals to
domestic factors as engendering persistent severe poverty and global inequality was
discussed. He insisted that global factors perpetuate severe poverty and global inequality
and urged moral responsibility on the part of affluent countries to redress this alarming
situation. He contended that unjust global institutional order imposed on the global poor
perpetuates harm and consequently violates their negative rights. He further argued that
citizens of affluent countries have not merely positive duties to assist, but also more
stringent negative duties not to harm the global poor.
The current rules for incentivizing pharmaceutical research were discussed. The
current globalized patent system was argued as an institutional failure, because the
TRIPS agreement and the TRIPS-plus provisions significantly impede affordable access
to essential drugs, including anti-retroviral drugs for the global poor in developing
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countries. Seven major problems of the current globalized patent regime were identified
and discussed, comprising high prices, neglect of diseases concentrated among the poor,
bias towards maintenance drugs, wastefulness, counterfeiting, excessive marketing and
last-mile problem.
The dissertation also discussed Pogge’s proposed new rules for reforming and
incentivizing pharmaceutical research in response to the problems engendered by the
current system. He proposed two basic reform strategies for addressing the monopoly
pricing issues and for improving access to essential drugs, including the differential
pricing strategy and the public good strategy. Differential pricing and compulsory
licensing were argued as inadequate in resolving the disadvantages of the current patent
system. The public good strategy was defended as more promising in engendering a
reform plan that would prevent the major disadvantages of the current monopoly patent
regime, while at the same time, preserving most of its important benefits. The three
critical components of public good strategy were discussed, including open access,
alternative incentives, and funding.
The HIF was discussed as a global institution for the effective implementation of
Pogge’s new plan for reforming and incentivizing research and innovation. The HIF’s
significant structural reform of the current globalized patent system was discussed.
Additionally, the HIF’s systematic solution to seven disadvantages of the current
globalized scheme was discussed. Some key objections by some authors were also
discussed.
The dissertation finally discussed a proposed paradigm of global health justice
which emphasizes a sliding scale of national and global responsibilities in realizing the
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core content of the right to health, including affordable access to anti-retroviral drugs.
Improved global health governance was essentially considered a desideratum for global
health. There was a consensus that health is a shared responsibility especially in relation
to affordable access to essential health services and collective defense against
transnational threats, including communicable diseases. Hence, it was forcefully argued
that the responsibility for guaranteeing the right to health for all does not rest exclusively
with the states and their obligations to their populations, but as well with the global
community. The Declaration recognizes and encourages “solidarity among human beings
and international cooperation”5 at the global level in tackling global challenges.
It was argued using Daniels’ works that Rawls’s and Pogge’s approaches for
global health justice were insufficient. Rawls’s statist version of relational justice
narrowly stresses the national responsibility of each country to realize the right to health
of all its citizens and effectively excludes the global responsibility of individual nations.
Conversely, Pogge’s cosmopolitan approach focuses too much on global responsibility
without adequate attention to the national responsibility of individual nations. A middle
ground that resists the pull of the two opposing alternatives of Rawls’s and Pogge’s
extreme positions was advocated for by Daniels. Therefore, the proposed paradigm
combines these two approaches by espousing their strengths and avoiding their
weaknesses. The paradigm refers to a sliding scale of national and global responsibilities
concerning the right to health, including affordable access to anti-retroviral drugs. The
sliding scale paradigm requires each developing country to spend 3% of its GDP on
national health in order to qualify to receive global assistance. This combined approach
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emphasizes that global responsibility supplements rather than replaces national
responsibility for health.
The dissertation also discussed its justification of the focus on government
programs to address the issue of affordable access to anti-retroviral drugs for participants
and host populations. The obligations of researchers and sponsors to participants and host
populations were argued to be transferable. The global capacity to redress health
inequalities was discussed, comprising the health development paradigm, the medical
relief paradigm and the new global health paradigm.
International human rights law was argued as a foundation for global health
justice and global health paradigm. International human rights law was also defended as
providing a theoretical framework for national and global responsibilities for realizing the
core obligations that arise from socio-economic human rights and for addressing global
health inequalities. The critical role of the principle of core obligation and the obligation
to provide international assistance in realizing the core content of the right to health and
consequently engendering obligation of global health justice was emphasized.
A consensus for a crucial need for an international agency such as Global Health
Fund for the distribution of health-related goods that would rectify the injustice stemming
from the current global system was discussed. Expanding the mandate of the current
Global Fund in order to include interventions for other diseases as well as addressing the
weakness of the public health systems in developing countries was argued as a good start
for establishing the Global Health Fund. An effective Global Health Fund rooted in the
new concept of financial sustainability would significantly improve the realization of
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right to health and affordable access to drugs, including anti-retroviral drugs in
developing countries.
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